STUDIES

IN THE

HISTORY OF SANSKRIT POETICS

HY

SUSHIL KUMAR DE M. A., D. LITT., READER AT THE UNIVERSITY OF DACCA

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

1925

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RAMA VARMA RESENCE MISTITUTE, TRICHUR COCHIN STATE



HISTORY OF SANSKRIT POETICS

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
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RAMA VARMA RESEARCH HISTITUTE, TRICHUR, COCHIN STATE.

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VOLUME II SYSTEMS AND THEORIES



RAMA VARMA DECEADON MICTITUTE. TRICHUR, COCHIN STATE.

TO

DR. L. D. BARNETT



PREFACE

Circumstances beyond my control have somewhat delayed the publication of this volume. Apart from the delay due to my remoteness from the place of printing, I could devote to it such time as could be spared from more regular duties; but in the interest of the work itself, I should have been glad if the delay had been longer and given me an opportunity of making it fuller in some parts than it actually is.

An attempt was made in the first volume to settle a working Chronology and indicate the original Sources of Sanskrit Poeties; the present volume is concerned with the more difficult task of tracing the development of the Systems and Theories. While I could not ignore the content in investigating the growth of the discipline, I thought it more useful to lay stress on the essentials of the doctrines and omit minor details, my object having been more historical than expository. I could not, for instance, give in this volume a technical analysis of individual rhetorical "figures", with which the Alamkara-sastra is traditionally and popularly associated ; but I have dealt with the general doctrine of poetic figures, in so far as they are not mere tickets of nomenclature but positive agents in the production of stylistic beauty or aesthetic pleasure. The study of analytical rhetoric, apart from its value as a for mal discipline, may be regarded as pedantic and futile, but Sanskrit Alamkāra-sāstra possesses a speculative interest by involving, besides mere Rhetoric, a great deal of what is known as Criticism, Aesthetics or Poetics; for it was almost impossible for the Alamkārikas, concerned as they were with form and technique, not to busy themselves with the general phenomena of literature or theorise on general principles. My omission, again, of all consideration of such peculiar development of the rasa-theory as we find in Vaispava devotional works may be criticised, but my concern here is not with bhakti-rasa but with ālamkārika rasa, although I have referred in passing to this erotico-religious application of the theory in Rūpa Gosvāmin's Ujjvala-nIlamani.

For a similar reason of historical and general treatment, greater emphasis has been laid on the earlier writers who cover the more creative periods of the discipline; of later writers, who show in the main an excessive dependence on their predecessors, only typical names have been selected with a due regard to their historical as well as intrinsic It is hoped, however, that no importance. important writer or his work has been overlooked. The dramatic theories, the omission of which has already been explained in the preface to the first volume, form an allied but indeed a totally distinct subject, which is reserved for a more detailed treatment, if possible on a future occasion, than what could have been practicable within the limited scope of this work. In spite of these and other limitations, I venture to think that I have

been able to make out a case for (if not actually write) a history of Sanskrit Poetics, and apply, however tentatively, the historical method to an important but comparatively neglected branch of Sanskrit speculative literature.

I take this opportunity of thanking critics and reviewers who have accorded a generous welcome to the first volume, as well as make renewed acknowlegments to those scholars who have made helpful suggestions, among whom my special thanks are due to Prof. Jacobi, Dr. Barnett and Prof. Sovani, Some minor errors and misstatements in the first volume—inevitable where there are so many details—are corrected, and some new materials added, at the end of this volume.

Little did I expect when I had the privilege of associating the first volume of this modest work, on its dedication-page, with the name of Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, who took a personal interest in it from the beginning, that he would not live to see its completion. I cannot make an adequate acknowledgment of all that I owe to him, nor need I dwell here on the roll of his public services, so untimely closed; but I recall with gratitude and affection the debt which I, with many other students of this and past generations in Bengal, owe to this departed friend and patron of higher education and research in this country.

University of Dacca December 15, 1924.

S. K. De



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ABBREVIATIONS

(in addition to those used in Vol. 1)

HAL = Kane's History of Alamkara Literature, prefixed to his ed. of Sahitya-darpana, 2nd. ed. Bombay, 1923.

GIL = Winternitz's Geschichte der indischen Literatur, Vol. iii, Leipzig 1922.

BSOS = Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies, London:

I. FROM THE BEGINNINGS TO BHAMAHA

(1)

Of the unknown beginnings of Poetics as a discipline, our enquiry in the preceding volume has indicated that we can only make a few surmises, by implication, from the oldest surviving works on the subject, from stray references in general literature, from the elaboration of similar ideas in other disciplines, and from the fully developed kāvya-style which would warrant the pre-existence of some doctrines of Poetics regulating its art and usage.

Apart from such surmises, the sixteenth chapter of Bharata's Natya-sastra gives us for the first time an outline of Poetics which is probably earlier in substance, if not in date, than the earliest existing kavya. In this chapter, one meets with a developed dogma, if not a theory, of Poetics which enumerates four poetic figures (alamkāras), ten excellences (gunas), ten defects (dosas), and thirty-six characteristics (laksanas) of poetic composition. These apparently constituted the principal contents of the discipline as it existed at a very early period, which may be taken, in the absence of other data, as the first known period in the history of Sanskrit Poetics.

t See Vol. I pp. 1-22.

It is proper to note in this connexion that in the Natya-śastra, Bharata is principally concerned with Dramaturgy and allied topics2, and deals Poetics in so far as it applies to the theme in hand. In later poetic theories, Dramaturgy is taken as a part of the discipline of Poetics, and the drama is accordingly considered as a species of the kavya. But there are reasons to believe that in older times Dramaturgy and Poetics formed separate disciplines, the former being probably the earlier in point of time, as well as in substance. We have seen that the existence of nata-sutras, which were presumably works in the sutra-style on the histrionic art, was known even in the time of Panini; but there is no reference, direct or indirect, to such ulamkara-sutrus, and indeed the term Alamkara itself in the technical sense was unknown in early literature. The earliest surviving works on Poetics, on the other hand, do not include a treatment of the thome of Dramaturgy which, having been a study by itself, was possibly excluded from the sphere of Poetics proper. Both Bhamaha and Dandin, no doubt, speak of nataka as a species of kavya, but they refer to specialised treatises for its detailed treatment . Vämans, the next important writer on Poetics, shows indeed an

² An outline of the different chapters of Bharata's Natya-kāstra is given in Winternitz GIL ili pp. 7 f, in Kane HAL pp. vi-vii.

³ Vol. I p. 21.

⁴ Kanyildaréa i 31, Bhī mahilamkāra i 24. The word anyatra in Dandin is interpreted by the commentators as referring to Bharata.

unusual partiality towards the drama (1. 3. 30-32). but even he did not think it proper to devote any special attention to it. Among later writers, it is not until we come to the time of Hemacandra, Vidyanatha and Visvanatha, when the science was already entering upon a period of critical elaboration and summing-up of results, that we find special chapters dealing with the topic of Dramaturgy. Of these late writers, Vidyanatha and Visvanatha explicitly refer to and summarise the Dasarupaka, a recognised work on the dramatic art ; while the encyclopaedic Hemacandra, who professes a great admiration for Bharata and his commentator Abhinavagupta, deals with the subject rather summarily, referring the reader to the standard works of Bharata and Kohala.

It seems, therefore, that the school of Dramaturgy had an existence separate from the orthodox school of Poetics. It is thus not surprising that Bharata should set apart, as he does, a chapter of his work for dealing with the ornaments of Poetry, so far as they apply to the drama (nāṭakdēraya). In his discussion of the gunas and does in their application to the drama, he expressly designates them as kāṇya-gunas and kāṇya-donas (xvi 92, 84) respectively; and with reference to the alamkāras he says kāṇyasyaite hyalamkārāh (xvi 41) s, making it clear at

⁵ Cf also verses 104, 110. Bharata uses the word kāvya many times here, as in other chapters, to signify the drama, but we must bear in mind that his conception of poetry is dramatic and justifies such employment of the term kāvya. But in this chapter he appears to

the same time that he considers them only as embellishments of the dramatic speech.

Bharata opens this chapter on Poetics with the discussion of what he calls the lakeanas (lit. characteristics), which appear to be partly formal, partly material elements of poetry. But these elements appear so important to Bharata that he devotes a considerable part of this chapter to their definition, and the whole discipline appears to have received from them the designation of Kāvya-lakṣaṇa referred to in xvi 17?. It is not very clear from Bharata's treatment as to what position these lakṣaṇas should occupy in a formal scheme of Poetics; but the func-

imply a distinction between the karya and the nataka as species of composition.

⁶ The number of these laksanas, as given in verses 1-3 and dealt with in verses 5-40, is thirty-six; but in verse 4, the reading of the printed text (ed. Kauyamala) is radvimend etani which should be rattrimend etani, as also indicated by Abhinavagupta's reading and by Bharata himself in xv 167b. In the first three verses, which are defective in the printed text, read (as indicated by Abhinavagupta's commentary) cakearasamhati", sobhabhimanan, gundnuvado tikaya", akhyana-yachaparti, precha-dretanta. These emendations can also be gathered from Bharata's own treatment of the individual laksanas. These verses are also quoted from the Abhinava-bharatt by Raghavabhatta on Sakuntala. where the printed text (p 20, ed. N. S. P. 1922) requires similar emendations. Read also in Bharata xvi 6: yatralpair aksaraih klistair vicitrair upavarnitam.

⁷ See Vol. I p. 36, footnote 1.

tion of most of these is assigned in later Poetics to alankaras or gunas. Dandin mentions them summarily (ii 366) under alamkaras in the wider sense, along with sandhyanga and vrttyanga which belong properly to the drama, and refers to agamantara (interpreted by Tarunavacaspati as alluding to Bharata) for their treatment. So does Dhanañjaya (ed. s. s. p., iv 84); while Visvanatha (ed. Durgaprasada, vi 171-211, pp. 316-332) takes them in connexion with the drama, calling some of them natyalamkāra (dramatic embellishment), and is at the same time of opinion that although some of them are properly included under guna, alamkara, bhava and sandhi, they require a particular mention inasmuch as in the drama they are to be accomplished with some care (p. 332). In later literature, the laksanas, which linger conventionally in Dramaturgy, entirely disappear from Poetics proper. This phenomenon would probably indicate not only the fact that the laksanas were strictly proper to the drama, but also the conclusion that what were in the infancy of Poetics, considered so important as to deserve separate treatment and to be differentiated from the gunas and the alamkaras, were with the growth of critical insight, assigned to the gunas and alamkaras themselves, to whose sphere in ultimate analysis they were thought properly to belong 8.

⁸ For instance, āšīh is one of the lakṣaṇas of Bharata, Bhāmaha mentioning it rather doubtfully as an alaṃkāra with the remark: āšīr api ca keṣāṇcid alaṃkāratayā matā (iii 54). In Dandin ii 357 (as well as in Bhaṭṭi),

From lakṣaṇas Bharata goes on to the more interesting topic of kāvyālaṃkāras or poetic figures. It appears from his treatment that only four such poetic figures were known and recognised in his time, viz. upamā (simile), rāpaka (metaphor), dīpaka (lit. illuminator) and yamaka (repetition of words or syllables similar in sound). The upamā is subdivided into four kinds, according as the object compared (upamēya) or the standard of comparison (upamāna) is one or many!, Bharata expressly making use of these technical terms. From another standpoint, five varieties of upamā are distinguished and illustrated, viz. (1) praiaṃsūpamā (2) nindōpamā! (3)kalpitūpamā (4) sadrā upamā and (5) kimcitsadrā upamā¹, according as these qualifications

it is already established as an alamkana. It is significant that Kuntala finds fault with those who regard it as an alamkana.

g It is difficult to translate some of these terms, for there are no equivalents for them in European Rhetoric, and therefore attempts at such translation are as a general rule avoided here. The poetic figure dipaka may be generally explained as a figure in which two or more objects, some relevant and some irrelevant, having the same attributes, are associated together; or, in which several attributes, some relevant and some irrelevant, are predicated of the same object. It is called dipaka or the "illuminator" because it is like a lamp which, when employed for illuminating one object, illuminates others.

¹⁰ viz., (i) ekasya ekena (ii) chasya anekena (iii) anekasya ekena (iv) bahtinānı bahubhih.

II Read ninds ca instead of nitambs in the text

¹² Abhinavagupta notices the reading asadrii.

apply to the upomāna. Bharata is apparently unaware of the finer shades of distinction (grammatical or otherwise) introduced later on into the treatment of upama by Bhamaha, Dandin and Udbhata, or of its comprehensive definition given by Vamana; but the very fact that the idea of comparison was even by this time analysed thus far shows a considerable amount of speculation on this point18. Bharata's first two kinds, however, are criticised by Bhamaha (ii 37), but accepted by Dandin without question (ii 30-31); while the name, if not the idea, of the third kind lingers in Vamana IV. 2. 2. Of rapaka and dipakata no sub-varieties are mentioned, and possibly these were comparatively late inventions. Of yamaka, on the other hand, ten aub-species are elaborately defined and illustrated15, a number exceeding even that given by Bhamaha. It would appear that in the earlier stages of

¹³ This figure is certainly one of the most ancient, and the idea of it was not unknown to Yaska (see Vol. I pp. 5-6).

¹⁴ Nobel (lieitrnege sur aelteren Geschichte des Alamkäraiästra p. 10, lootnote 4) doubts if samprakirtitam,
which is unintelligible in the context, is the correct
reading in xvi 55. Abbinava's commentary on this
verse runs thus: nănă pe iabdintara-văkya-paditmanas
tenăm adhikara-wirthănăm ăiraye arth'aerthată (?) yenăm
tathābhūtānām rukkāinkyānām tenām ākānkyā-pūrakam kriyāguņa-jātyādi tad dipakam. In the light of this remark,
may not the emendation sampradipakam be likely?

¹⁵ Most of the names of these varieties have survived in Bhatti, Dandin and other writers; but they are in most cases differently defined. See Vol. I, p. 54 footnote 2.

Poetics, what in later authors is known as a sabdálamkāra (of which the artifices of yamaka in particular seem to have found the greatest favour) received a more elaborate treatment¹⁶, although the process repeats itself in comparatively modern decadent authors who delight in such external poetic devices. The later distinction between sabdálamkāra and arthálamkāra is not referred to by Bharata¹⁷, as

17 Abhinava, however, reads into Bharata such a distinction, and in his *Locano p. 5, he says: cirantanair

¹⁶ as in Bhatti, Dandin, Vamana, Rudrata, the Agnipurana and Bhoja among older authors. Bhamaha gives only five varieties, and Udbhata is the only old writer who altogether omits its treatment. This figure, as Bharata's elaborate treatment would show, must have been very early comprehended, e. g., in Ramayana, Sundarakāṇḍa v 15-17, in Rudradāman inscription of the 2nd century A. D. Possibly it was favoured as a not unlikely substitute for rhyme, which is nearly absent in earlier Sanskrit and which probably originated from anta-yamaka in later literature. But Mammata and later writers, following perhaps the dictum of Anandavardhana (on ii 16 f) that yamaka, in order to be really poetical, requires a special effort on the part of the poet, and is in no way accessory to rasa, allude to it but dismiss it in a few words. As critical insight into the aesthetic requirements of poetry grew, the number of such figures as depended for their appeal chiefly on clever verbal arrangement, as well as their treatment in Poetics, naturally dwindled, although vamaka itself (as well as anuprasa) played a much larger part in later decadent poetry. Bhoja, with an inaccuracy characteristic of later writers, speaks of tricks like murajabandha as having been bharatakathita !

also by Bhāmaha; but Bharata uses the word sabdābhyāsa with reference to yamaka, which term might have suggested, as Abhinava's commentary on this point indicates, the later classification, which is implied for the first time by Dandin's treatment.

After the alamkaras, comes the treatment of ten dosas (xvi 84f) and ten gugas (xvi 92f), which seem to have constituted the orthodox number of faults and excellences of poetic composition. We shall have occasion to deal with the doctrine of guna and does in connexion with the rui-theorists, who for the first time take it up seriously; but it may be pointed out here that Bharata's enumeration and definition of individual dosas and gunas do not exactly correspond to those of his nearest successors. Except keeping to the conventional number of ten (although Bhamsha introduces an eleventh fault from the standpoint of logical correctness18 and a list of ten intrinsic poetic faults in a different context, as he also mentions only three poetic excellences), both Bhamaha and Dandin do not appear to have accepted implicitly this part of Bharata's teaching.

The faults mentioned by Bharata are :

hi bharata-muni-prabhrtibhir yamak opame kabdarthálamkáratvenégte.

¹⁸ With the exception of the eleventh fault, Dandin is not only in complete agreement with Bhāmaha but really follows the latter's enumeration and definitions almost literally. This point will be discussed later. See also Vol. I p. 68.

 gūdhártha = circumlocution or periphrase (paryāya-šabdábhihitam¹),

ii. arthantara = digression into irrelevant matter

(aparnyasya parnanam 20).

iii. artha-hina = incoherence (asambaddha), or multiplicity of meaning (asesartha),

iv. bhinnartha = (a) rusticity or want of refinement (asabhya or grāmya), or (b) changing the desired sense by another sense (vivakṣito'nya evārtho yatrānyārthena bhidyate),

- This phrase in Bharata cannot mean "expression by means of a synonym", for it would then be difficult to differentiate this does from chartha given below. Possibly this is the fault which appears in later writers as the figure of speech known as parysystia (=roughly, circumlocution or periphrase as a poetic figure). It is apparently so explained by Abhinavagupta. It is possible that later rhetoricians perceived that periphrase might sometimes be an ornament of expression, and thus analysed it into a poetic figure; and this may be taken as an instance in point of the process by which poetic figures multiplied themselves in later speculation.
- 20 Abhinava takes it in the sense of description of matters which should not be described in words (habdendvarpaniyam api vargitam), and rejects the sense of apraketa-varpanam. We are, however, inclined to prefer the sense of digression rejected by Abhinava. The defect varpivacana, mentioned by Mahimabhatta (p. 100), would possibly be this dosa of Bharata. This seems to be the fault in Magha i 43. Abhinava regards the sva-habda-varpatā-dosa of rasa and bāsva as included in Bharata's arthintara dosa, although it is not clear whether Bharata himself regarded this sva-sabda-varpatā to be a dosa at all.

- v. ekártha = tautology (ekárthasya abhidhānam),
- vi. abhiplutartha = aggregation of complete lines without merging them into a complete sentence (yat padena samasyate^{2 t}),
- vii. nyāyād apetam = defective logic (pramāņavarjitam),
- viii. vigama = defective metre (vrtta-doşa),
 - ix. visandhi = disjunction in which the words are not well knit ",
 - x. sabda-hina = use of. ungrammatical words (asabdasya yojanam 23)

But the faults discussed by Bhamaha are (ch. iv) :

- i. apartha = absence of complete sense 24,
- ii. eyartha = incongruity with the context,

²¹ Abhinaya explains: abhiplutürtham yathā—sa rājā nīti-kuhalah sarah kumuda-hobhitam | sarva-priyā vasantabrīh grīņme mālatikāgamah | iti; nīra pratipadam arthasya parisamāptatvād abhiplutürtham, cka-vākyatvena nimajjamāhhāvāt.

by the definition asspratisthesiabdam yat. The most likely emendation (for which I am indebted to Prof. Sovani) would be asspratisthesiabdam yat. Abbinava's explanation is not clear owing to the unfortunately defective state of our MS at this point, but Abbinava apparently means by sandhi or sandhana compactness, congruity, or merging, i. e. where the words are well knit.

²³ asabda = apasabda, Abhinavagupta.

²⁴ Both Bhāmaha and Daṇḍin say samudāyārthaśūnyaṃ yat, and this incompletion of the total sense arises, they explain, from the ron-satisfaction of the natural expectancy of words in a sentence (ākānkṣā), a point already dealt with by the grammarians and mimāṃsakas.

iii. ekärthu = tautology (Bhāmaha noting that othera call it punarukta, which well-known term is apparently unknown to Bharata).

iv. sasamšaya = ambiguity,

v. apakrama = violation of syntactical regularity,

vi. sabda-kina = use of words not approved by correct usage (grammatical),

vii. yati-bhrasta = deviation from the rules of metrical pause,

viii. bhinas-crtta = ase of long or short syllables in the wrong place in a metre,

 visamdhi = disjunction of eaphonic liaison when it is necessary,

x. desa-kāla-kalā-loka-nyāyāgama-virodhi, = inconsistency with regard to (a) place (b) time (c) the fine or mechanical arts (d) worldly usage (e) logic (f) āgama (=dharma-tāstra**; i. e. codes of law or jurisprudence).

Bhāmaha also adds another fault to these ten, viz., the down which arises from a faulty logical proposition (pratijāā), a faulty middle term (hetu), and a faulty logical illustration (drstānta); but this blemish is treated separately in the next chapter (ch. v), being interesting to Bhāmaha from the standpoint of the logic of poetry. In another context, while discussing the general characteristics of poetry (i 37f), Bhāmaha mentions ten other defects which a poet should avoid, viz.,

²⁵ ögamo dharma-sästräni, loka-simö ca tat-kṛtā | tadvirodhi tadicāra-vņatikramaņato...// says Bhāmaha bimself in explanation (iv 48).

- neyártha = farfetchedness, when the sense does not follow from the logical order of words but has to be guessed out from the general intention,
- ii, klista = obstruction of the sense,
- iii. anyartha = disappearance of the sense,
- iv. andcaka=inexpressiveness, when in the expressed words the sense does not appear to be openly dominant,
 - yūdhašahdābhidhāna = use of difficult expressions,
- vi. ayuktimat = impropriety, e.g. making clouds messengers in poetry,
- vii. arnti-lusta = expressly indecent "6
- viii. artha-dusta = implicitly indecent (later writers calling it aslilatva),
- kalpanā-dusta = difficult conception (?), where in the alliance of two words an undesirable sense is produced,
- k. sruti-kasta = unmelodious or harsh in sound 97.

As to how these two different series of ten faults are to be distinguished, Bhāmaha says nothing; but it is conceivable from his treatment that the latter concerns the inner nature or essence of poetry, while the former mentions only such defects as are more or

²⁶ Bhāmaha's text is obviously corrupt on this point. But the distinction between **ruti-dusta* and **sruti-kasta* of earlier writers is explained by Abhinava in his Locana p. 82.

²⁷ The examples given of this fault are words like ajihladat (Bhāmaha), or adhākṣit, tṛṇṇḍhi (Abhinava *Locana loc, cit.).

less external. A glance at these two lists of faults, given by Bharata and Bhāmaha respectively, will at once shew that while some of Bhāmaha's faults correspond generally to Bharata's in name or in substance, Bhāmaha in his elaborate treatment is certainly ahead of his predecessor. It is also noteworthy that Bhāmaha lays down, in his discussion of the last named fault of *iruti-kaṣṭa*, the general proposition (i 54) that a particular combination or arrangement sometimes makes even defective expressions allowable; in other words, a fault sometimes is converted into an excellence. Bharata, on the other hand, regards as we shall see, all gunas or excellences to be mere negations of dosas or faults.

After dealing with the dosas, Bharata speaks of the gunus or excellences of composition which are also enumerated as ten in number 14. He states summarily at the outset (xvi 91) that the gunus are the negations of the dosas (gunu viparyayad com), an opinion which is indeed extraordinary in view of the fact that later writers like Vamana (v. 1. 1-3) rightly consider gunus in a theory of Poetics to be positive entities, of which the dosas are the negations known by implication. It appears, on the other hand, that gunus like mādhurya and audārya, mentioned by Bharata in xvi 91 and 92, are not really, as defined by himself, negations of any particular defect discussed by him. Jacobi's explanation 29 is probably right that Bharata's description of the gunus as negations

²⁸ Abhinava reads kāryasya gunāh, and not kārydetha-

²⁹ In Sb, der preust. Akad. xxiv, 1922, p. 223.

of the dosas is in conformity with the commonsense view of the matter, for it is not difficult for one to seize upon a fault instinctively and realise its substance, while an excellence cannot be conceived so lightly unless its essence is comprehended by differentiating it from a more easily understood fault. The gunas, according to Bharata, are the following:

i. **aleşa = coalescence of words, connected with one another through the aggregate meaning desired by the poet, and consisting of a subtlety which is in appearance clear but in reality difficult to comprehend**a.

ii. prasada = clearness, where the unexpressed sense appears from the word used through the relation of the easily understood word and sense³.

30 Abhinava notes an alternative reading vicaropahatam instead of vicaragahanam, Hemacandra (p. 196) and Manikyacandra (Kinyaprakisa tamkata, ed. Anandasrama, 1921, p. 191) remark: svabhina-zhanjam vicara-gahanam vacah ilistam iti bharatah. Abhinava thinks that this excellence corresponds to Vámana's artha guna ilega.

31 Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra explain: vibhaktavāṣya-vācakūyogād anuktayor api iabdārthayoli pratipattili prasāda iti bharatali. Jacobi proposes (ZDMG
lxiv, p. 138, contd. fn.) to read mukhya instead of
mukha in the text, and thinks that Bharata's prasāda
corresponds to Dandin's samādhi. But Abhinava reads
sukha and explains: sukhayati, na prayatnam apeksate
yah iabdārthali. Perhaps by this guna, Bharata means
to imply some kind of sly hint (anukta artha), transparent
from the words used (such as we find, c. g., in the
figure mudrā in Candrilloka, od. Jīvānanda, v 139, and
Kuvalayānanda, ed. N. S. P., 1917, pp. 146-7), which may

iii. samatā = evenness, which is easy to understand and in which there is no redundance of expression nor excess of curpapadas^{3 2}.

iv. samādhi = superimposition (samādhāna) of something special or distinguishing in the sense³³.

correspond partly to the metaphorical mode of expression included by Vāmana in his peculiar definition of vakrokti (tv. 3, 8), or comprised by later writers under lakṣaṇā or npacāra. Referring to Vāmana's definition of artha-guṇa prasāda as artha-vaimalya (111, 2, 3), Abhinava seems to support our suggestion when he says so'rtha vaimalyāiraya'pi vaimalyam upacārāt, thus attempting to approximate Bharata's prasāda to Vāmana's artha-guṇa of that name.

32 The curuapada is defined by Bharata himself in xviii 50b, 51. Cf also Vamana 1. 3. 22, 24 where Arput is the name given to a kind of prose which contains short compounds. Commenting on this passage in Vamana, Gopendra Tippa Bhupala interprets the word as : curnopadena upacirad vyasta-pada-samohoro laksyate, tona vyasta-pada-bahulam chepant. Vamana himself in his orki gives two characteristics, viz., adirgha samāsa and anuddhata pada, short compounds and soft vocables. Referring to Vamana's habita-gupa of the same name in III. I. 12, and trying to approximate it to Bharata's samatā, Abhinavagupta remarks; sabdānām samatvāt tamah, curnapada-samisa-racani yatra sa satibaya na bhavati,....dirgha-samāso pyatyanta-samāsas ca visamatā, tad-viparyayena samati, upakranta-margiparityaga-rilpityuktam.

33 Abhinava explains: yasyarthasya abhiyuktaih pratibhānātisayavadbhir viseso pūrvah svollikhita upadadhate sa samāhita-mīnah-sampādya-visesatvād artho visislahtamādhih. In the second line of the text Abhinava reads

- v. mādhurya = sweetness, where a sentence heard or repeated many times does not tire or disgust³⁴.
- vi. ojas=strength, which consists in the use of varied and dignified compounded words, having letters agreeable to one another³⁵.
- vii. saukumārya = smoothness, where an agreeable sense is realised by means of agreeably

parikirtitalı (and not parikirtyate), and takes arthena as referring to the word samādki: samādki-habdasya yo'rthah parihāra-lakṣaṇas tena parikirtitalı paritalı samantād ākrāntyā uccāraṇe saṃpannah sa samādhih. This explanation of saṃpanna is probably given to make the definition correspond to that of Vāmana's ārahāvaraha-kramaḥ tamādhih (111. 1. 13); for Abhinava goes on explaining ākrīntyöccīraṇe ārahāvaraha-krama eva, the āraha and avaraha depending, as he discusses in detail, on uccāraṇa. Hemacandra and Māṇikyacandra explain Bharata's definition simply as artharya guṇāntara-samādhānāt samādhir iti bharatah.

- 34 Abhinava reads sentam and vakyam instead of ketam and kavyam in the printed text; and this is supported by what Hemacandra and Manikyacandra say with regard to this excellence of Bharata.
- 35 Abhinava reads bahubhih (instead of vividhaih) and sanurāgaih (instead of sā tu rvaraih), explaining the latter reading thus: yatra varaair varadntaram apeksate tatra sanurāgatvam. Hemacandra, however, attributes a somewhat different and otherwise unknown definition to Bharata, viz., avagitasya hīnasya vā sabūrtha-sampadā yad udūttatvam nisiūcati tad oja iti bharatah, and Mānikyacandra says to the same effect.

- employed metres and well-connected euphonic conjunctions³⁶.
- viii. arthavyakti = explicitness, which describes the nature of things, as they appear in the world; by means of well known predicates³7.
- ix. mlara = exaltedness, where there are superhuman sentiments, varied feelings, and the Erotic and the Marvellous moods 38.
- 36 The "agreeable sense" (sukumāritha), which corresponds to the anishuriksura-prāyatā of Dandin's guņa of this name, or to the ajarathatra or apāruņa of Vāmana's twofold anahumārya, implies probably the avoidance of disagreeable or insuspicious (amangala) statements. Thus instead of mrtah, one should say kirtisejam gatah. It is on this ground that theorists after Mammaja object that this is no guņa but a negation of the amangala doşa, which some writers include in the fault known as aklilatva.
- 37 The text is obviously corrupt. Abhinava reads supraxiddhābkidhāyinā, instead of supraxiddhā dhātunā ca which is unintelligible. Read also loka-dharma' instead of loka-karma'. Hemacandra explains: yasminnanyathā-sthito'pi tathā-sthita evdrthāh pratibhāti, so'rthavyaktih. He also points out that this guna of Ilharata corresponds to Vāmana's artha-guna arthavyakti (defined as masta-svabhāva-sphuta-tvam III. 2. 13), and would be equivalent to the poetic figure jāti or svabhāvakti of Dandin and others. Mammaţa p. 583: abhidhāsyamāna-svabhāvactīpahankārana vastu-svabhāva-sphutatva-rūpūrthavyaktih svākrtā, but Višvanātha would include it in prasāda-guņa.
- 38 The implication of adhinta rasa in this excellence, and the characteristic that it deals with divya-bhāva indicate a certain utharyavān dharmah, causing wonder, such as Dandin's udāra would contain. See the illustration of this guna given by Hemacandra p. 199. The inclusion of the

x. kānti = loveliness, which delights the ear and the mind, or which is realised by the meaning conveyed by graceful gestures (līlādi³⁹).

It will be noticed from this enumeration that in some cases it is difficult to see what Bharata means exactly by a particular guya, and that the classification is by no means exhaustive nor free from overlapping. On the other hand, most of the guass can be taken as approximating roughly to the individual sabda-quas and arthu-yugus elaborated by Vamana and other later theorists. The development of the gunu-doctrine is intimately connected with the central theory of the riti-school and will be dealt with later ; but it may be pointed out here that although the definitions of the individual guaras, as given by Bharata, do not correspond exactly to those of later writers, there can be no doubt that here we have for the first time a definite statement, if not a proper theoretic treatment, of the doctrine. The disagreement between different theorists with regard to the definitions of individual guass is a notorious fact in the history of Sanskrit Poetics, and one need not therefore be sur-

iringāra and adhinta rasas makes this guna of Bharata correspond partly to Vamana's artha guna hānti. But Dandin adds: ilāghyair višesaņair yuktam udāram kaišcid izyatē. There is no reference in Bharata to such 'praiseworthy epithets', although Hemacandra says: bahubhili sākṣmaiš ca višeṣāili sametam udāram iti bharatah. In the Agni-purāṇa 346, 9, however, we read: uttāna-padatautāryam yutam ilāghyair višeṣāṇaih, which might be a direct echo of Dandin.

³⁹ Itlidi=Itlidi-cețiă, Abhinavagupta. This would be comprehended by the dipta-rasatoam of Vamana's artha-guna kănti.

prised that later authors give us definitions which do not agree with those of Bharata, To Bharata, again, the relation of the gunas to riti, as elaborated by Vāmana, or to rasa, as first clearly enunciated by the Dhyanikara and Anandavardhana, was probably unknown. So was also Vamana's distinction between salida-quira and artha-guna, although Bharata's quinas are mostly of the nature of artha-quass, and some of them can be interpreted (as done by Abhinavagupta) as constituting sabda-quesas as well. But the number and nomenclature of the gunus, as well as the substance of some of them, as outlined by Bharata, are conventionally adhered to by all later writers, excepting Bhamaha who, as we shall see, was a radical thinker in this respect, until we come to the Dhyanikara and his followers who gave a new interpretation to the guar-doctrine. It is also important to note that Bharata takes the gunas, as well as the dosas and alamkaras, to be subservient to the purpose of awakening rasa, which is taken as the principal business of the drama. In this he anticipates and probably influences the view of the Davanikara and his school who, as we shall see, borrow Bharata's idea of rasa from the case of the drama and apply it to that of poetry.

(2)

It has been noted above that Bharata makes all these elements, the laksana, yuna, dosa and alam-kāra, subordinate to the principal purpose of awakening rasa in the drama. These elements cons-

titute what he calls vācika abhinaya (defined in viii 6, 9), which is dealt with in chapters xiv-xx and which forms an important factor, the anulhāva (vii 5), in calling forth the rasa. Hence Bharata expressly considers (xvi 104 f) the question of their employment in relation to rasa. It is necessary, therefore, to consider here briefly Bharata's teachings regarding rasa**, which is dealt with in the Nālya-šāstra, chapters vi and vii**.

It must be observed at the outset that resa does not appear to be Bharata's principal theme, and that it is discussed only in connexion with his exposition of dramatic representation with which he is principally concerned. It is not surprising, therefore, that Rajasekhara, probably following some current tradition, should regard Bharata as an authority on rapaka (drama) rather than on rasa, and mention one Nandikesvara* as the original exponent of the rasa-doctrine, which, if Rajasekhara is right, Bharata must have borrowed and worked up into his dramaturgic system. That the rasa-doctrine was older than Bharata is apparent from Bharata's own citation of several verses in the arya and the anastuble metres

⁴⁰ The question has been dealt with briefly in my article on the Theory of Rasa in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Commeration Volume, Orientalia, vol. III, and also in Sovani's article on the Pre-dhvani Schools in Sir R. G. Bhandarkar Comm. Vol.

⁴¹ In some other chapters Bharata deals with the cognate topics of the nāyaka and nāyikā and their adjuncts and emotional states, which will be referred to in their proper place below (ch. viii).

⁴² See Vol. 1 p. 2, fn 2.

in support of or in supplement to his own statements; and in one place, he appears to quote two āryā-verses from an unknown work on rasa⁴⁸.

The idea of rasa, apart from any theory thereon, was naturally not unknown to old writers; and Bharata's treatment would indicate that some system of rasa, however undeveloped, or even a Rasa school, particularly in connexion with the drama, must have been in existence in his time. But the bearings of this doctrine on poetry were seldom discussed, and the importance of rasa as one of the essential factors of poetry was indeed naively understood but was not theoretically established. As Dramaturgy was

⁴³ atrarge rasa-vicing-wakke, ed. Kayamala p. 67. The line is wanting in Grosser's edition. Kesava Misra, a comparatively recent writer of the 16th century, speaks of one bhagawan Sanddhoslam who, according to him, was a thira-kara on rasa: but the opinions of this otherwise unknown writer (see Vol.1, p. 262), as recorded by Kesava Misra, do not deviate materially from the conventional views of those later writers of the new school who admit the easentiality of rasa.

⁴⁴ We get the first definite exposition, as we shall see, of the idea of ram and its relation to poetry in the works of the Dhvanikāra and Anandavardhana; and its importance in poetry, as distinguished from the drama, was probably understood from that time. Māgha in some verses (see Vol. 1 pp. 63, in 3; also p. 344) shows himself conversant with some theory of rasa; but it is to natyur-rasa (such as described by Bharata) rather than to havya-rasa that he appears to refer. It is not maintained that older Sanskrit Poetry was devoid of rasa or that the earlier poets never possessed any idea of it; but it is suggested that the theory of rasa was not critically set forth, nor its aesthetic importance in poetry properly understood until

in the beginning a separate study, from which Poetics itself probably took its cue, the rasa-doctrine, which sprang up chiefly in connexion with this study, confined its activity in the first stage of its development to the sphere of dramatic composition and exerted only a limited influence on poetic theories 45. The importance of this dramaturgic rasa-system must have been somewhat overshadowed by the early dominance, in Poetics proper, of the Alamkara and Riti systems, whose traditions are carried on by the two earliest writers on Poetics, Bhamaha and Dandin, both of whom allow a very subsidiary place to rara in their scheme; but at the same time the comparative antiquity of such a rasa-system in connexion with the drama, going back to a time even earlier than Bharata, cannot be doubted.

The oldest known exponent of this system is Bharata, from whom spring all later systems and theories such as we know them, and whom even

the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana came into the field. The presence of rasa is such a familiar fact in Sanskrit Poetry as well as in comparatively modern Sanskrit writers on Poetics that one is apt to lose sight of this fact of historical importance.

45 That the doctrine of ram was originally associated with dramaturgy and later on applied to Poetics is clear from the tradition which survives even in very late writers, and makes them not only discuss the theory directly in connexion with the drama (e. g. Viśvanātha) but even borrow the illustrations mostly from dramatic poetry. Abhinava speaks of the kūvya as loka-nātya-dharmi-sthānīya, and says: nātya cvā: rasah, kāvye ca nūtyāmāna eva rasah kāvyārthah.

Anandavardhana himself (p. 181), in applying the rasa-theory to Poetics, names as his original authority. It is necessary for this reason to take into account Bharata's doctrine of natya-rasa as the original source of the doctrine of kavya-rasa elaborated in later Poetics. But long before the new interpretation of the relation of rasa to poetry, given by the Dhvanikara and authoritatively established by Mammata, was dominant, Bharata's views on rasa appear to have been discussed in some detail in dramaturgic systems with the result that divergent theories came to prevail under the names of Bhatta Lollata, Sankuka, Bhatta Nāyaka and others, all of whom are supposed to have been commentators on Bharata's text at, or at least to have taken Bharata as their starting point. With Bharata, therefore, we arrive at a distinctly definite landmark in respect of the rasa-doctrine.

It is worth noticing, however, that although all sheorists take Bhareta as their starting point and build up their own theories round his authoritative, if somewhat meagre text, Bharata himself, like all old masters, is tantalisingly simple in his statements; for the subject does not appear to have yet been brought into the realm of scholastic speculation. Bharata's work is encyclopaedic in its scope, but its primary theme is the drama and its concep-

⁴⁶ See Vol. I pp.37f. It is not yet clear whether all these writers were really commentators on Bharata as they are reputed to have been. At least in the case of Bhatta Nayaka, it is extremely doubtful if his lost Hrdaya-darpana was at all a commentary on the Natya-sastra. See below ch. vi.

tion of poetry dramatic, a view which perhaps inspired Vamana's partiality towards dramatic composition already alluded to, and which is concisely put by Abhinavagupta by saying kāryam tāvad dasarūpātmakam eog. In such a composition rasa, according to Bharata. should be predominant, and there are numerous passages which clearly indicate that there can be no sense of poetry, in his view, without rasa 17. Although Bharata does not enter into technicalities, he seems to be of opinion that the vibhavas and the ambhāeas, which later theory takes to be essential factors, call forth or evolve rase ; but he is not clear to as what this process of evolution exactly is. He takes the blaca as the basis of rasa and explains it generally as that which brings into existence the sense of poetry through the three kinds of representation, viz., through gestures, words, and internal feelings (vāg-anga-sattvopetān kāvyarthan bhāvaya utiti bhanah). This bhana, which consists of an emotional state of the mind, reaches, when permanent and not transitory, the state of rasa through the elements known as vilhava and anulhava. A vibhāva is explained thus : vibhavo nama vijaanarthah, vibhavyante'nena väg-anga-sattoäbhinaya ity-ato vibhavah. The term vibhava, therefore, is used to connote knowledge or cognition, and is explained generally as denoting that which makes the three kinds of representation capable of being sensed. In the same way, the anubhava is explained as that which follows upon and makes the three kinds of representation actually

⁴⁷ e. g. na hi rasād rte kaseid arthali pravartate, ed. Grosset p. 87 = ed. Kāvyamālā p. 62. Cf. also vii 7.

sensed. The third element of rasa, the vyabhicaribhava, consists of accessory emotional facts which help and strengthen it, and is etymologically explained as vi abhi ity-etdvupasargau, cara gatau dhātuh, vividham abhimukhyena rasan carantiti nyabhicarinah. As to what relation these elements bear to rasa and how this state of relish is brought about, Bharata simply lays down in a cryptic formula : vibhavanubhāva-vyabhicāri-sām yogād rasa nispattih, a formula which, in spite of his own explanation, is so ambiguous with respect to the exact significance of the terms sanyoga and nispatti that a great deal of controversy has centred round their interpretation, giving rise to a number of theories about rasa. Bharata's own explanation, if it can be called an explanation, is that just as a beverage is accomplished through various seasoned articles and herbs, so the permanent mood (the sthagi-bhava), reinforced (upagata) by various bhavas, attains the state of rasa; and it is so called because its essence consists in its taste or relish (asvadyateat), this being the etymological meaning of the word rasa*s. He also explains*" that the sthayi-bhava is the basis of rasa because it attains, as it were, mastery or sovereignty among forty-nine different bhavas mentioned by himselfs o.

⁴⁸ ed. Grosset p. 87=ed. Kāvyamāla p. 62. It is curious that all the terms which describe the essence of rasa, such as rasanā, carvaņā, or āsvāda, refer etymologically to the physical pleasure of taste.

⁴⁹ ed. Grosset p. 102, II, 7-19=ed. Kāvyamālā p. 70, II, 13-22.

⁵⁰ viz., 8 sthāyi-bhāvas, 8 sāttvika bhāvas and 33 vyabhicāri-bhāvas.

which naturally rest upon it as being presumably the principal theme or the mood in the composition in question.

Nothing definite can be concluded from all this except that, in Bharata's opinion, the sthayi-bhava or the principal mood in a composition is the basis of rasa, the essence of which consists in ascada or relish by the reader or spectator, while the vibhava, anubhava and the vybhicari-bhava awaken this state of emotional realisation or 'relish' in the reader's mind. But this explanation by its very ambiguity or vagueness taxed the ingenuity of theorists and commentators, its general trend anticipating theories like the utpatti-vada of Lollata and the anumiti-vada of Sankuka, and special terms in the passage in question like vyahita and samanya-guna-yoga suggesting specialised doctrines like the vyakti-vada of Abhinava-gupta and the bhukti-vada of Bhatta Nāyaka.

The original outlines of the theory, however, are accepted as fixed by Bharata. It is practically admitted on all hands, on semi-psychological considerations of poetry, that the rasa is a state of relish in the reader of the principal sentiment in the composition, a subjective condition of his mind which is brought about when the principal or permanent mood (sthāyi-bhāva) is brought into a relishable condition through the three elements, the vibhāva, the anubhāva and the vyabhicāri-bhāva, exhibited in the drama. Of these elements, the first two are important, the vyabhicāris being only concomitant or accessory. Bharata's explanation of these terms is rendered with greater precision by

his followers. By the sthayi-bhava in poetry and drama are meant certain more or less permanent mental states, such as Love, Grief, Anger or Fear. This permanent mood, constituting the principal theme of a composition and running through all other moods like the thread of a garland, cannot be overcome by those akin to it or those opposed to it, but can only be reinforced. Those elements which respectively excite, follow and strengthen (if we may use these expressions) the sthayi-bhava are in poetry and drama known as vibhāva, annbhāva and vyabhicāri- (also called saācāri-) bhāvabi. corresponding in ordinary life (as opposed to the extraordinary world of poetry) to the mundane causes and effects (laukika karana and karya). Deviod of technicalities, a vibhāva may be taken as that which makes the permanent mood capable of being sensed, an anubhava as that which makes it actually sensed, while a vyabhicari-bhava is that which acts as an auxiliary or gives a fresh impetus to it. In the case of Love as a permanent mood, the stock-examples given of a vibhava are women and the seasons; of anubhava, glance and embrace; of vyabhicarin, the transient subordinate feelings of joy or anxiety. Now Bharata says that the reader is enabled to realise or relish as rasa the

⁵¹ Ballantyne renders these terms conveniently, if not adequately, as the Excitant, the Ensuant and the Accessory respectively, a nomenclature which is followed by Ganganatha Jhā in his translation of the Kāvya-prakāka. Jacobi, however, uses (ZDMG, 1902, pp. 394 f) the terms Factor, Effect and Concurrent.

permanent mood of a composition through a certain correlation of these elements with the permanent mood, the correlation taking place apparently for the purpose of manifesting it and bringing it to a relishable condition. The question, therefore, arises, to which Bharata himself gives no definite solution, viz. what relation these elements bear to rasa, or in other words, how do they bring about this subjective condition of relish in the reader's mind, the solution depending, as we have noted above, upon the explanation of the two much-discussed terms samyoga (lit. correlation) and nispatti (lit. consummation) in the original sutra of Bharata. This is the central pivot round which all later theories move, and we shall take it up again in their connexion below (ch. iv).

Bharata mentions eight different moods or rasas in the drama, of which a detailed account is given in ch. vi. which is the authoritative source drawn upon by all later writers, although they sometimes differ, as we shall see, in the enumeration of the orthodox number of eight. Properly speaking, the primary rasas, according to Bharata, are only four in number, viz., spagara (the Erotic), randra (the Furious), vira (the Heroic) and bibhatsa (the Disgusting). The other four rasas proceed from these, as follow: hāsya (the Comic) from spagara, karuna (the Pathetic) from randra, adbhuta (the Marvellous) from vira, and bhayānaka (the Terrible) from bībhatsa (xvi 39-40).

The eight sthāyi-bhāvas or permanent moods, corresponding to the eight rasas, are given categori-

cally as (i) rati (Love) (ii) hasa (Mirth) (iii) krodha (Anger) (iv) utsāha (Courage) (v) bhaya (Fear) (vi) jugupsā (Aversion) (vii) vismaya (Wonder) and (viii) toka (Sorrow), forming the basis respectively of sringara, hāsya raudra, vīra, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, adbhuta and karuna. The vyabhicari-hhācas are mentioned as thirty-three in number and include the subordinate feelings of self-disparagement (nirveda), debility (glāni), apprehension (śańkā), envy (asnya), intoxication (mada), weariness (frama), indolence (ālasya), depression (dainya), reflection (cinta), distraction (moha), recollection (smrti), equanimity (dhrti), shame (vridā), unsteadiness (capalatā), joy (karsa), flurry (avega), stupsfaction (jalata), arrogance (garva), despondency (visada), longing (autsukya), drowsiness (nidra), dementedness (apasmara), dreaming (supta), awakening (vicodha), impatience of opposition (amarsa), dissembling (avahittha), sternness (ugratā), resolve (mati), siekness (vyādhi), madness (unmāda), death (marana), alarm (trasa) and doubt (vitarka) 50.

⁵² These English equivalents follow generally Ballantyne's renderings.—It must be borne in mind that the vyabhicări-bhāvas are independent hhāvas but occuring as accessory or concurrent to the principal mental state depicted,
which is known as the sthāyi-bhāva. Sometimes it may
happen that the vyabhicārin is principally manifested in a
composition, and the sthāyin is merely awakened; such
cases later theorists would call bhāvas (and not rasas) which
are thus incomplete rasas. Attempts have been made to distinguish between rasa and bhāva, and this question will be
discussed later on. It would appear from the enumeration of the vyabhicāri-bhāvas that the older theorists consi-

The sāttvika bhāvas, which can be taken generally as involuntary evidences of internal feeling, are then specified as eight in number 5 3, viz., stupor (stambha),

der many conditions from the spiritual point of view, which we would regard from the standpoint of the body (e.g. vyādhi or maraņa). See Jacobi in ZDMG lvi, 1902, p. 395 (n.2.

53 Regarding the sattvika bhava (which later theorists, e. g. Abhinavagupta, connect with the sattva guna of the Sāmkhya philosophers), Bharata says (ed. Grosset p. 120= ed. Kāvyamālā p. 82): iha hi sattvaņ nāma manah-prabhāvam, tae ca samākita-manastvād utpadyate, manah-samādhānāc ca sattva-nirvrtir iti , tasya yo'sau svabhāvo romāficdérddi-krtalı sa na sakyate uyu-manasa kartum iti ; lokasvabhavinukaranāc ca nātyarya rattvam ipritam. Thus Bharata connotes by it certain tokens of mental feelings, delineated in the dramatic representation by an imitation of human nature through steady concentration of the mind. Bharata adds the illustration : iha ki nalya-dharma-pravrttah mikha-dulikha-krto bhavas tatha sattva-vikuddali karya yatha svarīipā bhavanti. For, how can sorrow, he says, which must be manifested by weeping, or joy which must be expressed by laughter, be delineated except by these involuntary evidences? This is apparently what Bharata means by sattodbhinaya or zāttvikābhinaya. In the Dakartipaka, however, sattua is taken to mean'a sympathetic heart' and sattuika is explained as sattvena nirorttali (Cf Sahitya-darpana iii 134). Bhanudatta, in his Rasa-taranigini gives a somewhat different interpretation, and takes sattvika to mean physical gestures as evidences of natural feeling tsattvam fiva-sariram, tasya dharmah sattvikah, ittham ca sarira-bhavah stambhidayah sittvikā bhāvī ity-abhidhīyante). Later writers like the author of the Kavyaprakaia-pradipa bring in philosophical implications and interpret sattvika as originating in the

perspiration (sveda), horripilation (romanca), break of voice (svara-bhanga), trembling (vepathu), change of colour (vaivarnya), tears (airu) and loss of consciousness (pralaya). This psycho-physical analysis, however formal it may appear to us, is taken up in detail in chapter vii, and each of these states is categorically defined and illustrated strictly from the standpoint of the drams; but in later literature they are established authoritatively for poetry as well⁵4.

(3)

This is a rough outline of the teachings, relevant to Poetics proper, that we can gather from the somewhat meagre text of Bharata, and it may be taken as an outline of the discipline as it existed in the earliest known period of its history. With Bhamaha, Dandin and the Dhavanikara, on the other hand, begins the next period of its history, a comparatively brief but exceedingly important stage of extraordinary creative genius. Of the period anterior to Bharata, our knowledge is extremely scanty; and between Bharata and the definite formulation of poetic theories which begins with Bhamaha, lies, again, a long gap of which we do not possess much knowledge. It is clear, however,

sattva-guna. Whatever difference there might be as to the meaning of the term sattvaka itself, all the writers on this subject agree in applying the term to denote those gestures (enumerated above) which give an involuntary expression to internal feelings.

⁵⁴ e. g. in Mammața.

that certain poetical gunas, dosas, alamkaras and laksuus were known to. Bharata and treated of by him even as decorative devices of the dramatic speech. It would not be wrong to presume from this fact that the study of Alamkara-sastra, even if it was not yet fully developed and self-conscious, was probably older than Bharata himself. follows from this conclusion that the tradition of opinion, which crystallises itself in the oldest available manuals of Bhamaha and Dandin, or in the memorial verses of the Dhyanikara, comes to us in a definite shape indeed at a date much posterior to Bharata, but it is probable that in substance, if not in actual formulation, it may have been much anterior to Bharata, who himself gives an indication of such teachings. Excepting what we'get in Bharata, however, the history of this process of crystallisation (for the different systems appear in a relatively developed form in Bhamaha and others) is not known to us; but it must have covered a tentative stage whose productions, if they had been extant today, would have shown Bhamaha, Dandin and the Dhyanikara in the making, and would have partly filled up the long gap between Bharata and these earliest formulators of Poetics.

Even if they were the earliest formulators, neither Bhāmaha, nor Dandin, nor the Dhvanikāra however, claims entire originality of having created the system which he individually represents. None of them can be taken as the absolute founders of the particular doctrines of alreadāra, riti or dhvani with which they are respectively associated; and

with them we do not start at the absolute beginnings of the discipline. Indebtedness of these writers to their predecessors in the line, acknowledged by themselves, has already been noted in the first volume of this work (pp. 49-50, 70-71, 115-116); but apart from such explicit admissions, one can easily argue that certain fundamental concepts and formulas (such as vakrokti, riti, gana or alamkara) appear in writers like Bhamaha without a preliminary explanation, as things traditionally handed down or already too well known to require any detailed discussion It is also unthinkable that these early writers could have, as they certainly do not claim to have, evolved by themselves the relatively developed form and treatment of the main topies of Poetics in the absence of earlier tentative works.

It will be profitable, therefore, to pause and onquire if these works of Bhāmsha and others give us any indication of the stage or stages through which the discipline might have passed in the interval between Bharata and themselves. Fortunately there are passages in these writers which would give us hints as to the existence of such intermediate stages. Jacobi has already shown that Bhāmsha, in his treatment of the poetic figures, groups them in a curious but suggestive way which probably indicates the different stages in the growth and inultiplication of such figures before his time. Unlike later authors who, adopting some definite

⁵⁵ In Sb. der preuss. Akad. xxiv, 1922, pp. 220-222, See Vol. I pp. 33 f.

principle of classification, enumerate the poetic figures en masse56, Bhamaha begins (ii 4) by naming and defining a group of five such figures, and then goes on to enumerate other such limited groups of figures, taking 24 remaining figures in a final group. The first group of figures thus mentioned comprises anuprāsa, yamaka, rāpaka, dīpaka, and upamā, recognised, as Bhamaha says, by others (anyair udahrtah) and accepted by himself. These five correspond in reality to the four ancient poetic figures known to and defined by Bharata viz. yamaka, rūpaka, dipaka, and upamā; for anuprāsa, the additional figure mentioned by Bhamaha, can be taken as falling in the same class as yamaka", the one being variably as and the other padabhy asa. while both are what Bharata would call sabddbhuasa.

of partic figures appears to have been recognised, and he does not find any necessity of 'reporting' them or mentioning the n successively in groups as Bhamaha does; but he arranges them in his own way, taking the arthfilmpharas first and the habdilmpharas next, in two separate chapters. Udbhata, a follower of Bhamaha, deals with the first three groups of Bhamaha in the first three chapters of his own work (omitting, however, Bhamaha's phrases like anyair udahrtah, aparah, abhihitah bracit etc. with reference to these groups), the other three chapters taking up the remaining twenty-four figures of the last group. Although he follows generally the sequence as well the definitions of Bhamaha, he does not recite them in the manner of groups after Bhamaha.

⁵⁷ The distinction between pamaka and anuprasa may be explained thus: in the anuprasa there is a repetition of one or more consonants, sometimes but not necessarily along with the accompanying vowels; in pamaka, the consonants

Abhinavagapta very significantly takes 58 anuprasa as implied in the yamaka by Bharata; and the very fact that the anuprasa in Bhamaha in thus clearly differentiated from yamaka may indicate further refinement in the analysis of these figures and betoken a somewhat later stage.

In course of time, six other figures appear to have been analysed and added, and Bhāmaha mentions them next in a group in ii 66. They are ākṣepa, arthāntaranyāṣa, eyatireka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti and atiṣnyokti. Of these there is no trace in Bharata, This constitutes probably the second stage of development, in which can also be included a seventh figure vārttā, which is referred to by Dapdin in i 85, but which is not accepted by Bhāmaha (ii 87) 50.

as well as the vowels are necessarily repeated, and repeated strictly in the same order or sequence. In pamaka, the same group of vocables is repeated but it need not be the same in meaning and may even be quite meaningless in itself; but in the repetition of the anaprisa one should consider the meaning. Nicitam kham upelya niradaily priyabina briday in mire this would be an example of one variety of pamaka; while wire irani-kutire kuharini harinaritaya yapayanti would be an example of anaprisa.

- 58 ten înuprăsa-lătiyă ler anena (= yamakena) evopasamgrahăt.
- heta. sīksma and leia, which he rejects as not involving vakrakti. These, however, appear not in direct connexion with this enumeration of poetic figures but in the immediate context of vakrakti alluded to in the previous verse. These figures, however, are illustrated by Bhatti, and were probably recognised before Bhāmaha's time.

The third stage indicated by Bhāmaha's treatment does not appear to have been very productive, for in it we have the addition of only two more figures yathāsaṃkhya and utprekṣā (ii 88), and possibly of a third seabhāvokti. In this connexion it is noteworthy that by Dandin's time seabhāvokti (also called jāti, recognised by Bānabhātta) is established as the primary or first figure (ādyā alanıkṛti), while in Bhāmaha it occupies a rather dubious position; for the latter, in pursuance probably of his peculiar theory of vakrokti, does not appear to favour this figure very much. With regard to utprekṣābo, which is indeed an important addition to the Poetics of this period, Bhāmaha reports (ii 88) that Medhāvin called it sankhyānaba. Is it possible that

mentioned by Subandhu, ed. Sritangam p. 146; while upamil and dipaka are recognised by Binabhatta (introd. to Kādam-barī). Both Subandhu and Bāna speak of composition unlivened by sless; but it is not perfectly clear whether they mean by it a prabandha-gapa (as in Bharata) or the specific poetic figure of that name. Bhāmaha not only speaks of sless but mentions three kinds or cases of its occurrence. Subandhu's boast of having used double entente (as his commentators interpret it) in every word of his composition is not an idle one; and from his use of it, one can indeed incline to the view that Subandhu's bless is no other than our modern poetic figure of the same name, especially as Bharata's definition of sless as a gana is hardly applicable to Subandhu's case.

fit The text reads (Bhāmaha ii 88) :
yathāsamkhyana athôtprekṣām alamkāra dvam viduk |
samkhyānam iti medhāvinotpreksabhihitā kvacit ||

Bhāmaha's predecessor Medhāvin was the first to analyse and name this figure? Dandin, in a well known passage, considers in detail the question whether the word ion is indicative of utprekeā, a question which was apparently disputed by other rhetoricians between Bhāmaha and Dandin; but in Vāmana we find this is already an established fact. From Bhāmaha ii 40, again, we learn that Medhāvin set up seven upamā dosas, and this statement appears to have been accepted by Nami-sādhu (on Rudrata xi 24). Unfortunately we do not possess any other information about Medhāvin (or Medhāvirudra)^{6,2};

It is curious to note in this connexion that Dandin (ii 273) gives samplely as (and krama) as alternative names, not of utprekya, but of yatharankhya, which seems to be more plausible. Is it possible that the text is corrupt here? Kane (HAL p.xiii) suggests the emendation: sampley anam iti medhavi not prekyahitia kramit, which he translates as "Medhavin (calls yatharankhya) by the name of sampley ana, and in some places (in works on Alamkara) utprekya has not been spoken of as an atamkara." But the difficulty in accepting this emendation lies in the fact that Dandin's elaborate treatment of utprekya would indicate that this figure must have assumed enough importance, even in Bhamalia's time, to have been entirely overlooked in works on Alamkara. Vamana calls yatharankhya by the name of krama.

62 See Vol. I pp. 49-50. Nami-sādhu's quotation from Medhāvin (on xi 24) merely refers to Bhāmaha ii 402 which hardly adds anything to our knowledge. Rājašekhara and Vallabhadeva (on Siāu xi 6) cite Medhāvin as a poet, the former coupling his name with that of Kumāradāsa, and the latter actually citing a verse from Medhāvirudra (see ZDMG-lxxiii, 1919, p. 190, fn 1).

and to Nāmi-sādhu and Rājašekhara, who also cite him, he was possibly nothing mere than a name. From Bhāmaha's references, however, it is not unreasonable to presume that Medhāvin was the first writer on Poetics who, at an early period, gave an exposition of two very important poetic figures like upumā and utpreksā, the latter of which he might have himself invented *3.

After dealing with these groups of figures, Bhāmaha takes up (iii 1-1) in the next chapter all the remaining poetic figures, recognised in his time, all in a body, without any further break. These constitute a long list of twent y-four figures. This may be taken as the fourth stage which brings us down to Bhāmaha's own time, and which must have ended with the elaboration of a large number of figures, although the number is not as large as we find it in Dandin's time **. This stage is also represented

⁶³ The problems regarding upamā-doņas and utprekņā appear to have engaged, to a great extent, the attention of early writers. See Vol. 1 p. 61, fo 3, on upamā-doņas. On utprekņā, see Daņdin ii 226-234, Vāmana tv. 3. 9 vṛtti, Udbhaṭa ed. Telang, pp. 43-46.

⁶⁴ The differentiation and multiplication of poetic figures with the growth of speculation is a familiar fact in Alamkara literature; and it is not surprising that as the study advanced, the process of refining went on until a time came when the number became too unwieldy and the distinctions too fastidious; and then they had to be systematised in the light of some central principle. Such attempts were made from time to time, the earliest of which, as we shall see, was perhaps that of Vāmana.

by a canto in the Bhatti-kācya which illustrates in all thirty-eight independent postic figures, although (as we have already discussed 65) Bhatti appears to have made use of a text possibly unknown to Bhāmaha, if not materially differing from the latter's sources. There can be no doubt, however, that by this time the standpoint of the Alamkāra-sāstra was clearly defined and firmly established. With Bhāmaha begins a new epoch in which the uncertain gropings of the earlier periods vanish with the setting up of a more or less authoritative standard.

⁶⁵ See Vol 1 pp. 51-57.

II. BHAMAHA, UDBHATA AND RUDRATA

(The Alamkara System)

(1)

In Bhamaha's Kāoyālanukāra, the different topics of Poetics are formulated not incidentally, as in Bharata, but in such well-defined outline as would indicate that the Alamkara-sastra had already attained the rank of an independent discipline. We have seen that Bharata considered certain important elements of poetry as devices for embellishing dramatic speech and as subservient to the principal purpose of producing the dramatic rasa. In Bhamaha, on the other hand, the poetical embellishments form the principal object of study; and, while Dramaturgy and rusa are entirely ignored, we find for the first time a definite scheme of Poetics more or less systematically claborated and authoritatively established. Bharata's treatment would show that even before his time. some of the older poetic figures, most of the guyes and dosgs, had been recognised and clearly defined, even if no particular theory of alamkara had been in existence. But Bhamaha throws into prominence these poetic embellishments and the consideration of guyas and dosas in their connexion, in conformity perhaps to a tradition from which the whole discipline appears to have received significant designation of Alamkara sastra. We have attempted to explain in the preceding chapter that the comparative antiquity of this tradition or of this school of opinion cannot be denied; and the presumption is not unlikely that a system of alamkāra or an Alamkāra school (if the term is allowed from the emphasis it puts on the consideration of alamkāra or the poetic figure as the principal element of poetry) existed side by side with the Rasa school or the dramaturgic rasasystem, and influenced it, as it was to a limited extent influenced by it, although this doctrine or system of Poetics is represented to us by a comparatively late writer like Bhāmaha, who was by no means its original founder.

The general doctrine of this alankara-system is almost coextensive with what appears to have been the original standpoint of the Alankara sastra itself as an objective, empirical, and more or less mechanical discipline; for, despite the previous or synchronous existence of a system which elaborated the idea of rasa in the service of the drama, there is nothing to contradict the hypothesis, which we have already indicated and which is confirmed by the

I The word 'school' must be understood with the caution indicated in Vol I pp. 338-40, and in the note to my article on the Theory of Rasa p. 239. Referring to Bhamaha, Udbhata and others, Ruyyaka says: Ltd evam alamkira eva küvye pradhānam iti prāycānīm matam (p. 7).

² Vol. I p. 10. Sanskrit Poetry, more than ever in this 'classical' period of its history, appeared as the careful work of a trained and experienced specialist. The tradition of of such poetry points naturally to the working of the rules and means of the art into a system. This, combined with a natural and characteristic love of adornment, which demand ed an ornamental fitting out of thought and word, probably

very early existence of the alonkāra-system itself, that Sanskrit Poetics started apparently from some theory of embellishment (alankāra) which took into consideration the whole domain of poetic figures and confined its energies to the elaboration of more or less mechanical formulas with reference to the technique of expression. Just as there may be a theory

supplied the original motive-force which brought the study. of Postics into existence. The word "Alamkara" (lit, embellishment), applied to the discipline itself, as well as to the poetic figure, which forms the main topic of discussion in the earliest extant works from Bhamaha to Rudrata, would indicate that Sanskrit Poetics had probably grown out of a theory and practice of embellishment, which included and threw into prominence the whole domain of verbal and ideal figures of speech, those decorative devices by which poetic expression may be rendered attractive. It seems that originally Arr Poetica in India, as Jacobi suggests, did not gofurther than being a series of advice to the poet in his profession, and consisted more or less in formulating prescriptions for the practical working out of poetry. It pointed out the faults to be avoided and the excellences to be attained, and described the poetical embellishments which should enhance the beauty of expression, insomuch as the whole study came to receive the designation of Alamkarasistra, or the Science of Poetical Embellishment, theme of the "education" of the poet became in later literature a separate study when the theoretical aspects of the problems involved began to occupy an important place in the discipline, and we find a group of writers devoting themselves entirely to the subject of kavi-kikes which, having the practical and somewhat mechanical training of the poet in his art for its object, really represents the original standpoint of Poetics. Poetics was probably raised to the rank of an independent discipline almost about the time when

of painting consisting of a collection of information regarding the techniques of tempera, of oil-painting, of water-colour, of pastel, on the proportion of the human body and on the laws of perspective, the the art of poetry was supposed to comprise a collection of precepts relating to the forms of expression, its structural beauty, its damaging faults and its rhetorical ornaments, without going further into the speculative aspects of the problems involved, whole aesthetic judgment was directed to these means of externalisation, and aesthetic pleasure was regarded objectively from the standpoint of extraneous facts which contributed to it. It cannot indeed be dogmatically stated that the necessity and inevitability of postulating an altimate principle did not trouble these older writers; but the study must have begun with a method which resulted in the establishment of a series of more or less rigid definitions and categories elaborated to a degree of fineness. The question as to what constitutes poetry or poetic charm, the aesthetic fact, does not arise until Vamuna and the Dhvanikara come into the field ; for earlier authors like Bhamaha (i 23) and Dandin (i 10) propose to confine themselves chiefly to what they call the kasya-sarira's or the 'body of

Sanskrit 'Classical' poetry was already overstepping itself in its development.

³ The metaphorical expression kāvya-šarīra with its implied kāvyātman plays an important part in Sanskrit Poetics throughout its history. Its origin has been traced to the allegory of the Veda-purusa in Rgveda VI. 58. 3 (catvāri šriigā), and Rājašekhara indulges in an analogous

poetry' as distinguished from its ātmen, its 'soul' or animating principle. The advantages of verbal arrangement with due regard to the expression of

poetic conception of the Kavya-purusa (Spirit of Poetry) and his bride Sähitya-vidya. According to Rajasekhara's somewhat fanciful description, the body of this Kavya-purusa is composed of word and sense (sabda and artha), the face made of Sanskrit, the arms of Prakrit, the hips and loins of Apabhramia, the feet of Paisica, and the breast of mixed languages. This is evidently from the linguistic point of He further adds that famous sayings (ukticanam) constitute his words, moods and sentiments (reso) make up his soul, metres form the hair of his body, his conversation consists of questions and answers and riddles, and he is adorned by poetic figures like alliteration and simile. The later writers attempt to arrive at greater precision, first indicated by Vamana, who makes 'diction' (riti) to be the soul of poetry. That the external art of poetry can be systematised formed one of the fundamental postulates of Sanskrit Poetics; but at the same time the necessity of some deeper principle to explain the manifold character of its content could not be ignored. Hence the attempt to find the 'soul' or the animating principle in the body' or external frame-work of poetry. Bhamaha perhaps vaguely realised this when he proposed to take vakrokti as the underlying principle of artistic expression; but Dandin goes a step further and designates the ganas as the lifebreath' (printh) of the diction or riti, which he sets up as the most important part of poetry. Vamana is the first known writer to comprehend and state distinctly what this 'soul' is, and the Dhvanikara takes the last step in completing this figurative idea by defining systematically the mutua relation of the 'body' and the 'soul' of poetry. The Dhavnikāra implies in ii 7 that vyangya artha is this ātman, the gunas being compared to natural qualities like courage, and an agreeable sense and of clever clothing of the sense with poetical or rhetorical ornaments absorb the attention of these writers; and whatever may be the theoretic basis of poetic charm, it is enough if it is realised by the objective beauty of ingenious expression.

The two important factors, which go to make up the kānya-sarīra, i. e., the 'body' or external framework of poetry, are supposed to be sabda (word) and the alanking likened to external ornaments like bracelets which adorn the borly. This view is apparently accepted by Mammata (viii t) and taken as authoritative by all subsequent writers, while Nami-sadhu (on Rudrața xii 2) gives a similar but not accurate explanation of Rudrata's opinion on the subject. The final extension of this metaphorical conception is thus set forth by Visvanatha : kavyasya kabdarthan bariram, rasildis citm3, gunah sunndaryildivat, dosh kanatoldivat, ritayo'vayava-saqisthina-vinesavat, alamkirih kataka-kundaindicat, thus comprehending all the elements of poetry, discussed by previous writers, into this elaborate metaphor. Whatever may be the value of this metaphor as an index to the conception of poetry gradually evolved by Indian theorists, one point is clear, viz. that they all take, from Bhamaha to Jagamnatha, the habda and artha as constituting what they call the 'body' of poetry, and with this idea the theories start, ultimately ending in a search for its 'soul'. From another point of view, the sahda and artha form the central pivot round which all theories move (for they are all theories starting with expression) with particular reference to the question of the function par excellence operative in poetry. And as the study of Poetics itself, on the admission of some of its greatest exponents, drew its original inspiration from grammatico-philosophical speculations on speech, it is not surprising that enormous emphasis should be put on these two elements.

which adorn these are taken as forming the essential sign of a kāvya. In other words, poetry consists of a verbal composition in which a definite sense must prevail, and which must be made charming by means of certain turns of expression to which the name of poetic figure is given. This general standpoint is implied by Bhāmaha at the very outset in connexion with his general discussion of the two kinds of figures based respectively on word and sense:

rāpākādim alankāram bāhyam ācakṣute pare |
sapām tihām ca vyutpattim vācām vāāchantyalankṛtim tad etad āhuh sansabdyam nārtha-vyutpattir idrāi |
subdābhidheyālaṃbāra-bhedād istam dvayam tu nah ||.

This passage, also quoted with approval in the

⁴ See above footnote 3. Nahdirthan sahitan kinyam. Bhamaha i 16, from which, as Kuntala indicates, the name sthitya was probably given to pretry. The earliest use probably of this term ylaitys in Poetics occurs in Mukula (pp. 21 and 23) and in his pupil Pratiliarenduraja, while Rajašekhara expressly uses the term zāhutya-vidyō. The orthodox etymology of the term, which derives it from the above definition of poetry, as the union of word and sense, is thus put by Rajaickhara : sabdarthayor yathavat sahabhavena vidya sahitya-vidya, an interpretation with which Kuntala agrees. This sakitya or alliance of word and sense is admitted as a fundamental postolate from a very early time. and with proper modifications, by all schools and authors. Cf Dandin i 10, Vāmana L L I (vrtti), Rudrata ii I, Anandavardahna admits as unquestioned imbdirthan tavat kāvyam, upon which Abhinava comments tavat-grahanena kasyapyatra na vipratipattir iti dariayati. The view is alluded to by Magha in ii 86b, and apparently by Kalidasa in the first verse of Raghin'.

Vakrokti-jivita (on i 8) and the Kāvya-prakāša vi, is difficult to translate, but the meaning is clear and may be freely rendered thus: "Others regard metaphor and the like to be external ornaments. They postulate that grammatical correctness adorns speech, and call it excellence of language, (implying that) there is no such corresponding correctness of sense." We, however, accept two kinds of ornaments, referring either to word or sense." Dandin, who does not strictly belong to this school but who substantially agrees on this point with Bhāmaha, is more explicit in his statement and lays down (i 10) that the 'body' of poetry consists of a series of words regulated by an agreeable sense.

Although Bhamaha is the oldest representative of this system whose work has survived, he was, as we have stated more than once, by no means its originator. The system, as we find it set forth in his work, is certainly not primitive, but indicates the firm existence of a develope I teaching on the subject. Rājašekhara, we have seen3, gives us a long list of mythical names with which he identifies the original treatment of the various topics relating principally to the pootic figures. He assigns the elaboration of the poetic figures unuprasu, yamaka and citra, šabda-šleza, vāstava, uprīmā, utišuja, artha-bleza, and ubhayalankara respectively to Pracetayana, Citrangada, Sesa, Pulastya, Aupakayana, Parasara, Utathya and Kubers. While the antiquity of the distinction between sabdálamkaras and arthálamkāras generally (in spite of the above passage of

⁵ Vol. 1 p. 1.

Bhāmaha's) and of salda-sleşa and artha-sleşa in particular may be seriously doubted, some of these poetic figures may be allowed to have been very early recognised, as Bharata mentions some of them and Bhāmaha acknowledges nearly all (excepting citra which we find in Dandin and vāstava which we find in Rudrata). Medhāvin, cited by Bhāmaha, probably belonged to this school, and his is the only authentic name of an early exponent of this system.

With Bhamaha's work however, we emerge from the region of conjecture and doubt, and arrive at the first classic statement of a definite dectrine of Poetics. We must not yet look to his work, nor to that of his follower Udbhata, for a thoroughly critical system. We can deduce certain broad conceptions, but the practical object, underlying the speculation of this school in general, and its more or less normative character did not allow sufficient scope for purely theoretic treatment; nor can we expect such treatment at this early stage. Bhamaha, therefore, nowhere attempts a formal definition of poetry, nor does he state clearly the theory of vakrokti and alamkara which, as we shall see, was first systematically enunciated by his follower, the Vakroktijivita-kāra. The first chapter of Bhāmaha's work gives us some preliminary remarks about the general characteristics of poetry and its subdivisions, but a large part of it is taken up with the enumeration of the general faults which obstruct the proper expression of au idea.

Bhāmaha states at the outset the purposes of poetry (kānya-prayojana) and the qualifications of

a poet (kāvya-hetu), incidentally mentioning the 'sources' of poetry (kāvya-yonayah). Regarding the first topic of the aim and purpose of poetry, it is not necessary to discuss the different views in detail, as they generally enumerate extraneous objects and throw little light on the general theory of poetry. In the older writers there is a more or less uncritical mention of fame (kirtti) for the poet and delight (priti) for the reader as the chief objects of poetry; and herewith Bhāmaha (i 2), Dandin (i 105), Vāmana (r. 1. 5), Rudrata (i 21,22) and Bhoja (i 2), though belonging to different schools of opinion, seem to be content. But it became customary to add , from the poet's standpoint, 'wealth', 'social success' and 'escape from ills'. From the reader's point of view, poetry brought 'solace', 'instruction in knowledge' and 'proficiency in the arts and ways of the world'; and these were sometimes summarily comprehended by the term tricarga, viz., profit, pleasure and virtue, to which later on the caturearga, anticipated by Bhamsha (i 2), adds moksa or liberation of the soul. This is probably an attempt to bring poetry on a level with other arts or sciences which profess similar ends, and is in harmony with the deep-rooted idea of the functions of a sastru. It is, however, pointed out by later theorists like Mammata and his followerss, who in their turn develop Abhinavagupta's

⁶ Bharata had already laid down this pleasure-giving function of the dramatic art as krivlanakam (i 11), vinoda-kāranam (i 86).

⁷ c g. Mammaja i 2, Hemacandra p. 2 etc.

⁸ Abhinava uses the terms prables sammita, jaya-sammita and mitra-sammita, which are accepted by Mammata (ed.

idea (*Locana p. 12). that the kanya, as distinguished from the scriptures and the sciences, is kanta-sammita, i. e., like the teaching of a loving mistress, implying thereby that the pedagogic powers of poetry resolve themselves into a peculiar power of suggesting a condition of artistic enjoyment. The famous opening verse of the Kavya-prakasa makes this clear when it describes poetic speech as comprehending a creation, ungoverned by nature's laws and consisting of pure joy. The caturwarge and the other material objects of poetry are mentioned in almost unbroken tradition; but with the elaboration of a full-fledged scheme of Poetics in connexion with the suggestion of reso, the purpose of poetry was brought into a level with the ultimate theory about its nature; and poetry was supposed to create a peculiar mood of ac-thetic pleasure, conveyed generally by the philosophie term ananda . Jugan-

B. S. S. 1917, p. 9). Later writers distinguish (e. g. Ekāvalī pp. 13-15) between the Vedas which are prabhu-sammita, the Itihāsa etc. which are mitra-sammita, and the Kāvya which is kāntā-sammita.

natha completes the idea by defining it as a 'disinterested' or 'dissociated' (alaukika) pleasure, which depends upon a taste formed by repeated representation of beautiful objects, and which can be enjoyed by a man initiated into the poetic mysteries.

With regard to the other two questions, viz., the equipment of a poet and the sources of poetry, Bhamaha appears to be cognisant of their importance. His remarks on these points are, however, brief, as compared with those of Vamana, who deals with the subject elaborately for the first time. It may be pointed out in this connexion that Sanskrit Poetics, consistently with the original idea of its having been a more or less mechanical discipline, gives a long list of the essential qualifications which a poet should possess and lays down elaborate rules for his 'education'. With the advance of the theoretical aspects of the science, this theme was, no doubt, made the object of a separate study by a group of writers who make it their business to instruct the poet in his profession; but all early writers on general Poetics, more or less, touch upon the point. We shall have occasion to deal with this school of kari-siksa; but it will be convenient to indicate here briefly the earlier speculations on the subject. While not denying the supreme necessity of genius or poetic gift (satkavitva, Bhāmaha i 4) which consists in pratibha (poetic conception), all writers, early or

naturally ananda or priti became in later Poetics the chief object of poetry. Mammata calls it sakala-prayojana-mauli-bhutam.

late, agree in emphasising the necessity of study and experience. Both Bhāmaha (i 5) and Dandin (i 103-4) acknowledge pratible which is said to be natural (naisaryiki) or inborn (sahajā); and Vāmana puts it into a formula that in pratibha lies the seed of poetry, and defines it (L3,16 vriti) as an antenstal espacity of the mind 10 without which no poetry is possible, and if possible, it is only ridiculous, a dictum which is almost literally copied by Mammata who, however, uses the more general term sakti 11. Abhinavagupta ("Locana p. 29) defines it as intelligence (prajna), capable of fresh invention (aparea-rasta-nirmana-kaama), its distinguishing characteristic being the capacity of creating poetry possessed of passion, clarity and beauty (tasya višeso razáveša vniša lyc-mundarya-kävyanirmaga-keamatram); and he quotes the authority of Bharata (vii 2) who designates it as the 'internal disposition' of the poet (antargata bhāva). This agrees with the definition of pratible as projuc nava-navállekha-sálini, given in a verse cited anonymously by Hemacandra, but attributed by Ksemendra (Aucitya-vicarii ad M. 35) to Abhinava's gura, Bhatta Tanta; and it is recognised as canonical by later writers, to whom Abhinava and Mammata were the final law-givers, but who sometimes add

¹⁰ janmintara-gata-samskāra-višeņak kašcit. Daņdin describes it as pārva-vāsanā-guņānubandķi.

¹¹ used by Kudraja (i 14-15), who distinctly gives two alternative terms šakti and pratibhā, and by Abhinavagupta (Locana p. 137) who says saktili pratibhānam, varņamījavastu-viņaya-nūtanöllekha-šālitvam.

that it is lokôttara and capable of producing an indefinable charm variously termed vaicitrya, viochitti, cărutva, saundarya, hrdyatva or ramagiyateā.

While these theorists believed in pratibha, they also believed in "making a poet into a poet", and maintained the importance of what Dandin calls sruta and abbiyoga, but what later writers call vyutpatti (culture) and abhyasa (practice). Rudrata, therefore, thinks that pratible is not only sahajā or inborn, but also utpādyā or capable of attainment by vyatpatti or culture. The poet is thus required to be an expert in a long list of sciences or arts. The earliest of such lists is given by Bhamaha in i 9, where mention is made of the following studies as 'sources' of poetry 12, viz., grammar, prosody, lexicography, stories based on itihasa, ways of the world, logic and the fine arts. This substantially agrees with Rudrata's list (i 18), but Vamana deals with the topic in greater detail in 1. 3.21-20. and requires the poet to be conversant with grammar, lexicon, metrics, arts, morals, erotics politics, and, above all, the ways and means of the world. It it is also sometimes implied that the poet must have studied the theory of poetry and made himself proficient in poetical exercise (abhyāsa). He must be clever at weaving metaphors and other poetic figures, at the trick of producing a double meaning, at manipulating complicated schemes of

¹² Read kāvyā-yonayah (instead of kāvyayairvašī in the printed text), as indicated by Vāmana I. 3.1 (kāvyāngāni) and Rājašekhara viii (kāvya-yonayah). Cf Jacobi in op. cit. p. 224.

alliteration and rhyming, at following up quick composition, at making complete strophes out of broken lines and sentences, and similar ingenious practices. When a new work is published, it is submitted to and approved by assemblies of experts, as we are told by Mankhuka, Rajasekhara and others. was obviously expected to answer all the demands of theory, although it was by no means an easy test; for style, says an Indian stylist, is like a woman's virtue which cannot bear the least reproach. The public likewise possessed or were expected to possess a certain amount of theoretical knowledge; for the rusiks or sakrdaya, the man of taste, the true appreciators of poetry, must be, according to the conception of the Sanskrit theorists, not only well read and wise, and initiated into the intricacies of theoretic requirements, but also possessed of the fine instincts of aesthetic enjoyment13. The post naturally liked to produce an impression that he had observed all the rules, traditions and expectations of such an audience; for the ultimate test of poetry is laid down as consisting in the appreciation of the sakplaya Thus the poet is required to be true to his natural gifts and yet conform to the rigid demands of theory. The art of poetry in this way came to flourish in a learned atmosphere, and the theory of Poetics, as we shall see, naturally assumed a scholastic and dialectic character in common with the

¹³ On the subject of the "education" of the poet, see F. W. Thomas. The Making of the Sanskrit Poet in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume p. 375 f. On the sakrdaya see Vol. Upp. 111-12, and references given therein.

whole scientific literature of ancient India. It is true that a certain amount of inevitable difference is always to be found between theory and practice; and, as on the one hand, we have gifted poets aspiring to untrammelled utterance, so on the other, there is a tendency to degenerate towards a slavish adherence to rules, which naturally resulted in a strong overloading of a composition by complicated or artificial expressions.

With these general remarks we may now turn to a brief consideration of other topics in the work of Bhamaha. Bhamaha rests content by taking the kaoya to consist of sabda and artha (sabdorthan sahisan kanyam), giving equal prominence to word and souse in postry. But he implies by his treatment that the karya should also be faultless (nirdosa) and embellished by poetic figures (sillamkaru). Then follows the classification of poetry (i) according to form, juta verse and prose (ii) according to the language employed, into Sauskrit, Prakrit and Apabhramsa (iii) according to the subject-matter, into fourfold division, so far as it deals respectively with incidents human or divine, incidents invented by the poet's imagination, or incidents based on the several arts or sciences. (iv) according to the conventional way of grouping compositions into fivefold recognised division, viz. sarga-bandha (mahakavya), abhineyartha (drams), ākhyānikā, kathī and anibaddha-kāoya (i. e. detached poems like gāthās or individual šlokas). Bhāmaha's definition of a mahākāoya is more or less conventional, and practically agrees with that to be found

in Dandin (i 14 f) and in the Agni-purana (336, 24-32). With regard to abhineyartha, he omits its treatment because others have treated of it already. Bhāmaha lays down a somewhat hard-and-fast line of demarcation between the kathā and the ākhyāyikā, a view which is not accepted by Dandin and which Vāmana does not enter into as being too fine 14. With regard to the formal classification of verse and prose, it may be remarked that poetry, according to the view of Sanskrit theorists, has a twofold aspect according as it consists of verse (padya) or prose (gadya), although some authors speak of a mixed kind (mi*ra), e.g., the drama in which both prose and verse occur.

¹⁴ Vol. I pp. 60 and 67. We have tried to show elsewhere (The Katha and the Akhyayika in Classical Sanskrit in BSOS, vol. iii) that two or three well-defined stages are distinguishable in the development of these two species of the kāvya in Classical Sanskrit, the earliest being represented by the characteristics given by Bhamaha and the latest by those given by Rudrata, and that while Bhamaha cannot be taken as having accepted Bana's two masterpieces as his prototype, Rudrața has only generalised their important features into universal definitions of the katha and the ākhyāyikā. Lucote in his Essai sur Gunādhya et la Brhatkathā suggests (p.282) that Dandin must have found that Gunadhya did not observe the traditional distinction between the kathā and the ākhyūyikā (e. g. in the original Brhatkathā, on Lacôte's showing p. 220, there was a narration by Naravahanadatta of his own victories, which is contrary to the rule laid down by Bhāmaha), and was therefore led to reject it altogether. Bhāmaha, no doubt, refers to a kathā in Apabhraméa in i 28 but it is not known whether he was aware of the existence of the Brhatkatha.

The doctrine that prose is the opposite, not of poetry, but of verse, which began to be realised rather late in European critical theories, was very early admitted without question by Sanskrit authors with whom metre does not play the same part as it does in European poetry; for in India from the earliest time, it was usual to put down even the driest teachings in a metrical form 15.

Bhāmaha, however, appears (i 31-35) to be indifferent to the literary value of riti (roughly, 'diction'), to which Dandin and his followers of the Riti school attach so much importance. He thinks that the distinction made by the riti-theorists between vaidarbha and ganda is meaningless; and though he does not use the terms marga (Dandin) or riti (Vāmana), his statement would imply that he is speaking of vaidarbha and ganda-kāryas respectively, in which some had apparently seen differences of manner and treatment. As a necessary corollary apparently to this view, he does not think it worth while to devote much attention to the gunas, which the riti-theorists take as forming the constituent excellences of riti, and

theorists define poetry so as to include any literary work of the imagination in its scope, and absolutely refuse to make of rhyming or versing an essential. This tradition is so well established that the question is nowhere discussed and never doubted. Thus the theorists include under the head of poetry romances like Kādambari or Harqacarita which are written for the most part in prose. Vāmana even quotes a dictum which says that prose is the touchstone of the poets (gadyam kavīnām nikaṇam vadanti, clted in vṛtti on 1, 3, 21).

summarily mentions in another context (ii 1-3) only three gunas, viz., mādhurya, ojas and prasāda, apparently rejecting Bharata's ten orthodox excellences. He does not, however, connect them with the rtti, and thinks that they are distinguished according to the presence or absence, in varying degrees, of compound words.

Bhamaha then proceeds to define and discuss. with illustrations, the poetic figures or alamkaras. to which he devotes two long chapters (ii 4-95, iii 1-56), consisting of nearly one hundred and fifty verses. Then come (ch. iv) the dosas or demerita of composition (some of which are already dealt with in i 37-56), and the whole subject is wound up with two chapters (v-vi) on the logical to and grammatical 17 correctness of poetry respectively. Now leaving aside these two requirements and the dosas, all of which are in a sense negative requirements, the only thing of the highest importance in poetry, in Bhamaha's view, is apparently the alankara or the poetic figure, which takes up the bulk of his treatment. Bhamaha attempts to classify poetic expression into fixed rhetorical categories, and from this point of view his work possesses the general appearance of a technical manual, comprising a collection of definitions with illustrations and empirical canons for the benefit of the artist desirous of externalising his ideas. But

¹⁶ in which are discussed such nyāya-vaišeņika topics as the pramāņa, prajītā, hetu, distanta etc.

¹⁷ giving practical hints for attaining grammatical correctness (saušabūya) and corresponding to the last adhikaraņa of Vāmana's work.

in the course of his enquiry, it probably struck him that a philosophical or scientific classification of expressions is not possible; for, although every single expressive fact may be grouped together generically, the continuous variation of the individual content results in an irreducible variety of expressive facts. He attempts, therefore, to arrive at a synthesis by holding that there may be modes or grades of expression, of which the best mode is that which involves vakrokti¹⁸, by which a certain peculiarity or charm of expression is posited as the essential principle of all alamkāras¹⁹.

The etymological meaning of the term eakrokti is "crooked speech"; and this meaning appears in the verbal poetic figure defined by Rudrata (ii 13-17) and, after him, by all later theorists, who connote

t8 It is true that in one place Hh imaha speaks of the figure bhitvika as the characteristic excellence of a composition as a whole, a view which coincides with that of Dandin, as well as of Bhatti who illustrates this figure in one whole cante (canto xii). It is defined as the representation of objects, whether past or future, as if they were present, the condition of the representation being that the story or theme must have picturesque, strange and exalted meaning (citrodattidbhutirthatvan kathayah) and must be capable of being enacted well (reablimitati), and that the words used must be agreeable (sabdiankulatā). But Bhāmaha does not appear to lay any special emphasis on bhavikatva in Poetry, but deals with it as he does with any other poetic figure. No doubt, he speaks of bhivika as a prabu niha-guna, but Bhamaha does not seem to have made any theoretical distinction between the guna and the alambins as such, and the word gang here should not be taken in any technical sense.

¹⁹ On this subject, see my introd, to Kuntala's Vakroktijivita, pp. x-xix.

by this figure a kind of pretended speech based on paronomasia (alesa) or peculiarities of intonation (kāku). In Vāmana, on the other hand, vakrokti appears not as verbal figure (śabdálankāra) but as a figure based on the sense (arthdlamkara); and it is defined as a metaphorical mode of speech based on the "transference of sense" (laksana). Bhamaha, while admitting it, apparently in common with Dandin (ii 363), as a collective designation of all alamkaras "0, uses the term to imply a selection of words and turning of ideas peculiar to poetry and abhorrent of matter-of-fact speech. Kuntala, who developes this idea and builds a unique theory of alamkara on its basis, makes this meaning clear when he indicates by such eakratā the peculiar charm (vicchitti) or strikingness (vaicitrya) which can be imparted to ordinary expression by the conception of the poet (kavi-pratible). When words are used in the ordinary manner of common parlance, as people without a poetic turn of mind use them, there is no special charm, no strigkingness; and consequently it is not poetical in the sense in which Bhamaha and his follower understand it. Such svabhavokti or 'natural' mode of speech, to which Dandin is so partial but which he also distinguishes from vakrokti, is not acceptable to Bhamaha and Kuntala, who refuse to acknowledge svabhavokti as a poetic figure at all; for these

²⁰ See reference cited in ap. cit. fn 17 at pp. xv-xviii. Also see Jacobi in ZDMG lxiv 130 f, and in Sb. der preust. Akad. xxiv, 1922, pp. 224 f. Kuntala also uses the term vakrokti as almost coextensive with the term alamkõra (p. xxiii), and regards the so-called poetic filgures as aspects of vakrokti.

theorists apparently imply a distinction between the "artistic", or ornamental, or extraordinary, on the one hand, and the "naturalistic", or unadorned, or ordinary expression, on the other*1.

21 To Bhamaha and Kuntala, spabhanokti, which consists in a description of the natural disposition (svabhava) of an object, is obviously wanting in the requisite strikingness to be poetical; for they take it to be merely plain or unadorned description and imply that a poet should express things or ideas differently from the banality or prosiness of the sastras or of common life. But Dandin and later theorists, on the contrary, reckon jati or svabhavokti among the poetic figures. On this point we quote what we said elsewhere (Introd. to Vakrekti-jivila, p. xiv, in 17). "Though formally the expression of the suabhavokti may not differ from a statement or description in common life there is still a substantial difference. For, the poet sees or conceives the very same thing not in the same way as common people. In the case of the latter, all things stand in some relation to his personal interests, which should be understood to connote also scientific interest in them as objects of knowledge. But, for the poet, the object has no connexion with his or anybody's interests, not even as an object of knowledge; he has a vision of the thing in itself in its true nature. This is what is partially understood by lokütikranta-gocarata, and Jagannatha makes it clear (ed. Bombay, 1915, p. 4) while explaining the term lokôttaratva as an element of poetic charm. Literally lokôttara means super-mundane, but in the sense indicated above it may be translated roughly as 'disinterested' or 'dissociated'. Now, Dandin, adopting the traditional term alamkāra and applying it to the svabhāvokti, could not very well accept Bhāmaha's statement that vakratā is the characteristic of all poetic figures, because vakrokti excludes the svabkāvokti (Daņģin ii 362); but he tries to reconcile

Bhāmaha, therefore, lays down, in his classification of the different kinds of kāvya, that the subdivisions of poetry mentioned by him are admissible to
that designation in so far as they possess vakrokti
(i 30); and this is made more explicit by declaring
later on that whatever value might be attached to
the function of riti in poetry, the vakrokti is desirable
as an embellishment of poetic speech (i 36), which
he characterises elsewhere as vakrā (vi 23). Therefore he calls upon the poet to be diligent in accomplishing this, as the vakrokti manifests the sense of
poetry and as no emblishment of poetry is possible
without vakrokti (ii 85). It is not surprising, therefore, that he rejects figures like hetu, sūkyma and
lesa on the ground that they do not involve vakrokti.

It is curious, however, that Bhamaha nowhere explicitly defines or explains the word vakrokti. Perhaps here we have the work of early theorisers who have not yet learnt to theorise systematically, but who are carried away more or less by their practical object of establishing definite norms and

his own view with Bhāmaha's opinion by extending the latter's remarks regarding the atiānyakti (ii 81) over all poetic figures, thus including the reabhāvokti. The Indian theorists have almost neglected an important part of their task, viz., to find a definition of the nature of the subject of a poem as the product of the poet's mind; this problem is the main issue of Western Aesthetics. Only svabhāvokti and bhāvika can be adduced as a proof that the Indian theorists were conscious of the problem, but did not attack it in its entirety, treating it only in some of its aspects". See also, on this point, Jacobi in Sb. der preuss. Akad. cited above, pp. 224 f.

prescribing general formulas as a means of attaining literary expression. Or, perhaps the idea of vakrokti was traditional or already too well known in his time to require detailed treatment At any rate. after enumerating and defining the poetic figures up to and including atisayokti, he says generally saisā sarvaiva vakroktih (ii 85), with a hint (as it appears from the context) of identifying the vakrokti in substance with the idea involved in atisayokti. Kuntala appears to agree with Bhamaha that some kind of atitaya involved in vakrokti, and thinks that the ationya is a necessary element in what he calls vicitra-mārga, where vakrokti-vaicitrya prevails (i 27). Dandin probably arrives at the same conclusion in a different way when he speaks of all poetic figures as depending on atisayokti, a view which is explained thus by one of his commentators : alamkarántaranam api eya (atisayoktyalamkarah) upakari bhavati, atibaya-jananatvam vinā bhūpanatayā na ityabhiprayah. Anandavardhana's remarks in this connexion are illuminating. He says that it is possible to include atisaya in all poetic figures, as has been successfully done by great poets, for the purpose of increasing the beauty of poetic compositions; and citing Bhamsha's idea of atisayokti and vakrokti he remarks (pp. 208)11: "There is an excellence of charm in that poetic figure in which the atisayokti is established by the imagination of

²² tatrātibayoktir yam alamkāram adhitisthati kavipratibhā-vašāt tasya cārntvātībaya-yogah, anyasya tvalamkāramātrataivēti. Sarvālamkāra-barīra-svīkarama-yogyatvenābhedipacārāt saiva sarvālamkāra-rūpētyayam evārtho'vagantavyah.

the poet; other figures are merely so called. Since it is able to enter into the body or composition of all poetic figures, it is, by assuming it to be identical with them, called their essence". The atisayokti therefore, is taken, in the words of Abhinavagupta's explanation, as the common token or generic property of all poetic figures (sareálankára-sāmānya-rūpam), or, as Mammata puts it, as their life-breath or essence (prānateenācatisthate, p. 743). One can realise from this the close connexion between this important figure and Bhāmaha's notion of vakrokti.

Bhamsha defines atienyokti as nimittato vaco yat tu tokātikrāsta-gocaram (ii 81), which Dandin paraphrases as vivakeā yā višesasya loka-sīmātipartini (ii 214). It would seem, therefore, that the atisaya in the vakrata of poetic figures consists essentially in this lokátikranta-gocurata, and Abhinava makes this clear when he explains in this connexion ("Locana p. 208) : sabdasya hi vakratā abhidheyasya ca vakratā loköttīrņena rāpeņāvasthanam. From this it is reasonable to conclude that by vakratā Bhāmaha implies a kind of heightened or extraordinary turn given to expression (what Kuntals would call bhangs or vicchitti), which constitutes the charm or strikingness of poetic expressiou, as distinguished from common speech where facts are simply stated. We shall see that Kuntala elaborates this idea by the peculiar theory of vaicitrya or vicchitti (which is taken as almost equivalent to the term vakratā) of word and sense as forming the basis of all poetic decoration (the so-called poetic figures being mere aspects

of it), whereby the poet lifts ordinary speech to the level of extraordinary poetic utterance.

As a necessary corollary from the prominence given to vakrokti or alamkara in poetry by this system, it follows that ideas of rasa should be included in the scope of particular poetic figures. We shall see that Bhāmaha actually assigns this function to the particular figure rasavat, and, if we are to accept Udbhata's position as indicative of that of Bhamaha, also to the figures preyas and wrjasvin. By putting a technical interpretation on the word vibhavyate in Bhamaha ii 85, Abhinavagupta attempts to make out that the rasa as well as alamkara originates in cabrokti; but this is probably an instance of the not-unusual but rather far-fetched ingenuity of the commentator. Regarding vyangyartha or dhvani, the "suggested sense", which plays such an important part in later theories, Bhamaha nowhere expressly alludes to this idea; but we can never dogmatically affirm that some kind of suggested sense was not known to him. He defines figures like paryāyokta, vyājastuti, aprastuta-prasansa and samasokti, in all of which there is an indication of an implied sense. The paryāyokta, for instance, is defined as paryāyoktam yad anyena prakarenábhidhiyate (iii 8), and Udbhata expands this with vacya-cacaka-vrttibhyam sunyendvagamátmanā, in which there is a clear indication of an avagamyamana artha 23. This is also apparent from the criticism of Anandavardhana, who

²³ Cf Ruyyaka's remarks on this figure. See also Bhamaha's definition of samasokti, ii 79.

does not agree, however, that in Bhamaha's paryayokta there is a predominance of the suggested sense, inasmuch as the expressed sense is not intended there to be merely subservient (pp. 39-40). In another place (p. 108), Anandavardhana further remarks that Udbhata has shown in detail that expressed poetic figures like rapaka can sometimes be " suggested element, a case of what is explained by dheani-theorists as alamkara-dheani. in the opinion of the great exponent of the dhounitheory himself, Bhamaha as well as Udbhata (cf. Locana p. 10) is not an abhava-vadin or one who denies the existence of diponi (as Mallinatha, p.24, wrongly considers him to be), but an antarbhava-vadin who includes the idea of dheani in other elements of poetry. Discussing this point, Prattharenduraja appears to agree with Anandavar lhana; for, in his opinion, the dhvani, which is considered by some school to be the 'soul' of postry, is not separately dealt with by these early writers because they include it in poetic figures (p. 79). In the same way, Jagannatha (pp. 414-15) remarks that although Udbhata and others, who were earlier than the author of the dhvani-system, never use the term dhoani, it is yet unreasonable to hold on that ground that the concept of dheani was unknown to them, because they indicate some of its aspects in their definitions of figures like paryāyokta, samāsokti, vyāja-stuti and aprastuta-prasamsa. To the same effect is the general statement of Ruyyaka (p. 3), who says that Bhamaha, Udbhata and other ancient writers

would comprehend the suggested sense in the alumkara as an adornment of the expressed sense; in other words, they do not take it independently but as an accessory to the expressed sense, in the same way as they take rasa as an accessory element. Following perhaps the tradition of Bhamaha's paryāyokta, the younger Vāgbhata defines (pp. 36-37) the figure as dhvanitábhidhanam, and refers the curious reader to the treatise of Anandavardhana for a detailed treatment of dhranitokti , while Hemacandra defines (p. 263) it more briefly as vyangyasy6ktib. In all this, one can perceive an attempt to read the idea of dhram into older authors like Bhamaha and Udbhata and thus to find an orthodox authority for it from an early time; but it is not unlikely that the general notion of a suggested sense, like the general notion of rasa, was not unknown to these ancient authors, although it was only naively understood and never independently treated, being uncritically included as an element of some poetic figures,

(2)

The only writer of later times who develops Bhāmaha's notion of vakrakti is Kuntala, the author of the Vakrakti-fivita; but for this exposition, it disappears from the writings of this school, Udbhata, one of the earliest avowed followers of Bhāmaha, nowhere mentions it, although it is quite possible that we would have got a much more comprehensive idea of Udbhata's standpoint from his lost

Bhāmaha-vicaraņa or Kāvyālaṃkāra-vierti 24 than from his existing brief compendium of poetic figures. His Alaṃkāra-saṃgraha, as its name implies, consists merely of a collection of verses defining forty-one figures (including three varieties of anuprāsa), and we are left absolutely in the dark regarding his views on general problems.

In his treatment of these poetic figures, Udbhata follows Bhāmaha very closely, enumerating the figures in the same order and even borrowing literally the definitions of a large number of them. In the case of a few particular poetic figures, however, Udbhata enters into distinctions which were probably unknown to Bhāmaha. Thus, he speaks of four forms of the atisayakti, which Bhāmaha does not mention, but which agrees substantially with the four out of the five varieties of that figure recognised by later writers. Bhāmaha spoke (ii 6-8) of only two kinds of amprāsa, viz., grāmyānuprāsa and lātīyānuprāsa, which classification, Pratīhārendurāja thinks, is based on a tacit admission of the two vettis, viz., grāmyā

²⁴ See Vol. 1 p. 45. The six chapters of Udbhata's existing work deal exclusively with the poetic figures in the following order and divisions: I. punaruktavadābhāsa, chekānuprāsa, vrityanuprāsa (with the three vritis) lahinuprāsa, rāpaka, dīpaka (3 kinds), upamā, pratīvastūpamā. 11. ākṣepa, arthāntaranyāsa, vyatīreka, vibhāvanā, tamāsokti, atīšayokti (4 kinds). III. yathāsamkhya, utprekṣū, svabhūvekti. IV. preyasvat, rasavat, ūrjasvin, paryāyokta, samāhīta, udātta (2 kinds), bleṣa. V. apahnuti, viūesokti, virodha, tulyayogitā, aprastuta-prabaṃsū, vyājastuti, vidaršanā, saṃkara (4 kinds), upameyopamā, sahokti, parivrtti. VI. sasaṃdeha, ananvaya, saṃsṛṣṭi, bhāvika, kāvyalvūga (hetu) and kāvyadṛṣṭānta (drṣṭānta).

and upanagarika. Udbhata, on the other hand, distinguishes three varieties of anuprasa, called chekanuprasa, latanuprasa and vrttyanuprasa, the last of which appears to be classified again on the basis of the three orttis, viz., grāmyā (or komalā), parusā and upanāgarikā. These vrttis, which consist primarily of suitable sound-adjustment with a view to alliteration, appear to have been first recognised, as Abhinavagupta points out, by Udbhata, and from him known to Anandavardhana (pp. 5-6). We shall see presently that Rudrata mentions five vettis (ii 19 f); but we find Udbhata's views accepted by later theorists like Mammata and Ruyyaka who, however, consider the whole question from the point of view of rasa 35. Again, the grammatical basis of the divisions of upama (of which there is only a hint in Bhāmaha ii 31-33) first appears in Udbhata (i 35-40) in a form which establishes itself in later theory. It is true that Udbhata does not in the present treatise devote, as Bhamaha does, a special chapter to the question of grammatical correctness, nor does he allude to the theories regarding functions of words already hinted at by Bhamaha (vi 6 f), yet in deference to the grammatical analysis of speech, he discusses at some length the various subdivisions of upamā, due to suffixes like vat, kyac, kyan, kvip, kalpap and the like, indicative of resemblance; and this analysis became almost standardised in later literature. Regarding definitions of individual figures, minor differences, as well as further elaboration, are

²⁵ These vettis refer primarily to anuprasa (alliteration, or sound-arrangement of letters), and has nothing to do with

noticeable. Thus Udbhata's tudyayogita corresponds to that of Mammata, but Bhamaha's figure of the same name is perhaps equivalent to Mammata's dīpaka. The figures dṛṣṭānta and kāvyalinga (also called kāvya-drstanta and kūcya-heta respectively) are omitted by Bhamaha, but defined and illustrated by Udbhata for the first time. But Udbhata is the only older writer who entirely omits the treatment of yamaka. Again, Bhāmaha recognises šlesa involved in sahokti, upama and hetn, and Dandin speaks of sless as coming in and increasing the charm of all figures. But the well-known controversy regarding the division of sless into subda slesa and arthasless, together with the question of its relations to other poetic figures in which it may appear, seems to have started, as Ruyyaka notes, from Udbhata's time; for Udbhata declares that in cases of combination, the sless is stronger than the other figures to the extent even of dispelling their apprehension. We shall also see that Udbhata is certainly more advanced in recognising rasa and defining its place in the poetic figures, if not in poetry as a whole; and he even goes so far as using the technical terms bhava and anubhava, which can not be truced in Bhamaha. The samsreti of two or more independent poetic figures is found indeed in Bhamaha and Bhatti (as also in Dandin and Vamana), but Udbhata does not refer to the two cases of such samsrafi mentioned by Dandin (ii 360) and distinguishes it definitely from

the four dramatic vittis mentioned by Bharata (vi 25, NK 24f),

samkara (pp. 63 and 72), of which he mentions four cases 26

All this, however, means an advance, and not a deviation; it indicates an aspect of the growth of scholastic activity, which delighted in indulging in fine distinctions and minute classifications, and not a departure from the original standpoint. To later writers, however, it is not Bhamaha but Udbhata who is the authoritative exponent of this system and whose views are entitled to great respect from all schools of opinion. Bhamsha indeed commands veneration due to his antiquity ; but he was, in course of time, eclipsed by his commentator, and later theorists turn to Udbhata's work as embodying the standard opinions on the subject. We have the testimony of Anandavardhana. Abhinavagupta and Ruyyaka that some of the later speculations and controversies (e. g., those regarding upama-divisions, or slesa) started from Udbhata's time; and Udbhata (as also Dandin and Rudrata) probably showed the way to minute analysis and differentiation of poetic figures. which play such an important part in later theories. We can understand what influence Udbhata's teachings exerted in this respect when we bear in mind that they guided very considerably the enquiries of two important later law-givers in Poetics, Mammata

²⁶ Vamana gives the samerete a limited scope, recognising only two varieties, spamā-rāpaka and utprekṣdvayava, in opposition to Dandin ii 258-60. Dandin does not mention saṃkara. Possibly Dandin's aṅguṇāgibhāva-saṃsthāna variety of saṃsreti comes, as l'ratthārendu indicates, under Udbhaṭa's anugrāhydnugrāhaka variety of saṃkara.

and Ruyyaka, who fixed for the last time the definitions of most figures, analysed and arranged them on some general principle, and systematised their underlying doctrine. Although Kuntala elaborated one part of Bhamaha's teaching which he took as the basis of his own peculiar system of vakrokti, it was Udbhata who properly carried on Bhamaha's tradition and gave a systematic exposition of his work, Along with his great contemporary Vamana, Udbhata may be taken without exaggeration to have been the founder of the Kashmirian school of Poetics which produced its finest fruit in Anandavardhana; for Udbhata in Kashmir established the alamkaradoctrine in Poetics at a time when Vamana was skilfully constructing a theory of riti on the basis apparently of Dandin's teachings, and both of them prepared the way for Anandavardhaus.

Pratihārendurāja's interpretation of Udbhata is not always reliable as an indication of Udbhata's standpoint, for the commentator flourished a little over a century later than the text-writer and frequently reads his own notions into the text. For instance, Udbhata can be taken, as we have seen, to have been cognisant of a suggested sense, though he never speaks of dhanai or deals with it directly; but Pratthārendurāja refers to it in clearest terms and attempts by forced interpretation to make out that Ulbhata deliberately included it in the treatment of poetic figures. There is no doubt, again, that Pratthārendurāja was a great deal influenced by the views of the Rīti school of Vāmana. Discussing the mutual relation of guess and almakāra

(pp. 75 f), Prattharenduraja not only cites Vamana but closely follows his exposition. To Bhamaha, the distinction between guna and alamkara was hardly of any theoretic importance, and Udbhata appears to have been of the same opinion; for Ruyyaka distinctly states ulbhatadibhis tu quadlankārāsām prāyašah sāmyam eea sūcitam (p.7), and Hemacandra adds in the same way tasmad yadarika-pravahena yundlamkara-bheda iti bhamahavivarage.....bhattódbhato'bhyadhāt (p. 17). Vāmana on the other hand, putting granter stress on riti elaborately distinguishes between the gunas and the alankāras; and Pratīhārendurāji apparently reads Vamua's views into Udbhata. Udbhata omite all mention of riti which Bhamaha had only referred to in passing, but Udbhata speaks of the three opttis, which are connected in particular with the figure anuprasa but which correspond roughly to the three ritis of Vamans, and like the latter, again, to the three gunas recognised by Anandavardhams and his followers 27. But even then it can not be said that Udbhata's vettis cover the same ground or possess the same functional value as the three ritis of Vamana or the three yugas of Anandavardhans. Udbhata, according to Abhinavagupta, regards (p. 134) the yunas, again, as the properties of samphatana, but this samphatana cannot be taken as equivalent to Vamana's riti 36 In the

²⁷ riter hi gunequeva paryavasāyitā, Locana p. 231.

²⁸ Anandavardhana speaks of sanghalanā as threefold, viz., a-samāsā, dirgha-samāsā and madkyama-samāsā, according as there is the presence or absence, in varying

same way, Pratihārendurāja speaks of rasa as the 'soul' of poetry (p. 77), although there is nothing to warrant the supposition that Udbhata, fully aware as he appears to be of the importance of this element, would regard it as anything but a subservient factor in some special poetic figures. ***

(3)

Although influenced considerably by the rasa-doctrine, Rudrata belongs properly to the Alamkara school. He recognises the rasa and devotes two degrees, of compound words. Each of these is suited, though not invariably, to a particular rasa. But he thinks that the gunas are not of the nature of the sanghajans, nor are they dependent upon sanghajans, but that the appropriateness of the sanghajans is determined by the rasa and by the speaker and the subject (pp. 133-5). See Jacobi in ZDMG. Ivi. 1202, p. 779, In 6.

20 This point will be discussed in ch. iv below. Rajafekhara attributes some other doctrines to Udbhata and his school (audbhatāh), which cannot be traced in Udbhata's existing work : (1) that a sentence has a threefold, denotation (vikyasya tridhabhidhāvyāpārah iti un lbhatāh) (2) that artha is of two kinds, viz., vicarita-sustha and avicarita-ramaniya. the first found in the sastras and the second in kavyas. The Vyaktiviveka-vyākhyāna attributes a similarly untraceable siddhanta at p. 4. Such citations or association of earlier authoritative names with a particular view may be merely pagietha, which is not an unusual procedure with later commentators, as Sukthankar in ZDMG Ixvi, 1912 discusses. Prattharenduraja, for instance, attributes a strange opinion to Bharata that grammatical works and the like do not deserve the name of poetry because they are not acceptable as such in the absence of the necessary gupastairly long chapters to it, but, as we shall see later on, the function he assigns to rasa is more or less extraneous. On the other hand, what he appears to consider as important in poetry is the alamkara or poetic figure, to which he devotes ten chapters which form indeed the bulk of his work. His work itself is named Kānyālamkāra apparently after the works of Bhāmaha and Udbhata, and is so designated, as his commentator Nami-sādhu admits (on i 2), from the undoubted emphasis laid on kānyālamkāras or poetic figures as elements of poetry.

Rudrata, like other writers of this school, does not seem to attach much importance to the riti or its constituent gunas. He speaks, no doubt, of four ritis (and not two, after Dandin, or three, after Vamana) viz., pancali, latiya, gandiya and raidarbhi; but in his exposition he is not influenced by the views of the Riti school. The classification of 'diction', thinks, depends on the presence in varying degrees of short (lagha), middling (madhya) and long (ayata) compound words, or on their entire absence as in the case of the vaidarbhi which is. apparently for this reason, considered to be the best type. Bhāmaha, we have seen, adopts a similar principle of classification, not with regard to the riti but to the three gunus admitted by himself. The notion of riti, therefore, belongs, in Rudrata's opinion, altogether to the province of sabda, governed by fixed rules of verbal arrangement, or rather, of using compounds, and is therefore called the samasavatt vetti of sabda. Rudrata does not speak of dhvani, nor does he appear to have been cognisant of its

function; but he implies a suggested sense (as also Bhāmaha and Udbhata do) ancillary to the expressed sense in a limited number of poetic figures, e. g., in figures like paryāya or paryāyokta and in the figure bhāva vii 38-41 30.

Rudrata's detailed treatment of the poetic figures or alamkāras however, is the distinguishing feature of his work and indeed justifies its title. It is not only elaborate and exhaustive, but also presents considerable difference of method and treatment, which distinguishes him from other earlier writers of this school, and which may lend plausibility to to the supposition that he is not only later in time but is also probably following a tradition other than that of Bhāmaha and his followers. To Udbhata's

³⁰ The two illustrations that Rudrata gives under the figure are quoted in the Kauya-peakilia, and in the "Locana p. 45. Abhinava distinctly refers to Rudrata's baroillambiea as a case in which the pyangya sense is subordinate. Abhinava thinks that Udbhata would take bhanilanubara as preyas (p. 71-72) It is remarkable that Ruyyaka, in his review of Rudrata's opinion on this point, states that Rudrata admits the three Kinds of suggestion mentioned by the dhoani-theorists. He says that Rudrata implies vastu-thvani in the figure bhava, alamkara-dhvani in rapaka etc, rasa-dhvani in rasavat, and preyas. But it may be pointed out that excepting what is stated with regard to vastu-thvani being traceable in Rudrața's bhava, the remark does not apply. Rudrata does not mention, define or otherwise deal with the figures rasavat, preyas etc, nor does he speak of praffyamini utpreksi referred to by Ruyyaka in this connexion (although he gives an example of implied utpreted in ix 13). See on this point Jacobi in ZDMG 1xii, 1908, p. 295 fn 5.

limited number of poetic figures Rudrata adds nearly thirty more independent figures 31, besides enumerating several sub-varieties of most of the important ones, and devoting an entire chapter to citra (already discussed by Dandin). Udbhata (not to speak of Bhamaha and Bharata) nowhere treats clearly of the distinction between ideal and verbal figures (i. e. figures relating to word and sense respectively). although such a distinction is implied by his treatment of four sabddlamkires first, followed by an exposition of the arthélamkaras. Dandin also implies a similar distinction by a similar separate treatment without expressly stating it. Rudrata, on the other hand, classifies the figures, like Vamana, clearly into two groups according as relative prominence is given to sabda and artha. He also gives us for the first time a basis or principle of arranging the individual figures

³¹ The number in Udbhata is 41, in Rudrata 68 (excluding sub-varieties). The sixteen chapters in Rudrata deal with the following subjects: (1) the purpose and object of poetry, the qualifications of a poet etc. (11) the four riti's (pāncāli lātīyā, gaudīyā and vaidarbhā), the six bhāsās (Prākrit, Sanskrit, Magadha, Piśaca, Surasent, Apabhramsa), and the five alamkāras of šabda. (III) yamaka. (IV) šlega. (V. citra) (VI) habita-doyas, including doyas of pada and vakya. (VII) four bases of arthulamkara (vastava, aupamya, atisaya and ilesa), and the figures based on vastava. (VIII) figures based on automya. (IX) figures based on atikaya. (X) figures based on Alosa (XI) dosas of artha, including whama-dosas. (XII) ten rasas, and treatment of sragara. (XIII) sambhogabringara etc. (XIV) vipralambha-bringara, and the upayers. (XV) characteristics of other rasas, (XVI) kinds of poetic compositions and their characteristics,

in groups in respect of their general nature or characteristics. The subdâlamkāras are arranged under five broad heads, viz., vakrokti (equivocation), slesa (paronomasia), citra (tricks of pictorial effects, like conundrum etc.), anuprasa (alliteration) and yamaka (repetition of sounds or rhyming); while the arthalamkāras are classified on a principle of his own, viz., under vastavu (reality), aupamya (comparison), atisaya (elevatedness) and sleya (coalescence)39, The figures mentioned under arthálankaras are : (1) VASTAVA. Sahokti, samuccaya, jati, yuthasamkhya, bhāva, paryāya, visama, anumāna, dīpaka, parikara, parivetti, parisankhyā, hetu, kāraņamālā, vyatireka, anyonya, uttura, sāra, sūksma, leša, avasara, milita and ekāvali (23 figures), (2) ACPANYA. Upamā, utpreksā, rūpaka, apaknuti, saņiraya, samāsokti, mata, uttara, anyokti, pratipa, arthantaranyasa, ubhayaayasa, bhrantimat, aksepet, pratyunika, drslanta, parva, schokti, samuccaya, samya and smaraya (21 figures). (3) ATISATA. Pareu, visera, utpreksa, vibhavana, tadguna, adhien vikrodha vigama, asangati, pihita, vyāghāta and beta (12 figures). (4) št. sa. Two kinds-suddha and sunkirya, the former subdivided into avisesa, virodha, alhika, vakra, vyāja, ukti, asambhava, avayera, tattva, and virodhabhasa, and the latter comprising two varieties (10+2=12 figures).

³² Vamana had already taken antampa as the basis of his classification, for he would regard all figures as upamatrapation, implying that all figurative expression forms nothing more than aspects of metaphorical expression. Rudrata, however, thinks that all figures do not imply comparison, and in this he is in agreement with all writers excepting Vamana who is unique in his extreme view.

Dandin, who himself enumerates a very large number of poetic figures, very sagely remarks that if for some slight difference, a different figure is to be defined, there would be hardly any end to their infinite multiplication. This remark partly applies to Rudrata whose general scheme, as well as particular definitions, is open to such an obvious objection. One of the curious results of rigorously following this classification is that the same figure reappears as an alamkāra under different groups. sahokti and samuccaya have two aspects, based respectively on edstaga and aupamya, while the figure utpreksa appears similarly under aupamya and atisaya respectively. Some of Rudrata's figures have been abandoned by later writers, while some have changed their names or have been modified 33. later speculation inclining rather towards the more orthodox expositions of Udbhata, or even of Dandin; yet the general merit of Rudrata's analysis and definitions, testified to by the more or less implicit acceptance by later theorists like Mammata34, cannot

³³ e. g., Rudraţa's bhāva, mata, sāmya and pihita are not defined by later writers (excepting Vagbhaţa în his Kāvydnuhāsana), while his hetu is not admitted by Mammaţa. Rudraţa's avasara and pūrva (mentioned by the younger Vagbhaṭa) appear to be the same as the second variety of Mammaţa's (and Udbhaṭa's) udātta and the fourth variety of Mammaṭa's atihayokti respectively.

³⁴ Mammata's indebtedness to Rudrata is discussed by Sukthankar in ZDMG, lxvi, 1912, p. 478, as well as in many places in Nobel's Beitraege already cited. Ruyyaka, on the other hand, while drawing largely on Mammata himself, is more indebted to Udbhata.

be denied. They not only indicate a considerable advance in scholastic activity on Bhāmaha and Udbhata, but also remarkable independence, and consequent divergence, of treatment in several notable cases.

Taking the verbal figures. Rudrata's vakrokti, based on paronomasia (slesu) and intonation (kāku), has nothing in common with that of his predecessors, The intonational vakrokti is indeed not accepted by some of his successors (e. g. Rajasekhara p. 31 and Hemacandra p. 234), inasmuch as it is supposed to depend on mere peculiarities of reading (pathadharmatvat) : but on the whole, Rudrata's definition of the figure replaced that of Vamana's metaphorical oakrokti, survived Kuntala's broader interpretation of vakrokti, and firmly established itself as the only recognised figure in later literature from Mammata downwards. Again, Rudrata's classification of anuprasa is somewhat different from that of Udbhata, the former basing it on the five crttis of letters (varya), viz., madhurā, paruyā, praudhā, lulitā and bhadra, and the latter admitting only three vettis (parusa, upanāgarikā and grāmyā or komalā) only in connexion with one of his three kinds of anuprasa, viz., vrttyanuprasa. The later writers follow Udbhata on this point. Udbhata, again, omits the treatment of yamaka, in spite of the examples of Bharata and Bhamaha before him, and in spite of the fact that Dandin had already given one of the fullest treatments of that figure in the whole realm of Alamkara literature. Rudrata perhaps ranks next to Dandin in the fulness of his treatment, though there is considerable divergence in the details of classification in

the treatments of these two writers. In the same way, there is no reference to citra in Bharata, Bhamaha or Udbhata, although Magha says (xix 41) that it was in his time a figure indispensable in a mahākāvya. Dandin dilates upon some of its varieties, but Rudrata gives a much fuller exposition, and it is noteworthy that although Mammata does not attach much value to such verbal ingenuity, yet in his discussion of this figure he quotes almost all the illustrations from Rudrata. In connexion with the faults concerning verbal figures, Rudrata points out several cases (vi 29-33) where punarukta or tautology is not a fault : Udbhata, as Nami-sādhu also notes, includes all these cases in the figure punaruktavadábhasa or 'semblance of tautology'. Udbhata, again, speaks of slega apparently as an arthdlamkara, and divides it into sabda-slesa and artha-slesa, which correspond respectively to abhanga- and sabhanga-slesa of later writers. Rudrata, on the other hand, speaks of sleso as a sabdálamkara which he carefully distinguishes (ii 13) from the arthálamkara of the same name, which he deals with separately in ch, x and which forms the basis of twelve independent figures. The verbal figure sleya, on the contrary, is elaborately classified according as it relates to varya, linga, prakṛti, pratyaya, nibhakti and orcana (iv 12), Rudrata thus avoiding the controversy carried on by later theorists as to whether the sless is a figure of sabda or of artha.

Regarding arthálamkāras, Rudrata mentions only four upamā-doşas (xi 24), in contradistinction to seven of Bhāmaha and Medhāvin and six of Vāmana³⁵.

³⁵ See Vol. I p. 61, fn 3,

viz., vaisamya, asambhava, aprasiddhi and samanyasabda-bheda, the last defect including all cases of change of a word signifying common property (as construed with the upameya and the upamana), due to the difference of linga, vacana, kāla, kāraka and vibhakti. We have already noted that Udbhata enters rather minutely into the grammatical subdivisions of upama, but this finds no place in Rudrata's treatment, which includes them in a lump in somasopamā and pratyayopamā. Again, Bhāmaha positively rejects hetu as a poetic figure, although Dandin speaks of it as vācām uttama-bhūşaņam, including it under kāvyalinga (kāraka-hetu) and anumāna (jñāpakahetu). Udbhata recognises only kacyalinga, calling it also kāvya-hetu and distinguishing it from dretanta which he calls kāvya-drstanta. It is Rudrata (vii 82) who first defines and fixes its characteristics as finally accepted in Poetics. It is needless to cite any more instances; but what is said above will be enough to indicate, in the first place, that there is a considerable divergence of view between Rudrata and his predecessors with regard to the nature and scope of individual figures and their classification; and what is more important to note, it is easy to demonstrate that most of these differences are fundamental, We can reasonably assume, therefore, that Rudrata, possessed as he is of great inventive powers, either follows a system of classification and definition peculiar to himself, or follows a tradition of opinion different in some respects from that of Bhamsha and his followers, although in general theory he belongs to a common school.

Although Rudrata's work is remarkable indeed

for its careful analysis, systematic classification and apposite illustration of a large number of poetic figures, some of which have become more or less standardised, his direct contribution to the theory of Poetics cannot be valued so highly! Indeed, the practical nature and scope of his work, like that of Udbhata's, leave hardly any room for a discussion of of general principles or of the speculative aspects of the questions involved. Rhetoric rather than Poeties appears to be his principal theme, as it is of most writers of this system who concern themselves entirely with the elaboration of rhotorical categories in which they suppose the whole charm of poetry lies. Partly perhaps to his novelty of treatment and , artly to his omission of the discussion of ultimate principles is due the fact that Rudrata has hardly any direct follower in later literature, unless one cites Rudrabhatta, who, however, utilises only his rasa chapters. Rudrata's name is not associated with the establishment of any particular system, although he shows great fertility and acuteness in his treatment of individual figures, which, in some cases, have been implicitly accepted by later writers on the subject. Rudrata is the last great exponent of the Alamkara school, strictly so called; for after him the school began to decline and merge ultimately, like the two other sister schools relating to rasa and riti, into the finally dominant Dhyani school.

(4)

The decline of the alamkara-system was probably

synchronous with and was indeed hastened by the rise of the rival riti-doctrine. The first step towards this is indicated by the general trend of Dandin's work. Dandin who stands, as it were, midway between the Alamkara and the Riti schools, admits, no doubt, the great importance of poetic figures (alamkāras) in a scheme of Poeties (ii 1); but he takes them, along with the guess, as constituting the essence of what he calls the marga (or the riti). characteristic of 'embellishing' poetic speech is possessed by both alamkaras and gunas, both are, in his opinion, alamkāras in a wider sense, the gunas being special embellishments of the vaidarbha marga. while the alamkaras are common to both the vaidarbha and the gawla margas, Vamana, who systematically established the riti-theory, goes further and lays down that the great are essential (nitya) excellences, while the alamkaras are not essential (anitya) but serve only to increase the beauty of a poem already brought out by the former.

With the advent of the dhvani-theory, there was an elaboration of the concept of rasa as the principal suggested element not only in the drama but also in poetry; and both the guna and the ulamkāra naturally came to be subservient to it. But the gunas were supposed to reside in intimate relation to the rasa, without which they could not exist and existing with which they only served to heighten its beauty. The alamkāra, on the other hand, was supposed to be extraneous and artificial sources of beauty, just as ornaments are to the body. We shall

have occasion to deal with these questions in greater detail in connexion with the views of the riti- and the dhvani-theorists; it would be enough to indicate here that the later theorists, in their search for a fundamental principle, could no longer regard the discipline as coextensive with an external theory of embellishment; and necessarily the alamkara, as well as the guna, which appertain more or less to the objective beauty of representation, came to occupy a subordinate position as an element of poetry. was held that the term alamkara should explain the question as to what is to be 'embellished', and as such must confine itself, as the early formulators of the alamkara-system modestly yet wisely held, to the 'body' or frame-work of poetry ; it must not attempt to explain its 'soul' or essence.

The alamkara-system, however, left its undoubted impress on later theories. The riti-systems of Dandin and Vamana amply recognise its influence by devoting considerable attention to the detailed discussion of various poetic figures; and although no writer after Anandavardhana seriously contended that the poetic figure is the only element worth considering in poetry, yet all of them acknowledged its importance and assigned to it a place in their system. In spite of the emphasis which they put on dhvani and rasa, the new school, beginning from Mammata, devoted a large section of its works to the elaboration of various poetic figures, and the alamkara-chapter may justly claim to have been a thoroughy worked out theme. Here was given to Indian scholars rich material for subtle distinctions and endless classifications; and with a hair-splitting care, befitting scholastic minds, all kinds of metaphors, similes, alliterations and other figures were minutely analysed and defined. Indeed, the multiplication of limitless varieties of poetic figures, based on minute differences, as well as the making of a large number of subvarieties of each figure, went on through the whole course of the history of the discipline; and down to the latest times, we find traces of new and ever new poetic figures.

The extent to which this specialisation is carried will be understood by taking a typical example. The beauty of a lady's face is described; this can be done in several ways, resulting in a number of poetic figures, by taking the familiar comparison of the Sanskrit poet as the starting point. "Your face is like the moon"-upama; "the moon is like your face"-pratipa; "your moon-face"-rupaka; "is this your face, or is this the moon"-samdeha; "this is the moon, and not your face"-upahnuti ; "the moon is like your face, and your face is like the moon"-upameyopama; "your face is only like your face"-ananvaya : "having seen the moon I remembered your face"-smarana; "thinking it to be the moon, the cakere (a bird which is said to feed on moon-beams) flies towards your face"bhrantimat; "this is the moon, this the lotus, thus the cakora and the bee fly towards to your face"ullekha; "this is verily the moon"-utprekeā; "this is a second moon"-atisayokti: "the moon and the lotus are vanquished by your face"-tulyayonta; "your face and the moon rejoice in the night"-dipaka;

"your face always shines but the moon shines in the night"-vyatireka; "in the heavens the moon, on earth your face"-dratanta; "the moon reigns in heaven, your face reigns on earth"-prativastilpamā; "your face bears the beauty of the moon"nidarsana; "the moon is pale before your face"aprastuta-prasamsă; "by your moon-face the warmth of passion is cooled"-parisama; "your face beautifully spotted with black eyes and adorned with the light of smile"-samasokti. Some of these turns of expression lose their force or point in the translation, but this will roughly indicate the varieties of figures arrived at by nice distinctions, although these constitute only a few, of which comparison forms the basis. They are sharply separated from one another; and although some of the distinctions may appear to us to be somewhat trivial or formal, we cannot refuse to recognise the amount of ingenuity shown in the matter. Even taking only one figure upama, they subdivide it into a number of inferior varieties, most of which, however, are based on peculiarities of grammatical construction, but which Appayya Diksits, one of the latest writers on the subject, refuses to admit on this very ground in his treatise on poetic figures 36.

But the different theorists are not agreed in their exposition of the exact nature and scope of individual poetic figures. This difference is partly due to the inevitable change of view-points consequent upon the

³⁶ evam ayam pūrma lupta-vibbīgo vāķya-samāsa-pratyayavišeņa-gocaratayā šabda-šāstra-vyutpatti-kaušala-pradaršanamātra-prayojano nātivālamkāra-šāstre vyutpādyatām arhati, Citra-mīmāmaā p. 27.

progress of the study itself and gradual growth of ideas, and partly to the favourite refining process which loved to indulge itself in niceties of distinction. The development of the conceptions of the different poetic figures in the writers of different schools affords an interesting field of study in itself, and cannot be comprehended in our limited scope37; but one or two instances will make the process clear. The figure Aksepa, which (generally speaking) consists of an apparent denial of something which is intended to be said for the purpose of conveying a special meaning, is variously analysed by different writers. Vamana defines it as the repudiation of the standard of comparison, upamanaksepus caksepuh (1v. 3. 27). One interpretation of this, as given in Vāmana's own vṛtti, is upamānasyāksepah pratisedha. upumänäksepah, tulya-käryärthuoja univarthakyavivaksayam ; that is to say, the standard of comparison is rejected for the purpose of indicating that it is useless in the presence of the object described.

the development of the different conceptions of individual poetic figures from the earliest time to that of Jagannatha. Much material, however, will be found in Trivedt's and Kane's notes to their learned editions of Ekavali and Sahitya-darpana respectively. J. Nobel, in recent years, has published a series of articles on some of the alanguaras studied in their development. His Beitraege zur uelteren Geschichte des Alanguara-kastra deals with the figures dipaka, tulya-yegita, vibhāvanā, višesokti, aprastuta-prasaņaā, samāsokti, ni laršana, and arthintaranyīsa; while his articles in ZDMG lxvi, 1912, pp. 283 93 and lxvii, 1913, pp. 1-36 treat of vyājastuti, and sahokti and vinokti respectively.

This would be equivalent to the figure pratipa of later writers. But Vamana adds another explanation which indicates that the figure can also occur when the standard of comparison is only hinted at (unamamasydksepatah pratipattir ityapi sutrarthah). This would be equivalent to the samāsakti of some writers. Dandin's definition of aksepa, on the other hand, is very wide; for, according to him, the denial (pratisedha) need not be of what has been said (ukta) or of what is about to be said (cakeyamana), but it may be of anything whatever. Bhamaha, Udbhata and Mammata limit the denial in so far as it concerns the nkta or the voksyamana. They are followed by Ruyyaka, Vidyadhara and Visvanatha, but a second kind is added, viz., the apparent permission of what is not wished for. Jagannatha refers (p. 421f) to both the views of Vamana and Udbhata, but adds that, according to a third view, which he takes to be the view of the Dhvanikārs, all suggestive negation or denial is the province of aksepa. This is supported by the fact that the visesa or special meaning to be conveyed by the apparent denial is nover expressed but always left to be understood. It would, therefore, be classed by the Dhyanikara under "poetry of subordinate suggestion" (quabhatacyangya), for the expressed sense itself is charming here and the suggested sense is subordinated to it. It is probably in reference to such views that the Agni-puraga lays down : sa aksepo dhvanih syac ca dhvanina vyajyate yatah. The case of aksepa will exemplify, to some extent, the way in which each poetic figure is not only minutely analysed, but

olaborately classified into subvarieties by taking into account the different cases of its occurrence. Thus upamā (simile) is classified into six complete and twenty-seven incomplete forms; the figure upreksā into thirty-two varieties, the vyatireka into forty-eight, the virodha into ten. The number of self-standing figures, together with their innumerable adjunct of subvarieties, goes on increasing as the study progresses, until it reaches to a number exceeding one hundred; and it is not surprising that in the later stages of its history, whole volumes like Ruyyaka's Alamkāra-sarvasva, Jayadeva's Candrá-loka or Appayya's Kuvalayánanda are dedicated exclusively to the special purpose of analysing, defining and illustrating the various poétic figures.

The simple basis of classifying the poetic figures, according as they appertain to the word or the idea, into sabdálamkara and arthálamkara (verbal and ideal figure) obtained throughout from Rudrata's time, but some writers ald figures which are both of the word and the idea (sabdarthalamkara). The Agnipurana appears to be the earliest known work to mention this third division, and the position is taken up by Bhojs in his Sarasvati-kauthabharana. A long controversy, however, has centred round the propriety of such a classification; and it has been held that although, generally speaking, all figures are both of subda and artha, the raison d'etre of such divisions is the relative prominence given respectively to sabda, artha or both, on the dictum yo'lamkaro yad-asritah sa tad-alamkarah. But this relation of agraya and agrayin (i. e. inter-dependence)

is not accepted by all, and Mammata maintains that anvaya (connexion) and systireka (disconnexion or contrast) must form the test, which consists in considering whether the particular figure does or does not bear a change of synonymous words (pariertti-sahatea). If the figure disappears with the change of the word by its synonym, it is n verbal figure or kalidalamkara; if not, it is an ideal figure or arthalumkara The number of independent sabdálamkaras has never been large, the largest being probably the twenty-four mentioned The ancient writers pay, as a rule, greater attention to this class, which apparently affor led ample scope to decadent classical poets for mere verbal jugglery; but more recent writers like Anandavardhana or Mammata do not deal with it with so much care, on the ground that though such word play brings about variety or vaicitrya of expression to some extent, it does not help, but only retards, the comprehension of the rasa in a composition by entirely engrossing the reader's mind. The arthilamkaras, on the other hand, have always engaged more care and attention, and the favourite refining process has been systematically and untiringly pursued in this sphere. Their number, however, has always been subject to fluctuations; but it can be generally stated that while in the older writers the number is limited, in comparatively recent authors the multiplication is more marked. On the one hand. Bharata speaks only of four arthdlamkaras : Bhamaha, Udbhata and Vamana deal with about thirty to forty different figures; the number

reaching its maximum perhaps in Rudrata's sixtyeight. In Bhoja, Mammata and Ruyyaka there
is a reaction towards restriction and decrease; but
in the latest stage of our history, the Candraloka
gives about one hundred, while the Kuvalayanunda
adds a score more. Dandin, himself a great sinner in
this respect, very early protested against such
endless differentiation, and Anandavardhama agrees
with him; but it appears to have afforded endless
scope to the scholastic ingenuity of later theorists,
who, after the time of Anandavardhama, having
hardly had anything to systematise in respect of
the essentials of theory, occupied themselves in
elaborating the details.

As to the classification of the ideal figures (arthalamkaras) according to their essential characteristics, Dandin divides all figures into seathavolti and vakrokti, Vamana makes an early attempt to take aupamya as the central principle, while Rudrata groups them systematically under vastava, aupamya, atisaya and slesus. Mammata has no definite principle of classification. Ruyyaka suggests one based on (i) aupamya (comparison) (ii) virodha (incongruity) (iii) synkhala (linked succession) (iv) nyaya (logical reason) (v) gudhartha-pratiti (understanding of a secret sense) (vi) combination of figures (samsreti or sambara, Vidyadhara and Visvanatha substantially follow this classification, only splitting up nyaya into tarku-nyāya, vākyu-nyāya and loka-nyāya; but Vidyānātha substitutes the word sādharmya for aupamya (or sādršya), and speaks of adhyavasāva

³⁸ iii 9. See above p. 79.

(complete identification) and visesana-vaicitrya (strikingness of adjectives or attributes) as two other bases of classification. Perhaps none of these classifications would be regarded as strictly scientific, for they mix broad heads indicating psychological factors (like similarity, contrast or contiguity) with mere formal bases of classification as gudhartha-pratti or apahuava.

A development is also noticeable in the general conception of a kaeyalamkara or poetic figure. It is true that a "poetic" figure corresponds to a certain extent to "speech-figure", or to what is known as a figure of speech in a formal scheme; but later theorists explain that something more belongs to a poetic figure as such. The special charm, known as vaicitrya or vicchitti, peculiar to each composition, which rests ultimately on the conception or skill of the poet (kari-pratibhā or kari-kausala) makes up the kāvyālamkāra as such, and gives it its distinguishing characteristic. This view would be entirely omitted in a treatise on rhetoric merely; and with this point of view it is misleading to describe the theory of alankara as a theory of rhetorical categories only. Originally it might have been, more or less, a theory of externals, but the problem was complicated by the appearance of this new factor of thought, first introduced by Kuntala and then elaborated in the sphere of individual figures by Ruyyaka, Jayaratha and others, the development of which will be traced hereafter in its proper place.

III. DANDIN AND VAMANA

(The Riti System)

(1)

Dandin comes chronologically after Bhamaha, and Vamana, who comes after Dandin, was contemporaneous with Bhamaba's commentator Udbhata; but the rati-system, which Dandin and Vamana represent in Poetics, was probably older in tradition than Bhamaha himself, who half-contemptuously rejects the distinction between raidarbha and gauda kāvya. It can be traced back to the time of Banabhatta (firsthalf of the 7th century) who tells us that the Gaudas were already notorious for aksara-dambara, to which fact Dandin also alludes in his depreciation of the ganda mārya. It would be seen that although the terms marga or riti in the technical sense might not have been very ancient, both Dandin and Vamana themselves indicate that some such system as they advocate was traditionally existent; and they appear to refer to and sometimes actually quote from unknown expositors of the past1. It is probable that the Riti school, if we use this term to separate those writers who put an emphasis on riti as the most important element of poetry, had an independent origin and history, and existed for a long time side by side with the sister schools, which

¹ e. g. under Vámana L 2, 11, 12-13; 3, 15, 21; III, 1, 9, 25; IV. 1, 7 etc.

threw into prominence the elements of rasa, alamkāra or dhvani respectively.

We have already stated that Dandin is influenced, to some extent, by the teachings of the Alamkara school, and as such stands midway in his view between the alamkara-system of Bhamalis and the riti-system of Vamana. At the same time, there can be no doubt that in theory he allies himself distinctly with the views of Vamana. In Vamana, however, we find the system in its completely self-conscious form ; and here we have nothing of that vagueness or indefiniteness which characterises the rival alamkarasystem of Udbhata. With a clear-cut scheme and a definite central principle, Vamana proceeds to set forth his system in the brief but succint satra-form; and whatever may be the value of his speculations, there can be no doubt that Vamana was the first writer to enunciate a definite theory which, before the Dhyanikara, must have had great influence on the study of Poetica.

With regard to the commonplaces of poetic speculation, Dandin's standpoint does not differ much from that of Bhāmaha; and both start with the same notion of embellishing sound and sense, which, in their opinion, should constitute the 'body' of poetry. The classification of poetry into species of composition like the sarya-bandha (mahāhācya) etc., is almost identical², the only remarkable divergence occurring

² Under verse, Dandin mentions surgat bandha (=mahii kāvya), muktaka (single verse), kulaka (five verses), kaja (unconnected verses of different authors), and sanghāta (unconnected verses of the same author), under prose, he speaks

as already noted, in the case of kathā and ākhyāyikā, which rigid distinction is not admitted by Dandin³. Poetry is classified, according to its form, into prose, verse and mixed (mišra), while language furnishes another fundamentum divisionis yielding four distinct groups, viz., sunskṛta, prākṛta, apabhraṇāu⁴ and mišra, the last kind in both these divisions not being mentioned by Bhāmaha. The effect of combining these two principles of classification gives us four species of composition, viz., sarga-bundha (mahākāvya)

hathā, ākhyāyikā and ramphī. Vāmana gives two divisions of both prose and verse, viz., nibaddhā and anibaddhā (connected and unconnected). He thinks that verse is of various kinds, but divides prose into three varieties, vetta-gandhā (savouring of verse), cūrņa (having no long compounds and possessing sweet vocables), and nikalikā-prūya which is the opposite of cūrņa (1. 3. 21-26).

3 See above p. 57. The varieties of kathā mentioned by Hemacandra are ākhrāna, nidarhana, pravahlikā, matallikā, mapikulyā, parikathā, khayelakathā, sakalakathā and upakathā (pp. 338 f). The last three are also admitted by Ānandavardhana (p. 141) and defined by Abhinava. The Agnipurāna 337, 20 defines kathānikā.

4 It is not known what Bhāmaha signifies by the term apabhrania, but Dandin gives to it a definite connotation as the language of the Abhtras and others in the kānya, as distinguished from the kānya where it is the name applied to all languages other than Sanskrit. Nami-sādhu sententiously says: prāk tam eva apabhraniāh. Hemacandra adds to Apabhrania another kind called grāmvilpabhrania. Cf Bharata xvii 49, which makes it clear that the Apabhrania was a jāti-bhāṇā and not a deia-bhāṇā. The Abhtras were ancient settlers in the land and are mentioned by Patañjali (i 252). See I.1, 1918, p. 26.

in Sanskrit, skandhaka in Prakrit, osura in Apabhransia, and nataka in mixed languages, although it is not thought necessary to deal with them all in detail. The old division into sraeya and preksya kārya⁵, according as a composition appeals to the eye or the ear, is also referred to in i 39; but regarding preksya kāvya, by which dramatic composition is generally meant, Dandin summarily refers to specialised treatises on the subject.

These speculations, of course, constitute the common stock in trade of Poetics, and find themselves repeated in a more or less similar form in most writers irrespective of the school or tradition to which they belong. Thus Vamana also gives us preliminary chapters on the divisions of poetry (kācya-višesa), on the auxiliary aids or sources of poetry (kācya-višesa), on the persons entitled to study the science (adhikāri-nirāpaņa). Although belonging to a different school, Rudrata in the same way devotes two chapters (i and xvi) to these general topics of Poetics.

But in respect of the attention which Dandin pays to the claboration of poetic figures, his sympathy obviously allies him with the standpoint of the Alamkara school. He shares the views of this school in his general opinion that a good kācya should be embellished by those decorative devices which go by the name of alamkāra. At the same time, it is important to note that while Dandin believes, with all early writers, in the theory of embellishment, he differs in his view as to the means by which this embellish-

⁵ This division occurs again in Hemacandra, who divides preksya kaoya into Nilhya and geya.

ment should be realised; for he apparently helds that it is not the poetic figures only but the several literary excellences, the guyas (which are also designated alamkāras by him), that constitute the essence of the poetic manners (margas) or poetic diction, in the realisation of which alone the secret of poetry lies. Indeed, the marked emphasis laid on the marga, which is almost equivalent to Vāmana's vītie, and on its constituent excellences, known as gunas, to which the Alapkara school is apparently indifferent, is a distinct feature of Dandin's work, and places Dandin in his fundamental theoretic attitude in the Riti school. Although he does not go so far as Vāmana in setting up the riti as the essence of poetry, there can be no doubt that he attaches special importance to its literary value. It is true that Dandin never uses the term rati throughout his work, but his employment of the term marga (i 9, 40, 42, 67, 75, 101) or vartman (i 42, 92), implying 'mode', 'manner', or style in the objective sense, may be taken as almost synonymous. His general definition of poetry, or rather its 'body' or frame-work, as istartha vyavacchima puldent (i 10)-a series of words characterised by an agreeable sense or idea—naturally leads him to consider, first of all, the question of appropriate expression of appropriate ideas, or in other words, to discuss the suitable arrangement of sound and sense for the purpose of producing poetic effect, which is technically denoted by the term marga or riti. Speech, he says, is diversified in its mode of expression (vicitramarga, i 9), and he is aware of the fine distinctions

⁶ Vāmana also uses the term marga in III, t. 12.

which mark off one mode from another (i 40) and result in a multifarious variety of modes. All these he broadly divides into two clearly distinguishable types, called the raidarbha and the gauda, to the critical study of which his whole work is avowedly devoted. This classification is probably not Dandin's own but derived from some recognised tradition (i 40), although Bharata, who mentions the kārya guņas, does not refer to mārga or rīti, and Bhāmaha's analysis of the two types? (as well as of the guṇas) is somewhat different. Of the two types, Dandin gives preference to the vaidarbha mārga, which, in his opinion, results from a harmonious unification of the ten gunas or excellences of composition, the gauda being the exactly opposite type.

The ten guyas, which are spoken of as the manak or life-breath of the vaidarbka marga and which are non-existent in the gauda, are therefore essential

distinguishes between the validarbha and the gawla kūrya as two types of poetry obtaining in two different places. Bāṇa has already told us that people of different places liked different poetic devices (Harga-carita 1 id. 7), with which statement Dandin's remarks regarding the partiality of the Gaudas to certain tricks and excellences agree. As Vāmana distinctly says, the rītis, which took their names from localities, were probably analysed empirically from the styles which prevailed in these localities. With regard to gaṇas, Bhāmaha mentions them independently of the rīti. They are mādharya and prasūda marked by the absence of compounds, and ojas by their presence. They would thus correspond to the rītis of Rudraţa. Bharata mentions ten gaṇas only as essential to a good kāvya, and not in relation to rīti.

in a good composition. They are thus enumerated by Dandin :

- (i) slesa, the quality of being well knit, the opposite being sithila or looseness,
- (ii) prasāda, or lucidity, the opposite being ryutpanna or far-fetchedness,
- (iii) sanatā, or evenness (in the grouping of word-sounds), the opposite being raisamya or unevenness.
- (iv) mādhurya, or elegance consisting of alliteration of similar sounds (*entyanaprāsa *) and absence of vulgarity (agrāmyatea)*, respectively termed vāyram and rastu-rass. The name of the opposite of mādhurya is not given, but the opposite of *entyanuprāsa is varadertti (i 35) and that of agrāmyatea is grāmyatea, the latter rejected in both the mārgas.
- (v) suknonārcitā, or absence of harshness due to the use of soft vocables, the opposite being termed dipta,
- (vi) artha-vyakti, or explicitness of sense (common to both the mārgas, the opposite negatva being rejected in both).
 - (vii) wlaratea, or elevation consisting of the

⁸ The irulyanaprisa is the name given to the grouping of similar sounds which exist between letters belonging to the same sthina, such as kantha, tilu, murdhan, danta etc. It is thus distinguished from varnanaprisa. The subdivisions of anaprisa are infinite: but Bhoja (ch. ii) gives an elaborate scheme of classification containing six main varieties, viz. iruti, vitti, varna, pada, nama-dvienkti, and läta.

⁹ For the meaning of the terms gramyatva and rasa occurring in this definition, see below ch. IV.

expression of some high merit (common to both the the margas),

- (viii) ojas, or force due to the presence of compounds (common to both the mārgas, but the Vaidarbha attempts a simpler kind of prose, while the Gauda attempts a peculiar style both in prose and in verse, long compounds prevailing in the latter case),
- (ix) kānti, or agreeableness due to conformity to general usage: in other words, absence of the unnatural, the exaggerated or the grotesque, the opposite being atyukti,

(x) samādhi, or transference of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, i. e. metaphorical expression generally (common to both the mārgas).

It will be noticed that the above enumeration of the literary excellences of diction, which differs greatly from that of Bharata¹⁰, is neither exhaustive nor strictly logical. The artha vyakti, for instance, may well be included in the prasāda. The definition of udāratea is rather vague, so also is that of kāuti, in both of which Dandin apparently admits subjective valuations not clearly indicated. Again, the mādhurya, though defined primarily as a particular mode of word-arrangement, is regarded more or less as a subtle excellence which defies analysis¹¹. A similar indefinable psychological factor is apparently admitt-

¹⁰ See above pp. 15f.

¹¹ Dandin's treatment implies that he considers it both as a sabda-guna (illustrated in i 53) and as an artha-guna (illustrated in i 64), although this distinction is not mentioned by him (but of the word vibhakta in i 68).

ed in the samadhi, the definition of which makes it difficult to distinguish from it poetic figures like rapaka or metaphor, where there is also poetic superimposition of an object or its qualities on another. It is quite possible that from Dandin's point of view, the difference between the sumadhi-yena and the rapakaulamkare may consist in the fact in the guna there is a transference only of the qualities or actions of one thing to another, while in the alamkara either one dharmin itself is substituted for another, or the new dharma entirely supplants the existing dharma. But this process of poetic transference is essentially a mode of figurative expression resting finally on laksana, and Vamana would regard Dandin's definition of the samadhi-gana as constituting the figure vakrokti, which, in his opinion, consists in a similar transference based on resemblance.

It must also be pointed out that some of Dandin's gunas refer to sa'da (word), some to artha (sense), while others to both these elements. The mādhurya and sukumāratā are primarily sabda-gunas, depending on the use of specific vocables, while between themselves, the mādhurya requires sound-alliteration, and sukumāratā the prevailing use of tender vocables. But the use of words or syllables suggesting a vulgar sense must be avoided in mādhurya, a fact which precludes us from taking it strictly as a sabda-guna. Dandin does not make a hard-and-fast distinction between sabda-gunas and artha-gunas, as his successor Vāmana does; but taking his definitions as they stand, it would appear that he probably regards some of them (c. g., šlesa, samutā, sukumāratā or

ojas, all of which refer to sound-effects) as constituting what later theorists would call sabda-gunas, and others (e.g., prasada, artha-vyakti, udaratva, kānti or samādhi) as constituting artha-gunas; while gunas like mādhurya he would in the same way classify as belonging both to sabda and artha. Dandin himself was perhaps conscious of the defective nature of his classification, and consequently added (i 101-102) that in the midst of a general agreement regarding the usage of gunas, there always exist differences between writers and writers as regards the emotional value of their composition or their artistic presentation.

After dealing with the guas in relation to the two opposite types of marga, Dandin begins (ch. ii) the treatment of those poetic embellishments which are specifically called alamkaras or poetic figures. It must be distinctly understood that the word alamkara is used by Dandin in the general sense of that which causes beauty in poetry, kārya-kobhākarān dharman alamkaran pracaksate, ii 1. It appears to include in its wide scope both gusas, and alamkaras properly so called. Referring to his own discussion of the gugas in the previous chapter, in relation to the raidarbha marga of which they constitute the essence, Dandin speaks of them in ii 3 as alamkāras, and goes on to mention the figures as sadharanam alamkarajātam. In other words, poetic figures are alamkāras common to both the marges (sadharana), while gunus are alamkāras belonging exclusively to the vaidarbha. He says, therefore, at the outset of his treatment of the poetic figures (ii 3) :

kāścin mārga-vibhāgártham uktāh prag

apyalamkriyāh/

sādhāraņam alamkāra-jātam adya pradaršyate//

"For the purpose of classifying the marnas, some alamkāras have been already spoken of (by me in the previous chapter) : now are shewn those alamkāras which are common (to both the margas)". Turunavacaspati rightly comments on this verse 12; "The slesa and the like are already spoken of as the ten guyas. If it is objected, therefore, that they cannot also be called alumkarus, the reply is that the characteristic of an alamkara consists in its capacity of embellishing, and that on account of this characteristic they (quass) are also alamkaras. The learned teachers have already said that the guess are indeed alamkaras. Hence the alamkaras, like the slesa, which are essentially gugas, were mentioned before to indicate the difference between the (two) margus; but now are enumerated those alamkaras which are common to the two margas." Dandin, it may be pointed out, uses the word ulasskriva in same general sense in iii 137 (or iv 14 in Madras ed.). From what is said above it follows that Dandin does not make a fundamental theoretic distinction between the guna and the alamkara as such (as later writers from Vamana downwards do), but apparently regards them

¹² pürvam ileşildayo dain gunā ityuktam. Katham telamkāra ucvante iti cet, inbhākaratvam hi alamkāra-lakṣaṇam, tallakṣaṇa yogāt te pyalamkārāh....... guņā alamkāra eva ityūcāryāh.....tatah ilesildayah gunātmakālamkārāh pūrvam mārga-prabheda-pradaršanāva uktāh idānīm tu mārga-dvayasādhāraņā alamkārā ucyante.

both essentially as alamkara, taking the word in its wider sense of that which embellishes; the quads being of primary importance as essentials of a good style, and the alamkaras (i. e. poetic figures) of subsidiary value as constituents of styles, both good and bad. It is noteworthy that Dandin never makes a confusion in the use of the two terms, but invariably applies the former term to denote (except in one case in ii 364) the literary excellences of diction (i 42, 76, 81, 100), and the latter to designate the poetic figures to which the name is traditionally restricted (ii 7, 116, 214, 220, 268, 300, 340, 359 : iii 141, alaykāratā in ii 237, 287, 367). In this way he practically foreshadows, if he does not theoretically develop, the rigid differentiation of the guna and the alambara of the Riti school.

The subsidiary alamkāras, consisting of poetic figures, are dealt with by Dandin in two chapters (ii and iii), devoted respectively to the treatment of the verbal (sabda-) and ideal figures (artha-alamkāras). He does not expressly state this distinction, which is implied in his treatment, but he gives his general opinion that verbal tricks like those of yamaka are not especially attractive (naikānta-madhuram). He deals with them, however, in greater detail than his predecessor Bhāmaha. The prahelikā (conundrum), for instance, which is merely alluded to in one verse by Bhāmaha, is elaborately discussed and illustrated by Dandin (iii 96-124) who mentions sixteen different kinds of this figure. He also gives a detailed treatment of yamaka, and defines with illustrations such

difficult tricks as gomutrikā, ardha-bhrama and sarvatobhadra 13

To the arthalamkāras, however, Dandin naturally pays greater attention. He mentions by name (ii 4-7) only thirty-five poetic figures ; but the special feature of his treatment, as contrasted with those of Bhāmaha and Vāmana, consists in his attempt to make a large number of subordinate varieties, the most remarkable instance being that of upamā, which has thirty-two subdivisions, of which eight at least have the value of independent figures to later writers.

Bhāmaha in a somewhat obscure verse states that a prahelikā is a serious composition possessing varied constituent meanings as well as the tricks of passaka, and is so called in Ramaŝarman's Acquitottara. Rudraţa, like Dandin, deals with the prahelikā as well as the citra-bandhas in some detail. Some of the citra-bandhas are mentioned by Bāṇa and Māgha. Under the general designation of citra-poetry, they are discredited by Ānandavardhana, and their importance diminished in later Poetics. They became the subject of specialised treatises like the Vidagdha-mukha-maṇdana of Dharmadāsa Sūri (vol I pp. 297-98).

¹⁴ The figures dealt with in their order of treatment are : svabhāvohti, upamā, rūpaka, dīpaka, āwīti, ākņepa, arthūntaranyāsa, vyatīreka, vibhāvanā, samāsokti, atīsayokti, utprekṣā, hetu, sūkṣma, leša (or lava), yathā-saṃkhya (or taṃkhyāna or krama), preyas, rasavat, ūrjasvin, paryāyokta samāhita, udātta, apahnuti, ideṣa, viiseṣokti, tulyayogitā, virodha, aprastuta-praiaṃsā, vyājastuti, nidarianā, tahokti, parivṛtti, ābīs, saṃkīrna and bhāvika. The verses ii 4-7, which give a prefatory list of figures, are suspected to be an interpolation, but the list substantially agrees with the poetic figures dealt with in ch. ii.

Dandin also anticipates Udbhata in pointing out the importance of sless as the cause of special charm in other figures (ii 362), and agrees with Bhāmaha in holding that the atieayokti is essential in all poetic figures (ii 220). The term vakrokti is used only once and is reserved by him as a collective name of all poetic figures (with the exception of the svabhāvokti). According to Dandin's scheme (as indicated in ii 362), the whole realm of poetic figures can be divided into two distinct parts, consisting of svabhavokti, on the one hand, and pakrokti, on the other. By the former. which he characterises as the first or primary figure (ādyā alamkṛtih), he implies a plain and direct description of things belonging to a genus (jati), or of an action (kriya), of a quality (guya), or of an individual (dravya)1-1. In this 'natural' description, there is apparently no scope for any artificial or ingenious mode of expression, and it should, therefore, be distinguished from all other poetic devices, figurative or otherwise, collectively designated as the vakroktile. Among other figures, defined by Dandin for the first time, may be mentioned the avrtti, lesa (= vyājokti or vyāja-stuti), sūksma and hetu (the last included by Udbhata in his kāvyalinga). He does not define ananvaya and sasamdeka, calling them asadharanopama and samsayopama respectively, and includes upamarūpaka and utpreksāvayava under rūpaka and utpreksā

¹⁵ These terms are to be taken in the sense they have in grammar (and not as they have in philosophy).

¹⁶ This interpretation is supported by Dandin's commentators (see Madras ed. pp. 201-2). We have already dealt with the question in our Introd. to Vakrokti-fivita pp. xv f. See above pp. 6cf.

respectively, With Bhāmaha, he alludes to vārttā (i 85), which is illustrated by Bhatti, but which disappears from later Poetics, being included perhaps in the scope of svabhāvokti. The prativastāpamā is not an independent figure in Dandin but a variety of upamā, while the samāhita of Dandin is different from the same figure of Udbhata and Vāmana. These few instances would indicate that, compared with the work of his predecessor, Dandin's work attempts to present many new ideas. Possessing great inventive powers and a gift of lucid exposition, as well as a notable degree of scholastic acumen, he endeavoured not only to refute and correct in many places the earlier views, but sometimes gave a new shape to them.

It will be convenient to examine here briefly the doctrine of dosa, which forms a counterpart of the doctrine of game enunciated by the Riti school. Dandin mentions, after Bharata, ten flaws or dosas of literary composition (ch. iii 125f, or ch. iv Madras ed.), but he defines them differently in most cases. They are in name and substance identical with Bhamaha's first list of dosas noted above 17, with the only exception of the eleventh fault of defective logic, which is recognised by Bhamaha but vigorously rejected by Dandin as a fault difficult to judge and unprofitable to discuss. But even with reference to this fault, Dandin agrees with Bhamaha in the enumeration of its six subdivisions. With regard to Bhamaha's second list of faults, which concern the inner essence of poetry, they would

¹⁷ See above pp. 11-12. See also Jacobi in Sb. der preuss. Akad. xxiv, 1922, pp. 222-3.

correspond in general to the dosas (or rather the opposites of gunas) which Dandin mentions as being absent in the vaidarbha marga and as characterising the opposite gauda marga. We have noted that some of these are expressly named by Dandin. They are (i) the opposite of slesa, called sithila (ii) the opposite of prasada, called vyutpanna (iii) the opposite of samatā, called vaisamya (iv) the opposite of sukumāratā, called dipta (v) the opposite of kānti, called atyukti (vi) the opposite of artha-vyakti, called negatva (vii) the opposite of madhurya (unnamed). These form seven faults as against ten of Bhamaha, but Dandin speaks of the excellences udaratea, samadhi (and probably ojas) as having no opposites (or corresponding faults), inasmuch as they are common to both the margas.

But Dandin does not enter into the question first raised by Bharata as to whether the dosas in Poetics are positive entities or mere negations of gunas. Bharata holds that musas signify nothing more than the pegative condition of dosdilhava, so that dosas are, in his opinion, positive entities, from which the gunas are known by implication. It is clear from Dandin's treatment, however, that he mentions in ch. iv the external faults apparently as positive entities, after the manner of Bhāmaha; while the essential faults are taken as negations of some of the gunas of the vaidarbha marga and consequently as positive characteristics of the gauda marga. He attempts to avoid the controversy by making use of the distincttion of the two opposite types of diction, making the so-called quaas the characteristics of the vaidarbha

type and some of the so called dosus the characteristics of the gauda type. Vāmana, on the other hand, in conformity to his clear-cut theory of riti, goes directly against the opinion of Bharata and expressly makes the guass positive entities, defining the dosus as opposites of guass and as known from the latter by implication (guas-vipergatmano dosab, arthatas tadavanjamab) But he adds that the dosus should be dealt with separately for the sake of clear understanding. He therefore divides the dosus into four classes (i) defects of words (padardosus) (ii) defects of the meaning of the words (padartha-dosus) (iii) defects of sentences (vākya-dosus) (iv) defects of the meaning of sentences (vākya-dosus).

¹⁸ Rudraja, apparently accepting both gunas and doyar as independent entities, enumerates and classifies dosas on a different principle. Taking indda and artha as the two elements of poetry, he mentions in two series (1) habda-dosas or defects of words (2) arthusdoess or defects of sense. The first series includes nine faults, viz. (i) pada-doșas like aumartha, apratita, visanuthi, vipartia kalpana, gramya and deiya (6 kinds) (ii) vākya-doņas, such as samkirņa, garbhita, and gatartha (3 kinds). The second series comprehends (besides four apama-dosas) nine faults again, viz., apahetu, apratita, nirugama, badhayat, asambaddha, gramya, virasa, tadvat and atimatra. After the advent of the dhvani-theorists. the dona (like the guna) came to be related to the rasa, the poetic mood in a composition, and began to be defined as that which depreciates or hinders the awakening of rasa. The doctrine of dosa was taken along with the doctrine of guna, of which it formed the counterpart, and was considered from the standpoint of rasa alone. They were no longer absolute entities, but attributes or absence of attributes relative to the development of rasa, and must therefore be

(2)

Vāmana's work¹⁹, in comparison with Dandin's, shows further progress and elaboration of the ideas discussed above. Indeed, what is vague and unsystematic in Dandin appears fully developed and and carefully set forth in Vāmana, who may thus be fittingly regarded as the best representative of the viti-system. To Vāmana belongs the credit of

governed by the theory of awaits or propriety which these theorists put forward in their treatment of rasa. The doeas came to be defined generally as raplpakareaka (Visvanatha): but specific rasa-slower also came to be defined and discussed. The question whether the doya is nitya or anitya (already raised by Bhamaha and Rudrata) is solved by supposing that a dogo may sometimes become a gwad if it helps (and not hinders) the development of the rare. Mammata and most later theorists accept the distinction of dosas relating to pada, vakya and artha; but they speak also of rasa-dosas and alamkana-dosar. The later opinion regarding the respective character of gunn and does appears to be that each of them conveys a positive meaning, in spite of the fact that some does approach the condition of gundbhavas and some gunar approach the condition of doublanes. Even Dandin in ch, iv separately mentions ten dosar which he does not regard as constituting the opposite of any of his guest.

thereunder. Vāmana reverses the order of older sūtra-writers and divides his work into five adhikaraņas, each of which consists of two adhyānas (excepting the first and the fourth which contain three each), the whole work thus having five adhikaraņas and twelve adhyānas. The arrangement of these adhikaraṇas is as follows. I, šarīra: dealing with the object of poetry, persons qualified to receive instructions in

being the first writer on Poetics, who, before the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhans, gave us a well thought-out and carefully outlined scheme of Poetics, no longer naive or tentative, which, in spite of its theoretic defects, is in some respects unique and valuable.

The enquiry as to what is the 'soul' or essence of poetry is for the first time definitely posed and systematically worked out by Vamana; his predecessors, to whom the 'body' of poetry is more important, never having troubled themselves with this question. Vamana lays down in clear terms : ritir atma kavyasya, 'the riti is the soul of poetry' (1, 2, 6); and working out this figurative description he points out (ertti on 1 1. 1) that the word (sabda) and its sense (artho) constitute the 'body', of which the soul is the riti. He defines the riti as visistapada racana or particular arrangement of words. This particularity (vaisistya) of arrangement, again rests upon certain definite condination of the different gunus or fixed excellences of composition. For instance, of the three kinds of riti proposed by Vamana, the vaidarbhi unites all the ten gunus, the quadi abounds in ojas and kanti, the pancali is endowed with madhurya and saukumarya. This is how Vamana

the subject, the riti and its subdivisions, the subsidiary aids and divisions of poetry. II. desa dariana: treating of the defects or flaws of composition. III. gwna viverana: considering the gunas or excellences of composition. IV. ālamkārika: devoted to the definition and illustration of poetic figures. V. prāyogika: setting forth the poetic conventions and propriety of poetic usages, and šabda šuddhi: (corresponding to the last chapter of Bhāmaha's work), explaining grammatical solecism.

would distinguish the different ritis from one another. On these three ritis poetry takes its stand, just as painting has its substratum in the lines drawn on the canvas (vrtti on 1. 2. 13). The vaidarbhi is of course recommended as containing all the excellences; and as the genius of each diction is peculiar to itself, Vamana rejects the view that the other two inferior dictions ought to be practised as steps leading up to the vaidarbhi; for he argues that the proper diction cannot be attained by one who begins with the improper. If the weaver practises weaving with jute, he does not attain proficiency in the weaving of silk. It will be seen from this analysis of the three kinds of diction that the caidarbhi is the complete or ideal one which unifies all the poetic excellences, whereas the other two encourage extremes. The one lays stress on the grand, the glorious or the imposing, the other on softness and sweetness, whereby the former loses itself often in bombast, the latter in prolixity. It will be noticed also that the names of the different rais are derived from those of particular countries, and Vamana expressly says in this connexion (t. 2. 10) that the names are due to the fact of particular excellence of diction being prevalent in the writings of particular countries. This makes it probable that the theory of diction, peculiar to this school, originally arose from the empirical analysis of the prevailing peculiarities of poetic expression in different places, and furnishes another proof of the general a posteriori character of the science itself20.

³⁰ In the absence of proper data, it is impossible to determine when the distinction between the Eastern and

It should be observed that the term riti is hardly equivalent to the English word 'style', by which it is often rendered but in which there is always a distinct subjective valuation. Although artha (i. e. sense or idea) is admitted as an element by Sanskrit writers, the riti consists essentially in the objective beauty of representation (of the intended idea), arising from a proper unification of certain clearly defined excellences, or from an adjustment of sound and sense. It is, no doubt, recognised that appropriate ideas should find appropriate expression; or in other words, the outward expression should be suitable to inward sense. Bharata goes further and formulates that in the drams the expression should also be in keeping with the temperament and character of the speaker to whom it is attributed. But at the same time, the riti is not, like the style, the expression

Southern styles-Gauda and Vaidarbha-was first recognised. We have already noted that Bana speaks of people of different localities affecting different tricks of style, some putting stress on sound, some on sense, while others indulging in a play of fancy. In Dandin's time the distinction must have been fully established. Jacobi (Mahārastrī, pp. xvf) suggests that the simpler Vaidarbha style was a reaction against the older and more ornate Gauda-style (which Dandin disfavours), and that it came into existence probably in the 3rd century A. D., being known to us from Hala's Sapta-Sataka (467 A. D). It is possible to argue, on the contrary, that the Gauda-style itself is a sign of further development or decadence, exhibiting a tendency to a more elaborate style (as opposed to an earlier and plainer Vaidarbha-style), which we find, as a matter of practice, asserting itself more and more in later decadent Sanskrit kūvya. Cf Keith, Classical Sanskrit Literature p. 50.

of poetic individuality, as it is generally understood by Western criticism, but it is merely the outward presentation of its beauty called forth by a harmonious combination of more or less fixed literary 'excellences'. Of course, the excellences are supposed to be discernible in the sense or import, as much as in the verbal arrangement, but this subjective content is not equivalent to the indefinable element of individuality which constitutes the charm of a good style. If we accept the nomenclature of a modern analyst of style 1, we may say that the Sanskrit authors admit what he would call the 'mind'-in-style, as a subject of technical formulation, but not the 'soul'-in-style, which is clusive and which they leave to individual writers to evolve in their own way.

Vamana, therefore, teaches that the gunas are essential in poetry, as they go to make up the rifi, which is the 'soul' of poetry. The objection of the author of the Ekacali (p. 51) that to conceive the gunas, on the one hand, as the principal element and therefore as something fit to be adorned (upaskārya) and to call them, on the other hand, properties that adorn poetry (npaskāraka) involve contradiction in t-rms, raises only a scholastic quibble which does not bear serious examination. The gunas are, no doubt, spoken of as habdarthayor dharmah, but this, as the commentator points out, is a loose or popular use of the term; for, strictly speaking, they are concerned directly with riti (quan pastuto riti-nistha api, upocărăc chabda-dharmă itguktam p. 69, ed. Benares), which is described as gundimā. To the

²¹ Water Pater's essay on Style in his Appreciations.

objection that these entities have no absolute existence, Vāmana replies that their existence is vouched
by their cognition as such by men of taste (samvedanatvāt III, 1. 26, on which comm. sahrdaya-samvedanasya viṣayatvāt), and that these excellences
are not found in all cases of recitation but depend
upon the presence or absence of certain well-defined
characteristics (III, 2. 28 and vṛtti).

Like Dandin, Vamana enumerates the guyas as ten, which appears to have been the standard number from Bharata's time, but he really doubles the number by clearly differentiating between the salida-quads and the artha-gunas, and regarding each guna as belonging respectively to salda and artha. In other words, each guna is looked at from two different points of view, and the distinction thus proposed between verbal and ideal excellences comes in, as technically put, according as the word or the idea is the denoter (vācaka) or the denoted (vācya). This sharp distinction, no doubt, clears away some of the vagueness surrounding Bharata's and Dandin's definitions of individual gunus; and Vamans, though widely differing from his predecessors in the peculiar connotation he attaches to some of them, is careful in distinguishing the allied gunus from one another. In most essentials, Vāmana undoubtedly continues and expands Dandin's somewhat unsystematic scheme, but his definitions bear in some cases an altogether different complexion, and justify us in presuming that Vamana develops his ideas from elsewhere, as he himself often supports his analysis by verses quoted from unknown sources (e. g., under nr. 1. 9, 25; 2. 15 etc.).

His scheme of the gunas may be tabulated thus :

Sabda-guna

Artha-guna

- i. ojas, or compactness of word-structure (qādha-bandhatva, where bandha = parla-rucana. iii. 1, 4)
- ii. prasada, or laxity of structure (scrithilya)
- iii. slesa, or coalescence of words resulting in smoothness (masy gatva, yasmin sati bahunyain prolanyekavod bhasante)
- iv. samatā, or homogeneity of manner, i. e., of construction (margábhedah, yeun margenopakramas tasyátyágah)
 - v. samādhi, or symmetry due to orderly ascent and descent, i. e., when the heightening effect is toned down by softening effect, and vice versa (arohavaroha-krama)
 - vi. mādhurya, or dispadatva)
 - vii. saukumārya, or

- i. ojas, or maturity of conception (arthurya presullish)
- ii. prasada, clearness of meaning (arthavaimalya)
- iii. slesa, or coalescence or commingling of many ideas (ghatana)
- iv. samatā, or nonrelinquishment of proper sequence of ideas (prakramabheda)
- v samādhi, or grasping of the original meaning arising from concentration of the mind (arthadratih. samādhi-kāranatrat)
- 21. mādhurya, tinetness of words (prthak- strikingness of utterance (ukti-vaicitrya)
 - vii. saukumārya,

freedom from harshnesss freedom from disagreeable (ajarathatva)

udāratā, or liveliness in which the words seem as if they are dancing (yasmin sati nrtyantiva padāni)

ix, artha-vyakti, or explicitness of words whereby the meaning is easily apprehended (ihatityartha-pratipatti-hetutea)

x kānti, or brilli-(aujjvalya)

inauspicious ideas (apārusya)

viii, wdāratā, or delicacy i. e. absence of vulgarity (a ramyatva)

ix. artha-vyakti. explicitness of ideas which makes the nature of things clear (vastu-svabhavasphulatva)

x. kanti, or prominance, i.e. richness of words once of the rasas (diptarasatea)

It will be seen from this brief enumeration that Vamana's gunus differ considerably from those of Bharata or Dandin. Vamana's ojus, for instance, would correspond to Dandin's slesa, while Dandin's madhurya is split up into prthak-padatea and agramyaters. Vannana brings in the idea of rasa in the arthu-guna kante (cf Bharata's kante), thereby admitting it in one of the essentials of poetry, while Dandin acknowledges it in some of the non-essential poetic figures. Vamana's artha-guna arthavyakti would be regarded by Dandin as an instance of svabhāvokti-alamkāra. But it must be observed that Vamana's scheme, while being more systematic and thus marking an advance on the speculation of Dandin's is hardly satisfactory as a whole. The somewhat pedantie classification of guesas, into external

and internal, verbal and ideal, is in itself open to objections and has been controverted by later theorists22. The distinctions are sometimes unconvincing, and it is natural to suspect that they are made for the sake of symmetry of having two sets each of ten excellences. Taking the individual guyas, it appears that Vamana himself was perhaps conscious of the defective nature of some of his definitions. although he must have elaborated the ten quana according to some fixed convention. For instance, his salda-quea pravada is merely a negation of his ojas : Vanuana himself admits this and adds the qualification that the prasada is an excellence when appearing along with ojes and not by itself, for when it appears by itself it is clearly a defect. If it is objected that there cannot be a combination of two such contradictory guses, Vamana replies that such a combination is a fact of common experience, Vamana's slesa is rejected by Mammata as an independent excellence, inasmuch as it is only a particular form of ojas. In the same way, the sankamarya is not admitted by later theorists on the ground that it is merely the negation of the defect of harshness, just as Vāmana's udārratā is a negation of vulgarity (grānlyatva). His samādhi as an artha-guna is different from Dandin's samadhi, but it is hardly an 'excellence'. It is supposed to consist in comprehending the original meaning, but this happens in the case of all compositions, for there can hardly be any poetry, worth the name, of which the meaning

²² e. g. Mammata viii, Hemacandra pp. 195-200, Manikyacandra pp. 1911, Jagannatha pp. 62 f etc.

is not comprehended. These and other objections are brought forward by Mammata and his followers, who protest against this needless multiplication and differentiation of the guaas, and who sum up the literary 'qualities', which they admit as an embellishment of the principal sentiment (rasa) of the composition, under three broad categories, differentiated on entirely psychological grounds, viz., ojas (energy), prasāda (lucidity) and mūdharya (sweetness).

It is also noteworthy that the riti-system assigns to some of the games functions which other systems assign to alamkaras or poetic figures. Vamana's artha-guna kanti corresponds to figures like rasavat of the alamkara-system 23, while Dandin's samuellic in some cases will be equivalent to the rupuka and analogous metaphorical figures. Vāmana's artha-guya artha-vyakti is nothing more than the svabhavokti of Dandin, and Dandin's kanti only defines the limit, as Hemacandra puts it, to the figure ationyokti (séyam atisayokter yantrana, na panar gundutaram). On the basis of Bhamaha's vakrokti, the later writers of the Alamkara school, we shall see, postulate ukti-vaicitrya as the fundamental principle of all figurative expression, but this is comprehended merely as one of the excellences by Vāmana's definition of the artha-guna madhurya.

It will be clear from the above, as well as from Hemacandra's (pp. 195-200) and Manikyacandra's (pp. 191f) claborate review of the guna-doctrine, that

²³ For this reason Vamana does not define the rasavat as a figure,

the writers of the Riti school, especially the followers of Dandin and Vamana, differ widely in their attempts at defining and classifying the gunas, and that such attempts are open to criticism. Some of Bharata's definitions, on the other hand, do not always agree with those either of Dandin or Vamana, For instance, Bharata's ojus, which consists in the use of high-sounding compound words of varied strikingness, may correspond to Dandin's ojus, but Hemacandra states that the essence of this gana consists in imparting loftiness to an object which is low or treated with contempt. Again, Bharata's presada, corresponding to Dandin's samadhi, is a metaphorical mode of expression, which Vamana would include m his peculiar definition of the vakrokti-figure, and which comes generally under laksaya or upacara of later theorists. Bharata's udara differs considerably from Vamana's udarata which does not comprehend, as Bharata's udara does, the rasas and bhavas in its scope ; but it corresponds partially to Vamana's artha-guna kanti. At the same time, it would seem that, in spite of such minor discrepancies, Bharata's scheme of the games as a whole is developed to its furthest possibilities by Vamana. That there are inevitable differences in the definition of particular quasa in the earlier writers on the subject, and that the whole doctrine, despite the care of its exponents, is still unsatisfactory, only indicate the fruitlessness of the efforts of early theorists in comprehending all the literary excellences of a composition within the hard-and-fast limits of a few categories, on the interpretation of which they spond so much ingenuity

but on which they cannot in the nature of things arrive at any absolute agreement.

Hemseandra and Manikyacandra in their review of this doctrine cite the opinion of an authority 94, called Mangala who, we are told agrees with Bharata in his definition of oias and maintains with Vamana that Dandin is not right in emphasising it in the gonuli riti, inasmuch as it is common to all ritis. The only other reference to this writer is made by Raja sekhara, who cites some opinions of this writer agreeing substantially with those of Vamana, and quotes at p.14 a dictum from Mangala which occurs in a slightly different form in Vamana 1, 2, 1, From these citations by Rajasekhara it appears that Mangala, if he is not earlier in date than Vamana, belongs most probably to the same school of opinion. There can hardly be any doubt that the system existed even before Vamana gave a definite form to it; and Vamous's systematic formulation certainly obtained for it a large number of adherents and followers, so that important later authors like Rajasekhara, Hemacandra and Jayaratha cite with respect the opinions of the Vamantyas, just in the same way as they cite the Audbhatas, the followers of Vaniana's contemporary and rival Udbhata.

After the guess, Vāmana deals with the poetic figures or alamkārus as elements of subsidiary importance. At the outset Vāmana states, no doubt, that poetry is acceptable from embellishment (alamkāra); but he is careful to explain embellishment, not in

²⁴ Vamana himself quotes some verses giving us ancient definitions of the various sabda-gamas (under III. 1 25).

the narrow sense of poetic figures, but in the broad and primary sense of beauty or charm (kāvyam grāhyam alamkārāt, saundaryam alamkārah). He also points out that it is only in the secondary instrumental sense that the term alamkara or embellishment is applied to simile and other poetic figures (alam? krtir alamkārah, kurana vyutpattyā punar alamkārasabdo'yam upremádisu cartate). In this view, Vamana apparently develops logically Dandin's teaching ; but Vamana does not make the presence of poetic figures a necessary condition. What makes poetry acceptable, in his opinion, is the presence of charm or beauty, which he does not define and which is in some respects undefinable. The riti and its constituent quans come in as a sine qua non in the production of this beauty, but the poetic figures only contribute to its heightening. This distinction between the suma and the alamkara as to their respective position in a formal scheme of Poetics, which is vaguely hinted at by Dandin, is fully developed by Vamana (m. 1, 1-3). The quage, being essential to the riti, are defined as those characteristics which create the charm of poetry (kāvyasobhayah kurtaro dharmah)-a function which is assigned to both quous and alamkaras by Dandin-but alamkaras are such ornaments as serve to enhance the charm already so produced (tad-a'isaya-hetavah). The gunas are said to be nitya (permanent), implying that the alamkaras are anitya (punar alamkara anityā iti gamyate esa, Kāmadhenu com. p. 71), for there can be charm of poetry without the alamkaras but no charm without the quass (tair vinā kāvya-

sobhanupapatteh). In other words, the guna stands to poetry in the samavaya-relation (see Kamadheuu on III. 1, 4), while the alamkara in samyoga-relation. samyoga being explained as mere conjunction and samaväya implying inseparable connexion or inherence (nitya-sambandha)35. To put it in the usual figurative language, the guna is related to the 'soul' of poetry (viz., riti), while the alamkara rests merely on the 'body' (viz., sabda and artha). The alamkara. without the gana, cannot of itself produce the beauty of a poem, but the latter can do so without the former. But Vamana justifies at the same time the existence of the alambara as an element of poetry, and supports a phase of poetry, which is indeed admitted by Anandavardhana but not properly understood by him, and which is elaborated only by his follower Ruyyaka who, however, takes his inspiration on this point from the Vakroktijtvita-kara.

Vāmana's treatment of the poetic figures is in some respects peculiar to himself in its general outline, as well as in the specific definition of individual figures.

Vāmana is the only old writer who deals with the smallest number of poetic figures. He recognises

²⁵ This is criticised by Mammata viii p. 470: for he maintains that gwpas like ojas and alamhūras like anuprūsa and upamā reside in the relation of inherence (samavāya-sthiti).

²⁶ They are in their order of treatment: yamaka, anuprāsa, upamā, pratīvastūpamā, samāsokti, aprastuta-prašamsā, rūpako, bleņa, vakrokti, utpreksā, atišavokti, samdeha, virodha, vibhāvanā, ananvaya, upameyopamā, parivrtti, krama, dīpako, nidaršana, arthūntaranyāsa, vyatireka, višesokti, vyājastuti, vyūjokti, tulyayogitā, ākṣṣṣpa, sahokti, samāhita, and saṃsoṣṭṭ (including upamā-rūpaka and utprekṣūvayava):—30 figures.

only two kinds of sabdálamkara, viz., yamaka (rhyming) and anuprasa (alliteration). With regard to the arthalamkaras, he lays down in general terms that the upamā or comparison lies at the root of all poetic figures, which are defined in relation to it and to which is given the collective names of upamapropanca27. The importance of upama, involved in other figures, is recognised from Bhamaha's time; and consequently this figure, which is the source of all the figures grouped together by later writers us sādršīja-mūla or aupamya-garbha alamkāras, is always given a place of honour at the beginning of most treatises on Sanskrit Poetics 28; but Vămana goes to the extreme of defining all figures with reference to the idea of comparison, or in terms of the relation of the upamana and the upameya. On account of this fundamental postulate, his definitions of some of the figures differ widely from those given by other writers; and he has also to exclude such figures as parydyokta, preyas, rasavat, urjasvin, udatta, bhavika and sukema which he does not define. He gives a peculiar definition of the figure vakrokti as a mode of metaphorical expression. His visesokti would correspond to the ripaka of Jagannatha, and his aksepa to the pratipa or samasakti of some later writers. Vamana defines apalmuti as the conceal-

²⁷ The commentator explains: pretivastu-pramukhānām alamkārāņam upamā-garbhatvēd upamā-prapahca iti vyapadešah kṛtaḥ (on IV, 3, 1).

²⁸ upamainineka-prakāra-vaicitryenālamkāra-bijabhūtēti prathamam nirdiņtā, Ruyyaka p. 26 , sād bya vitchitti-višesai rūpaka-dīpakādyanekālamkāra-bijatayūpamāyāh prathamam nirūpaņam, Mallinātha p. 195.

ment of one thing by a similar thing with a view to impose the character of the later on the former; in other words, the upameya is denied its nature and the upamānus is established in its place. Dandin states that the denial of something and the representing of some other thing in its place constitute the figure which need not be based on aupamya; and following him, some later writers (e. g. Viśvanātha) speak of a second variety of apahauti in which there is no gamyamāna aupamya or implied comparison²⁵.

(3)

This brief summary of the views of the leading authors of this school will show that the riti-teachings mark a great advance on the alamkara-doctrine in many respects. There are many points which are common to both these systems; but, by clearly defining and working out the doctrine of riti as that distinct characteristic of poetry which sharply separates it from dry philosophical or technical writings, the Riti school seems to have first suggested and started the enquiry (only hinted at by Bhamaha's theory of vakrokti) as to what constitues the essential charm of poetry, and anticipated the theory of vicehitti (or ukti-cuicitryu) elaborated later by Kuntala and other adherents of the alamkara-doctrine. The Dhvanikāra pays an indirect compliment (iii 52) to the Riti school for having first perceived, however dimly, the true nature of poetry, although he does not agree with its peculiar theory of riti. The Riti

²⁹ Cf Uddyota, ed. Candorkar, p. 39.

school also goes a step further than the Alamkara school in including the rasa among the necessary characteristics. It is possible that Vamana's partiality for the drams, which he considers to be the best form of composition and from which he supposes other forms of poetry to proceed (I. 3, 30-32), led him to realise the importance of rasa, already worked out as fundamental in the drama by the dramaturgic Rasa school, and to incorporate it in one of the essential properties of poetry (m. 2, 14 and vetti). But, at the same time, it was perhaps his idea to make his definition of poetry comprehensive enough to cover a larger field and include those instances, e. g., which develop no rasa. The kāvyasobha, a term which he probably borrows from Dandin (ii i), or saundarya which conveys the same general idea as the word 'beauty', is regarded as the ultimate test of all poetry; and this beauty, in his opinion, agreeing with the commou-sense view of the matter, is realised by earefully worked-out diction, which avoids the damaging flaws by adopting primarily the so-called literary excellences, as well as the poetic figures for the secondary purpose of heightening the effect thus produced.

But the riti-system, in spite of Vāmana's wellreasoned formulation and the advocacy of his followers, never appears to have wielded very great influence, and its existence was comparatively short-lived³⁰.

³⁰ A commentator on Vāmana, named Sahadeva, tells us that Vāmana's work went out of vogue, and its tradition was restored by Bhaṭṭa Mukula ()) who obtained a copy of the work. See notes to the Kāvya-mimāṇuā, ed. Gaekwad Oriental Series, p. 5.

There is no doubt that like the rasa- and the alamkāra-systems, it left its impress on later theories, but it never found a serious champion after Vāmana among latter-day writers, and its theories never found unqualified acceptance. Its general doctrine of rīti began to be discredited and severely criticised from Ānandavardhana's time as too crude an explanation of the nature of poetry; and Mammata, the foremost anthority of the latest school, ingeniously combats and sets aside the leading views of Vāmana.

It may, however, be noted that some of the broad principles enunciated by the Riti school have been tacitly recognised by later theorists. The importance of rati or diction, as such, became established as a stock-idea in Poetica : but it was accepted with grave modifications. It was accepted by the Dhvani school in so far as it contributed to the development of the rasa-dhvani, and its chief characteristic was supposed to consist in an arrangement or disposition of words or letters for that purpose 31. This modification naturally diminished the value of all discussion and elaborate classification of the ritis into different types, and the function of the three vitis of Vamana was made practically equivalent to the three gunas admitted by the authors of the Dhvanydloka; but they do not yet appear to have lost all interest with later theorists. Even those writers, who do not subscribe to the doctrine either of the Riti school or of the Dhvani school, pay considerable attention to this question. Thus Rudrata adds lati to the enumeration

³¹ varna-sanghatana-dharmatva, Anandavardhana p. 5; see also ii 8-11.

of the three ritis of Vamana, although by riti Rudrata means a definite usage of compound words. The Agnipurana accepts this fourfold classification, but the distinction is supposed to lie not only in the length or shortness of the sentences but also in the qualities of 'softness' or 'smoothness', as well as in the prominence of metaphorical expression (upacara). Bhoja, who carries the elaboration still further, adds two more types of riti to the Agni-purana's four, viz., magadhi and acantika, the former being an intermediate style between vaidarbhi and paacali, and the latter forming only a khanda-riti, i. e. a defective or incomplete type. Rājašekhara in his Kāvya-mīmāmsā gives us the same three ritis as Vamana does, but in his Kurpūra-manjari he appears to speak of three ritis, respectively named vacchomi (from Vatsagulma), maahi (magadhi) and pamcalia (pancali) The older Vagbhata mentions only two ritis, viz., pañcali and lattya, the one having some compound words and the other having none; but the younger Vagbhata accepts the three vitis of Vamana and classifies them on the basis of the three excellences, madhurya, ojus and prasada, which were the only three quas recognised since Mammata's time. The Dhvanikara does not discuss this question, but Anandavardhana appears to assign equal functional value to the three vettis of Udbhata and the three ritis of Vamana, a view which Mammata enunciates thus : etas tisro vrttayo vamanádinam mate vaidarbhi-gaudi-püňcályákhyá ritayo matah33.

³² But a distinction has always been theoretically maintained between the vetti and the riti. The vettis, originally

Abhinavagupta, however, thinks (p. 6, l. 12) that the three ritis of Vāmana, which, in his opinion, characterise an elevated, soft and middling theme respectively through a peculiar combination of the gunas, have, together with Udbha(a's critis, no separate existence from gunus and alamkāras. Attention, therefore, was naturally directed to the gunas and alamkāras more than to the riti itself, of which they formed, in Vāmana's opinion, the constituent elements; and the riti, if recognised at all, was

styles of dramatic composition (Bharata iii 25), have been included by Udbhata (i 4 f) under anuprasa or alliteration, as they are formed by a special arrangement of letters for conveying different ideas, suitable (Abhinavagupta adds, Locana pp. 5-6) to different rasas. Ruyyaka therefore says orttis to rasa-visayo vyšpārah, tadvatī punar varaa-racantha orttile, pp. 20-21. The riti, on the other hand, is mostly a matter of objective adjustment of the different 'excellences' of a composition, although admitting artha as an element of consideration; while the wetti concerns itself with the psychological effect produced by the arrangement, as well as by the sense of which that arrangement is a vehicle. One and the same riti may conceivably produce different pritis, and the same vytti may be produced in different vitis, although a fondness for symmetry led the theorists to assign a distinct witti to each riti. Anandavardhana expressly distinguishes between the dramatic witti and the poetical witti by saying that the former is dependent upon the sense, the latter upon the expression : vācydkrayo ye vyavahāras tā etāh kausakildyā vyttavah, vācakilsrayas copanāgarikildyāli. They enhance the heauty of drama and poetry respectively by being used according to the drift of the rasa in the composition : vrttavo hi rasidi-tatparvena samnivislah kam api nalyasya kāvyasya ca chāyām āvahanti, p. 182.

recognised as consisting in a particular disposition of words, letters or syllables, which favours the development of rasa, and stands in the same relation to it as (in the usual figurative conceit) the conformation of the 'body' to the 'scul' (pada-samghatana ritir anga-samsthā-višesavat) u akartrī rasddīnām, Visvanatha ix 1). It follows from this that the respective functions assigned to guas and alamkaras are not in relation to the riti but to rasa, which is one of the fundamental elements of poetry with the later schools. We have already noted that after Anandavardhana, the gunas are taken as inseparable attributes and causes of excellence (angino rasasya ntkarsa-hetavah acala-sthitayah gunah, Mammata viii 1) of the rasa or the principal poetic mood in the composition (and not, as Vamana thinks, of the riti). The poetic figures, on the other hand, are only attributes of sabda and artha33, which constitute the body of poety, and therefore heighten the poetic mood or rasa in an indirect way (ibid, viii 2). Vāmana's ideas about 'poetic charm' are also taken as axiomatic, but they appear in later theories in a somewhat different form as the vicehitti, or vaicitrya, or kavipraudhókti underlying all figurative expression.

In spite of these and other important contributions to the general theory of Poetics, it is obvious

³³ Mammata, we shall see, takes the guna as directly related to the rasa as the angin, and if we sometimes speak of them as belonging to habda and artha, we do so only figuratively (upacarena): but Jagannatha (pp. 33-35), going back to Vamana's old position, combats this view and thinks that this usage is not figurative.

that the fundamental doctrine of the Riti school could not have been accepted in its entirety; nor could it have competed against that of the Dhyanikara, because Vamana comprehended poetry only from the formal point of view, whereas the former showed a deeper insight into its inner nature. The more or less objective definition of the riti, given by this school, was hardly enough to satisfy the search for ultimate principles. Visvanatha, following the Dhyanikara and Anandavardhana in this respect, states this objection when he says that the rife is a particular kind of formal arrangement, a peculiar disposition or posture of parts; what is called the 'soul' or essence of poetry is something quite differents. Again, the analysis of the several types of diction shows considerable ingenuity indeed, but it was found almost impossible, as Dandin himself admitted very early (i 101-2), to label and classify all the modes of poetic expression with definite and analterable characteristics. As the Riti school, therefore, tended to make invidious and essentially unprofitable (except as empirical facts) distinctions between the vaidarbhi, gandi and other styles, with regard to whose exact significance there was bound to be inevitable difference of opinion, it naturally provoked criticism and opposition. In the same way, the endeavour to exhaust and classify all the literary

³⁴ yat tu võmanenõktam—rītir ätmä kävyasya iti, tan na, rīteh saṃghaļanā-višeņatvāt, saṃghaļanāyās cāvayavasaṃsthāna-rūpatvāt, ātmanas ca tad-bhinnatvāt, p. 18 ed. Durgāprasāda, 1915. (It will be noticed that Visvanātha here speaks of rīti as a kind of saṃghaṭanā).

excellences and flaws within clear-cut bounds on the basis of more or less formal analysis, was sure to prove unconvincing; and a protest against minute differentiation or endless multiplication of the gunas was rightly and definitely propounded by Mammata who (following Anandavardhana pp. 79 f) reduced the number to three only, viz., madharya, ojas and prasada, in relation to the ultimate factor of poetic sentiment. The attempt, therefore, to stereotype the entire poetical output into so many ready-made styles and fixed excellences, was bound ultimately to be discarded in favour of other and more penetrating principles. We shall see in the next few chapters that such a principle in poetry came to be recognised in the suggested element of rasa, which was being already elaborated in the service of the drams and which was utilised by the dhvani-theorists as one of the most important aesthetic foundations of poetry.

IV. LOLLATA AND OTHERS

(The Rasa System)

(1)

While the orthodox schools of Poetics were elaborating systems of alambara and riti, there flourished several writers who discussed the question of the dramatic rasa after Bharata, and formulated explanations of the latter's much discussed satra on the subject1. Their exposition, however, concerned the dramatic art, and their theories did not as yet come properly within the sphere of Poetics, which was entirely dominated by the alamkara and riti-systems. The aesthetic importance of the rasa, therefore, was never realised, as we shall see, until it was taken up and worked into Poetics by the Dhvanikara and his followers. The dramaturgic Rass school, however, had in the meantime elaborated several theories of rasa and brought it into prominence as an element of the drama; and in this way it succeeded, to a certain extent, in reacting upon and influencing the orthodox theories of Poetics, which appear to have possessed, even at an early period a limited acquaintance with the rusa, and which actually accord it a place, however small, in their general systems of alamkāra or riti.

This will be obvious from a reference to the views of Bhāmaha and Dandin on this subject. To Bhāmaha,

I See above pp. 22-24, 27.

the most important element in poetry is ulamkara or vakrokti. He does not seem to possess any clear notion of the function of rasa in poetry, the only direct reference to it occurring in the definition of the figure rasavat, which, in his opinion, must manifest the rasas clearly (rasavad daršita-spasta-šringārādirasam, iii 6). The rasa is thus included in the scope of a particular figure only and given a very subordinate place in his system?. Bhāmaha seems to have been aware of the existence of the sragara and other dramatic reses; but the speculations regarding the origin and function of rasa do not appear to have started in his time; and, in common with Dandin, he never thought it necessary to use the technical terms vibhāva, anubhāva etc., so familiar to later writers on this subject. In Bhamaha's opinion, the rasa need not be invariably present in poetry, but it may sometimes be delineated in pakrokti. In i 21, no doubt. Bhamaha lays down that a mahākāvua must separately depict all the rasas; and in v 3, he speaks of the kaeyu-rasu as mitigating the rigiour of the sastros, a sentiment which

² Commenting of Bhāmaha's central verse on vakrokti (ii 85), saiņā tarvaiva vakroktir anayıletho vibhāvyate, Abhinavagupta attempts to read into it his own idea of the importance of rasa and interprets vibhāvyate technically as pramadödyānair vibhāvatām nīyate, višegma ca bhāvyate, rasamayīkriyata iti. He apparently makes Bhāmaha mean that by vakrokti, the sense of poetry is rendered into a suitable factor of rasa, so that by using the word vibhāvyate with the technical meaning given to it by Abhinava, Bhāmaha would imply that the rasa as well as alanukāra originates in vakrokti.

is endorsed by Rudrata (xii 1-2) and which probably inspired the dictum of Abhinavagupta that the sastra is prabhu-sammita, while the kāvya is jāyā-sammita. The term kāvya-rasa is used here probably to indicate 'the flavour of poetry' in an untechnical sense; but even if we read, with Abhinavagupta ('Locana p. 182), a technical meaning into it, it only shews that the earlier authors were content with assigning a pleasing but extraneous function to rasa³.

The same remarks with regard to the recognition of rasa apply more or less to Dandin; but Dandin seems to have been more alive to its importance than Bhāmaha. Like Bhāmaha, Dandin allows the rasas to be included in figures like rasasat, which appear to have been the only means by which they could permit the rasa to play even an unimportant role in their systems. It may be contended that Dandin gives prominence to rasa by including it

³ Such a distinction appears to be implied also in Dandin ii 292; and one can differentiate two meanings of rata (see below): (1) hävya-rasa, the flavour of poetry or the aesthetic delight produced by it, and (1) rasa in the technical sense of nätya-rasa. It is worthy of note that in the latter sense it is very rarely used in earlier classical poetry (except perhaps in Māgha). This hāvya-rasa in its essence is not very different from Bhāmaha's vakrokti; for it is possibly a kind of heightened expression inconsistent with commonplace utterance. The word rasa must be taken in this untechnical sense when one meets with it in early classics and in such expressions as rasavat or rasavaha in Dandin.

⁴ Jacobi in ZDMG lvi, 1902, p. 401 fn.

in one of the essential excellences (quass) of the diction (riti), viz., in madhurya, which is defined as the establishment of the rasa in the word and in the object (vāci vastunyapi rasa-sthitih, i 51) ; but from ii 292 it appears that Dandin means by the term rasa in the madhurya-guna to connote absence of vulgarity (agramyatva5), and does not contemplate the inclusion of rasa in the technical sense. The madhuryaguna, according to Dandin (i 51-7), may appear in two different aspects, in so far as it creates vag-rasa and vastu-rasa, the former consisting of repetition of similar sounds (sratyanaprāsa?) and the latter connoting absence of vulgarity (agramyatea). Thus Hemacandra explains (p 198) the rasa in Dandin's mādhurya, according as it resides in the vak or vastu, in this way : gruti-varnanuprasabhyam vagrasah..... agramy&bhidheyataya to vastu-rasah*. Thus the

⁵ Strictly speaking, gramps is not 'vulgar' in its usual restricted sense, although Dandin seems to bring under its connotation the aidids or the indecent. It means 'the low', 'the rustic', or 'the common', as opposed to the noble or the refined, and probably corresponds to the French word vulgairs.

on this point: mādhurya-guņe pradaržital, kabdūrthayor agrāmyatayā jāto raso vākņasya bhavati, alankāratayā nirdistans rasavatīvam apla-rasāyatītam (p. 167), the last part of the passage calling attention to the fact that the only cases where the eight (dramatic) rasas are admitted by Dandin occur in connexion with his inclusion of the rasas in figures like rasavat. In i 64 Dandin speaks of agrāmya artha as rasūvaha.

⁷ See above p. 101, in 8. Dandin speaks of anuprasa as rasilvaha in this sense in the same context (i 52).

⁸ With this explanation Manikyacandra agrees : sruti-

rasa in Dandin's mādhurya has a distinct connotation which separates it from the technical dramatic rasa of the Rasa school⁹.

At the same time it cannot be affirmed that Dandin was entirely ignorant of the concept of rasa as elaborated by Bharata and his followers. He declares (i 18) that a mahākāvya should invariably depict rasa and bhāva. His treatment of the figures rasavat, preyas and ūrjasvin (ii 280-87) gives a much clearer indication of his undoubted acquaintance with the eight recognised rasas, all of which he enumerates by their respective names, and four of which (viz., bringāra, raudra, vira and karuşa) he illustrates as elements of the poetic figures under discussion. If we are to accept Abhinavagupta's statement.

varudnuprāsābkyām vāgrasah, agrāmyatavā tu vastu-rasah, ittham rasa dvedhā (p. 189, ed. Ānandākrama.)

of the term rasa (which, however, Dandin does not explain, as he does in this case) is to be found in iii 149 (or iv 26, Madras ed.), where the phrase girām rasah (=vāgrasah) is interpreted by Taruņa-vācaspati merely as sādhatvam. The modern commentators, misled, no doubt, by their own idea of the importance of rasa, read into Dandin their own ideas on the subject. Dandin nowhere speaks of the 'suggestion of rasa' (rasa-dhvani) as the 'soul' of poetry, but Prems-candra, commenting on i 10, reads this into Dandin. The artha-rasa in i 62 seems also to have a distinct reference to agrāmyatā.

p. 57f. The text of Abhinava's valuable commentary on Bharata's rasa-siitra, so far as it is relevent to the theories on rasa discussed below, has been printed by me as an appendix to my article on the Theory of Rasa published

Dandin's conception of rosa is similar to that of Bhatta Lollata (which we shall deal with presently), and he believes therefore in the development of rasa as an effect from the vibhapas and anubhavas. Dandin's somewhat meagre treatment hardly justifies us in making a definite statement on this point, but we may assume that Dandin apparently speaks of rasas like spagara or randra being developed as effects from such permanent moods as rati or krodha. For, speaking of the figure rasavat which should possess the characteristic of manifesting the rasas, he gives an example of the manifestation of sphgara in such a figure with the remark : ratih árngáratám gatá / rúpa-báhulya-yogena (ii 281). Similarly with reference to the development of randra from krodha, he says : ityāruhya parām kotim krodho randrátmatām gatah (ii 283). But the rasa in these figures is subordinate to the expressed figure itself of which it serves as a means of embellishment (alamkāratayā smrtam); in other words, the rasa is developed not for its own sake but as increasing the beauty of expression. It would seem, therefore, that Dandin was, to some extent, cognisant of rasa and bhāva, but he could not give it a place in his system except as an embellishment of the language or of the sense; and this objective view of the function of rasa, if we may presume it in these early authors. was apparently responsible for this subordinate position given to it by the alamkara and riti-systems.

in Sir Asutosh Mookerjee Silver Jubilee Commemoration Volume (Orientalia, vol. iii). It is cited below as "Abh. on Bh.", with references to the pages of the article, which I have very largely utilised in writing this chapter.

Although Vamana improves upon Dandin's system in other respects, he does not seem to have gone further in the treatment of rasa. His idea of making all poetic figures an aspect of metaphorical expression precludes him from defining the figure rasavat in the same way as Bhamsha and Dandin do, but he attempts to include the rasa in one of the essential (nitya) characteristics of poetry, viz., in the artha-guna kanti, which he defines as an 'excellence of sense' in which the rasas should be conspicuously present (dipta-rasatvam kāntih, m. 2. 15). The suggestion for this inclusion of the rasas in one of the excellences was probably found in Bharata's definition of the kanti-guna, or more directly in Bharata's peculiar definition of the udara-guna ; but it is clear that this certainly marks an improvement upon the treatment of Dandin and Bhamaha. who include the rasa in some of the non-essential figures.

Udbhata adheres in the main to the views of Bhāmaha and treats of the rasa as an element of the some of the figures like rasavat. One verse, however, which occurs in the text of Udbhata published by Jacob in JRAS, 1897, p. 847, rasādyadhisthitam kāvyam jivad rāpatayā yatah/kathyate tad rasādinām kāvyātmatvam vyavasthitam//apparently designates the rasa as the essence or 'soul' of poetry, without, however, setting up an aesthetic system on its basis. But the verse is quite out of place in the context in which it occurs 11, and in

¹¹ This verse (vi 17) occurs after the figure kānyalinga (vi 16), after the definition of which one should expect its

the text published by the Nirnaya Sagara Press, it is wanting, although given as a quotation (with a tad āhuh) in the accompanying commentary of Pratihārendurāja (p. 77). Misled by Jacob's text, Jacobi supposed12 that Udbhata was the first writer to consider the question as to what constitutes the 'soul' of poetry and to regard the rasa as such. It is clear, however, that the verse in question is not Udbhata's, and cannot be reconciled either with its immediate context or with Udbhata's general standpoint, as well as with his definition of rasquat. It cannot be denied at the same time that Udbhata betrays a closer acquaintance with some theory of rasa and its technicalities, using terms like vibhava, sthayin, sañcărin (iv 4) and anabhāva (iv 2), and enumerating, after Bharata, the eight orthodox natya-rasas with the addition of a ninth rasa (viz., santa) in the category. But Udbhata takes all this into account as an embellishment of an expressed figure like rasavat ; the rasa is not considered on its own account, but because it helps to emphasise or constitute the charm of a particular figure. Hence Pratiharenduraja remarks that the question as to the nature of

illustration, which is given in the verse vi 18 next after the verse in question. If Col. Jacob's text is accepted, then the verse rasidyadhisthitam (vi 17) would be abruptly thrust in between the definition of kavyalinga and its illustration. As a matter of fact, it occurs in Prattharenduraja's commentary on kavyalinga and is erroneously incorporated in Udbhata's text by the editor.

¹² ZDMG, 1902, p.396. In a conversation with me (1920) on this point, Prof. Jacobi admitted that he was misled into this supposition by Col. Jacob's text.

rasa and bhāsa, and as to how far they may stand as the very 'soul' of poetry is not discussed by Udbhata at all, partly for fear of prolixity and partly because it is irrelevant. 13.

Rudrata, on the other hand, seems to be the earliest writer who explicitly includes the rasa in his treatment of Poetics, and devotes four chapters to its discussion. At the beginning of his work, he praises the poets who have won eternal fame by composing kāvyas enlivened by rasa. In ch. xii ho speaks of ten rasas (adding preyas and sānta to the orthodox eight of Bharata)¹⁴, describing sragāra (love) and the characteristics of the hero and heroine in that connexion. The next two chapters take up the two kinds of sragāra (saṃbhoga

of Sarngadeva (referred to in Vol.1; p.26, In) that Udbhata was one of the commentators on Bharata. If it were true, it only shows that Udbhata was conversant with Bharata's text, as his citation of a half-line (iv 5, though it is doubtful if this is at all a hārikā-verse of Udbhata's) from Bharata vi 15 and use of technical terms like vibhāva etc would indicate. It does not prove that Udbhata belonged to the school of Bharata. On the other hand, evidence is not wanting that Udbhata in his theoretical standpoint was a follower of Bhamaha.

¹⁴ If Udbhaţa iv ş i= a kārikā-verse (and not wrongly incorporated into the text from Pratthärenduraja's commentary), then Udbhaţa was the first writer to admit kānta into Bharata's category of eight rasas. The prevas of Rudraţa is probably suggested by the poetic figure prevas admitted by Bhāmaha, Dandin and Udbhaṭa. Rudraṭa appears to allude (as Nami-sādhu rightly comments) to Bharata by the term ācārya in xii 4.

and vipralambha-love in union and in separation) and questions cognate to each. This treatment is rounded off by a short chapter describing the nature and character of the styles (riti) suitable to each 15. It is not clear, however, as to what significance Rudrata attaches to rasa as an element of poetry, for he is entirely silent with regard to the theoretical aspects of the question. Out of the sixteen chapters into which his work is divided, only four chapters deal with rasa, not theoretically but descriptively, while the rest of his work is taken up with the details of the poetic figures on which obviously he puts the greater emphasis. Speaking of the necessity of making a poem sarasa from the standpoint of the reader, he says (xii 1) that to those, who enjoy the rasas but fight shy of the aastra, instruction in the caturvarga is easier to impart through the medium of delectable writing : and this is the chief motive, in his opinion, for inspiring the sense of poetry with rasa. Rudrata starts with sabda and artha as the two constituents of poetry, and elaborates his views about poetic figures as embellishment of these elements; but he does not discuss how the rasa comes in into his

¹⁵ Rudrața defines riti, as we have already seen, with reference to the employment of compound words. He recommends the vaidarbhi and păncâli ritis in the cases of the four rasas, preyas, karuņa, bhayānaka and adbhuta, and the lāṭiyā and gauḍiyā in the case of raudra, there being apparently no fixed rule with regard to the remaining rasas. He uses the term aucitya in this context, which anticipates the theory of aucitya first elaborated by Anandavardhana in connexion with the delineation of rasa.

system, a fact which may lead one to suspect that these chapters on rasa were probably later engraftments extraneous to, if not inconsistent with, his general standpoint. Rudrata, in his theoretical tendencies, has no affinity with the Rasa school, but belongs to the Alamkara school, a fact which would distinguish him from Rudrabhatta, the keynote of whose system is to be found in the idea of rasule, We have to this effect the testimony of Ruyyaka and Jayaratha Ruyyaka says17 that Rudrata laid special stress on alamkara, in which were comprised the three kinds of suggestion (dhvani), ineluding the suggestion of rasa, and that in figures like rasapat, the rasa and bhava implied are taken as elements which heighten the charm of the expressed idea 1 ".

The older writers on Poetics, therefore, before the advent of the dhemai theorists, content themselves with the working out of the outward form of expression, the 'body' of poetry, and hardly

¹⁶ See Vol. I, p. 91.

¹⁷ ed. Kavyamālā p. 5. Samudrabandba agrees with this view.

¹⁸ Nami-sādhu, explaining Rudraţa xii z, states that in the opinion of his author, habda and artha constitute the 'body' of poetry, the poetic figures take the place of artificial ornaments, while rasa resembles natural qualities like prowess and beauty (rasās tu saundaryūdaya iva sahajā guṇāḥ). But there is nothing in Rudrata which will support this description of his standpoint, especially as Rudraţa can scarcely be supposed to look upon poetic figures, which are of great importance in his view of poetry, as mere artificial embellishments of poetry. See above pp. 75-6, 77.

trouble themselves with the question of an ulterior aesthetic principle, the 'soul' of poetry; nor do they identify, as some later writers do, this 'soul' with the subtle psychological factor known as rasa. Vamans, no doubt, starts the question and offers to solve it by declaring that the diction or rlli is this 'soul'; but we have seen that in Vamana's view, the riti is not the expression of poetic individuality but the objective beauty of representation called forth by a definite adjustment of certain fixed literary excellences. The older writers, therefore, lay the greatest emphasis on the alamkara (or poetic figure), or on the riti (or diction in the objective sense), the advantages of which were considered sufficient for poetry ; and, cognisant as they were of that acathetic delectableness which must be present in all poetry and which in Sanskrit goes by the name of rasa, they could not harmonise it well into their theory of externals and treated it more or less as an embellishment of the language by including it in postic figures or by allowing it to form an element of one of the excellences of diction. This was the only way in which they could recognise the rasa. It is partly for this reason that the Dhyanikara (iii 52) condemns carlier theories as crude and insufficient for the purpose of explaining the nature of poetry, and expounds his own system in which the suggestion of rasa (rasa-dheani) plays such an important part.

(2)

The reason why the rasa was even thus perfunctorily admitted into the older systems appears to have been the fact that Bharata's treatment of the rasa in the drama had already established itself, having been further elaborated by a number of commentators and writers on the subject, and it naturally influenced, to a limited extent, the enquiry of early thinkers. We have already noted that Bharata's famous satra on rasa by its ambiguity taxed the ingenuity of his followers and led to a great deal of controversy regarding its true interpretation; and as each writer tried to explain it in his own way, it gave rise to a number of theories on rasa.

Bhatta Lollata appears to have been one of the earliest formulators of such an explanation. His work is unfortunately lost, and very little can be gathered from the brief review of his opinion in Abbinavagupta's commentary on Bharata 19, which is copied more or less by all subsequent writers who deal with Lollata's views 20. But it

¹⁹ Abhinava's review of the opinions of Lollata, Śańkuka and Bhatta Nāyaka, which is followed by Mammata and all later writers, is extensively reproduced by Hemacandra (pp. 57.66) and Māṇikyacandra (pp. 40 f, ed. Ānandā-śrama). This portion of Abhinava's commentary will be found in my article on the Theory of Rasa (already referred to, see above fn 10), pp. 240 f. Detailed references therefore are not as a rule given here.

²⁰ See, for instance, Mammata ch. iv, Hemacandra p. 57,

is clear even from this summary exposition by an adverse critic that Lollata, in explaining Bharata's sū!ra, took the vibhāva as the direct cause (kārana) of rasa, which therefore is an effect (anukārya or utpādya), and the term nispatti of Bharata should be explained as utpatti or pusti. The rasa, found in characters like Rama, is attributed to the actor. who imitates the characters in form, dress and action, and thereby charms the spectator. Mammata and his followers make this interpretation of Lollata's view more clear by saying that the permanent mood or sthayin is directly connected (mukhyataya prttya = saksat sambandhena) with the hero like Rama, but it is recognised as existing in the actor through a clever imitation of the original character, this imitation being apparently the source of the charm to the spectator. The rasa, therefore, resides in the hero, but it is not clear how a mental state which belongs to the hero can be transferred to the actor, and how the spectator can be charmed by a feeling which does not exist in The spectator's mere apprehension of the feeling imitated by the actor cannot produce even a semblance of the original feeling and consequent delight in the mind of the spectator; otherwise such a delight would be brought about even on witnessing a love-affair in the ordinary world, as distinguished from the world of poetry 11. It is

Mallinatha on Vidyadhara p. 85, Govinda on Mammata p. 63 etc.

²¹ Govinda criticises Lallața's view thus : tad apesalam, sămăjikeșu tadabhāve tatra camatkārimubhava-virodhāt, na

also argued that this cause-and-effect theory of Lollata cannot satisfactorily explain the relation of the vibhanas etc. to the rasa. An effect may exist even when its efficient cause is destroyed; but as the life of the rasa is circumscribed by the exhibition of the vibhavas, it disappears when the latter disappear, a fact which goes to prove that the rasa must not be taken as an ordinary laukika effect 22. Again, the cause and the effect cannot be contemporaneous; if the rasa is supposed to be un effect, its relish cannot be, as it actually is, contemporaneous with the appearance of the vibhanax. Hence Visvanatha remarks (p. 86) that if the rasa is an effect, having for its cause the perception of the viblavas, then at the time of the relish of rasa the vibhagas would not be perceived; for we do not find the simultaneous perception of a cause and its effect. The perception of the touch of the sandalwood unguent and the perception of the pleasure produced thereby cannot take place simultaneously, however rapidly the one may succeed the other.

Sankuka, the next important writer on this subject mentioned by Abhinavagupta and others 3, therefore rejects this interpretation of the utpattivadins, who are said to follow, in their peculiar theory, the Mimāṃsā school of philosophers. Lollata's view does not treat of rasa as a matter of the spectator's

ca tajjhānam eva camatkāra-hetuh, laukika-krūgārādi-darbanendpi camatkāra-prasangāt (ed. Kāvyamālā, 1912, p. 63).

²² Govinda p. 69, Mallinátha pp. 87, 93-4-

²³ The reference to Śańkuka's views is to be found in Mammata and others, as cited above in fn 20.

feeling. Sankuka, on the other hand, thinks that the rasa is not produced as an effect, but inferred by the spectator, and the inferred feeling is relished by him as rasa. The permanent mood of the hero is inferred to exist in the actor (though not actually existing in him) by means of the vibhavas etc., eleverly exhibited by him in acting, so as to produce an illusion of identity with the feelings of the hero24; and the mood thus inferred, being sensed by the spectator through its exquisite beauty, adds to itself a peculiar charm "5, and thus develops into a relishable condition of his own mind which is called the rasa. The realisation of rasa, therefore, is a process of logical inference, and the nispatti of Bharata's sutra is explained as anumiti, the vibhavas standing to rasa in the relation of anumapaka or gamaka to anumapya or gamya. But the mood itself, though inferred in this way from the relation of logical major and middle terms, is yet cognised as different from the objects of ordinary inference, being inferred, as it were, by force of its connexion with the vibhavas, which factors, though artificial in themselves, are not recognised as such. cognition or knowledge is characterised as being based on what is called citra-turaga-nyaya (or the analogy by which a horse in a picture is called a horse), and should be differentiated from the true ('he is

²⁴ rāmūdyabheda-bhāvitena nate tat-prakāhitair eva vibhāvādibhir anumitah, Mallinātha p. 85.

²⁵ vastu-saundarya-balād rasanīyatvena sthāyinām anyūnumeya-vailakṣaṇyāt Govinda p. 65, practically paraphrasing Mammata.

Rāma'), the false ('he is Rāma' with a following negation 'he is not Rama'), the doubtful ('he may or may not be Rama') knowledge, as well as from the knowledge of similarity ('he is like Rāma')20. The theory, however, has been discredited by later schools on the ground (as Govinda concisely puts it 27) that it disregards the well-recognised fact that the inference of a thing can never produce the same charm as direct cognition. It has also been pointed out that the rasa is not capable of being cognised by the ordinary means of arriving at knowledge, for the feeling of a hero like Rama, being past, cannot be cognised directly by the organs of sense belonging to the present ". The anumana-theory is criticised elaborately in connexion with the theory of 'suggestion', coming topically within the province of the suggestion of rasa (rasa-dheani). We shall have occasion to deal with this aspect of the theory in its proper place; but the general argument with which it is sought to be discarded is that the vibhavas cannot be taken as the middle term in proving the sthayin, because the former do not stand in the same relation to the latter as the

²⁶ as interpreted by Maromaja, and Abhinava p. 241. Hemacandra, expanding Abhinavagupta's exposition, puts it in this way na oltra nartaka eva sukhiti pratipattile, ndpyayam eva rāma iti, na vāpyayam sukhiti, nāpi rāmah syād vā na vāyam iti, na cāpi tatsadršam iti, kim tu samyanmithyū-samšaya-sādršya-pratītibhyo vilakvanas citra-turagūdinyāyena yah sukhī rāma asūvayam iti pratītir asti (p. 59).

²⁷ pratyaksam eva jäänam sa-camatkäram nünumityödir iti loka-prasiddhim avadhäyünyathü-kalpane mänübhävah, p. 65.

²⁸ Vidyādhara p. 94.

middle term (sādhana) does to the major term (sādhya), but are simply its suggestors (vyanjaka).

The pibhāvas, therefore, do not constitute either the efficient cause (kāraka-hetu) or the logical cause (jääpaka-hetu) of rasa, as held respectively by Lollata and Sankuka. Apart from technicalities, Lollata's view appears to be that the spectator ascribes to the well-trained actor the same mental state as belonged to the hero, and his apprehension of this imparted feeling produces a similar feeling in his mind, causing delight. Sankuka thinks that the well-trained actor so cleverly simulates the action of the hero that the spectator apprehends the actor to be identical with the hero, and infers from this illusion the actual feeling of the hero in his own mind, being moved by the extraordinary beauty of the represented action. In both these theories, however, the difficulty remains viz., that if the rose is an objective entity, produced or inferred, how can it bring about a subjective feeling of relish in the audience in whom these factors (vibhavas etc.) are presumably absent? If, on the other hand, it is supposed that the rasa exists in the audience also, the question still remains as to how the particular feeling of a particular hero (like Rāma, who is different from or superior to the spectator himself) can be relished or realised as his own by the spectator? These objections are thus ably set forth by Bhatta Nāyaka 10.

²⁹ Another objector to Sańkuka's view appears to be Bhaţţa Tauta, whose opinions are summarised by Abhinava (who refers to him simply as asmad-upādhyāya) in a passage

as interpreted by Abhinavagupta in his "Locana (pp. 67-8): "If the rasa is perceived as belonging to another person, then it is a case of tatsthya i. e. one would not himself be personally affected by it. It is also not perceived as belonging to oneself out of poetry dealing with the deeds of heroes like Rama. If it is perceived as belonging to oneself, then the origin of rasa in self is admitted. But this is not reasonable, for there is nothing there which can operate as a vibhave for the audience. If it is objected that the generalised idea of the beloved (kantatua), which lies dormant and awakens in us germs of latent impressions. operates in the capacity of a vibliaca, then how can it be applied to the description of a deity and the like? The recollection of one's own beloved does not intervene in one's consciousness. How can vibliavox, like the construction of a bridge over the sea, which form the attributes of an extraordinary hero like Rama, become generalised (in the mind of an individual spectator)? One does not recollect only Rama's energy, because it has no resemblance (to one's own energy). The rasa is not perceived when one learns it from a verbal composition, because a man would learn it in the same way from the direct observation of a pair of lovers. If it is assumed that rasa is produced, then a man would feel disinclined

which is substantially reproduced by Hemacandra at p. 59 under Bhatta Tauta's name. See also Manikyacandra p. 43 who draws also upon Abhinava's exposition of Tauta's view.

to tragedy, insamuch as he finds only pain following upon the production of the pathetic mood (karuna)."30

Bhatta Nayaka, therefore, attempts to refute earlier theories and set up a poculiar doctrine of aesthetic enjoyment (bhoga) which makes the relish of rasa possible. He argues (as interpreted by Mammata and others) that (i) the rasa cannot be produced as an effect, because the causes (namely, the wibhācos), being nonrealities, connot bring about a real effect; (ii) it can not be inferred, because the real character (e. g. Rāma), not being before the audience, his feeling does not exist, and what does not exist cannot be inferred (na tattvato rāmasya smrtih, anupalabdhatvat). Nor is it a case of revelation (abhivyakti) of something potentially existing (*akti-rupa); for in that case, the potential emotions, once awakened, would occupy their field of action in diverse degrees, thus contradicting the nature of rasa as

syāt. Na ca svægatatoena rāmidi-caritamayāt kāvyād asau pratīyate. Svātma-gatatoena rāmidi-caritamayāt kāvyād asau pratīyate. Svātma-gatatoena ca pratītau svātmani rasasyötpattir evābhyupagatā syāt, tā ciyuktā, sāmājikam pratyavibhāvatvāt. Kāntātoum sādhāramam vāsanā-vikāsa-hetur vibhāvanāyām prayojakam cet, devatā-varņamīdau tad api katham? Na ca sva-kāntā-smaramam madhye samvedyate. Alokasāmānyānām ca rāmādīnām ye samudra-setu-bandhādayo vibhāvās te katham sādhāramsam bhajeyuh? Na cotsāhādimātram smaryate, ananurāpatvāt. Šabdād api tat-pratipattau na rasūpajanah, pratyakṣād iva nāyaka-mithuna-pratipattau. Utpatti-pakṣē ca karuṇasyōtpādād duhkhitve karuṇa-prakṣāsu punar apravṛttih syūt.

one; moreover, there would be the same difficulty as to whether the rasa is revealed in oneself or in another person. To slove these and other difficulties, Bhatta Nāyaka (as interpreted by Abhinavagupta) maintains that the rasa is enjoyed in connexion with the vibhavas through the relation of the enjoyer (bhojaka) and the enjoyed (bhejya). This school 31 postulates three different functions of a word, namely, abhidha (already admitted by the Mimānisakas and grammarians), bhavakatva and bhojakatva, and thus ascribes to a poem a threefold potency of its own. namely, the powers of denotation, of generalisation and of enjoyment. The abhidha is not merely the actual Denotation of a word, but is given an extended meaning so as to include laksana or Indication in its scope (abhidha laksanaiva), thus embracing the two functions already analysed by previous speculation. It is meant probably that the Denotation (as postulated by Bhatta Navaka) also gives to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of rasa. The bhāvakatva (or rasa-bhāvanā), which, as Abhinavagupta suggests, is apparently derived from Bharata's general definition of bhava, is described as the power of generalisation which makes the vilhavas as well as the sthayi-bhava, sensed in their general character without any reference to their specific properties. The vibhava, Sita, for instance, is

³¹ Bhatta Nayaka's views are set forth and criticised by Abh. on Bh. p. 244, "Locana p. 68, Mammata ch. iv, Hemacandra pp. 61 f., Govinda p. 66.

understood through this power not as a particular individual but in the general character of a woman, and the sthayi-bhava (e.g. Rama's love towards her) is taken as love in general without any reference to the agent or the object. In this way the audience can appropriate the pibhavas, as well as the sthayi-bhava, as universal. After the rusa is thus generalised, comes it enjoyment. By the third function of bhojakatva, the sthayin is enjoyed in this general form, accompanied by the vibhavas, sensed also in a general form; and this enjoyment is described as a process of delectation similar to the enlightened self-sufficient and blissful knowledge, arising (in the language of the Samkhya philosophers, which is borrowed by these theorists) from the prominence of the attribute of goodness (satture) in a man, and different from what is known as worldty happiness, being divested of personal relations or interests. It is differentiated from the two kinds of knowledge, anubhava and smarana; and consisting of the qualities of melting, pervading and expanding the mind, it is compared to the indescribable bliss of divine contemplation (brahmasvada-sacivah). According to Bhatta Nayaka, therefore, the rasa consists in the sthayi-bhava or the permanent mood, experienced in a generalised form in poetry and drama through the powers of abhidhā and bhāvakatva, and enjoyed by a blissful process, known as bhoga, till it is raised to a state of pleasurable relish, which is not worldly (alaukika) but disinterested and which is akin to the philosophic meditation of Brahma.

It will be noticed that these different theories about rasa, though applied to drama and poetry, are yet generally tinged with the doctrines of the various schools of Indian philosophy. Lollata, it is clear, is a Mīmāmsaka who believes in the far-reaching function of the Denotation of a word and thinks that it is capable of expressing all other implied or suggested sense in the shape of the rasa. Sankuka, on the other hand, is a Naiyayika or logician who would demonstrate the rese by means of syllogistic reasoning. He believes that the implied rasa can be reached by the logical process of inference from the expressed sense, although he has to admit that the inferred mood is cognised differently from the objects of ordinary inference, being sensed by the spectator through the force of its exquisite charm. In Bhatta Nayaka we mark a further development. In his theory there is not only a transition from what may be called the objective to the subjective view of rasa, and an understanding that the whole phenomenon should be explained in terms of the spectator's inward experience, but also the fact that Bhatta Nāyaka in his peculiar theory of aesthetic enjoyment (bhogu) is substantially following the teachings of the Samkhya philosophers. We need not enter here into the details of Samkhya psychology or metaphysics, but we may indicate briefly the application of its main teachings to the conception of poetry and the artistic delight resulting from it34. The purpose

³² Hiriyana, in his article on Indian Aesthetics, in the Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference,

of evolution in Samkhya is the attainment of bhoga (experience of pleasure and pain) and apavarga (spiritual emancipation through right knowledge). The enjoyer of rasa in poetry is like the knower of Brahma, but the aesthetic attitude is different from the philosophic. The aesthetic attitude is indeed one of samuit (or cit-svabhāvā), i.e., pure contemplation dissociated from all personal interests, and results in vitranti or composure; but in the philosophical attitude there is complete detachment or alcofness from pleasure and pain and egoistic impulses, for the knower becomes impersonal by transcending his buddhi. This comes about through the predominance of the sattvika guna in both cases; but in the spiritual attitude the buddhi, which contains in it vasanas or acquired impulses, modifying its intrinsic sattvike character, is purged of all its egoistic tendencies, and the true knower, realising the intrinsic disparateness of prakets and purusa, transcends the empirical plane. Such complete detachment is not possible in the aesthetic attitude. The world of poetry, being idealised, is different from the natural world and does not evoke egoistic impulses; for the objects contemplated in poetry have no reference to any one in particular but are entirely impersonal. These impersonalised forms, therefore, afford to the enjoyer of poetry escape from the ills which arise from personal relations, but they are the means only of temporary release from the natural world, for he

Poona, vol. II, has dealt with the subject at some length.

One may think, however, that his note that Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka
was a mīmānaka has not been clearly made out.

cannot, like the ordinary man, transcend his buddhi altogether. The three stages in the appreciation of poetry which lead ultimately to the aesthetic experience of rasa indicate that the apprehension of the meanings of words (abhidhā) is not important in itself but only as a means of apprehending the generalised conceptions which are unrelated to any one in particular, the bhavakatva being the process generalising, by which the factors of the feelings, as well as the feeling itself, become impersonalised. These idealised creations of poetry lead to enjoyment or bhoga, which implies that the condition produced is one of pleasure, as distinguished from the case of the natural attitude which is not always pleasurable, as well as from the spiritual attitude which is neither pleasurable nor painful.

(3)

If we may judge from the somewhat elaborate criticism levelled against Bhatta Nāyaka's theory, it seems to have produced a greater impression than earlier theories, and paved the way, no doubt, for the later theory of Abhinavagupta to whom belongs the credit of explaining the new aesthetic system of the Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana.

The Dhvanikara, however, in his exposition of rasa-dhvani and rasa, seems to have been greatly influenced by the Dramaturgic Rasa school. Bharata, the acknowledged law-giver of this school, declared that the business of the drama was to evolve one or more of the eight rasas; and therefore a more

or less elaborate psychology of human sentiments had been analysed in the service of the dramatic art even before poetic theories began to be seriously discussed. Bharata's ideas on these psychological processes and on rasa, which is the final internal experience consisting in the consciousness of a certain condition of the ego, were elaborated by his commentators and followers, until the Dhyanikara, followed by Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, came into the field. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory, the idea of rasa was naturally taken over to poetry and poetic theory; and as the transitiou from the naive to the sentimental poetry was accomplished, the theorists went a step further and crected the vasa into one of its essential foundations. Anandavardhana is quite explicit on this point when he says (p. 181) : etac ca rassdi-tätpuryena kävya-nihandhanam bharatádávapi suprasiddham eva. In other words, what was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others thus found its way into poetry, profoundly modifying, as it did, the entire conception of the kāvya35. From his extensive literary and philosophical studies as well as from his interest in the work of Bharata and his followers, Abhinavagupta goes further and lays down: nātyāt samudayariipād rasah, kācye'ni nātyāyamāna eva rasah kavyarthah. These theorists realised that no system of Poetics, as no system of Dramaturgy,

³³ Rudrabhatta states (i 5) in the same way that Bharata and others have already discussed rasa in connexion with the drama, while his own object is to apply it to the case of poetry. Cf Lindenau, Rasalekre, p. 2.

can ever ignore the feelings, moods and sentiments, and must find an important place for rasa, the manifestation of which is as much the business of poetry as of the drama. Gradually stress came to be laid on the emotional mood, as well as on the imaginative thought, which the poet succeeds in communicating to us: the outward expression, on which the older writers pinned their faith so much, being regarded only as a means of suggesting or pointing to the implicit significance of such a mood in poetry.

The insufficiencies of the earlier theories on rasa are obvious and are therefore rightly criticised by Abhinavagupta; but it was a happy idea to elaborate the theory in such a way as not only to supply these deficiencies but also to fit it well into the theory of 'suggestion' or dheam formulated by the new school. It is not necessary for us here to enter into the details of the dhyani-theory, which will be treated in its proper place; but we may for convenience and continuity of treatment indicate here generally how the idea of rasa was worked up into them. The Dhvani school, in its analysis of the essentials of poetry, found that the contents of a good poem may be generally distinguished into two parts. The one is that which is expressed and includes what is given in so many words; the other content is not expressed but must be added to it by the imagination of the reader or listener. The unexpressed or suggested part, which is distinctly linked up with the expressed and which is developed by a peculiar process of suggestion (vyanjana), is taken to be the 'soul' or essence of poetry. To the grammarians and learned writers, it perhaps seemed paradoxical to state that the very essence of poetry was that which was not even expressed. On the other hand, some form of symbolical speech, in which wisdom demands that one should express oneself more in hints and suggestions than in actual words, was always in vogue, and the poets had been more or less partial to the method of speaking in metaphor or wrapping up their ideas in transparent allegory. But suggestive poetry is something different from the merely metaphorical, which Vamana had already amply recognised and on which the Alamkara and the Riti schools had put so much emphasis. The metaphorical or the allegoric, however veiled it may be, is still in a souse expressed and must be taken as such ; but the suggestive is always unexpressed, and is therefore a source of greater charm by its capacity of concealment. This unexpressed or inexpressible is called into being by a particular function of suggestion, appertaining to words and their meanings, which this school postulates, and by which poetry becomes (in the language of Kant) an expression of the 'aesthetic idea'

Now the unexpressed, through the suggestive power of sound or sense, may be an unexpressed thought or matter (vastu), or an unexpressed figure of speech (alamkāra), but in most cases it is a mood or feeling (rasa) which is directly inexpressible. The Dhvani school, therefore, took up the moods and feelings as an element of the unexpressed and

tried to harmonise the idea of rasa with the theory of dhvani. It was realised that poetry was not, as Dandin thought, the mere clothing of agreeable ideas in agreeable language; the feelings and moods play an important part in it. But the feelings and moods are in themselves inexpressible. We can give a name to them, but naming a mood or feeling is not equivalent to expressing or developing it. At best, therefore, we can suggest it. What the poet can directly express or describe are the vibhavas etc.; but with the help of these expressed elements which must be generalised and conceived, not as they appear in the natural (laukika) world, but as they may be imagined in the world of poetry, the poet can awaken in us, through the power of suggestion inherent in words and their meanings, a particular alaukika condition of the soul in which the relish of the feeling is possible. It is true that the poet cannot rouse the same mood or feeling as, for instance, Rama, whom he describes, felt. but he can call up a reflection of it, which is similar in some respects; and the condition of the reader's soul in the enjoyment of such feeling is in poetry and drama the relish of rusa, which can be brought into consciousness only by the power of suggestion inherent in words or ideas.

Here comes in the new colour given to the rasa-theory by the exponents of the Dhvani school. They interpret Bharata's central dictum to mean that the rasa is suggested by the union of the sthäyin with the vibhāvas through the relation of the suggested (vyangya) and the suggestor (vyangaka):

the nispatti of Bharata, therefore, should mean abhivyakti.

The elaboration of the rasa-theory, however, by this school in the direct tradition of Lollata, Sankuka and Bhatta Nayaka, is associated by Mammata and others with the name of Abhinavagupta 34. Commenting on Bhatta Nāyaka's theory, Abhinava points out that there is no need, as there is no authority for assuming the two powers of bhavakatva and bhogikarawa; for they are implicitly included in the idea of rasa-vyanjana and its ultimate asvāda. Bharata's dietum kāvyārthān bhāvayantīti bhāvāh implies the bhāvakatva to be an inherent capacity of all bhavas, as the means of bringing into consciousness the sense of poetry, the term sense indicating here the principal sense consisting of the relish of rasa. Hence the sthayin, together with the vyabhicarin, being bhāvas themselves, bring into existence through this inherent power the extraordinary relishable sense of poetry, cognised in a general or impersonalised form. In this way, the sthayin may be regarded as the bhavaka or nispadaka of rasa; and this so-called bhavabatva, according to Abhinava, consists in nothing more than a suitable use of guna and alamkāra (samucita-guņālamkāra-parigrahātmakam) for the ultimate purpose of awakening the rasa through the suggestive power of word and sense. Thus, partially admitting bhavana or bhavakatva

³⁴ There is some difference in the general theoretical positions of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta which will noticed later.

but explaining it somewhat differently, Abhinava turns to the other power assumed as bhoga or bhogikarana by Bhatta Nayaka. He remarks that beyond pratiti or perception of rasa, he. is not aware of any other process called bhoga. If it is relish or enjoyment, it is already admitted as the essence of rasa, and nothing is gained by giving it a new name. Abhinava thinks that the bhoga supposed by Bhatta Nayaka is nothing more than the aspada or relish of rasa, based on permanent moods like rati etc., and made possible by the suggestive power of poetry. It falls naturally, therefore, within the domain of suggestion and need not be taken as a separate function (bhogikarana-vyāpāraš ca kāvyātmaka-rusa-visayo dhvananatmaiva).

This pratti of rasa, Abhinavagupta maintains, results from its abhivyakti or manifestation by the power of suggestion, and consists of a state of relish known as rasand, asvada or carvand. What is manifested is not the rasa itself, but its relish; not the mood itself but its reflection in the form of a subjective condition of aesthetic enjoyment in the reader. This taste or relish partakes, no doubt, of the nature of cognition; it is nevertheless different from the ordinary laukika forms of the process, because its means (viz., the vibhāvas) are not to be taken as ordinary or laukika causes³⁵.

³⁵ This will make it clear why the rasas like karuna, bibhatsa and bhayanaka, which cause pity, disgust or horror, can be termed rasas in which enjoyment is essential. The relish of rasa is supposed to be an extraordinary bliss,

Although rasa requires these factors for its manifestation and cannot exist without them, it cannot yet be regarded as an ordinary effect, and the cause and effect theory is inapplicable; for in the transcendental sphere of poetry, it is said, the connexion between cause and effect gives place to an imaginative system of relations, which has

dissociated from personal interests and not to be likened to ordinary pleasure and pain in which personal or egoistic impulses predominate. The mind is so entirely lost in its contemplation that even when the sentiment of grief or horror relished in such a state, pain is never felt, and even when felt it is a pleasurable pain. This fact is borne out by the common experience that when grief is represented on the stage, the spectator says 'I have enjoyed it'. Hence Visyanatha remarks (iii 6-7 and prtti) that those very things which are called causes of pleasure and pain in the world (e, g, banishment of Stta in the forest), when consigned to poetry and drama, possess the right to be called, in consequence of their assuming such an impersonalised form, alaukika vibhāvas etc., and from them only pleasure ensues, as it does from bites and the like in amorous dalliance. It is also maintained that tears constitute no proof that anything but pleasure is felt in poetry; for the tears that are shed by the reader are not those of pain but those of sentiment. Jagannātha's remarks in this connexion are interesting. He says (p. 26) that the shedding of tears and the like are due to the nature of the experience of particular pleasures, and not to pain. Hence in a devotee tears arise on listening to a description of the deity; in this case there. is not the slightest feeling of pain. Such is the power of detachment which poetry produces that even unpleasant things like sorrow generate dissociated pleasure, and this pleasant relish of impersonalised or idealised artistic creations should be distinguished from the ordinary experiences of life. the power of stirring the reader's soul into rasa. The resulting rasa cannot be identified with the constituent vibhāvas, for the latter are not experienced separately, but the whole appears as rasa, which is thus simple and indivisible. At the time of the relish nothing else but the rasa is raised to our consciousness. The writers on Poetics are fond of explaining this phenomenon under the analogy of a beverage which, made up of black pepper, candied sugar, camphor and other ingredients, gives us yet a taste different from that of its constituents. The result therefore is an indissoluble unity of taste from which every trace of the constituent elements is obliterated.

Abhinavagupta goes a step further also iu maintaining that the permanent mood, (sthayin), inferred from its laukika causes (e.g., women, garden etc.) remains in the hearts of the appreciating audience in the subtle form of latent impressions, the idea of vasana or latent impression having been already admitted by the philosophers. On reading a poem or witnessing a drama, this permanent mood, remaining in the form of latent impression, is suggested by the depicted vibhavas etc., which cease to be called laukika causes but go by the name of vibhavas etc. in poetry and drama, and which are taken in their general form without specific connexions. The vibhavas, therefore, are generalised or impersonalised in the minds of the reader, and do not refer to particularities, not through the power of bhanakatva, as supposed by Bhatta Nayaka, but generally through the

suggestive power of sound and sense and specifically through a skilful use of quaa and alamkara in poetry, and clever representation in the drama. In the same way, the sthayi-bhava, which is the source of rasa 36, is also generalised, because the germ of it is already existent in the reader's mind in the form of latent impressions; and this, together with the beauty of the generalised representation of the vibhācas etc., removes all temporal and spatial limitations. The mood is generalised also in the sense that it refers not to any particular reader but to readers in general, so that the particular individual, while relishing it, does not think that it is relished by him slone, but by all persons of poetic sensibility. This relish is known as rosa in poetry and drama.

To state it briefly and without any technicality, there is in the mind a latent impression of feel-

The sthäyin is so called because, in spite of its being transient like all feelings, its impression in the form of vasanā or saņiskāra is more or less permanent, being called up when the rasa is cognised. Cf Prabhā p. 61: antaḥkaraṇa-pravrtti-rūpasya ratyūder āšu-vināšatus'pi saņiskāritmanā cirakāla-sthāyitvād pāvad-rasa-pratīti-kālam anusaṇidhānāc va sthāyitvam. But possibly it was originally called sthāyin because it constituted the permanent mood or sentiment in the composition, which nothing akin to it or opposed to it could overcome, but which could only be strengthened by other bhāvas. But the sthāyin itself is not rasa; it must be vyakti-višista and vibhāvādi-melaka, and thus made carvaṇòpayogā or relishable, Govinda p. 62. The ultimate relish of rasa is free from the contact of the sthāyin, as it is of the vibhāvas.

ings which we once went through (or which we acquired from previous births), and this is roused when we read a poem which describe similar things. By universal sympathy or community of feeling we become part and parcel of the same feeling and imagine ourselves in that condition. Thus the feeling is raised to a state of relish, called rasa, in which lies the essence of pootic enjoyment. It will be noticed that these theorists presuppose latent impression of experience (vāsanā) and universal sympathy (sādhāranya or sādhāranikarana). Those who have not experienced the feeling of love, for instance, and have therefore no impression of experience left in them, as well as those who have no sense of community of human feelings, can never relish rasa. The vasana, we are told, is natural (naisargiki) and may have been left in our mind through the samskara of previous births, but it may also be acquired by study and experience. The writers on Poetics, therefore, are merciless in their satire on dull grammarians and old Mimamsakas, to whom such relish of rasa is denied, and they declare unanimously that the rasika alone is capable of realising the rasa; for the rasa is not an objective entity which can reside in the hero or the actor, but a subjective condition realised by the reader's own capacity of aesthetic enjoyment. Thus, a degree of culture, experience and aesthetic instinct is demanded in the critic, the rasika or sahrdaya, in conformity with this subtle conception of poetry. As Abhinavagupta puts it, adhikari catra vimala-pratibhanasali-hrdayah. and describes such a subrdaya ("Locana p. 11) as

yeşüm kävyönusilandbhyösa-vasad visadibhüte mano-mukure varnaniya-tanmayibhavanayogyatā te hrdaya-samvüdabhöjah sahrdayāh.

It may be pointed out here that this subtle conception of rasa makes it difficult to express the notion properly in Western critical terminology. The word has been translated etymologically by the terms 'flavour', 'relish', 'gustation', 'taste', 'Geschmack' or 'saveur' ; but none of these renderings seems to be adequate. The simpler word 'mood', or the term 'Stimmung' used by Jacobi may be the nearest approach to it, but the concept has hardly any analogy in European critical theories. of the terms employed have association of subtle meanings of their own, and are therefore not strictly applicable. For instance, the word 'taste' or 'relish' though literally correct, must not be understood to imply aesthetic judgment, 'good or bad tasto', but must be taken to indicate an idea similar to what we mean when we speak of tasting food. At the same time, this realistic description must not lead us to drag it down to the level of a bodily pleasure; for this artistic pleasure is given as almost equivalent to the philosophic bliss, known as ananda, being lifted above worldly joy.

This peculiar condition of the mind, the rasa, is realised, according to Abhinavagupta, through the characteristic function of vyanjanā or suggestion inherent in word and sense. The idea is elaborated by later theorists who take pains to shew that it does not not come under the province of Denotation (abhidhā), nor of Import (tātparga), nor of Indication

(laksana), nor of Perception (pratyaksa), nor of Inference (anumana), nor of Reminiscence (smarana). which means of knowledge are admitted by philosophers and grammarians. Into these technicalities which properly come under the discussion of the oyanjana-ortti, we need not enter; but it may be noted here that Abhinava describes this abhivyakti. which is taken as synonymous with carvana, as vitavighna-pratiti or realisation freed from obstacles. Jagannatha and the author of the Prubha commentary on Kanya-pradipa describe vyakti as bhogadvarana cit. Both these terms constitute a link connecting the present theory with the teachings of the Vedanta. The dismissal of the avidya and the elimination of koma and karmon (interest and activity) lead us to a point of detachment where we realise the intrinsic identity of self with Brahma and apprehend the bliss or anauda resulting from such a realisation. The idea of Vedantin's moksa, which consists of a condition, not to be produced but to be made manifest by the removal enveloping obstacles, finds an analogy in the idea of the manifestation of rasa, implied in its abhieyakti, which consists not in the expression of anything new but in the revealing of something already existing. The brahmásväda is likened to the rasásväda because in both cases the intimate realisation comes after the limitations of the ego-centric attitude are transcended. and all separate existence is merged in the unity or harmony realised. This happens in the case of rasasvada when the poetic sentiment, which remains in his heart in the form of latent impression, is made to shipe forth. and the spectator's mind is purged of all egoistic impulses by the force of the idealised or generalised creations of poetry, consisting of the vibhavas etc., which are therefore termed vighnapasarakas or removers of obstacles. It is therefore alaukika, being unlike the taste of interested worldly happiness and being incompassable by the ordinary processes of knowledge. Its essence consists in its relish or taste, asvāda, careaņā, or rasaķā; but it is a relish in which the rasa alone, spart from its constituent elements, is raised to consciousness. It is therefore described as a relish in which the contemplation of anything else but rasa is lost (vigalita-vedydntara), or which is free from the contact of aught else perceived (vedydniara-sparsa-sunya), like the state of mind lost in the philosophic contemplation of Brahma. It is not capable of proof or designation and cannot be made known, because its perception is inseparable from its existence; or, in other words, it is identical with the knowledge of itself. The only proof of its existence is its relish itself by the sahrdaya or the man of taste (sakala-sahrdayahrdaya-samvedana-saksika); and the sahrdaya, to whom alone this bliss is vouchsafed, is like the yogin or devotee who deserves this preference through his accumulated merits (punyacantah praminvanti yogivad rasa-santatim)37.

³⁷ The artistic attitude is therefore different from the natural, and more akin to the philosophic. But art affords only a temporary release from the ills of life by enabling one to transcend his personal relations or practical interests, and restores equanimity of mind (vièranti) by leading him

This, in its general outlines, is the rasa-theory as finally fixed by the Dhyani school; and all later writers, from Dhananjaya to Jagannatha, accept, more or less, this new interpretation and attempt to work it out in detail. Even Mahimabhatta, who tried to demolish the dhrami-theory, acknowledges the importance of rasa and declares that on this point there is no difference of opinion between himsel(36 and the Dhyanikara, the only difference existing with regard to the function par excellence which manifests the raso. Thus an endeavour was made by the dheani-theorists not only to explain the concept of rasa in terms of inward experience, but also to absorb this idea of aesthetic delectation into the new theory of dheart, and make it applicable to poetry as well as to the drama; and the Rasa school, properly so called, began to merge from this time onwards into the dominant Dhyani school, to the consideration of which we

away from the common world and offering him another in its place. This is an attitude of pure pleasure, of disinterested contemplation (sampoit), but not of true enlightenment which comes to the knower who, no longer on the empirical plane, transcends completely the sphere of pleasure as well as of pain. The attitude is variously termed camatkāranirveka (awakening of poetic charm), rasanā (relish), āsvāda (taste), bhoga (fruition), samāpatti (accomplishment), laya (fusion) and višrānti (repose), which terms indicate the philosophical colouring given to the doctrine. For the idea of camatkāra involved in rasa, see my introd. to Vakroktifivita p. 26, fn 28 and below under Jagannātha (ch. vii).

³⁸ kavyasyatmani sangini (angini?) rasadi-rupe na kasyacid vimatih, p. 22.

now turn, leaving the treatment of the later development of the rasa-theory to a subsequent chapter.



V. THE DHVANIKARA & ANANDAVARDHANA

(The Dhvani System)

The origin of the Dhvani school, like that of other schools of Poetics, is lost in obscurity; but the first clear formulation of its theory of dheani as a whole is to be found in the memorial verses of the Dhvanikāra, whose date is unknown but who could not have been very far removed from the time of his commentator Anandavardhana. It is possible, however, that the Dhvanikāra himself is following a much older tradition. The fact that he shows himself conversant with some theory of rasa, alankāra and riti need not be cited to the credit or discredit of this conjecture; for these

I See Vol. I pp. 114-15. Kane (HAL pp. lx-lxi) sets forth ably, if not convirwingly, Sovani's hypothesis (see Vol. I, p. 111) that the name of the Dhvanikara was Sahrdaya, Kane, however, modifies the view by suggesting that "it was due to the profuse use of the word sahrdaya in the Dhvanyd-loka and to making sahrdaya the final court of appeal in all matters of taste that the founder of the dhvani-theory earned the epithet of sahrdaya par excellence" (p. lxiv). Kane also hazards the conjecture that Anandavardhana was possibly a pupil of the Dhvanikara, or one closely associated with him; and this will, he thinks, explain the confusion of authorship. I am afraid that the passages that Kane cites in support of these conjectures are hardly decisive, and the question must still be regarded as an open one.

systems themselves cannot be traced back to any definite period of time, and there is also no conclusive evidence that the Dhyanikara was aware of the particular views of Bharata, Bhamaha or Dandin, with whom we begin the historic period of growth of these systems. But the very first line of the first verse of the Dhoanyaloka itself states that the theory that dhoans is the essence of poetry was traditionally maintained by earlier thinkers (kānyasydīmā dhvanir iti budhair yah samāmnāta-pārvah). Accepting this statement of the Dhyanikara, it is difficult, however, to explain why the dhvani-theory did not in the least, as the rasa-theory did to a certain extent, influence such early writers on Poetics as Bhāmaha, Dandin or Vamana. It is easy to maintain, on the other hand, that the eyanjana as a function must have been evolved by the school which set up a theory of vyangya artha or dheans, as this function is not traceable in philosophers or philosophical grammarians before the time of Anandavardhana. Bhamaha2, Vāmana (IV. 3. 8) and other early theorists discuss or show themselves cognisant of such a 'suggested sense' in general; but they never use the terms vyanjana, or vyangya artha or dhvani, as they probably would have done if it had been so universally known or accepted as the Dhvanikara's statement would apparently imply. But this non-recognition by other schools need not be taken as a serious argument, as it admits of several reasonable explanations. It is well known that the philosophers refuse to recognise the vyanjana as

² See above Ch. II, pp. 66-67.

a vyāpāra sui generis3, and even after it was put forward by the Alamkarikas, they would explain it by another recognised function as anyatha-siddha: it is not surprising, therefore, that orthodox grammarians or philosophers should entirely ignore it. The absence of any direct reference to dhouni in early writers on Poetics may be explained by the not unlikely supposition that probably the Dhyanikara himself, who summed up and uttered the theory is a definite form, was contemporaneous with these writers, as we cannot put him much later if we are to leave sufficient margin between him and his commentator, as well as make room for intermediate scholastic activity evidenced by the recapitulation-stanzas cited by Anandavardhuna in his crttis. Even leaving aside this conjecture, the cases of such non-recognition are actually explained by the Dhvanikāra himself, in the verse we have already cited, as constituting really cases of half-recognition : for he seems to indicate that these carly writers were cognisant of dhvans, but not having understood its nature they naively and uncritically looked at it from other points of view, some comprehending it in other elements of poetry, some thinking it incomprehensible, and others (like the post Manoratha cited by Anandavardhana) going to the extreme of denying its existence altogether. One of the objects of the Dhvanikara in this statement was, no doubt, to indicate that he was not putting forward

³ See Jacobi in ZDMG, Ivi, 1902, p. 397 fn 2, and p. 398 fn r.

⁴ See Vol. I. p. 114, and BSOS, 1, 4, 1920, pp. 7-S.

something entirely new, and to find an authority for his procedure in the implied attitude (real or imaginary) of certain older writers; but, apart from this, it is clear that although there is nothing explicit in the older writers, one can never affirm that some kind of 'suggested sense' was not known to them.

It would be extraordinary indeed that a work like Dhvanikāra's could have sprung into existence without having had a previous history, although such earlier forms of the theory as might have enabled us to trace directly its origin and growth were either not committed to writing or had disappeared in course of time; for at its first appearance as we have it in these karikas, we find the theory in a relatively complete shape, the outlines of which, definitely settled, may require considerable filling up but no important or substantial modification. This is probably implied by Abhinavagupta's gloss on the word parampara in Anandavardhana's explanation of the phrase sumamnata-parvah used by the Dhvanikara with reference to the previous existcace of the theory, Abhinava explains (p. 3) that the theory was stated in unbroken tradition by previous thinkers without its being discussed in particular books (avicchinnena pravahena tair etail uktam, vinapi visista-pustakesu vivecanāt). It is true that Mukula refers (p. 21) to a theory of dhvani being newly described by some men of taste (sahrdayair5 nutana-

⁵ The word salirdaya here cannot be taken, as Kane (HAL p. lxi) takes it here as elsewhere, as a proper name referring to the Dhvanikāra; nor is it to be taken as a title of the propounder of the altrani-theory. As in most of the

tayôpavarnitasya) as something not comprehensible by the recognised function of lakṣaṇā, and does not discuss it for its over-subtelty (etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuādgrīyaṇā buddhyā nirāpaṇīyam...ityalam atipra-saṇṇena); but he may in this passage be directly referring to the Dhvanikāra, who for the first time probably summed up in his memorial verses the floating traditions, or to Ānandavardhana to whom belonged the credit of fixing the theory into a new and complete shape.

This conjecture about the traditional existence of the dhvani-theory in some form or other even before the Dhvanikara receives support from the fact that the theory in its essence derived its inspiration from the works of the early grammarians and their semi-philosophical speculations on speech, Originating as a theory of expression, the theory of vyaājanā, no doubt, received no recognition from orthodox grammarians, but not choosing to appear as an entirely novel theory, it sought the protection of the grammarian's authority by pretending that it was founded on the analogy of their ancient sphota-theory. We have already noted the great influence of the older science of grammar on poetics, and Anandavardhana himself is careful in noting

places that Kane cites, it refers in general to the critics or men of taste who established the new theory, or in particular to the Dhvanikāra or Ānandavardhana, and there is no need to go beyond this ordinary meaning of the term in Alamkāra literature. Possibly the reference is directly to Ānandavardhana who was a contemporary of Mukula's father Kallaţa (see Vol. I p. 76).

⁶ See Vol. I, pp. 10-11.

that the system demonstrated by him is built on the system of the grammarians, who were the earliest theorists to apply the term dheani to the spoken letter which reveals the sphota7. Abbinavagupts, commenting on this passage, perhaps goes too far in following up, after the authority of the Vakyapadiya, all the details of the sphota-theory, but there is hardly any doubt that the writers on Poetics had this theory before them when they elaborated their own system of dhrani. The sphota, which has been likened to the neo-platonic logos, is often translated by the terms 'expression', 'notion', 'concept' or 'idea'; but none of these terms brings out its essential nature. Some philosophers propounded and the grammarians took it for granted that a word has intrinsically a word-prototype corresponding to it. The sphota is not exactly this wordprototype, but it may be explained as the sound of a word as a whole, and as conveying a meaning apart from its component letters (various). The sphota does not contain exactly the sounds of the

⁷ pratkame hi vidvāmsa vaiyākaraņāk, vyākaraņamālatvāt sarva vaiyānām. Te ca ir āyamāņem varņesu dhvanir
iti vyāharanti. Tathaivānyais tan-matānusāribhih sāribhih
kāvya-tattvārtha-daršibhir vācya vācaka-saņmišraķ šabdātmā
kāvyam iti vyapadeiyo vyaājakatva-sāmyād dhvanir ityuktaķ
(pp. 47-8). See 'Locana on this, Ci also: parinišcitanirapabhraņša-šabda-brahmaņām vipašcitām matam ābrityaiva
pravrtto'yam dhvani-vyavahāra iti taih saha kim virodhāvirodhau cintyete (p. 199). In this last passage, the reference is
not to Vedāpta, as some would think, but to the grammaticophilosophical theory of šabda-brahma. See Jacobi's note
on this passage in ZDMG, [vii, 1903, p. 56 fn 1,

word in the order peculiar to the letters, but the sounds or something corresponding to them are blended indistinguishably into a uniform whole. When a word is pronounced, its individual sounds become reflected in some degree in the order of the sphota in which the particular sounds are comprised; and as soon as the last sound dies away, the sphota, in which the idea corresponding to all these sounds is comprised, becomes manifest and raises to our consciousness the idea thus associated. The sounds of a word as a whole, therefore, and apart from those of the constituent letters, reveal the sphota.

Taking their cue from this somewhat mystical conception, the Alamkarikas developed the idea of dheani by analogy. The several expressed parts of a poem, they held, reveal the unexpressed deeper sense, which is something singular and different from the denotative and indicative elements both in order and in essence, and which is termed the dheani (lit. 'sound', 'echo', 'tone') or vyangya artha (suggested sense) in poetry. The word dhvani itself, as Anandavardham pointed out, is sometimes used by the grammorians for the word or letters which reveal the sphota. Mammata's remarks in this connexion are pertinent. In his vrtti on the definition given by him of dheani (i 4), he says that the dapani is, according to the grammarians, that word which reveals the all-important sphota, inasmuch as through it arises the knowledge of the word's meaning. Others, by which he signifies the writers on the dhrani-theory in Poetics, carry this doctrine of the grammarians a step further and apply the term dhousi to the meaning, as well as to the word which is capable of suggesting a meaning superseding the one which is directly expressed. Intrinsically the two theories have scarcely any mutual connexion; but what the Alamkarikas really wanted was an authority for their assumption of the power of cyanjana, which the great grammarians did not acknowledge. The sphotatheory of the grammarians, however, presupposed something similar, for the parsons of a word reveal, as it were, the ideal word. Hence it afforded analogy which could at least boast of the authority of the Vaiyakaranas, the prathame vidvamanh, and which could therefore be seized upon by the Alankarikas as the foundation of their own theory of suggestion. It may also be pointed out that the sense of 'manifestation' which exists in the vyanjana is an idea which, we have already noted, is not unfamiliar to Indian philosophical speculation. The eyanjana does not consist in the utterance of something new, but in the manifestation of something already existing; it is, to use a familiar illustration from Indian philosophical systems, like the revealing of the already existing jar by the lamp. Although the general concept of dhvani connects itself with such half-mystical currents of thought, Anandavardhana yet takes care to point out (pp. 232-4) that this dhvani is not, as often supposed, something mystical but something that can be properly defined and grasped; and he has

⁸ See Vol. I p. 12.

no sympathy with those schools which would dismiss it, as Kapila has dismissed the sphota from the philosophical realm, on the ground that it is something inexplicable (anākhyeya).

Although it accepted, with some modifications, the grammarian's analysis of the nature and function of speech as well as based its theory of dheani on the analogy of the theory of sphota, the school really started independently with a distinct theory of expression of its own, which demonstrated a function of vyadjana and vyanyyartha untraceable in earlier speculative literature. But the influence of of other schools of Poetics on the composite work of the Dhyanikara and Anandayardhana cannot be ignored. The latter, if not the former, appears to be perfectly familiar with the views of Bharata, Bhamaha, Udbhata and Vamana, most of whom are cited directly by name; but even the Dhyanikara must have known the theories of the Rass, Alamkara and Riti schools in some form or other. For, the Dhranydloka has two professed objects in view, viz., (1) the establishment of the theory of dhvani and demonstration that this idea cannot be comprehended by the theories of earlier or contemporaneous schools of Poetics, and (2) an examination of the existing ideas of rasa, alamkara, riti, guna and dosa with a view to correlate them with the idea of dheani, and thus by synthesis to evolve a complete and systematic scheme of Poetics. It succeeded so far in realising both these objects that not only was the concept of dhvani accepted implicitly by almost all later writers, but the systoms, which emerged after Anandavardhana and of which Mammata may be taken as the first and foremost representative, cannot be regarded strictly as independent schools, nor can they be affiliated readily and entirely with the older Rasa, Alamkara or Riti schools. They constitute in substance a new aesthetic scheme in which the ideas of all these schools are worked and harmonised into a comprehensive doctrine, the outlines of this new adjustment being first clearly marked and the foundations firmly laid by Anandavardhana.

Starting as a theory of expression, the Dhyani school concerns itself, first of all, with the grammatico-philosophical problem about the function of words and their moaning, or in other words, about the relation of a word to that which is expressed by it. The grammarians, logicians and the Mimamsakas had already laid down that the primary or intrinsic meaning (mukhya or sakya artha) of a word is abhidha, generally translated by the term Denotation, which gives it its peculiar significance. Thus, the concept of the cow is given by the word 'cow' by its power of Denotation. It has been defined as that power of a word which conveys to the understanding the meaning attached to it by convention, without the intervention of any other power. This convention (samketa) consists in a particular word conveying a particular meaning (asmāc chabdād ayam artho boddhavyu ityákárah sakti-grāhakah samayah), which is comprehended by observing what takes place in the world (vyavahāra). We need not concern ourselves

with the question whether this sakti is isvareccha or icchā-mātra (divine or human will); but there are several theories as to where this convention is to be understood, held respectively by the grammarians, logicians, Saugatas and Mīmāmsakas. The writers on Poetics maintain, after the grammarians, that it has reference either to genus (jāti), individual (dravya), quality (guga) or action (kriyā).

When this abhidha or the primary meaning of a word is incompatible, another power called laksana or Indication (i. e. transferrence of sense) is communicated, whereby another meaning connected therewith is apprehended, either through usage (radhi) or from some special motive (prayojana). Thus one can say 'the country rejoices', but since the country itself cannot rejoice, it is indicated that the people of the country rejoice. This power really belongs to the sense (artha-vyāpāra), as later analysis points out, but it is attributed to words and is thus an aropito sabdaoyapara. That is to say (as other writers explain it) we have first sabda or the word, then its vacyartha or direct denoted meaning, after which or in connexion with which comes the lakewartha or indicated meaning through the power of Indication. It is thus santara (and not nirantara like abkidhā), having the vācyārtha coming in between; for the laksana is resorted to when the primary sense is incompatible (badhita) and is so

⁹ Both Mukula and Mammata (Sabda-vyāpāra", p. 2) point out that this view of the Ālamkārikas is based on the dictum catustays sabdānām pravrttib, occurring in the Mahābhānya (ed. Kielhorn p. 19, l. 20).

far artha-mistha as based on the expressed sense 10. Hence the three essential requisites of the lakeana are the incompatibility (or exhaustion) of the primary sense, the connexion of the indicated sense with the primary sense, and the reason or motive (prayojana) for resorting to it. As the Denotation is dependent on worldly convention (vyavahārika samketa), so is the Indication (as Mammata points out) upon the special convention based on these three requisites; and as there can hardly be any indicated or transferred sense without the primary sense, the Indication is sometimes called the tail, as it were, of Denotation (abhidha-pucchabhata). In fact, writers like Bhatta Nayaka, as we have seen'1. would include laksana under abhidha, of which it is supposed to be an extension.

The lakeana being thus of a derivative nature, its relations to abhidea have been summarised differently in different works. The Nyaya-satra gives an exhaustive list of the relations on account of which a word is used in a secondary or transferred sense for another (n. 2, 63), corresponding to the lakeana of the Alamkarikas; but Mukula quotes the authority of Bhartymitra who summarises

¹⁰ šakya-vyavahita-laksyārtha-visayatvāc chabde āropita cva sa vyāpārah, vastute riha-nigha evētyarthah, tad uktam— 'sāntarārtha-nighah' iti, 'Pradīpa, ed. N. S. P. 1912, p. 27.

¹¹ See above Ch. tv p. 155.

¹² Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛkā p. 17. The verse is also quoted anonymously in Mammata's Sabda-vyōpāra' p. 8, in Kāmu-dhena p. 133 and in many other works. Abhinavagupta

them in a verse into five categories, viz. samlandha (connexion), sādršya (similarity), samavāya (inherence), vaiparitya (contrariety) and kriya-yoga (association through action). 'The fat Devadatta does not eat in the daytime' (pino devadutto diva na bhankte) 'the lad is a lion' (simbo manarakah), 'the herd-station on the Ganges' (gangayam ghosul); 'this fool is a Brhaspati' (brhaspatir ayam markhah) and 'in the great war thou art a Satrughna' (mahati samare satrughnas tvam) are given as respective instances of the usage. We need not further dilate upon these niceties of analysis, nor enter into the elaborate classifications of baksana, but we may note here that the laksand or transferred expression lies at the root of figures like metaphor and of metaphorical mode generally, which consist in the fancied transferrence of the qualities or action of one object to another. It has been pointed out that the transferred expression, resolving into the metaphorical, is the source of a particular beauty, because the special motive (prayajana) with which the poet chooses the transferred expression becomes realised along with it, without being directly or at all expressed. When we say, for instance, 'youth is the springtime of life', we mean to imply at once, without directly expressing it, the beauty, vigour or enjoyments of spring-time. The prayojana or motive, though unexpressed, is yet apprehended. This is supposed to be one of the reasons, as we shall see, why we should admit, besides Denotation and

^{(*} Locana p. 56) alludes to it, and discusses these five categories.

Indication, a third function of vyanjana or suggestion, by which something not expressed is revealed.

But there is a limited class of writers who postulate another function, called tatparya or Purport, which leads us to apprehend the connexion among the meanings of the constituent words in the form of the import of the whole sentence, function conveys the connected meaning of the several words and therefore differs from abhidha and laksana which convey the meaning of a particular word, the tatparyartha being manifested, not by word, but by a whole sentence, and therefore remaining distinct from the meanings denoted or indicated by individual words. The words have, according to this view, the power of denoting or indicating things and not the connexion (auraya) among things, which is known not from the import of words as such, but from their relations of compatibility (yogyatā), proximity (sannidhi) and expectancy (ākānkṣā). When the logical connexion or anraya is thus known, a special sense arises which is called tatparya. Mammata explains (ii 1, vrtti) the position of these Abhihitanvaya-vadins, as they are called, thus15: "When the meanings of the words, to be hereafter explained, are connected in accordance with expectancy, compatibility and proximity, another sense arises, called purport, which has a distinct form and which, though not constituting the sense of words

¹³ ākānkēā-yogyatā-sannidhi-vašād vakupamāņa-svarūpāņām padārthānām samanvaye tātparyārtho višesa-vapur a-padārtho'pi vākyārthah samullasatityabhihitānvaya-vādinām matam.

is yet the sense of the sentence—this is the view of the Abhihitânvaya-vādins". The theory of this school is rejected by another school of Mimāmsakas, called the Anvitâbhidhāna-vādins, who deny the necessity of postulating a special function like tātparya; for they hold that words have a power to denote not only things but also their purport or connexion along with them. To put it in another way, words do not express their sense generally but connectedly. In ordinary life, for instance, we first understand meanings from sentences, and words convey ideas not absolutely but relatively, i.e., as having a connexion with another. Mutatis mutandis, the theory would remind one of Berkeley's denial of abstract ideas.

The formulators of the dhouni-theory do not enter into these minute discussions but appear to recognise them implicitly, although most writers from the time of Mammata (who deals with these questions in his Kavya-prakasa as well as separately in his Sabdavyāpāra-paricaya) start with a preliminary analysis of word-function, and some later works like Appayya's Frtti-varttika are devoted specially to the subject. All writers from Anandavardhana's time accept as a rule the abhidha and lakeana, but they are not unanimous with regard to the tatparya as a separate function, which they take as included in the vyanjana vrtti, this being the third and and most important function established by the Dhyani school as the theoretical foundation of dhvani or the 'suggested sense' in poetry. The vyanjana or power of suggestion is generally defined

as that function of a word or its sense by which a further meaning comes into being, when the other functions, viz., abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, are exhausted in their scope. Ideas or notions are what are conveyed by words through their powers of Denotation and Indication; these, put together in a sentence, convey a complete thought through the supposed power of the sentence, styled Purport. Now, another power is postulated by which a deeper sense, the vyañgya artha, is revealed, consequent upon but distinct from the simple thought¹⁴. All good poetry, called par excellence dhvani-kāvya ¹⁵, must have such a sense implicit in it, a sense which can only be realised by the vyañjanā-vrīti or power of suggestion postulated by this school.

Now the question has been hotly discussed as to whether it is necessary to postulate this separate function of eyanjana, or whether it may not

¹⁴ A word (or its sease), in virtue of these three powers in called respectively the expressive (vācaka), the indicative (lakṣaka) and the suggestive (vṣaṅjaka), and the sense which arises is termed respectively an expressed (vācya), indicated (lakṣya) and suggested (vyaṅgya) sense.

synonymously (cf Hemacandra p. 26) with the word opingyirthir (suggested sense), and sometimes wrongly as co-extensive with opingana, which term properly designates
the process manifesting it. The divani-kāvya is so-called
because the opingyartha, which predominates in it over
the väcydrtha, is 'echoed' par excellence in this class of poetry.
Viśvanātha (p. 198) explains the term etymologically thus:
vācyād adhika-camatkāriņi opingyarthe divanyate'sminn
iti oputpattyā divanir nāmittama-kātyam.

be comprehended in other recognised functions like abhidha or lakeana, and in other intellectual processes like anumana or inference. Jayaratha cites (p.9) a verse which enumerates twelve different ways in which the problem of Suggestion may be and perhaps was explained away; but broadly speaking, we need notice, as Anandavardhana and his followers have done, only the principal attempted explanations. The first verse of the Dhvanydloka summarises these antagonistic views into three groups. One sceptical school entirely denies the suggested sonse in poetry. A second school, which is agnostic in this respect, holds that it is beyond the province of words (kecid vācām sthitam avisaye tattoam ūcus tadiyam), and can only be perceived by a man of refined discernment (sahrdaya-hrdaya-sampedyam, Ananda p.10). A third school would try to trace it back to the recognised functions like whicha, luksana and latparya, or to some such means of knowledge as anumana or syllogistic reasoning. These three schools naturally divide themselves into two distinct standpoints: the one absolutely denies or ignores the concept of dhrani and thus does away with the necessity of vyanjana; the other, admitting the dhvani, attempts to explain away the necessity of cyclifana as being sufficiently accounted for by the ordinary recognised functions.

Against the attack of the systems which deny the existence of the suggested sense, the old argument that nothing can be denied which is not apprehended is applied; but apart from such purely scholastic objections, the real grounds for postulating the suggested sense are, the consideration in the first place, that being a profound verity, it can positively be established by an examination of aesthetic facts as well as facts of experience; and in the second place, that, there are some elements of poetry (e. g. the rasa) which cannot be satisfactorily explained as evealed by abhidhā, laksanā, anumāna or similar other means.

This brings us to the consideration of the views of those who accept the concept of eyangya artha but dispense with the necessity of such a separate and unauthorised vetti as vyanjana, and regard it as included in other functions of sound and sense. Some Mimansakas hold, for instance, that the so called suggested sense is conveyed by the abhidha-vetti or the denotative power of a word. In this connexion, the dirgha-vyapara-vadins are said to have maintained that as a single arrow, discharged by a strong man, destroys by a single movement, called velocity, the armour of the enemy, pierces through his body and takes away his life, so a single word, used by a good poet, brings before us by a single power, called abhidha, the sense of

this opinion to Lollata, which we followed in our footnote 2, p. 39, Vol. I. Sovani doubts if this view is ascribed to Lollata by any standard Sanskrit writer. This view is no doubt criticised by Mammata (p. 225), Mahimabhatta (p. 27), Vidyadhara (p. 43) and others, but nowhere Lollata is mentioned by name. Jhalakikara and Durgaprasada, as Sovani points out, wrongly calls the adherents of this view bhallamatoparivinals, but possibly they take their cue from Govinda's mistaken remark to the same effect in his Kānya-pradīpa, ed. N.S.P. 1912, p.149.

the word, teaches us its logical connexion (anvaya) and makes us apprehend the suggested sense. The substance of this graphic description appears to be that such is the more and more expanding function of abhidha that it is not to be measured in the balance and confined to the single business of making us understand the samketita artha, but it is competent to express whatever sense is apprehended after a word is heard. But it is urged in reply that the abhidha has not the power to give us the perception of a matter (vastu), an imaginative fact (alamkāra) or an emotional mood (rasa), because it ceases, in the orthodox opinion, after conveying the conventional (i. s. literal) sense, and the rasa etc. are not matters of mere convention. Nor is the denoting, for instance, of component vibhavas, which give rise to the rasa, a denotation of the rasa itself; for it is acknowledged that the rasa is not realised by a mere naming thereof but partakes of the nature of a self-manifested joy, which can at most be suggested. These facts cannot be satisfactorily explained unless we assume with the dirgha-vyāpāra-vādins an all-comprehensive power for the abhidha, for which there is hardly any authority. Moreover, if we assign such extensive powers to Denotation, why even admit the power of Indication, since the sense conveyed by the latter might be understood from the Denotation itself?

Admitting the denoted sense, therefore, strictly as that conveyed by convention, it cannot be said to be manifold, for it exhausts itself after conveying the particular conventional concept; the suggested sense, on the other hand, becomes varied in accordance with the diversity of the occasion, the speaker and similar other factors. The denoted meaning is shown to differ from the suggested (1) in point of form, for the suggested sense may sometimes be quite the opposite of the negative or positive (as the case may be) expressed sense, (2) in point of location, for the expressed sense resides in words alone, while the suggested sense may be found in the words, in their position, in their denoted meaning itself, in the affixes or suffixes, in the arrangement of letters and so forth, (3) in its effect, for the denoted sense brings a mere cognition, the suggested a surprise, (4) according to the nature of the speaker, the addressee, or the perceiver. The attempt to maintain that the suggested sense is conveyed by the tatparya or Purport, as some Naiyayikas hold, is similarly shown to be insufficient; for the function of the Purport is exhausted by simply making us apprehend the logical connexion of the ideas in the sentence itself and cannot, therefore, take us to the ryangyartha, which arises after the sentence is understood.

Nor is the laksanā-vrtti sufficient to explain the subtle power of Suggestion. Those who maintain, however, that the suggested sense is no other than the laksya or indicated sense are asked ("Locana p. 51) whether they consider the non-difference of Suggestion and Indication to mean (1) that the two functions are identical (tādātmya or tādrāpya), (2) that they consider the Indication to be the constant differentiating property (laksana or ryāvartaka-dharma) of

Suggestion, or (3) that the Indication is an occasional differentiating mark (upalaksana or tatastha laksana) of Suggestion in special cases. The Dhvanikāra and Ānandavardhana discuss these views generally (pp. 50-9), but Abhinavagupta deals with them somewhat elaborately.

With regard to the first of these views, viz., the tadrapya or identity of Abvasi and bhakti (by which term laksanā is meant), the Dhvanikāra lays down that Suggestion cannot be identical with Indication, because both have properties peculiar to themselves (i 17). Indication is based upon the consideration of the barring of the expressed sense, and consists merely in upacara (upacara-matram tu bhaktih, Ananda p. 51), or, as Abhinavagupta expresses it, in the secondary application of a word (guna-criti). The suggested sense, on the other hand, though essentially distinct in character, does not yet cancel the expressed sense altogether. The later writers17 explain further that it is not a mere secondary application of a word through usage or special motive : for if you say that in such a sentence as 'a herd-station on the Ganges', the supposed motive, viz., the coolness and purity of the site, is not suggested but indicated, then the notion of 'the bank', which is the real indicated sense, would become the primary meaning of the word 'Ganges' (for the motive and the secondary sense of 'bank' cannot both be indicated), and consequently would be cancelled, since there can be no Indication without the primary sense being cancelled. We must

¹⁷ e.g. Visyanatha in his Sahitya-darpana pp.247 48.

therefore acknowledge another indicated motive for the indication of the first motive (for there can be no indication without the supposition of an indicated motive), and a third motive again to this second indication, and so on ad infinitum. In fact, as already noted before, the prayofana or special motive is not expressed at all; if it is left unexpressed, how is it then apprehended, unless we suppose that it is suggested? It has also been demonstrated that Suggestion is based on the peculiarity of the speaker, the addressee and various other circumstances, and there is a difference as well in location, the Indication residing in a word only, the Suggestion in a word, its parts, its sense and in the style. Mammata adds that Suggestion cannot be said to be co-extensive with Indication and Denotation combined; for it is seen to come into existence from mere letters without any specific Denotation.

The second view that Indication is the laksana or the constant differentiating characteristic of Suggestion is shown by the Dhvanikāra to be vitiated by the logical fallacies of too wide (alivyāpti) or too narrow definition (acyāpti). This is more or less a scholastic objection, and is based on the characteristic notion of Suggestion defined by its champions; for both Anandavardhana and his commentator show that Indication sometimes covers a much wider, sometimes a much more limited field than Suggestion. The vyašjanā, for instance, is not accepted when the prayojana of the Indication is not charming; on the other hand, in cases of vivakṣitānyapara-vācya dhvani, there is scope for

Indication, for the Suggestion here is expressly based on Indication. The third view, that Indication may be an occasional distinguishing mark (upalakṣaṣa) of Suggestion is not denied by the Dhvanikāra, for Suggestion may sometimes rest ultimately on Indication, e.g. those cases which are admitted by dhvani-theorists as based on lakṣaṣā (lakṣaṣā-māla dhvani); but this does not prove the opponent's position that Indication is identical with Suggestion.

Some of the oldest and most aggressive objectors to the admission of the vyanjana-vrtti are the adherents of the anumina-theory, whose views are refuted at some length by Anandavardhana himself, but who are represented to us in later literature by Mahimabhatta in his Vyakti-ciceka, a work which was written with the avowed object of establishing that the suggested sense can be arrived at by the process of syllogistic reasoning. Most of these controversies belong to the realm of scholastic speculation and are far removed from actual Poetics. We shall deal with Mahimabhatta's theory in its proper place ; it will suffice here to set forth the theory in its general outline as it obtained in Anandavardhana's time and notice the arguments with which it is sought to be disproved.

From Anandavardhana's repudiation (pp. 201 f) of the views of this school, it appears that its essential position consisted in establishing that the cognition of the unexpressed or suggested sense is nothing more than the cognition of the object of a logical conclusion, so that the relation of the suggestor

and the suggested is that of the syllogistic middle and major terms (vyangya-pratitir linga-pratitir evéti linga-lingi-bhāva eva teşām, vyangya-vyanjakabhavo naparah kascit). One of the alleged reasons for this assumption is that the Dhvani school itself admits suggestivity as depending upon the intention of the speaker, which intention is always an object of logical conclusion. Anandavardhana, however, demonstrates that this does not affect the general position of his school. He shews that words have two different functions, the one inferrable (anumeya) and the other communicable (pratipadya). The first. consisting of intention (vivaken), may either be the wish to utter a sound or the wish to express an idea by a word; the former, being a common characteristic of all animals, does not come within the aphere of speech. The communicable is something different from this, and consists of the idea itself which forms the object of the speaker's need of communication (pratipadyas tu prayoktur arthapratipadana-samihā-vişayikrtah). It may be either expressed (vācya) or suggested (vyangya); for the speaker sometimes wishes to communicate the idea directly by its Denotation, or sometimes he wishes to do so in such a way that it is not conveyed directly in words. This last-named inner content, Anandavardhana maintains, cannot be recognised in the form of a syllogistic conclusion, but can be by some other artificial or natural relation ; for words. in the form of a logical middle term, can convey that an unexpressed idea is the object of intention, but cannot convey the unexpressed idea itself (vivaksā-

vişayatvanı hi tasyarthasya sabdair lingataya pratiyate, na tu scarupam). If the contrary is maintained, then, as every idea could be logically established, there would be no dispute about the correctness or falsity of an idea, any more than about any other conclusion from a logical syllogism (yadi hi lingatayā sabdānām vyavahārah syāt, tac-chabdárthe samyan-mithyūtvádi-vivādā na pravarteran). It is only when the unexpressed takes the form of the intention of the speaker that it may be a matter of ordinary inference; but the inner content of the idea itself, when unexpressed, can be communicated only by the supposition of an artificial power like Suggestion, for the natural mode of direct expression, as wall as inference, is out of the question.

With the establishment, against such hostile views, of the suggested sense and the function of Suggestion in poetry, which is variously termed vyanjana (revealing), dhranana (echoing), gamana (implication) or pratyayana (acquainting), we are introduced to the special doctrine of the system. The unexpressed or the suggested sense (vyangya artha), to which the name dhvani is applied when it is predominant, is definitely posed as the 'soul' or essence of poetry18, and poetry is classified into

¹⁸ But the verse i 2, in which this view is set forth appears, when literally taken, to state that "the sense which is praised by men of taste and which has been established as the soul of poesy, has two subdivisions, viz., vācya or the expressed, and prafiyamāna or the suggested", implying thereby that the artha itself is the 'soul' or essence of

three kinds in relation to the suggested sense. The best kind, specifically called dheani-kāvya, is supposed to be that in which the suggested sense predominates and supersedes the expressed. It is thus defined by the Dhvanikāra (i 13): "The learned call that particular kind of poetry dhvani in which the (expressed) word and sense, subordinating themselves, manifest that (other suggested) sense" 19. This is par excellence Suggestive Poetry, and therefore pointedly called dhvani 29. The second class of poetry, in which the suggested sense is not predominant but subordinate, is called gunibhūta-vyangya kāvya or Poetry of Subordinated Suggestion 21. This Sub-

poetry and that it includes the vacya as well, as one of its varieties. The Dhvanikāra, therefore, apparently declares that the expressed sense is also the essence of poetry, although this, as Viávanatha objects, is opposed to his own statement in the first line of his work, which speaks of the suggested sense alone as the essence of poetry in accordance with the tradition of ancient thinkers. Abhinavagupta tries to reconcile these two apparently conflicting dicta by supposing that the real object of the Dhvanikāra in i 2 is to distinguish between the vacya and the pratiyamāna sense, and not to establish both as the 'saul' of poetry. The objection is really over-fastidious; for it can be easily shown that in the elaboration of the theory, the suggested sense is throughout taken as the atman.

19 yatrürthah sabdo vä tam artham upasarjanikṛta-svūrthau | vyanktah, kävya-viseyah sa dhvanir iti sūribhih kathitah ||. Here tam artham refers to artha defined in one of the previous verses, e.g. in i 4.

20 For the etymology of the word, see above footnote no. 15.

²¹ Dhvanyiloka, iii 35

ordination consists in the suggested sense being either of equal or inferior prominence. It has been classified elaborately, if not logically, on the hint furnished by the Dhvanydloka itself, into eight varieties, according as the suggested sense is (1) ancillary, (2) hinted by tone or gesture, (3) subservient to the completion of the expressed sense, (4) of doubtful prominence, (5) of equal prominence, (6) obscure, (7) unconcealed, or (8) not charming. That poetry, which is without any suggested element, is reckoned as the third and the lowest kind, being merely 'pictorial in word' or 'pictorial in sense', and is called citra or Pictorial Poetry 29. In it could be included all verse which, on account of sound or magnificence of pictorial representation, or some such mechanical means, flattered the ear and was considered worthy of admiration. Under it also comes the whole body of expressed poetic figures (alamkara-nibandho yah sa citra-visuyo matah, cited p. 221), which, containing no suggestive element, appeal by their turns of expression alone (vaicitrya) and which are characterised by Anandavardhana as mere vag-vikulpa. Anandavardhana makes it clear that the citra-kārya is

²² Ānandavardhana describes citra-kānya thus: rasabhāvādi-tātparya-rahitam vyang pirtha-visca-prakāhana-haktihānyam ca kāvvam kevala-vācya-vācaka-vaicitrya-mātrākrayenopanibaddham ālekhya-prakhyam yad avabhāsate tac citram (p.220). Abhinavagupta derives the word in different ways: vismayakrd-vṛttādi-vaiāt. kāvyānakāritvād vā citram, ālekhyamātratvād vā, kalā-mātratvād vā (p.34). In deference to Ānandavardhana, Mammaţa speaks of citra as the third and lowest kind of poetry; but Visvanātha altogether rejects its claim as poetry.

not really fit to be called poetry, it is an imitation or copy thereof (kāvyánukārah); for, strictly speaking, there can be no poetry in which there is no suggestion. It is admitted by him, however, to the category of poetry, because the poets, who are unfettered in their mode of expression, have, as a matter of fact, been found producing poetry of this kind, in which there is no intention of developing a suggested sense, but which is wholly taken up with the object of bringing about a strikingness of sound and sense.

These three types of poetry are then elaborated and classified with somewhat minute and subtle ingenuity. In this treatment, we find the characteristic passion for reducing averything to a formula and the scholastic delight in indulging in fastidious refinements; but at the same time there is a sincere. effort to do justice to all the aesthetic facts, so far as they have been recognised, and to unify the various currents of ideas obtaining in different schools by synthesising them with the central principle of suggestion in poetry. We see throughout the speculations of this school an anxiety to protect itself from the reproach of being too theoretical, of ignoring or doing violence to facts; and this anxiety made the theorists evolve a scheme which should not overlook the inherited stock of notions but find a place for them in a comprehensive system. need not take the dheani-theory here in all its minute details, and go through the five thousand, three hundred and fifty-five subdivisions of suggestive poetry, the object of which was possibly to mark out

not distinct classes, but distinct properties or circumstances; but we shall attempt to trace here briefly the effort made by this school to dispose of the already accumulated matter of Poetics, represented by the notions of the rasa, riti, guna, dosa and alamkāra, into the dhvani-system itself, by means of different arrangements or classification of the idea of suggestion.

The true poetry, the dheani-kavya, is divided into two broad classes, viz., avivaksita-vācya and vivakşitányapara-vācya, which two designations, clumsy as they are23, respectively indicate their nature. In the first case, the expressed sense is not meant; in the second case, it is certainly meant but ultimately amounts to something else, viz., the unexpressed. The first is obviously based on lakeann or Indication, which the poet employs with the conscious purpose of bringing the unexpressed into comprehebsion; and the question involved is about words and expressions which are taken not in a literal but in a transferred sense. This poetic transference, as we have already noted before, is at the root of metaphorical expression generally, the importance of which both the Alamkara and Riti schools amply recognised and industriously examined, and which Dandin specifically included in the samādhi-guna, and Vāmana treated under the special figure vakrokti. As such, therefore, it could not be very well ignored, and

²³ Mahimabhatta criticises both these terms, holding that the former is nothing more than a case of bhakti or laktanā, and the latter contains an inherent contradiction (i.e., if a thing is vivakṣita or pradhāna, it cannot be anyapara).

by including it, as the dhrani-theorists did, in one of the principal divisions of good poetry, they rightly assigned to it a prominent place in the new system.

The second division of suggestive poetry, the vivaksitanyapara-vācya, in which the expressed is meant but is made to resolve itself into the unexpressed, is obviously based on abhidha or Denotation, and embraces the more important matter of rasa, which has already been worked out by the Rasa school in the sphere of the drama. possible cases of this division are enumerated, viz , (1) that in which the suggested is of imperceptible process (asamlaksya-krama), i. e., where the expressed denotation brings the suggested sense imperceptibly into consciousness, and (2) that in which the suggested is of perceptible process (samlakayakrama). Under the first group comes the suggestion of rasa and bhava, for it is made clear that these emotional states can only be suggested in this way. Under the second group are included the suggestions of matter (vastii) and of figure (alamkara) by matter and figure in turns, based respectively on the power of word, or its sense, or Thus the unexpressed, which is raised to both. comprehension by the suggestive power of a word, or its sense or both, can be an unexpressed fact or matter, an unexpressed imaginative mood which may be put into the shape of a poetic figure; but in most cases-and these cases are of primary importance in poetry-it is an unexpressed emotional mood (rasa) or feeling (bhāva), which is

directly inexpressible, but which can only be suggested by an expressive word or its sense. We have already seen24 that the poet can at his best directly expresses the three factors which bring about the rasa, viz., the vibhava, the anulhava, and the vyabhicari-bhava, but not the rasa itself as a mood which is inexpressible in its nature. At the most, we can give a name to it, e.g., we can call it love, sorrow or anger, but the mere naming of the rasa in poetry is not capable of awakening the mood itself in the reader which consists of a self-manifested state of the mind. Therefore, with the denotation or description of these factors, the poet can only suggest the rasa; in other words, he can call up a reflection of the mood which the reader realises as a particular condition of his own mind 15. The expressed factors, the viblavas etc., are thus the suggestor or vyanjaka of the rusa, which is the suggested or ryangya. The suggested, no doubt, depends for its manifestation on the expressed (vacydrthapekan), which consists of a denotation of the factors which suggest it, but it is in no way produced from it as an effect and differs entirely in essence. This suggestion is said to be 'of an imperceptible process', because the perception of of the suggested rasa by means of the various factors

²⁴ See above Ch. IV, p. 163.

²⁵ Abhinava explained (Ch. IV, p. 165f) that the reader realises the feeling depicted because the artistic creations are generalised, and in this generalised form the reader realises them as his own, through a certain community of human feelings, and because the germs of the feelings already remain in a latent form in his mind.

necessarily involves a process, but from its quickness the process is not perceived, like the process, as one writer graphically puts it, of the apparently simultaneous piercing of a hundred lotus-leaves placed one upon another. At the moment of relishing a poetic mood or feeling we are so absorbed in it that we do not perceive the process which suggests it, and this subtle suggestion may fittingly be

described as one of 'imperceptible process'.

By the side of the dhvani-kāvya, the true poetry, in which the suggested sense is predominant, we have poetry of second-rate excellence, designated grandbhata-vyangya kavya, in which the unexpressed plays a subordinate part, in so far as it serves to emphasise or adorn the expressed. Here was an opportunity of including some of the results of earlier investigations of the Alamkara and Riti schools, which indirectly recognised a suggested sense but comprehended it, consciously or unconsciously, in some expressed poetic figures, Thus, in samasokti was admitted the apprehension of a suggested matter, in dipaka of another suggested figure, in reservat of suggested reser. But in all these cases the expressed sense is meant to predominate and constitute the charm of the particular figure, the suggested sense being there only to emphasise or embellish it. Thus, in the much discussed figure rasgrat, which was recognised by old Poetics and which helped to smuggle in, as it were, the idea of rasa into their systems, the moods and feelings were supposed to have been roused, not for their own sake, but only to embellish the expressed

thought. But this was not doing full justice to the fundamental significance of rasa, and the point was bound to be re-examined. The dhouni-theorists did not reject but justified this kind of poetry, in which the rasa is suggested not directly but secondarily, and included it in their second class of poetry. The other important case of this kind, known to carlier writers, in which something remains unexpressed but is understood, occurs in very many poetic figures which depend for their charm upon another analogous figure involved in themselves. Thus, Vāmana thought that the npama or comparison was involved in all figures, and Bhamaha stated (in which Dandinsubstantially concurred) that all figures, in order to be charming, presupposed an atianyakti, which he took as being involved necessarily in pakrokti. Udbhata assigned an apparently similar function to alesa involved in some figures. Since the agama, atisayokti and slesa 26 are themselves independent figures, they can be involved in other figures as something unexpressed or suggested by the latter. But as the expressed figure is here in each case prominent, and the unexpressed merely helps to bring out its charm, these cases, in the opinion of the dkeani-theorists, may also be fittingly relegated to this second class of poetry. In the third class are included those cases where there is no borrowed charm of a suggested sense at all, and where the appeal consists in some striking mode of direct expression, as in those

²⁶ Udbhaţa, however, holds that when the ¿leşa is involved in another figure, it predominates and dispels the apprehension of the figure itself.

figure of speech, for example, which delight us by their turns of expression alone.

Thus the suggested sense, or the unexpressed has three different aspects; it may either be (1) a matter or an idea (pastu-dhvami), (2) a poetic figure (alamkara-dhuam), or (3) a mood or feeling (rasa-dhvani). The first occurs when a distinct subject or thought (a matter of fact) is suggested : the second, where the suggested sense constitutes something imaginative (not a matter of fact) which, if expressed in so many words, would assume the form of a poetic figure ; and the last, where a mood or feeling, which is directly inexpressible but which can be suggested, is the principal element. The dheani-theory, therefore, comprehends three kinds of poetry which deal with the communeation of a fact (or a thought), or of an imaginative, or an emotional mood. Abhinavagupta points out 27 that this doctrine is not expressly taught in the kārikās, but is clear from Anandavardhama's treatment in his vrtti"".

It appears, however, that both the Dhvanikara and Ānandavardhana lay a special stress upon rasa-dhvani; and in spite of the fact that the citra-kāvya or the lowest class of poetry is entirely devoid of it, it seems to afford the most weighty criterion by which a poem is to be judged. In a complete

²⁷ yas tu vyācaste—'vyangyānām vastavlamkāra-rasānām mukhena' iti, sa evam prastavyah—etat tāvat tri-bhedatvam na kārikākāreņa k-tam, vrttikāreņa tu daršitam, p.123,

²⁸ v. g., sa hyartho väcya-sämarthyäksiptam vastu-mätram alumkärä rasidayas oʻtyancka-prabära-prabheda-prabhinno darsayinyate, p.15.

scheme, no doubt, the alamkara-dhvani and vastudhount, tacitly recognised by older writers and practised by the poets, must also be justified; but the central question, which is carefully examined, is as to how a composition should help the rasa to expression, for it is repeatedly laid down that neither the alamkura nor mere parrative (p. 148) but the suggestion of rasa should be the guiding principle of the poet in his composition of word and sense". In other words, the rasa appears to be the contre of gravity towards which everything else in a poemriti, guna, dosa and alamkara—should move; and stress coming to be laid on emotion in poetry, the suggestion of rasa came to prevail over other kinds of suggestion. No doubt, it is laid down in ii 7 that the unexpressed, apparently in all its three forms, is the angin or the principal element, and the gunas and alamkāras are to be esteemed in so far as they rest upon it. But this all-important augin is explained by Anandavardhana practically with special reference to rasz (rezadi-laksanam) so, and the Dhyanikara himself elsewhere discusses the merits of diction and the adjustment of words, letters

²⁹ ayam eva hi mahākaver mukhyo vyāpāro yad rasūdīn eva mukhyatavā kavyārthīkrtya tad-vaktyanuguņatvena babdānām arthānām ebpanibandhanam, p.181; paripākavatām kavīnām rasūdi-tātparya-virahe vyāpāra eva na bobhate, p.221.

³⁰ The term rasidi should be interpreted to mean the rasa, bhāva etc. as the angin; but the particle ādi might in every case be taken to imply strictly the other two kinds of vrangya artha, viz., vastu and alamkāra, which would be as much of an angin as the rasa, although such an interpretation is doubtful from the context.

and sentences with regard to their capacity of awakening the rasa, a theme from which a theory of aucitya or propriety was evolved. Again, the Dhvanikāra lays down that the gunibhūta-vyangya class of poetry can become true poetry (dhvanikāvya) from the consideration of its tendency, if any, of developing a rasa (iii 41). In several places, Ānandavardhana is so much carried away by his enthusiasm for rasa that he goes almost near stating expressly that the rasa is in fact the essence of poetry, as it is of the drama³¹.

This borrowing from the rass-system-for the idea of rasa, as Anandavardhana himself says, was already well established in the drama by Bharata and others-fills the outlines of the dhvani-theory with a fundamentally important aesthetic content, which was not yet fully recognised in the poetic, as it had been in the dramatic art, And, in this sense, the dheani-theory has been characterised as an extension of the rasa-theory. But in reality it was not an extension so much as a re-arrangement; for the dhvani-theorists accept the rasa (despite the emphasis they put upon it) as only one of the aspects of the unexpressed in poetry. Neither the Dhvanikara nor Anandavardhana could, at least from the standpoint of theoretic consistency, explicitly make the suggestion of rasa the exclusive end of poetry, inasmuch as the unexpressed may in some cases be a matter or an imaginative mood, although it can be shewn that their views practically tend to

³¹ rasadiyo hi dvayor api tayoh (= kāvya-nātyayoh) jīva-bhūtāh, p. 183. See also the citations in fn 29 above.

such a proposition and probably inspire later theorists to work out the thesis that the rasa alone is the essence of poetry. The essentiality, thus implicitly, if not explicitly, ascribed to rasa by the formulators of the dheani-theory, is, however, expressed more definitely by Abhinavagupta, who appears to have attached little weight to mere theoretical considerations. The point will be dealt with later; it will suffice here to indicate that Abhinavagupta in many places expresses himself unambiguously that the rasa is in fact the essence of poetry; and, admitting that the unexpressed may also take the form of vastu or alamkaru, he thinks that these two forms of suggestion terminate ultimately in the suggestion of rasass. We shall see that this opinion probably inspired the somewhat extreme theory of of Visvanatha that the rasa alone constitutes the essence of poetry; but the considerations, which had wisely restrained the authors of the Dhoanyaloka from expressing it in clear terms, could not, as Jagannatha's criticism of Visvanatha's view shews, be easily put out of the way, and recognition was refused to any further development of the theory out of itself.

The Dhvanikāra's idea was probably to make his conception of poetry wide enough to cover those varieties of poetry which develop no rasa,

³² rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalaņkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasaņ prati paryavasyete, p. 27. An almost similar view is expressed in his comment on the word ucita in Ananda's exposition of the Dhvanikāra's remark on the essence of poetry; ucita-šabdena rasa-viṣayam eva aucityaņ bhavatiti dariayan rasa-dhvaner jīvitatvam sūcayati, p. 13.

or, which develop it imperfectly, although his real leaning to rasa possibly betrayed itself in a different end, from which theorists like Visyanatha drew the inevitable logical conclusion. Nevertheless, we have here an honest attempt to do justice to facts; not only to set forth what pootry ought to be but to establish the actual facts of poetry as they appeared to these theorists. They could not ignore the fact that the matter or the imagination played an important part in some kinds of poetry, although they were alive to the consideration that the emotion was in most cases the important criterion. This attitude towards empirical analysis is also exemplified by the anxiety which made them never spare themselves the trouble of going so far as to classify the cases of the unexpressed into more than five thousand different aspects, taking into consideration all conceivable facts and circumstances. which can be made out by a careful analysis of poetic speech. This fidelity to facts did not also allow them to ignore the aesthetic ideas of earlier speculation, for though those were found insufficient for explaining the whole problem, the concepts of rasa, riti, yuna, dosa and alamkara had to be examined and their place properly defined in the new system before it could be established as a complete scheme. One of the triumphs of this school was, no doubt, the admission of the old idea of rasa to its full importance in the art of poetry, as in the cognate art of the drama ; but the school did not forget at the same time to harmonise the other important elements into its comprehensive theory.

The justification of the riti is shown to consist in its relation to the suggestion of rasa, and it is recognised in so far as it serves as a means to that end. The dheani-theorists, however, dispense with the somewhat useless classification of the varieties of riti (iii 52, vrtti) 33, the nature of which is not discussed by Anandavardhans, but which, Abhinava points out, is explained by the position assigned to the guars (ritir hi gusesveva prayavasavitā)34. The function of the gunas is justified only by their part in the development of the rasa in the theme; and from this standpoint, as we shall see presently, their minute classification is needless, Anandavardhana admitting only three mas corres-

³³ The numbering of this verse is wrong in the text : it should have been iii 47.

³⁴ Abhinava says (p. 231): radiha-'vikeso gundtmö' (Vāmana 1, 2, 3) gunāi ca rasa paryavasāyina eviti hyuktanı prag guna-niragane 'aragara eva madharah' (Dhva. ii 8, p. 70) ityatriti. Vamana has laid down that the riti is nothing more than a particular arrangement of words (visista-padaracana) and that the essence of this particularity of arrangement consists in the games. The nature and scope of the gwaas, therefore, determine those of the riti. Now the Dhyanikara has pointed out in it 8 f how the the three gunas, viz. madhurya (in bringara), ojas (in raudra) and prasada (in all the rasas) contribute to the development of the rasas; and his remarks regarding the gunas apply to the riti, which need not be taken separately. Roughly speaking, his three gunut correspond, therefore, to the three sitis of Vamana. Anandavardhana speaks of the gunas as having samehatana-dharmatoa (p. 5), but this is probably only giving an exposition of the view of Udbhata who, according to Abhinavagupta (p. 134), had held that the gunas are samghalang-dharmgh. He might mean, as Mammata

ponding roughly to the three ritis of Vāmana³⁵. The relation of the guass to the rasa is further made clear by drawing a sharp line of distinction between them and the alamkāras, which also serve to embellish poetic expression. Expanding the dictum of Ānandavardhana in his vriti on ii 7, the later writers explain that the guass are the inseparable attributes of the rasa ³⁶ without which they can-

does, that particular combinations of letters produce particular rasas (see ii 8f). No doubt, in iii 5 f, both the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana speak of samghalana in connexion with the gunas; but they define samphalani as depending on the length or shortness of compounds (which would correspond to the definition of riti given by Rudraja). The appropriateness of the samehalana depends on the ultimate object of manifesting the rasa, as well as on the speaker and the theme. The question, therefore, resolves itself into a theory of suitability or propriety (aucitya) with regard to the disposition of words, letters and sentences, having a special reference to the rasa (rasa-niyama), as well as to the theme in hand (vacyaor vigaya-niyama) and to the temper and character of the speaker (maktr-niyama). Anandayardhana expressly lavs down (p. 135) that the gunas are not equivalent to samghalani (na gunāh tanghalani-svarūpih), nor do they depend on samphatana (na ca samphatandéraya gunah); on the other hand, the samghatana depends on the gupas.

35 A similar function is assigned to the vrttis recognised by Udbhata. See p. 142, and also Abhinava's remarks on pp. 5-6.

36 Anandavardhana says (ii 7 v tti): "The gunas are those which depend on that sense, which is the principal existing content (migin) in the form of rasa etc. Those, again, which rests upon the parts or members (miga), namely the expressed word and sense, are considered to

not exist, and are defined in terms of their having rasa-dharmatva, rasavyabhicari-sthititva and rasapakārakatva. If we sometimes speak of them as belonging to a word and its sense, it is said in a figurative way (upacara), and the old distinction between sabda-guna and artha-guna must be regarded in this light. The alamkaras, on the other hand, belong essentially to sabda and artha, and through this means indirectly embellish the rasa. Mammata describes their nature as follows: "Poetic figures, like alliteration, simile and the rest, are those which sometimes help the existing (rasa), through the parts or members (i.e. sabda and artha), just as a necklace and the like (do to the human soul)"37. vrtti explains38 : "Poetic figures are those which help the principal existing rasa, through the excellence of the parts, consisting of the expressor (word) and the expressed (sense), just as a necklace and the like add to the excellence of the soul through the adornment of a part of the body like the neck. Where there is no rusa, these end

he alapkinus. The former may be compared to qualities like bravery, and the latter to ornaments like bracelet". Mammaja uses the term acala-sthiti (interpreted by Govinda as aprthak-sthiti) to indicate the relation of the guna to the rasa.

³⁷ upkurvinti tam santam ye'nga-dvärena jätucit| härildivad alamkäräs te'nupräsipamildayah. ||

³⁸ ye väcya-väcaka-lakņandingittisaya-mukhena mukhyam rasam sambhavinam upakurvanti te kanthidyanganam utkarindhāna-dvārena sarīrino pyupakārakā hāridoya ividamkārāh. Vatra nisti rasa tatrikti-vaicitrya-mātra-paryavasāyinah, kvacit tu santam apt nipakurvanti.

in mere strikingness of expression (vaicitrya); and sometimes when the rasa is existing, they do not help it". The alamkaras, therefore, have only an indirect relation to the rasa through their capacity of embellishing the expressed sabda and artha, and add to its excellence only secondarily. They can exist without the rasa in the form of mere strikingness of expression (ukti-vaigitrya); and even when the rasa is present, the poetic figures are not invariably necessary 39. As to how the alamkara may sometimes help the rasa, the question is discussed by the Dhvanikara in ii 19-20, and the four possible circumstances may occur (1) when the poot, not dealing with it as the main point, intends its subordination to the main theme, e. g. the rasa, (tatparatvena, adagitvena), (2) when he accepts or rejects it as suiting the occasion (kale graha-tyagayok). (3) when he does not want to carry it out effectively to the end (noti-nirvahe), and (4) when accomplished effectively, it is still made subservient (nirvahe' pyangatve)40. The comparatively subsidiary position thus assigned to the alambara 11 must not, however,

³⁰ This is explained by the following commentary: gunā rasam vinā nāvatieţhante, gunā rasam avaiyam upakurvanti, alamkārās tvavaiyam nöpakurvanti, gunā rasa-dharmā atah sākṣād rasa tiṣṭhanti, alamkārās tu na rase sākṣāt tiṣṭhanti kim tu tvanga-dvāreņa.

⁴⁰ Cf Hemacandra p. 17.

therefore, the alambara is taken as an accident, not as an essential; and though technically the phrase analambara by punals bought is open to the objections brought forward by Visvanatha and Jagannatha, the views of the latter on

be taken to indicate any tendency to minimise its importance, for Anandavardhana himself admits that poetry depends on it for its operation (kāvyavrttes tadásrayāt). But the alamkāra is accepted only in connexion with the augin or the principal element in poetry, which in most cases takes the form of rasa; and alamkaras, other than such, which are devoid of or unconnected with the suggestion of rasa and therefore unpoetic, are in Ananda's opinion, mere vag-vikalous, and should be included in the citra-kāvya, which is no poetry but an imitation thereof. The authors of the Dhranyaloka ignored these because their system had no place for them; but the poet may sometimes intend not to awaken the rasa or anything else unexpressed, but to produce mere strikingness of expression in the form of a poetic figure. Such cases, therefore, should be acknowledged and analysed. We shall see that followers of the dhouni-system like Ruyyaka realised this deficiency in the treatment of the Dhavanikara and tried to supply it by admitting the significance of such figures for poetry and analysing their content after the indication given by Kuntala.

the point under discussion do not differ substantially from those of Mammata. In Mammata's definition there is no direct mention of vakyārthībhūta rasa or of the maigya sense other than the rasa (which are there by implication), but the gunas and daṇas are expressly mentioned. The explanation of these peculiarities of the definition must be sought in the historical development of these ideas in the earlier schools, and not in any attempt to invent an original definition. See below Ch. vii.

The view indicated above regarding the nature of the gunas necessarily dispenses with their endless multiplication and differentiation. Mammata and his followers, taking the standpoint of the Dhvanyaloka in this respect, admit only three gunas, viz. mādhurya (sweetness), ojas (energy) and prasāda (lucidity), out of the ten recognised since Bharata's time. They shew elaborately that these ten are either included in the three mentioned above, or else constitute mere absence of defects, while some of them are even positive defects. In fact, these three gunas are defined broadly enough to include most of the ten guyas of Bharata, Dandin and Vamana, Thus, the madharyo, found chiefly in the Erotic, the Pathetic and the Quietistic moods, is described generally as that excellence which pours delight (aklada) into the mind and makes it melt, as it were (drati-kāraga); the ojas, arising in the Heroic, the Furious and the Disgustful moods, is that property by which the mind is brilliantly expanded (vistāra-kāraņa); while the prasāda, found in all poetic moods, causes them to pervade the mind (vyapti-karana), like the fire pervading dry fuel, or water pervading a pure piece of cloth. As they are related to the main poetic mood in the composition and made suitable to its particular kind, the classification, as given here, naturally proceeds on a psychological basis having reference to their influence on the reader's mind (so as to lead up to the particular mood), and supersedes the old differentiation resting on an adjustment of sound and sense. It will be also

seen from the somewhat comprehensive definitions of the three gunas that the slesa, samādhi and audārya of older writers may be included in ojas, and the artha-vyakti in prasāda; while sau-kumārya and kānti are essentially the opposites of of the defects of harshness (pārusya) and vulgarity (grāmyatva) respectively, and samatā or uniformity of diction may sometimes be a positive defect.

Consistently with this view of the gunas, the dosas or defects of a composition are recognised in so far as they are the repressor of the rasa, as well as of the expressed sense. The dosas, therefore, convey a positive significance, like the guyan, in relation to the rasa, in spite of the admitted fact that some dosas approach gundbhavas (negation of gunas) and some gunas approach dosabhanas (negation of dayes). The punarukta or tautology, for instance, is generally a fault, but it may sometimes be an excellence if there is an apprehension of the charm of the suggested rasa through it. The justification of the distinction between invariable (nitya) and non-invariable (anitya) fault lies in the fact that in the case of some poetic moods, we can generalise the avoidance of particular combinations as being always damaging for the effect. Thus, the Dhyanikara points out that when love or spingara is the principal suggested mood, one should always avoid faults like unmelodiousness (gruti-dusta), although it is not a fault in the case of the Heroic or randra-rasa.

The attempt, therefore, to estimate the worth of a poem by analysing two kinds of meaning, the

one explicit and the other implicit, and judging it by a reference to the latter rather than to the former, explains in a new light the nature and function of the gunas and dosas, as well as of the alamkaras, which were admitted by previous speculation, but over which there had been so much controversy. The explicit, or expressed word and sense, in which poetry is clothed constitutes its mere vesture, but this external or accidental feature alone appealed to earlier thinkers, whose attention was practically confined to the expressed sabda and artha. The gunas and dosas (along with the so-called riti), as well as the alamkaras, are only certain forms of these, being merely turns given to salela and artha in expression, and are justified as such. They cannot, therefore, be taken as essential, for they do not touch the easence of poetry which consists of the implicit or unexpressed meaning. But at the same time, they cannot be ignored because they are the means by which the unexpressed is suggested, the expressed word and sense being the vyaniaka of the deeper vyangya sense. In classifying the implicit or the unexpressed, again, into the communication of a fact (vastu-dhvani), or the suggestion of an imaginative mood (alankara-dhvani), or the manifestation of an emotional state (rasa-dhrani), the theorists recognised the truth that the essence of poetry may consist of fact, imagination or feeling as the predominant implicit factor, the outward expression being important as a means of pointing to this implicit significance. But it is also perceived that the emotional mood, which the poet succeeds in

communicating to us, is of the highest importance in poetry; and stress came to be laid on this emotional mood to the extent even of ignoring the imaginative or the realistic, and poetry came to have a deeper significance as a means of emotional realisation. This the dhrami-theorists did by emphasising the rasa-dhrami in poetry.

This is, in brief, the outline of the new system which attempts to take into consideration all the known facts and dogmas and build a compact theory of poetry on their basis. But its chief merit consists in its elaboration of the most necessary and fundamental principle of all higher poesy, viz., the art of suggestion, which should lead the reader through diverse routes from that which is distinctly expressed to that which is left unexpressed. With the arrival at this point, one discovers the real significance of a poem and appreciates the taste or relish of the underlying poetic sentiment, which is in reality inexpressible. The ornamental fitting out of thought or word, as well as the literary excellences of structure or or style, everything contributes towards this end. In this connexion, we must not mistake this suggestion to be a form of quiet hinting, or of absolute silence, such as we find in some modern poetic mystics, or that particular train of thought which holds that all things have their being in the unexpressed and resolve themselves into the indeterminable. Sanskrit poetry does not aim at leaving the unexpressed to be darkly gathered, nor does the theory of Poetics regard it as indeterminate. The unexpressed is bound up by means of definite links with

the expressed, without which it cannot exist; but it is wrapped up in such a manner as to make it possible only for the initiated in the poetic hierogly-phies to comprehend it in its subtlety. The unexpressed is not understood by those who know grammar and lexicon, but only by men of taste and literary instinct who know the essence of poetry. It is the province of the sahrdaya, the connoisseur, who is expert in discerning through the intricate meshes of veiled word and sense into the aesthetic relish of deeper significance, in which the pleasure of the beautiful is mixed up with the pleasure arising from the fineness of the problem itself.

This general scheme of Poetics outlined by the Dhyani school, in spite of the loopholes that may be detected in the doctrinal edifice, is accepted as canonical by all important writers coming after Anandavardhana. Here and there an isolated theorist arose who dared to question the general creed, but he was at once put down as a heretic and condemned to neglect and oblivion. The immediately following systems of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra and the Vyaktiviveka-kara were, in spite of their able and ingenious efforts, unable to supplant the dheani-theory; and, finding no strong adherents, themselves languished and died out. These views are taken notice of by later writers only for the purpose of refuting them, Bhatta Nāyaka, judging from the long quotations from his lost work in Abhinavagupta and others, seems to have made a greater impression; but even he does not appear to have been very successful. All these writers, no doubt, accept the concept of

a suggested sense, but when they endeavour to explain it in a different way, they could hardly find a patient hearing. Even Visvanatha's attempt to push the theory to its logical extreme did not meet with universal approval. The labours, therefore, of all later writers, typified by Mammata, consisted generally in working out the details of the dhvanitheory and the scheme of Poetics standardised on its basis; and they spent all their fine scholastic powers in refining and explaining but hardly in adding anything of abiding interest. No other work on Sanskrit Poetics has indeed exerted so much influence as the Dhvanydloka, which brought to a focus the tentative efforts of earlier thinkers, and by its thoroughness and masterly exposition eclipsed all its predecessors, dominating, as it did, the thoughts of generations of theorists even down to the present time.

VI. ABHINAVAGUPTA AND THE REACTIONARY SYSTEMS

(1)

The importance of Abhinavagupta as writer on Sanskrit Poetics lies in his learned exposition of the dhvani-theory in his well known commentary on the text of Anandavardhana; and his erudition, reputation and influence as a great scholar and philosophical writer of his generation, no doubt, added a weight to his championship of the theory, and contributed a great deal to its ultimate exclusive acceptance in later Poetics. His theoretical standpoint, however, does not differ, except in one material point which will be dealt with presently, from that of the formulators of the dheani-system; and he may be fairly regarded as belonging to that group of faithful commentators who are more anxious to interpret than to incorporate new ideas into the system they comment upon. On the other hand, Abhinavagupta was also greatly interested in the dramaturgic work of Bharata and wrote an elaborate and stupendous commentary on this encyclopaedic text. From this interest in dramaturgy, we have seen't, he came to be deeply interested in the various theories about the origin and function of rose, not only in the drama but also in poetry; and one of the latest and most important theory on rasa is directly associated with his name by Mammata, Hemacandra and others.

¹ See Ch. IV, p 160.

In expounding this theory, he tried to explain clearly how the vyakti or vyanjana of the dhvani-theorists could be applied to the case of the manifestation of rasa, thus correlating the rasa-doctrine with the dhyani-theory. He defined the concept of rasa and its place in poetic theory, and furnished a brilliant aesthetic explanation of a phenomenon which had already taxed the ingenuity of many a previous thinker on the subject.

Having realised the importance of rasa in poetry, Abhinava, however, went a step further than the Dhyanikara and Anandavardhana in boldly setting it up as the only essence or aesthetic foundation of poetry. a view which has greatly influenced all later speculation on the subject. From the earlier drama and dramatic theory, no doubt, the authors of the Dhvanydloka had worked up the idea of rasa into poetry and poetic theory; but as the emotional mood in poetry, which the fact of rasa emphasises, came to be more and more prominent, the rasa stood out more and more in relief as its essential aesthetic basis. We have seen? that Abhinava's prodecessors in the Dhvani school consider rasa only as one of the elements of the unexpressed, which may take other forms in the shape of an unexpressed matter (vastu) or an unexpressed imaginative mood (alamkara). No doubt, their theory puts great emphasis on the rasa-dhvani or suggestion of rasa in poetry; but both the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana are yet careful in taking into account other kinds of suggestion and do not, as they could not, erect the rasa into the very 'soul'

² See Ch. v, p. 210.

of poetry. No doubt, it may be thought that they show a decided partiality to rasa, which would practically lead to a conclusion of its essentiality; but they could not, having regard to theoretical consistency give exclusive preference to it : for in their complete scheme of Poetics the rasa-dhvani, which is only one of the three forms of the unexpressed, plays as much part as the vastu- and alamkaradhuani. They had to recognise that the centre of of gravity in a poem may lie in its material and its imagination, as much as in its emotional element. Abhinavagupta appears to have attached little weight to these theoretical considerations, which had restrained his predecessors from explicitly stating what they practically implied; and brushing them aside, he carries their theory to its utmost logical consequence by declaring the essentiality of rasa (rasenaiva sarvam jīvati kāvyam), without which, in his opinion, there could be no poetry (na hi tac-chinyam, i. e. rasa-sünyam, kāvyam kimcid asti, p. 65). He attempts, however, to explain the theoretical discrepancy by saying that the two other aspects of suggestion, concerned respectively with casta and alamkara, resolve themselves ultimately into the suggestion of rasa, which is in fact the essence of poetry (rasa eva vastuta ātmā, vastvalamkāra-dhvanī tu sarvathā rasam prati paryavasyete, p. 27). This opinion, no doubt, influenced the view of later thinkers to a great extent; for, although Mammata carefully follows the cautious attitude of the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana, Visvanatha, developing their theory (after Abhinava) further out of itself, pushes it to its extreme limit and builds

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up his own scheme of Poetics on the basis of the theory that poetry consists of a sentence of which the 'soul' is rasa (vākyaṃ rasātmakaṃ kāvyam). But we shall see that the considerations which led the Dhvanikāra and his commentator to leave their view on this point wisely unstated could not be easily put out of the way, and they are repeated substantially by Jagannātha in his criticism of Visvanātha's view. All later writers, however, agree in thinking that the vasa-dhvani is certainly the most important point for consideration in poetry; and even if they do not explicitly state with Abhinava that the vasta-and alaṃkūra-dhvani resolve ultimately into rasadhvani, they yet show a decided partiality to the latter element.

This is, in brief, the general position of Abhinavagupta as a champion of the new system established by Anandavardhana. The final dominance of this system in later speculation is due not only to the instrinsic worth of the theory itself and its masterly formulation by Anandavardhana, but also probably to the authority which Abhinava's exposition as well as his reputation lent to it. We find in the immediate followers of the system, however, not the extreme position of Abhinavagupta, but the theory and the scheme as finally outlined by Anandavardhana. With Anandavardhans, the dhvani-theory, which was itself ancient, came to prevail; but with him also was evolved a more or less complete scheme of Poetics in which the divergent gleams of earlier thought and the accumulated stock of recognised ideas meet and are rationally adjusted. This scheme, with the

concept of dhvani (especially rasa-dhvani) at its centre, was summed up and uttered in the consise form of a systematic text-book by Mammata, another Kashmirian, whose influence perhaps was no less potent than that of Abhinavagupta in raising it to almost exclusive authority in later times. This system, which for convenience we have called the Dhvani system, absorbed and overshadowed all previous schools and systems, and came to reign supreme, only to be improved in detail by the large crowd of its followers who form the bulk of postdhvani writers on Poetics. Jagannaths, one of the latest writers of this group, very aptly remarks, therefore, that the authors of the Dhvanyaloka settled the path to be followed by later writers on Poeties (dhv mikrtam alamkarika-sarani-vyavasthapakatvät, p. 425).

But it must not be supposed that the theory of dhvani or the system could obtain universal acceptance without some vigorous opposition. Before we take up the post-dhvani followers of Anandavardhana, it will be necessary to consider here some of the reactionary writers who either follow and develop other traditions of thought, or who refuse to acknowledge the new theory. Adherents of other schools, such as Pratihārendurāja (pp. 79f) who commented on Udbhata, or Gopendra Tippa Bhūpāla (p. 72) who commented on Vāmana, carry on the older tradition and do not fail to criticise the new theory. Says Mukula, Pratihārendurāja's guru: lakṣaṇā-mārgāvagāhitatvaṃ tu dhvaneḥ saḥrdayair nūtanatayópavarnitasya vidyata iti...etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kuśágrīyayā buddhyā

nirūpanīyam, na tu jhagityevāsūyitavyam ity alam atiprasangena (p. 21). But more hostile opposition or attack came from some really thoughtful writers who urged new systems, or new explanations of the dhvanitheory in terms of old ideas. Most of these theorists lived near enough in time to Abhinavagupta; and coming later than the authors of the Dheanyaloka, they accept or show themselves cognisant of the general concept of dheans, but attempt to formulate other explanations of it. All of them, however, agree that the vyanjana vrtti need not be postulated or proved for explaining the suggested sense of poetry, and conservatively maintain that the suggested sense can be reached from the expressed sense by some of the recognised means or processes of knowledge (e.g. anumana). None of these writers, therefore, is what the Dhyanikara would call an abhava-vadin, i.e., none of them would deny the existence of dhvani, but they would try to explain it in terms of already recognised concepts or processes. These theorists are Bhatta Nayaka who probably preceded Abhicavagupta, Kuntala who was probably the latter's contemporary, and Mahimabhatta who was either a younger contemporary or lived immediately after Abbinavagupta. It will also be convenient to take up in this connexion the school of opinion represented by the writer on Poetics in the Agnipurana and by Bhoja, which stands in many respects apart from the Kashmirian school of Anandavardhana and which appears to have been entirely untouched by the implications of the dhvanitheory.

(2)

It is unfortunate that Bhatta Nayaka's Hrdayadarpaga is now lost. From the citations of Abhinavagupta and others, the conjecture is likely that it was not a commentary on Bharata's Natya-śāstras but an independent work written in prose and verse (i.e., with verse-kārikā and prose-vrtti) and resembling Mahimabhatta's later Fyakti-viveka written in the same style and with the same object. Like the latter work, it was composed, if not for establishing a new theory of Poetics, at least for controverting the position of the Dheanydloka and formulating a different explanation of dhvani, especially of rasa-dhvani. When Mahimabhatta later on took upon himself the task of "demolishing" the dhvani-theory, he boasted at the outset of this elaborate attack that he had composed his Fyaktiviveka without looking into the Darpaya4 (presumabaly Hradaya-darpana, as explained by his commentator), which was therefore obviously written

³ See Vol. 1, pp. 39-43.

⁴ It is curious that Mahimabhatta says that in composing his own work he has not also looked into the Candrikā, which was apparently an adverse commentary on the Dhvanyaloka. It is probably the same work as is referred to and criticised frequently by Abhinavagupta in his "Locana, and as, he says, was composed by one of his ancestors. Abhinava's references and criticism also confirm the idea that it criticised the text of the Dhvanyaloka adversely on many points. See Vol. I, pp. 105-6. This Candrikā is also apparently cited by Māṇikyacandra and Somesvara in their commentaries on Mammata.

with the same object of dhvani-dhvanisa. No doubt, Bhatta Nāyaka was one of the four writers (mentioned by Abhinava, Mammata and others) who formulated explanations of Bharata's sūtra on rasa; but this in itself is no reason to take him as a commentator on Bharata's text⁵. On the other hand, Abhinava's references in Locana make it reasonably clear that the Hrdaya-darpana, like the Fyakti-viceka,

⁵ My attention is called to a passage (I owe the reference to Prof. Sovani) in the Abhinava-bharafi ch. i, which appears (see Sovani's article on the Pre-dhvani Schools in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, p. 390, centra in JRAS, 1909, pp. 450-52) clearly to indicate that the Hrdaya-darpana was a commentary on the Natya-sastra. The passage in my MS runs thus (commenting on bealimana yad udahrtam in Bharata (t) : bhatta-uāyakas tu brahmanā paramūtmanā kam prayojanam uktam its vyškhyšnam hrdava darbane paryagrabit. This passage is indeed significant, and the relevancy of any comment on Bharata i 1 is difficult to explain in a work, which ex hypethesi is not a commentary on that text; but it appears to militate against those references to and passages from Bhatta Nayaka's work (prose as well as verse) which Abhinava cites and criticises in his Locana (pp. 11, 12, 15, 19, 21, 27, 28, 29, 33, 63, 67-68) and which consist mostly of direct criticism of the text of the Dhvanyiloka. Either of two explanations is possible : (1) that the Hrdaya-darpana was in fact a commentary on Bharata's Natya-sastra, and Bhatta Nayaka's criticism of the Dhvany-. aloka might have constituted incidental discussions in it (but this does not explain the presence of verses in it which later writers, including Abhinavagupta, quote from Bhatta Nayaka in their exposition of his views); or (2) that it was an independent work in prose and verse, consisting of Bhatta

had the special object of criticising in detail the text of the *Dheanyáloka* as well as its theory; and its discussion of rasa might have come in topically in connexion with Bhatta Nāyaka's general views regarding poetry and poetic expression.

The question, however, cannot be definitely settled so long as we get only glimpses of Bhatta Nāyaka's views set forth in the brief exposition and adverse criticism of Abhinava and others. We have already considered at some length Bhatta Nāyaka's views regarding the origin and function of rasa in poetry. We have seen that Bhatta Nāyaka regards rasa-carvaņā as the essence of poetry, but he is apparently not prepared to accept the function of vyanjanā as itsmeans of manifestation?

Nayaka's propounding of his own views in opposition to those of the Dhvanyeloka; and the discussions of rasa-theory and of Bharata's text are not altogether inexplicable, as they might have been topical in connexion with his general theory. The passage from the Abhinava-bhārati cannot be taken as decisive; and I am inclined to accept the latter explanation, with which Kane also (HAL p. xii) appears to agree. Kane, however, does not appear to have seen this passage from the Abhinava-bhārati.

6 see Ch. IV, pp. 154f.

7 Bhajfa Nāyaka's objection to the abhivyakti-theory is thus summarised by Abhinavagupta ("Launa p. 68): "If the potentially existing brigāra is supposed to be manifested by abhivyakti, then it would occupy its field of action in diverse degrees (viṣapirjana-tāratamya-pravrttild), i.e., thus contradicting the nature of rasa as one. There would also be the difficulty mentioned before (see above p. 153), namely, whether the rasa is manifested as existing in oneself or in another person".

It is possible that he admits a suggested sense, as the essence of poetry (rasa-dhvanis tu tenaivátmatyángikrtak, Locana p.15); but from Abhinava's twitting him on this score it is probable that he denied vastu-dhvani (kim tu vastu-dhvanim dusayata rasa-dhvanis tadanugrahakah samarthyata iti susthutarām dhoani-dhoamso'yam, p. 22). Bhatta Nāyaka maintains in a verse attributed to him by Abhinava (p. 27), Hemacandra (p. 4), Manikyacandra (p. 4) and Jayaratha (p. 9) that the distinction between various kinds of literary composition lies in the fact in the sastra, sabda predominates, artha in the akhyana, (=probably itihasa), while in the kavya, both salids and artha are subordinated (gunthhuta or nyagbhāvita). Elsewhere he is represented by Abhinava (p. 68) as saying that the verbal composition (aabda) which makes up poetry is different from other species of verbal composition by the fact that it possesses three elements. Of these elements, abhidha or Denotation belongs to the province of expressed meaning, bhavakatea or power of generalisation to that of rasa, and the bhojakatea or the power of enjoyment to the appreciating audience; thus we have three functions attributed to the three elements of poetry. If Denotation, among these, is taken by itself (i.e. without the other two), then what is the essential difference, he asks, between the poetic figures and the dogmas which form the method of sastras? Or, if this manifold distinction of functions is without importance (metaphorically as well as intrinsically), then why avoid faults like unmelodiousness (srutidusta) ? These considerations, Bhatta

Nāyaka thinks, would give us the second function, viz., bhāvakatva, by which generalisation is accomplished of poetry as well as of its factors (vibhāvas). It is no account of this function that abhidhā or Denotation is also Indication (lakṣaṇā), i.e., the Denotion can give to the expressed sense a metaphorical significance as the basis of rasa. After the rasa is thus generalised (bhāvita), comes its enjoyment or bhoga which, we have seen, Bhatta Nāyaka represents, after the Sāṃkhya philosophers, as a process of disinterested contemplation akin to the philosophic contemplation of Brahms.

Bhatta Nayaka thus postulates a function of bhoga, beyond those of abhidha and bhanakatva. inherent in poetry, in order to explain the working of rasa. He seems to imply that the rasa, which the dhecon-theorists would take as the suggested emotional scuse of poetry, is, in his opinion, purely spa-sumcedge and therefore transcending definition. In other words, he belongs to that class of objectors to the dawni-theory regarding whom the Dhvanikara says that they do not dony dhvani but think that its essence lies beyond the province of words (i 1c). In a verse attributed to Bhatta Navaka by Abhinava (pp. 15, 11) and Jayaratha (p. 9), he speaks of kavyangatva and not kavya-raputa" of what is known as dhours; a statement which would indicate that having assumed the concept, Bhatta Nayaka's object was to establish an explanation different from that

⁸ Read in the verse kāvyningatenop na rūpatā, instead of kāvyningatoum na rūpitā, as given by the reading of MS ga indicated in Locana p. 15.

Nāyaka would regard what is called vyangya-vyāpāra to be an element (kāvyāmāntva) and not an essence of poetry, being reached by the bold utterance of the poet (praudhōkti). In this sense, the kavi-karman or act of imagination on the part of the poet (indicated by Bhatta Nāyaka, as Jayaratha points out, by the word vyāpāra), which makes šabda and artha subservient to itself, is the most important thing in poetry; a view which approximates Bhatta Nāyaka's theory to that of Kuntala, who makes kavi-karman the source of vakrokti in poetry.

(3)

Kuntala, author of the Vakrokti-fivita, on the other hand, had no direct intention of attacking or disproving the dheani-theory. He appears to have accepted the fact of a suggested sense in poetry, but, following the tradition of Bhāmaha's vakrokti, he develops a system of vakrokti of his own, in some aspects of which he includes all ideas of dheani and rasa. Nearly the whole of his long lost work has been recently recovered, and a part of it (chs. i and ii) has been published by the present writer?; it is now possible, therefore, to depend no longer on the references to Kuntala in later literature for an account of his views, but gather it independently from his own statements 10.

g In the Calcutta Oriental Series, 1923.

to An account of Kuntala's theory of poetry is given

The central idea in Kuntala is that the vakrokti is the essence (jivita) of poetry; and by vakrokti he understands a certain striking or charming (viritra) mode of expression (vinyāsa-krama), which is different from or excels the common or matter-of-fact expression of words and ideas in the sastrax and the like (sästrádi-prasiddha-sabdárthópanibandha-It is therefore a deviation from the vyatireki). established mode of speech for the purpose of attaining a certain strikingness (vaicitrya or vicchitti), or an imaginative turn of words and ideas (bhangibhaniti or bhaniti prakara) peculiar to poetry and abhorrent of common speech, in which facts are more or less simply stated. This is the vakratva or vakra-bhava underlying all poetic speech. A distinction, therefore, is implied not only between the method of the sciences and the scriptures (sastradi), on the one hand, and that of poetry, on the other, but also between what may be called the "naturalistic" and the "artistic" mode of expression 11.

Kuntala, therefore, holds that salamkyta kabila and artha or embellished word and sense alone constitute poetry, and this embellishment consists of vakrokti. The so-called embellishments, which go by the name of poetic figures (alamkāras) in orthodox Poetics, are merely aspects of this vakrokti, and can be properly included in its comprehensive scope. So can also the ideas of dhvani and rasa. This vakrokti being the only possible alamkāra and being essential

in my introduction to the above edition, which see for detailed references.

¹¹ See above Ch. 11, pp 61-2.

as such, Kuntala finds fault with the common statement that the alamkara belongs to poetry; for such a statement would imply that poetry may exist without it (i 7, 11).

Kuntala then explains that the vakrokti charms us by the skill of the poet, and is therefore called vaidagdhya-bhangt-bhaniti12. It rests ultimately on the conception (pratibhā) of the poet, or on his skill (kaušala), or on an act of imagination on his part, which is termed kavi-vyāpāra or havi-karman. Kuntala does not exactly define this kaci-vyāpāra, which is the ultimate source of poetry, perhaps because he is conscious of the fact that it is in its nature undefinable; but he analyses it elaborately.

¹² The word vidagdha is used in opposition to the word viduat to signify a man versed in belles-lettres as distinguished from a scholar, and the Dhnanyiloka often speaks of an appeal to videgdha-vidual-parient (pp. 201, 230). Avantisundart is cited in Kaupamiminasa p. 46 as saying vidagdhabhaniti-bhangi-nivedyam vastune rupam na niyata-svabhavam. The vaicitrya is discussed by Anandavardhana at p. 243, in which connexion he uses the term hamiti-kytam vaicitrya-matram. Abhinava speaks of infinite variety of upamavicchitti (upamā-vicchitti-prakārānām asankhyatvāt, p.5 "Locana), and uses it also synonymously with carutea (p. 8). It would appear from the verse quoted by Anandavardhana at p. 130, the word vicehitti, used in this sense in poetic theories, is applied analogically from the same word used to signify a certain feminine charm or elegance derived from carelessness in dress and decoration (Bharata xxii 16). See on this point Haricand Sastri, L'art Poétique de l'Inde pp. 64-65. The word bhang in the sense of a turn of expression is used in Dhva pp.139,241. Etymologically it appears to have the same meaning as vicchitti.

and distinguishes and classifies its function in six different spheres, namely, in the arrangements of letters (varya), of the substantive and terminal parts of a word (pada-pārvārdha and pada-parārdha), of a sentence (vākya), of a particular topic (prakaraņa), and of the composition as a whole (prabandha). He devotes nearly the whole of his work, with the exception of the introductory portion of the first chapter, to the definition, classification and illustration of these varieties of kavivyāpāra-vakratā, which thus form the different categories into which poetic speech may be analysed.

It is clear from this brief exposition that Kontala cannot admit as poetry a composition involving mere southdeakts, which he takes to be plain description without the requisite strikingness; and he consequently develops Bhamaha's indication that a kind of atisaya is involved in pakrokti-vaicitrya. This atisaya, if it is taken in the sense of the lokatikranta-gocarata of Bhamsha's atisayokti, would imply a kind of heightened charm of expression which is lokottara or dissociated from personal interests and relations. The dissociation, therefore, which is supposed in the artistic attitude involved in the relish of rasa13, is also implied in vakrokti; and on this point Kuntala appears to agree with the main position of the rasa-theorists. Kuntala also thinks that the ultimate test of this lokottara vaicitrya is tadvidahlada or pleasure in the appreciating sahrdaya, who plays here apparently the same part as he does in the rasa-theory, or in poetic theories generally. It seems,

¹³ See above Ch. IV.

therefore, that the exponents of the different theories approach ultimately the same standard, albeit through different avenues of thought, and agree in holding that vaicitrya or camatkara (in alamkara or rasa) must be finally subjected to the taste of the sahrdaya.

Thus a new turn was given to the alamkara-system of Bhamaha; or rather, what was implicit or naively expressed in it was developed to its logical consequence by Kuntala's systematic analysis of its implications14. In spite of the obviously extreme nature of his central theory and his somewhat quaint nomenclature, his work is of great value as presenting a unique system, or rather as systematising the alankaratheory of earlier writers in a refreshingly original way. The dhouni-theorists had either dismissed the poetic figures (alankaras) as mere vag-vikalpas, or considered them only as heightening the charm of the unexpressed element in poetry. They speak of the relation of the alambara to the principal suggested element of poetry (e. g., in the shape of rasa); but there might arise cases where the poet's obvious intention is not to awaken the rasa or anything else unexpressed, but simply to produce a strikingness in the form of an expressed poetic figure. In these cases, the authors of the Dhoanydloka think that all such figures which, in connexion with an involved unexpressed element, possess a peculiar charm, belong to the class of poetry called by them junibhita-vyangya; if there is no such unexpressed element involved, they have a pictorial effect

¹⁴ The vakrokti-system of Kuntala may properly be regarded as an off-shoot of the older alangkāra-system (Ch. 19).

merely, and may be included in the lowest class of postry, called by them citra and described by themas no poetry but an imitation thereof. In other words, they take such poetic figures as being connected with the unexpressed possess a peculiar charm, and and thus justify their position in poetry; the figures unaccompanied by the unexpressed or in no way connected with it are condemned to the level of nopoetry, as phases of speech which is of infinite variety (anantā hi vāg-vikalpās tat-prukārā eva calamkārāh). Kuntala, on the other hand, justifies the significance of such figures in poetry as figures, and shews that this significance is independent of all considerations of their connexion with the unexpressed, as it consists in the very vaicitrys or strikingness involved in in them, which is sufficient in itself, and does not borrow its power of appeal from elsewhere.

But he justifies the alamkāra as such only when it involves the vaicitrya, vicehitti or vakratva and becomes a phase of vakrakti. He admits that the poetic figures are particular forms of speech, aspects of the expressed denotation (abhidhā-prakāra-viteṣāh), in which one need not suppose any connexion with the unexpressed, but he supposes at the same time a specific differentia in it which consists in a peculiar turn of expression resulting in a characteristic strikingness (vaicitrya or vicehitti) and depending upon an act of imagination on the part of the poet (kavi-pratibhā-nirvartita). Thus the so-called alamkāras of orthodox Poetics are admissible when they are found on analysis to possess these characteristics of peculiar charm imparted to them by the fertile

imagination of the poet; and these therefore constitute the elements which go to make up the being of a poetic figure 15. Kuntala in this way not only supplies a remarkable deficiency in the teaching of the Dhyanikara and Anandavardhana, but also justifies the existence and fixes the conception of a poetic figure as distinguished from a mere speechfigure. It is no wonder, therefore, that later followers of the Dhyani school, who form the bulk of postdhyani writers on Poetics, readily accept Kuntala's analysis, and regard the two characteristics, viz., vicchitti and kavi-vyāpāra, as forming the ultimate test of a poetic figure. Mammata lays down that where there is no suggested rasa, the poetic figures simply result in ukti-vaicitrya or charmingness of expression, and states generally that alamkara is charmingness itself (vaicitryam alamkārah). shall see that Rayyaka was the first writer who accepts Kuntala's test of a poetic figure and applies it systematically to a detailed examination and classification of individual poetic figures.

It follows from the prominence given by Kuntala to vakrokti in poetry that all ideas of dhvani and rasa should be comprehended in certain aspects of vakratā, just as the vettis of Udbhata, connected

¹⁵ Hence, the word "poetic" figure or kāvyālaņkāra, instead of "figure of speech." See above Ch. II. pp. 94. In a formal scheme of Poetics they no doubt correspond, but this point of view of its involving poetic charm would be entirely omitted in a treatise of rhetoric. It is therefore misleading to translate Sanskrit Alankāra as Sanskrit Rhetoric. See ZDMG, Ivi, 392 fn.

with anuprasa, as well as anuprasa itself and yamaka of orthodox writers, are taken as kinds of varnavinyāsa-vakratā or vakratā depending upon the peculiar arrangement of letters. The idea of dheani is included partly in rudhi-vaicitrya vakrata, where Anandavardhana's own verse tala juanti quaa as well as the verse snigdha-syamala-kanti cited by Auanda as an example of arthantara-samkramitavacya dhvani (i. e. the case of suggestion where the expressed sense passes into another sense), is given as instances. Other aspects of dheani are acknowledgod in upacāra-vakratā, where the verse yaanam ca mattameham, cited by Ananda as an instance of atyanta-tiraskrta-vācya dhomi (i. e., the case of suggestion where the expressed sense disappears ontirely), is given as an example. From Kuntala's treatment it appears that he takes upacara in the sense of a supposed or fancied identification of two objects. however distinct, on the basis even of the slightest resemblance. As such, therefore, it is admittedly involved in figures like metaphor (rapaka) and forms the basis of metaphorical expression generally. This would come under the comprehensive domain of transferred expression known as lukşana, and would be included by the dhrani-theorists under laksanamula-dhvani, i. e. suggestion based on transference or Indication16. Kuntala would thus belong to that group of writers regarding whom the Dhvanikara says that they do not deny the existence of dhount

¹⁶ It is for this reason that Ruyyaka thinks that the Vakrokti-jivita-kāra comprehended all ideas of dhvani in upacāra-vakratā and the like (p. 5 with Jayaratha thereon).

but regard it as bhākta (bhāktam āhus tam anye), i. e., depending on a transference of sense or Indication.

Regarding rasa-dhoani which comes under asamtaksya-krama-vyamyya (i. e., suggestion of an imperceptible process), it is clear that Kuntala who admits not the essentiality of rasa but that of vakrakti, can comprehend rasa only as an element in some aspects of vakrokti. In the third chapter of his work, dealing with vākya-vakratā, he discusses how poetry may be made charming by delineating appropriate rasas, In this connexion he examines in some detail such figures as rasanat, preyas etc., in which the rasa was admitted as an element by early theorists, whose system, maintaining the importance of alamkara in poetry, could not otherwise recognise rasa indepen-The special poetic figures like rasavat dently. etc., constituted the back-gate, as it were, for the admission of the idea of rasa in the alamkara-systems. When, however, the theory of rasa assumed its proper importance in the schools, the necessity naturally arose of explaining how the rasa, which is essential and therefore fit to be embellished (alamkārya or upakārya) cau itself be regarded as a means of embellishment (alamkara or upakaraka) in figures like rasavat. We find accordingly in the Dhyanikara and Anandavardhana an attempt to comprehend the rasavat etc., under the class of poetry called by them quaibhata-vyangya, in which the suggested sense (in this case the suggested rasa) is subordinated to the expressed sense. The theory was put into shape by distinguishing the sphere of asamlaksya-krama dhvani from that of figures like rasavat on the ground that when the rasa is predominant and forms the essence of the poem in question, it constitutes the principal suggested element, and as such it is alamkārya; but when it is subordinate to the expressed sense, its constitutes mere alamkāra or embellishment (Dhwa' ii 4 f). The "Pradīpa puts this concisely by saying: yatra pradhānam rasādis tatra dhvanih, yatra tvapradhānam tatrālamkāra iti bhāvah. Logically following this view, Mammata does not regard the cases of rasavat etc., as poetic figures at all, but only as a variety of guṃbhūtavyangya poetry¹⁷.

¹⁷ Later writers and commentators, however, unwilling to depart from the authority of the "ancients", attempt to explain the problem of reservat in various ways by a method of ingenious interpretation, which keeps to the letter but changes the spirit of the old dictum. Most these views are discussed by Visyanatha. One school holds that the designation alankira, given to figures like rasapat merely because they help the development of rate, is a purely secondary application of the term (bhakta), for they are not really alamkarar but should be accepted as such in deference to the practice of ancient writers (rankdyupakāra-mātrenshālamkrti-vyapadeso bhaktas cirantana-prasiddhyddigikarya eva), These theorists admit a difference between rasavat, on the one hand, and alamkuras properly so called (such as upamu). on the other; for in the one case the rasa directly embellishes another rata, while in the other case, the rasa is indirectly embellished through the form of word and sense. But they maintain at the same time that there is one thing in common between the two kinds, viz, that both of them embellish the rasa, either directly or indirectly, by being subservient to it. On account of this similarity of function, the designation alamkura, which is properly applicable to such

Kuntala takes up the rasquat topically under vastu vakratā, which may relate to both sahaja and āhārya vastu, the delineation of rasa coming apparently under the latter head, which is described as kavi-šakti-vyutpatti-paripāka-praudha. He criticises the definitions of rasavat given by Bhamaha, Dandin and others, and holds that it is neither darkita-synstaśrngarddi-razam, nor rasa-samśrayam, nor again rasapesalam, but rasena tulyam vartamanam; and consequently it is not an alamkarya but an alamkarya. In other words, the rasa is awakened in these cases for its own sake, and not for the purpose of embollishing the expressed word and sense. If not theoretically invulnerable, this view is interesting as indicating that the importance of rasa, first advocated in poetic theories by the Dhvanikara, appears to have influenced thinkers belonging to other traditions of thought. The Dhyanikara attempts to reconcile the older idea

figures as upama, is applied to the rasawat by an extension of the sense (bhakti), and this usage has the sanction of ancient and respectable authority to which we must bow. But this explanation is rejected by others as being too fine. The difference between alamkaras like upama, on the one hand, and the rasavat, on the other, which is supposed to be due to the fact of direct and and indirect embellishment, is admitted to be true, but is explained away as purely accidental and immaterial; and, strictly speaking, we should designate both as alambaras instead of indulging in fine distinctions. A third view, which altogether rejects this distinction between direct and indirect embellishment, maintains that the general definition of alankara as that which embellishes the rasa through word and sense, is applicable as much to be rasavat as to regular figures like upamā.

of rasavat as involving the idea of rasa secondarily, by admitting it in his second division of poetry; but Kuntala brushes aside even the view of his master Bhamaha in this respect, and thinks that this case should be regarded as one in which the poet has an opportunity of creating a kind of vakrokti in which the rasa supplies the principal charm. But he allows the rasa to play the greatest part in what he calls prabandha-vakratā, i. e., in vakratā occurring in the composition as a whole, which, he thinks, must be accomplished chiefly by the aid of pleasing rasas (rasánturena ramyena yatra mreahanam bhavet). It is not the mere matter or plot, but the beauty imparted to it by the continuous sense of rasa in it which can make the words of a poet live (nirantararasoddhara-garbha-saundarya-nir drah / girah kavinam jivanti na katha-matram airitah). Kuntala even accepts the Dhvanyáloka's judgment that in the two great epics, the santa rasa is the angin (predominant rasa) and constitutes their principal charm, although he thinks that it is ultimately the kari-pratibha which is the all-important thing in poetry.

(4)

Mahimabhatta begins his Vyakti-viveka, whose very name implies that it is a consideration of the theory of vyakti or vyanjanā established by the authors of the Dhvanyāloka, with the proposition that his object is to comprehend all ideas of dhvani in the process of anumāna or syllogistic reasoning (anumāne)

ntarbhācam sarvasyaiva dhvaneh prakūšayitum). He proceeds therefore to consider in detail the text as well as the theory of the Dhyanikara and Agandayardhana. He criticises minutely the definition of dheani given in Dhva° i 13, which, if properly considered, applies, he thinks, to cammana. He considers (especially in the third chapter) most of the examples given in the Dhvanyaloka and tries to demonstrate that they are really cases of agamana. Indeed, throughout his work he proceeds by an ulaborate process of destructive criticism and makes the definition of dhuani, propounded by its advocates, conform to his definition of what he calls kāvydnumiti as the process through which another sense is revealed by the expressod sense, or by a sense inferred from it connectedly (vācyas tad-anumito vā yatrārtho'rthantarum prakāšayati / sambandhatah kutašcit sā kāvyānumitir ityaktā, p. 22).

This being his main position, he accepts only two senses of sabdo, namely, the actually expressed (vacya) and the inferrible (commeya), including under the latter both lakeya and vyangya senses, whose independent existence he does not admit. He says (p. 7); "Meanings are of two kinds, the expressed and the inferrible. Of these, the expressed belongs to the function of a word, and is alone called the primary sense of a word From it, or being inferred from it, as from a logical hetu or middle term in a syllogism, another sense which is inferred, is called the inferrible sense. This again is threefold, consisting of mere matter (vastu), the poetic figures (alamkara) or the rasas.

The first two of these varieties can also become the expressed, the last is always inferrible". It is clear enough from this that Mahimabhatta apparently accepts the recognised concept of a suggested sense in the shape of a vastu, alamkura and rasa, but maintains that these are not revealed by vyakti or suggestion, but by anumana 18; for the expressed sense and the so-called suggested sense stand in the relation of linga and lingin, the middle and the major terms of a syllogism (p. 12).

Mahimabhatta maintains, by analysing many examples taken from the Dhvanydloka, that the expressed sense does not really auggest the unexpressed sense, but that between the two, other inferences are possible and do occur. The vyakti, as Amandavardhana himself abnits (p. 192), is the manifestation of that which is desired to be manifested, and which becomes manifest along with that which manifests it, just as a jar in a dark room becomes visible along with the light which makes it visible. The vastu, ulamkara and rasa, which are the three suggested clements in the opinion of the dhrani-theorists, are not manifested in this way, for they are not comprehended along with the expresse! which suggests them, but only afterwards. The interval between the perception of the expressed ribhavas and the suggested rasa, for instance, is indeed very short,

¹⁸ This is the only important point of his disagreement with the Dhvanyulaka; in other respects, he says, there is hardly any disagreement (prapabhuta dhvaner vyaktir iti saiva vivecità | yat toanyat tatra vimatih prayo nastityupo-keitam |/).

and is therefore called by the dhouni-theorists themselves a process of imperceptible sequence (asamlaksya-krama); but this very nomenclature shows that the existence of a krama or sequence cannot be denied, and that the expressed and the unexpressed, therefore, are sequential. Being such, they must bear the relationship of a logical premise and its conclusion (pp. 11 f). Even in the case of the indicated sense, as in the phrase gour valikah, what one first understands is that the two (quur and vahika) are not identical, and from this the conclusion arises that they are meant as possessing similar qualities : the indicated sense here is ultimately reached by anumana (p. 24). Thus artha is merely a ground of inference and not a cyalijaka. The process of of inference is very wide in its scope, much wider than dhouni which is naturally included in it (tasya, i. e. anumānasya, ca tadapeksayā mahā-visayatvāt p. 12). With regard to sabda, it cannot be taken as the vyanjaka or suggestor of anything else but its literal meaning. As it exhausts itself after expressing its literal or primary sense, even the secondary indicated meaning (laksya artha) has admittedly to be inferred, not from itself but from the latter; how can it be supposed to suggest any deeper sense? But such words, through their expressed sense, can well become the ground or source of inferences (anumāpaka), pp. 27 f.

The process of inference in poetry by which the unexpressed may be thus reached is presumably the ordinary process of syllogistic reasoning, which consists in the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) of the middle (linga) and the major (lingin) terms. The davani or suggested sense is the lingin, and its suggestors (viz., word and sense) are apparently its linga. The invariable concomitance is ascertained in three ways, viz., by anupalabdhi (non-cognition), tādātmya (identity) and tadutpatti (causation). In reply to Mahimabhatta's position, it has been shewn that none of these means of proving a syllogism is applicable to establishing the invariable concomitance between the linga sabdarthan and the lingin dhvani. The non-cognition of word and sense does not prove the existence of dhvani; for non-cognition only proves that lingin which consists of the absence of something. That a jar is absent can be proved from its non-cognition. But here the lingin dheani does not consist of the absence of anything. Therefore the hetw is vitisted, and the noncognition of word and sense can only prove their absence, but not that of dhvani. There can be no identity, again, between the suggested sense (dhuani) and that which suggests it (sabda and artha); for the suggested meaning is essentially different from the expressed, and comes out prominently by keeping the latter in subordinate position. Similarly, the test of tadutpatti or causation does not apply, for here the word and sense cannot be regarded as being caused by the suggested sense, in the same way as the smoke, which proves the existence of fire, can be taken as being produced from the fire itself.

Viávanātha puts the objections in another way.

Inference is the knowledge of the lingin by means of the linga, qualified by its existence in the subject (paksa-sattea), its existence in similar instances (sapakea-sattva) and its exclusion from opposite instances (vipaksa-vyāvartatva). For example, we conclude in the subject, a. g., a smoky hill, the existence of the lingin fire by the lingu smoke, which we see existing in it, as well as in similar instances (such as in the culinary hearth, where there is no doubt as to the existence of fire), and which we see absent from opposite instances (e. g., such places where the absence of fire is certain). But this syllogistic method is not strictly applicable to establishing the suggested sense from the expressed : for logical inference, Visvanatha points out, has nothing to do with works of imagination. Take, for instance, the following verse :

dretim he prativešini keaņam ihdpyammad-grhe dāsyasi prāyendsya šišoh pitā na virusāk kaupīr apah pāsyati | ekākinyapi yāmi satoaram itah srotus tamālākulam nirandhrās tamum ālikhantu jaratha-cehedā nala-

granthayah //

"O neighbour, will you cast your eyes for a moment here on our house? The father of this child will scarcely drink the tasteless water of a well. Though alone, I go quickly hence to the river whose banks are covered with tamāla-trees. Let the densely swarming knots of reeds with their hard projections scratch my body". Here the reed-knot's scratching the woman's body and her going alone to the quiet river-aide may be taken as the linga of her enjoyment with a lover, which is the

suggested sense (lingin) here. But these alleged reasons, though they help to reveal the unexpressed sense, are not invariable; for dalliance with a gallant is not, from the logical point of view, universally predicable of a woman going alone to a river-side or from her being scratched by the reed-knots.

It is noteworthy that Mahimabhatta relies (p. 26) also upon the arguments of those objectors of the dhvani-theory who think that dhvani is identical with bhakti¹⁹; but he opposes alike the views of those Mimamsakas who believe in the single pervasive power of the expressed sense²⁰, as well as the view of the Vakroktijivita-kāra. His objection to the latter system is naturally based on his own idea of the importance of rasa and unimportance of dhvani. In his opinion, any deviation from common usage involving charmingness of expression, such as Kuntala upholds, may take either of two forms, viz., (1) it may resolve itself more or less into a theory of propriety (aucitya)²¹, or (2) it may mean the mani-

¹⁹ See above Ch. v, pp. 194f.

²⁰ See above Ch. V, pp. 192-93.

dwelt upon in the Dhuanyalaka) in the second vimaria of his work. He divides the subject of impropriety, which may be sabda-visara and artha-visara, into two heads according as it concerns the matter or form of poetry. The former, called antaranga anaucitya, consists in improper employment of the vibhāvar etc. in the manifestation of rasa. It has already been dealt with in the Dhvanyalaka. The formal impropriety, called bahiranga anaucitya, is chiefly concerned with the occurrence of five defects, viz., vidheyavimaria (pp. 37-58). prakrama-bheda (pp. 58-66), krama-bheda

festation of an implied sense other than the expressed sense. If the first alternative is meant, it is superfluous to one who admits rasa in poetry, as no theory of rasa can dispense with a theory of propriety or suitability with regard to the adjustment of its factors 22. To admit the other alternative is to bring in the idea of dhrom in a more or less disguised form.

It is true that Mahimabhatta's work is a masterpiece of scholastic argumentation, exhibiting much fastidious criticism and great learning of a miscellaneous kind; but its avowed object is polemical and it does not pretend to set up a new system. Mahimabhatta possessed all the qualifications of a good controversialist and enters into his task with a decided animus, which constitutes the source at once of his weakness as well as of his strength. A fine product of a scholastic age, he cannot yet look beyond the pettiness of immediate issues; and whatever might be the value of his peculiar proposition, he hardly ever adds to its limited interest any indepen-(pp.66-69), pannarnktya (pp.69-84) and micripacana (pp.84-100). The question of aucitya will be dealt with in the next chapter. 22 A similar criticism, Prof. Sovani thinks (in a letter to me, dated March 2, 1924), is levelled against the Vakroktijivitakāra's theory by Abhinavagupta in "Locana p. 208. But, in my opinion, it really refers in the context to Anandavardhana's discussion of the views of those who think, after Bhimaha, that the atisayokti is involved as an essential element in most poetic figures. This standpoint is similar to that of Kuntala but the passage in question cannot be taken as a decisive reference to him or his theory

of vakrokti.

dent treatment of the larger problems of Poetics. This is perhaps one of the reasons why even his logical acumen and his erudition failed to keep the interest of his work alive; but the chief reason why his book was forgotten in later times and was cited only to be condemned-a fate which it shared with the Vakrokti-jivita of Kuntala-was that it pitted itself against the more formidable theory of the Dhyanikara and Anandavardhana which was destined to supersede it by attracting away the best thinkers of later times. The anumana-theory of Mahimabhatta, like the vakrokti-theory of Kuntala, appears to have never received any liberal recognition in the hands of later theorists, nearly all of whom, since Mammata's time, accepted without question the system of the Dhvanyaloka; and in attempting to explain away the new theory in terms of the already recognised idea of anumana, or reviving Bhamaha's old position in the face of the more widely received theory of the new nesthetic school, Mahimabhatta and Kuntala were apparently fighting on behalf of a cause already doomed.

(4)

The school of opinion, represented in Poetics by the alamkāra-portion of the Agni-purāņa apparently follows a tradition which departs in many respects from the orthodox systems, and which is further developed in later literature by Bhoja in his Sarasvatīkanthābharaṇa 33.

²³ Much of this section was printed originally as an article contributed to JRAS, 1923, pp. 537-49. Prof.

It is well known that this apocryphal purana is ambitiously cyclopaedic. There is hardly any doubt, however, that the alambara-portion of this work, as we have already remarked, is chiefly a compilation, in a somewhat edlectic fashion, by a writer who was himself no theorist but who probably wanted to collect together and present a workable epitome, conforming in essentials to the teachings of no particular orthodox school, but gathering its material from all sources. This will be borne out not only by its independent, if somewhat loosely joined and uncritical, treatment, but also from the presence of verses culled from various old writers.

Taking the alamkāra-section of the Agni-purāna and the Sarasvati-kanthābharana side by side, one is struck at once by some fundamental characteristics which are common to both. The most poculiar feature of the Agni-purāna theory is the absence of the doctrine of Ahvani, although the concept of the doctrine of Ahvani, although the concept of the doctrine of ahvani, although the manner of ancient authors, in the figure āksepu (sa āksepu thranih syār on thraninā cyajyate yatah, 344, 14). The word thrani is also used in the opening verse

Sovani in a letter to me, dated March 2, 1924, points out that Anandavardhana's citation (p. 222) of the Agni-purana 338, 10-11, which enabled me (Vol. I. p 103) to fix the lower terminus of the date of the alaqukāra-portion of the work, is doubtful, in view of the fact that Abhinavagupta (on Bharata vi 38) actually ascribes one of these verses by name to Anandavardhana. But it is not intelligible why the verse is given in the text of the Dhuanyaleka (p. 222) with tathā cidamucyate, which phrase generally indicates a quotation (cf his comment on the word usuate in Dhua² iv p. 236, II, 4-5).

(336, 1 = Bhoja i 1), which says generally that speech consists of dhvani, varna, pada, and väkya (dhvanir varnāh padam väkyam ityetad vähmayam matam); but apparently this alludes to the grammatical word which reveals the sphota, and which is indicated by the same term in the Vakyapadīya. The work, however, recognises abhidhā and lakṣaṇā, the ideas of which were already elaborated by philosophers and philosophical grammarians. At the same time, apart from obvious borrowings or copyings from Bharata, Bhāmaha and Dandin, this work cannot be taken as substantially following the views of any one of the schools represented by these names.

There is no doubt that in one verse, which is conveniently cited by Visyanatha in support of his own extreme view, the Agni-purage speaks of rasa as the "soul" of poesy in contrast with mere verbal ingenuity (vag-vailagdhya-pradhane'pi rasa evatra finitam, 336, 33), and devotes somewhat lengthy chapters to the description, after Bharata, of the rasa and bhatas; yet there is nowhere any central theory of ram or any elaboration of of a system of Poetics on its basis, As to the origin of rasa, it propounds a peculiar view that from infinite bliss (ananda) proceeds self-consciousness (ahamkāra), from self-consciousness proceeds conceit (abhimana), from conceit pleasure (rati), of which arayara (love), hasya (laughter) and other rasas are modifications (338, 2-4). It admits with Bharata four fundamental rasas, from which are derived five others. Although partiality is thus shown to rasa in poetry and drama, the Agai-puraga

cannot be relegated entirely to the Rasa school; for it does not make any attempt to correlate with this central principle the other factors of poetry, viz. rīti, guņa and alamkāra, which are also recognised as of great, if not of equal, importance. One fact, however, worth noticing in this connexion is that although the Agni-purāņa recognises nine rasas, adding šānta to the orthodox eight, it extols and gives prominence to ārūgāra: a trait which is unique and which is further developed by Bhoja, who, as we shall see presently, accepts no other rasa than ārūgāra in his Śrūgāra-prakāša and gives almost exclusive attention to this important rasa in his Sarasvatī-kanthābharaņa.

On the other hand, although treatment is accorded to riti (ch. 339) and guya (ch. 345), the Agni-puraya does not follow the tenets of the Riti school, as represented by Dandin and Vamana. Dandin classifies riti, which he calls marga, into two extreme types, vaidarlihi and gaudi, to which Vāmana adds pāncāli as an intermediate type; but the classification, according to both, depends upon the presence or absence of certain fixed excellences of diction. known as gunas. To this enumeration Rudrata adds lali, but by riti he means a definite arrangement of sentences with reference to the use of compound words of variable length. The Agnipurana accepts this four-fold classification, but the distinction is supposed to lie not only in the length or shortness of compound words, but also in the qualities of softness or smoothness, as well as in the prominence or otherwise of metaphorical

expression (upacara). The quass, again, are regarded as fundamental characteristics both by Dandin (i 42) and Vāmana (r. 2. 6-8), who take them as forming the essence of riti, and distinguish them carefully from alamkaras, which, in the opinion of Dandin, form the general characteristics of both margas, and, in the opinion of Vamana, are merely accidental characteristics enhancing the charm of poetry already brought out by the gunas. The Agni-purana, however, defines the gunas, which are nowhere connected directly with riti, simply as those characteristics which reflect great beauty on poetry (yah kavye mahatim chayam anujrhuatyasau yunah, 345, 3), a definition which hardly distinguishes them from alamkaras, the definition of which is here almost the same, kavya tobhakaran dhurman alamkaran pracaksate (341, 17) 14, and is, strangely enough, merely copied uncritically from Dandin, ii 1. The classification of quas themselves, again, in this work is peculiar to itself. Ordinarily, the gunas are classified as either sabdajunas or artha-gunas, and this procedure is sanctioned by Vamana. The Agui-purage brings in finer distinctions (345, 3 f.). The gunus are here said to be of two kinds, specific (caisesika) and general (sāmānya), the former apparently confining itself

²⁴ This verse is also cited by Bhoja (ch. v, p. 355): but it is possibly an indication of the uncritical nature of his work that he should remark: tatra kāvya-šobhākarān ityanena šlesopamidinad guņa-rasa-bhāva-tadúbhāsa-prasādiv-din apyupagrknāti, apparently as a commentary on Dandin's view!

to any specific part or feature of a composition, the latter existing as common to its several component parts. The samanya guna, again, is in its turn classified into three subdivisions, according as it appertains to sabda, artha, or both; the Agnipurana admitting for the first time, so far as we know, this threefold classification. An altogether different scheme of enumeration of these quaar then follows. Vamana mentions in all ten gunas, making each of these a sabda-guna as well as an artha-guna. The subda-quyas, according to the Agni-puraga, are seven in number, viz. slesa, lälitya, gamblarya, saukumārya, udāratā, satyā, and yaugiki; the artha-quous are six, vix madhurya, samvidhana, komalatva, udāratā (!), praudhī, and sāmayikatā : the saldartha-gunas are again, six, viz. prasada, saubhānya, yathāsamkhya, prasastatā, pāka, and raga. The characteristics of some of these gunas are not very clearly marked; and in gunas like samwidhana and yathasamkhya are included ideas which are credited by other writers to the alamkaras. It is curious, also, that although not enumerated us such, Dandin's ojas is reproduced (345, 10= Dandin i 80) in the course of the definition of individual sabda-gunas.

In the same way, it can be easily shown that the influence of the Alamkarn school, as represented by Bhamaha and Udbhata, is not very marked in this work. The sabdálamkaras are, with some modification, developed, no doubt, on the general lines of Dandin's treatment, but the arthálamkaras do not strictly conform to the orthodox classification

or definition. The Agni-purana gives eight varieties of the latter, viz. svarūpa (or svabhāva), sādršya, utpreksa, atisava, vibhavana, virodha, hetu, and sama (343, 2-3); the figures upamā, rūpaka, sahokti, and arthantara-nyasa being included separately under sadreya (343, 5), and mention being made of eighteen kinds of upama embracing most of Dandin's numerous sub-varieties of that figure (343, 9 f.). The Agnipurana is also one of the earliest known works which add a separate chapter on the ubhaydlamkāras (not recognised by earlier writers), and this includes six varieties, viz. prašasti, kānti, aucitya, samksepa, yāvad-arthatā and abhivyakti (344, 2), some of which would come under guess of other writers25. Indeed, the classification and definition of the gunas and alamkaras, which are not differentiated very clearly, would appear crude and unsystematic, when compared to the elaborate critical treatment of the Riti and the Alamkara schools.

From this brief outline, it will be clear enough that the Agni-purana follows, in its general standpoint, none of the orthodox schools of Poetics, so far as they are known to us, although with regard to its material, it attempts to cull, in its encyclopaedic spirit, notions, expressions, and even whole verses from the authors of the different schools, without, however, connecting them with a central theory. It borrows, for instance, Dandin's definition of the kāvya-šarīra (iṣṭārtha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī),

²⁵ It is noteworthy in this connexion that Dandin's samādhi-gupa is treated here under the context of lakṣaṇā with the hint apparently of identifying them.

but the attempt to supplement it by adding karyam sphutad-alamkaram gunavad dosa-varjitam (336, 6-7), is merely eclectic and hardly constitutes an improvement. The same remarks apply to its definitions of fundamental notions like guna or alamkara, which are merely copied or paraphrased uncritically from earlier writers. At the same time, mere eclecticism is not enough to explain cortain features of this work, the peculiar treatment and arrangement, for instance, of the gunas and alamkaras which depart very strikingly from orthodox views of the matter. In order to explain this novelty, we should, having regard to the essentially derivative nature of the work itself, admit the probable existence of an altogether different line of speculation, of which, unfortunately, no other early traces are preserved.

This tradition of opinion is followed and further developed by Bhoja. The prominence given to rasa and the absence of the dheani-theory in Bhoja, therefore, need not surprise us; nor should the peculiar arrangement of the gunus and alamkāras appear unintelligible. The same reverence to Bharata and Dandin is shown throughout; and, in fact, Dandin is estimated to have supplied Bhoja with more than two hundred unacknowledged quotations. At the same time, Bhoja very freely incorporates definitive verses and illustrative stanzas from most of his well-known predecessors, especially from Bhāmaha, Vāmana, Rudrata and Dhanika. He even appropriates kārikās from the Dhvanyāloka, although he does not accept its theory. His huge

compilation, like its prototype the Agni-purana, is more or less cyclopaedic in scope and eclectic in spirit, and represents apparently one of the several forms of arranging the teachings (with the exception of ignoring the dhvani-theory) of earlier schools in the light of a different tradition, of which another form is perhaps preserved, to a certain extent, in the two Jains Vagbhatas. But in some of the main points, his indebtedness to the Agnipurana is obvious, and here the teachings of the orthodox schools are of no avail. The verbal borrow ings are numerous. Thus Agni. 341, 18 f., has much in common with Sarasvati-kanthabharana. ii, some verses of the former being literally adopted by the latter. The Agni 341, 18-19, says : ye vyutpattyadina saldam alamkartum iha keamah! sabdálamkaram ahus tan kavya-mimamsa-kovidah 26.// This definition of a sabddlamkara is adopted by

Bhoja, with the only verbal change of the last line into sabdálamkāra-samjāās te jūeyā jātyādayo budhaih (ii 2). Such instances can be easily multiplied, and we may eite for comparison Agni, 341, 21. and Bhoja, ii 39; Agni. 342, 10 and Bhoja, ii 79; Agni, 338, 11, and Bhoja, v 3, etc. Apart from this fact of literal borrowing, which being a common trait in Bhoja is not conclusive, there is a striking coincidence, as we shall see presently, of treatment, as well as agreement of views on fundamental points, which is more than merely accidental. It is not suggested that Bhoja is directly copying from the Agni-purāna; it is quite

²⁶ Instead of kāvya-mīmāmsakā vidah in the text-

possible that they exploit in common an unknown source. But there is hardly any doubt that they follow a common tradition which is different in many respects from that of the Kashmirian writers, although Bhoja, being chronologically later, is more open to the influence of the latter.

Bhoja develops the definition of poetry given by the Agni-puraya by adding expressly rasa among its essential characteristics, which, as the commentator Ratuesvara points out, indicates the influence of the "Kāsmīrakas":

nirdosam gunavat kāvyum alamkārair alamkṛtam/ rasdnvitam.......(i 2).

In conformity to this definition, which mentions rather uncritically all the requisite elements, Bhoia deals in the first chapter with the dosas and gunas and devotes the next three chapters respectively to the consideration of poetic figures (alamkaras) of sabda, of artha, and of both sabda and artha. In the last chapter is given a detailed treatment of rase, for Bhoja thinks that rasokti is essential in poetry (v 8). But like the author of the Aquipurana, Bhoja is not explicit with regard to the question of correlating this aesthetic element with other elements of poetry, and his conception of rasa bears resemblance to that of the utpattivadins whose causal theory, as Abhinavagupta points out. is accepted by earlier authors like Dandin. doubt, in one verse (i 158), Bhoja is apparently of opinion that a poem is relished only if it contains the guess, even though it may possess various kinds of poetic figures; for even excellent

present an ugly aspect, as the form of a woman, destitute of youth, looks ugly even though she wears excellent ornaments. But this verse is only an unacknowledged quotation from Vāmana (III. 1. 2, vrtti), and must be taken as an instance of eulogistic statements, not unusual in Sanskrit writers, made for the purpose of simply emphasising a point, or as a characteristic of the uncritical and confused nature of the work itself; for otherwise we cannot reconcile this dictum with others of a similar nature made in connexion with rasa or alam-kāra.

Although Bhoja puts a great deal of emphasis on rasa, probably in accordance with the views of the new school of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, as well as of his own school, he cannot yet be taken as an adherent of this school, or of the older Rasa school. Bhoja mentions here as many as ten rasas, adding the santa and the preyas (the last occurring also in Rudrata) to the eight orthodox rasas mentioned by Bharata (vi 15); but in his treatment he follows the Agni-purana tradition in singling out the spagara for almost exclusive attention. This trait is also noticeable in his other work, Spagara-prakāsa, in which he accepts only one rasa, the Erotic¹⁷, thus justifying its title.

Bhoja modifies the Agni-purana's classification of the gunas by dividing them, according as they

²⁷ So says Vidyādhara, p. 98; also Kumārasvāmin, p. 221, and the author of Mandāra-maranda-campīl ix p. 107. See Vol I pp. 147-8.

relate to sabda and artha, into external (bahya) and internal (abhyantara), on the one hand, and specific (vaišesika) gunas on the other. By the last he understands those which are gunas in spite of their being essentially dosas or faults (i 60 f). He carries the differentiation and multiplication of quasa still further, and enumerates twenty-four sabda-queas and as many artha-quas, again, of identical names. Like the Agni-purana, Bhoja is not very precise or critical in his definitions of individual gauas, and he assigns to some gauas properties which are ascribed to alamkaras by other writers. It is curious to note that the artha-guna kānti is defined, after Vāmana, as dīpta-rasatvam (i 81), including rasa therein; and in the sabdaquaa gambhirya (i 73) is incorporated the concept of dhouns. At the same time, rasa is taken elsewhere as a fundamental aesthetic concept, and the idea of dhyani is omitted from his treatment, Bhoja, however, does not pay any homage to Vamana's classification of riti, the elaboration of which he carries still further. He adds two more types of ritis, viz. avantika and majudhi (ii 32), to the four mentioned by the Agni-purana, the former of these being an intermediate kind between vaidarbhi and pāneāli, and the latter forming only a khanda-riti, i.e. defective or incomplete type. It is also noteworthy that some of the upama-dogas, such as hinatva and adhikatva, are included in the general discussion of dosas as hinopama and adhikopama, and not mentioned, in the usual manner, in connexion with the figure upamā itself.

In the treatment of alamkaras, Bhoja is one of the earliest writers to follow the Ami-purana's, classification into three groups, viz. sabdálamkāra, arthálamkara, and ubhayálamkara. Without entering into details here, we may state that Bhoja's treatment is much fuller 28. He enumerates, for instance, and defines the largest number of sabdalamkaras mentioned by any author, namely twentyfour, and develops further the treatments of Dandin, the Agni-purana and Rudrata. The number of arthdlamkaras, however, is surprisingly limited, and a love of symmetry probably leads him to enumerate them also as twenty-four in number, which is also the number of the uhhayalamkaras. The most curious chapter is that which deals with the last-named class of poetic figures, which includes figures like upamā, rūpaka, utprekeā, dīpaka, atišaya, and other well-recognised arthalamkaras. Mammata later admits this three-fold classification of poetic figures, which is not recognised by all, but unlike Bhoia, he includes a very limited number in the mixed third class, such as punaruktavaddbhāsa, in which stress is laid equally on sabda and artha.

This novel and somewhat unorthodox standpoint, which follows a peculiar line of speculation different in some respects from the accepted views of the various

²⁸ His treatment also is sometimes very curious. He makes poetic figures, for instance, out of the six pramāṇas of Jaimini (cf Māṇikyacandra on this point at p. 304). One of the results of this is that he has to admit the philosophical idea of upamāna (as a means of knowledge), in a poetic figure of that name, and distinguish it as a figure from the well known figure upamā.

established schools, makes Bhoja's work an interesting study; but its theoretic importance has been exaggerated. The work, no doubt, possesses a certain importance for this unique treatment in the history of Sanskrit Poetics; but its value consists, not in its theories, nor in its discussion of general principles, but in its being a very elaborate, if somewhat diffuse, manual and an exhaustive store-house of definitions and illustrations, for which not only the works of Alamkarikas but also of almost all the well-known poets have been laid under contribution. The later writers, in spite of the fascination which the magic name of Bhojaraja carries with it, cite this work chiefly for its abundant wealth of illustration, or for the purpose of supporting some unorthodox view to which Bhoja might have lent the authority of his name. The learning which this work parades, though extensive, is ill-assorted and upcritical, its ideas lacking in system and its expression in preciseness. The school of opinion which Bhoja represents does not appear to have received any support or following in later times 00

²⁹ Apart from occasional citations from Bhoja by later authors, Vidyanatha appears to be the one writer who goes to the length of following Bhoja's elaborate classification of the gwnas (see below, ch. VII).

VII. MAMMATA AND THE NEW SCHOOL

(1)

The foregoing sketch of the progress of the principal schools and systems, terminating in the dominance of the Dhvani school, will make it clear that the history of Sanskrit Pootics is marked by two or three well-defined stages1. The dim beginnings of the science are indeed hidden from us, but we enter upon the first historic stage of its formulation, in a more or less developed form, in the works of Bhamaha and Dandin. This is followed by a fruitful and creative stage, ending with Abhinavagupta, in which the theories of the different schools or systems were settled in their general outlines, giving rise to four distinct schools of opinion, respectively represented by the rasa-, alamkara-, riti- and dhvani-systems. It covers more than three centuries, and includes some of the great names in the history of the discipline, like those of Bhamaha, Udbhata and Rudrata, of Lollata, Sankuka and Bhatta Nayaka, of Dandin and Vamana, of the Dhvanikara, Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, of Kuntala, Mahimabhatta and Bhoja : all of whom helped, in a constructive or destructive way, to shape the different currents of thought which ultimately ran into one stream in the textbook of Mammata.

¹ See Vol. I, pp. 330 f.

If we attempt to discriminate between these different schools of thought and roughly indicate the broad steps taken in the progress of the discipline, we can state generally that the Alamkara system proposed to confine itself to a theory of embellishment (alamkara) of expression consistently with what was probably the original tradition of the discipline ; the Rasa system, starting with the consideration of the drama, was responsible for introducing into poetic theory the subjective element of rasa, represented in the feelings, moods and sentiments; the Riti system laid atress on the objective beauty of representation realised by means of diction (riti) and its constituent excellences (guyas); while the Dhyani system, admitting the underlying truth of all these doctrines, elaborated a peculiar theory of suggestion in poetry (dhvasi), including the suggestion of rasa, to which everything else was correlated. It will be seen from this that a relative emphasis was laid on the elements of alamkara, rasa, rtti (including guna and doga) and dhvani by each of these systems; and although the soft hand of Indian dialectics drew lines of fantastic ideas, consisting of odd and abstruse schemes, it is on these essential points that the theories centred themselves, and the main currents flowed thereof in different directions. It was, however, realised in the end that all these gleams of thought must be gathered into a focus, and all these currents must be made to flow into one stream. The purely normative character of the discipline began to disappear, and it was understood that, however much importance was attached

to the fact of externalisation, to the consideration of embellishment or diction, it was far outbalanced by the most necessary and important principle of higher poetry, viz., the art of suggestion, especially connected with the art of suggesting a peculiar mental condition of enjoyment, technically known as rasa, of which the charm lies in a disinterested and impersonal pleasure in the mind, the attitude proper to contemplation of the beautiful.

This period ends with the ultimate standardisation of a more or less complete scheme of Poetics, outlined in the *Dhwanyáloka*, in which an attempt is made to bring into a definite focus the scattered ideas of previous speculation. The period which followed this and with which we are concerned

² The problem, therefore, does not concern rhetoric merely, and the ideal of beauty (if the expression is allowable) is no longer conceived from the outside, being associated with a peculiar condition of artistic enjoyment, the suggestion of which is taken as the chief function of poetry. As suggested by an able critic of Sanskrit literature (Oldenberg, Die Literatur des alten Indien, pp. 207f), the Indian theorists permit intellectual vigour and subtlety, the masculine beauty, to stand behind that of purely feminine enjoyment born of the finest sensibility. Both these traits are found in the literature from the earliest times; the idea of ecstatic rapture side by side with a strong inclination towards sagacity and subtelty. It is true that the dogmatic formalism of a scholastic discipline naturally sank to the level of a cold and monotonously inflated rhetoric; but at the same time it must be admitted that the theorists were not blind to finer issuses, nor were they indifferent to the supreme excellence of real poetry and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it. They always take care to add that despite dormas

in this and following chapters, is necessarily a stage of critical elaboration, the chief work of which consists in summarising and setting forth, in the concise form of text-books, the results of earlier speculations. The stage is marked by great scholastic acumen, if not by remarkable originality or creative genius, but it denotes also a progressive deterioration of the study itself. It covers the age of numberless commentaries, which may be characterised, like the scholia of European classical literature, as consisting mostly of "comments on comments of annotated annotations". They busy themselves with the explanation, expansion or restriction of the already established rules. We have also the rise of a number of popular writers and textbookmakers who wanted to simplify the science for general enlightenment, the lowest stage being reached when we come to manuals and school-books of comparatively recent times.

It is difficult to classify some of these writers. Here and there we find isolated and straggling followers of the older schools. Some are frankly uncritical, some merely edectic; while others are

the poetic imagination must show itself; and the ultimate test of poetry is the appreciation of the salrdaya, the man of taste, whose technical knowledge must be equal to his finer capacity of aesthetic enjoyment, born out of wide culture and identification with the feelings and sentiments of the poet. As this capacity, which is likened to the bliss of divine contemplation, is vouchsafed to the fit and few, the critic as well as the poet is born, and not made.

characterised by the very modest ambition of producing nothing more than a popular text-book. But the majority of the writers of this period, which covers more than five or six centuries, accepts, with some reservations, the dhoani-theory and the scheme of Poetics as finally determined by Mammata. There are small groups of writers who devote themselves to special topics, like ka i-šiksā or the subject of rasa (especially syngara-rasa), but this apparent branching off from the main stem of the finally authoritative Dhvani system, is to be explained as due rather to the following of older traditions, or perhaps to the refining or analytic spirit of the times, than to any real split in the domain of general theory. With regard to matters of general theory and the main problems, the decadent Post-dhysai writers as a rule thought that that there was nothing new to set forth; they consequently fell back on matters of detail which helped to satisfy their growing speculative passion for fine distinctions and their scholastic bent for controversy. It would be tedious, as well as useless, therefore, to treat them here at any great length, for they repeat more or less the same idea in their own way, sometimes in the same stock manner and phrasoology, and differ from each other only in matters of no great theoretic importance. The only subject worth studying in them is their minute analysis and elaboration of numberless poetic figures, which are not treated, as not coming perhaps within the scope of their general exposition, by the Dhvanikara and Anandavardhana, but which occupy a very considerable position in later literature. Here was room enough to supplement, as Ruyyaka expressly states, the treatment of their predecessors; and this portion of their work is beaten out with such extreme nicety and elaborateness that the Alamkāra-sāstra, judging from these works alone, would be, as it often has been, designated as a study of Rhetoric merely. But even from Ruyyaka's time, the scope and nature of most of the individual figures appear to have been fairly fixed, only to be criticised and improved upon here and there by such later writers as Jagannātha.

It is important, however, to note that although this new school (navyāh, arvācīnāh) accepts in main the general position of the Dhyani school, it is yet not entirely free from the influence of of older schools. It betrays a sneaking regard for older writers and brings back, rightly or wrongly, some of the old ideas into the elaboration of its own theory of poetry. It is difficult, for this reason, to take these writers in a lump and affiliate them directly to the Dhvani school. Mammata's definition of poetry, for instance, is not altogether free from the influence of the views of such older writers as Vāmana; Ruyyaka follows Udbhata and Kuntala extensively in his detailed analysis of poetic figures; Visvanatha clearly betrays the influence of the Rasa school on his own system; while Jagannatha revives in a new form the old definition of poetry given by Dandin. It is remarkable that most of these writers attempt to arrive at a precise definition of poetry, a task which was wisely left alone

by the Dhvanikārs; but in doing so, they probably meant to find out a comprehensive formula to cover the old ideas as well as the new, although it must be said that they succeed less often than they involve themselves in hopeless inconsistencies. This reactionary tendency, however, is interesting as indicating that they were not unconscious of the importance of earlier views as they were not entirely content with the clear-cut scheme of the Dhvanyáloka; a fact which would go to demonstrate, to some extent, that want of originality is a charge which cannot be brought in its entirety against these followers of the finally dominant Dhvani system.

(2)

The first and foremost writer of this group is Mammata, whose Kāvya-prakāša must have helped a great deal, judging from its popularity and influence, in finally establishing the authority of the Kashmirian school of Anandavardhana. This work, combining as it does the merit of fulness with that of conciseness, not only summmed up previous speculations in Poetics in the succinct form of a text-book, but it became in its turn the starting point of endless text-books and exegesis.

Mammata's general standpoint will be obvious at a glance by examining his well known definition of poetry. Although he adheres in the main to the teachings of the Dhvani school and accepts rasa as an important element of poetry, his definition tad a-doşau sabdárthau sayunavalankrti punah kvápi

("poetry consists in word and sense, devoid of the defects and possessing the excellences, and sometimes devoid also of poetic figures") follows the time-honoured custom of starting with word and sense (sabda and artha) and mentioning the guna, dosa and alamkara; but it does not expressly include any reference to dhvani and rasa, which are apparently comprehended by implication. For, following up this definition, Mammata begins with the discussion of the functions of sabda and artha, incidentally establishing the function of suggestion (vyanjana) and the superiority of the suggested sonse (vyangya artha or dhvani), and divides poetry into three classes (viz., dhvani, gunibhita-vyangya and citra) in relation to the suggested sense. This leads him to enumerate and exemplify the various subdivisions of these three classes of poetry, and in this connexion dilate upon the nature and theory of rasa, which is included in the scope of "suggestion of imperceptible process" (asanlaksya-krama vyanqua). In this context, he examines and rejects the views of Lollsta, Sankuka and Bhatta Nayaka, and accepts the vyakti-vada which he ascribes to Abhinavagupta. Mention is made of the eight orthodox dramatic rasas (astau natye rasah smrtah). but the ninth rasa, the santa, is added, apparently as relevant to poetry.

Mammata then proceeds to discuss the guna and dosa, not in relation to poetry in general as his definition would imply, but in relation to their subserviency or otherwise to the awakening of rasa. The gunas as excellences of composition are inter-

preted in a new sense (after Anandavardhana) and brought into effective relation with the underlying sentiment in a work, as qualities which serve to heighten its charm, The verbal form of a work cannot be said to possess the qualities of energy or sweetness (except by way of analogy), unless we mean by it that the underlying sentiment is vigorous or sweet. The guess, therefore, are related to the rasa, as virtues like heroism are related to the soul of a man. The verbal form, the mere sound, produces the excellences only as a means or instrument; the real cause is the rasa, even as the soul is the true cause of virtues of like heroism in a man. The same consideration applies also to the case of poetic figures (alamkaras), and their place in poetry is justified by their relation to rasa. They are compared to ornaments on a man's body; and as such, they adorn words and meanings which constitute the 'body' of poetry. They thus serve to embellish indirectly (through sound and sense) the underlying soul of sentiment, but not invariably. If the rasa is absent, they produce mere variety of expression. It should also be noted that the gunas are accepted, after Anandavardhana, as three in numbers, and it is

³ Mammaha demonstrates with some care that it is not necessary to accept the ten gunas of Vamana, but that it is quite enough if we postulate three comprehensive excellences, viz., ojas (energy), prasāda (lucidity) and mādhurya (sweetness). If we examine the gunas of Vamana critically, we find that some of them can very well be included in these three; some constitute mere absence

maintained that combination of particular letters signify particular guass, so that the three vrttis of Udbhata (and roughly the three ritis of Vāmana)

of defects; while others are sometimes positive defects, Thus, Vāmana's šlesa, samādki and udāratā are comprehended by ojas; arthavyakti is merely an aspect of prasada; samata, consisting of a certain uniformity of style, is sometimes a fault; while saukumärya and känti, defined repectively as freedom from harshness (or inauspiciousness) and vulgarity, are simply the reverse of the defects kruti-kasta and gramyatva. These considerations simplify the classification of the gangs and put a limit to their useless multiplication or differentiation (witness, e. g., Bhoja's elaborate scheme of 24 gwnas). Mammata, therefore, thinks that the distinction between labda-guna and artha-guna is meaningless, for the latter need not be separately considered. The mental activity involved in the enjoyment of rasa, is made to justify only three (and not ten) gwnas which are thus brought into effective relation with the principal sentiment of a composition. Thus, the ejas is supposed to cause a brilliant expansion (vistara) of the mind and resides in the moods of heroism, horror and fury; the prasada, proper to all the moods, is taken as the cause of a quick apprehension of the sense, extending over the mind at once (pyāpti or vikāsa), like a stream of water over a cloth, or like fire among dry fuel (cf Bharata vii 7); while the madkurya, residing normally in the erotic mood of love-in-union, but also appropriate to and rising successively in degree in pathos, love-in-separation and calm, is regarded as causing a softening or melting of the heart (druti). The three conditions of the mind, viz., expanding pervading and melting, which accompany the poetic sentiments, are thus made the basis of the three gunas : and though these mental states are sometimes mixed up and lead to various other mental conditions, these latter effects

are equalised to the three gunas defined by himself *.

Mammata admits dosas of pada, vākya and artha,
as well as dosas of rasa, a mode of treatment which

are too many and too indistinct to be taken as the basis of new ganas. This exposition follows and expands Dhvany-dloka it 8-11 (see above pp. 218f); but it is possible that the original hint of associating these effects on the mental condition of the reader with the three ganas was supplied by Bhatta Nāyaka ("Lorana p. 68) who speaks of the enjoyment (bhoga) of rata as being characterised by the mental conditions of expanding (vistāra), prevading (vibāsa) and melting (druti). Vinvanātha substantially agrees with this view of Mammata; but he takes the technical objection that the vias etc. are not the causes of, but identical with, the process of expansion etc.

4 See above p. 130. We have seen above that Mammata explains away the so-called excellences of sense (arthagunar), so that the gunus are confined to the sphere of sound. They are produced by a particular arrangement of letters (varya), compounds (samasa) and style of composition (racanā). Thus the mādhurya or sweetness results from the employment of (i) all sparea letters or mutes (from k to m), excepting the cerebrals (t, th, d, dh) coming with the last letters (nasals) of their respective class, (ii) r and n with short vowels, as well as from (iii) complete absence of compounds or presence of short compounds. The vius or energy is produced by (i) compound letters formed by the combination of the first and third letters of a class with the letters immediately following them (i.e., with the second and fourth letters respectively) (ii) conjunct consonants of which r forms a part, (iii) cerebrals other than a (which letter is indicative of madhurya) (iv) doubled letters, i. e., combinations of the same letters, (v) palatal and cerebral sibilants (i, i), (vi) long compounds, and (vii) a formidable or bombastic style. For obvious

is followed by most later writers. Although the the poetic figures are not, in his opinion, always necessary to poetry 5, he rounds off his treatise with an elaborate analysis and illustration of figures of sound and sense (including a limited number of figures which are of a mixed kind), enumerating as many as sixty-seven independent figures.

From this brief summary of the topics of Mammata's work, it will be clear that its value consists not in its originality but its orderly and concise discussion of the main issues (excepting those of Dramaturgy, which Hamacaudra, Vidyānātha and Visvanātha attempted to supplement), and his definitions as well as general treatment attempt to cover

reasons there are no rules for prasada. The letters mentioned here are mostly the same as those given by Udbhata as suggestors of upanagarika, paraga and komala (or grāmyā) vittis respectively. Mammata therefore thinks that Udbhata's three vittis, which Udbhata himself comprehends under vittyanaprāsa, are really equivalent to the three ritis of Vāmana and to his own three gunas.

5 From the new standpoint, Vamana's view that the gunas produce the beauty of a poem, while the alanguar merely heighten the beauty thus produced, is clearly inadequate. If the doctrine is taken to mean that the possession of all the excellences constitutes poetry, the gaudi and the panels which are not marked by all the gunas, would not be poetical; if, however, the presence of a single excellence is enough to dignify a composition to the rank of poetry, then we are driven to accept even a perfectly unpoetical passage as poetry, if it contains, say, the quality of energy.

almost all fields of thought traversed by his predecessors. The enormous popularity and authority which the Kāvya-prakāsa has always enjoyed and which is indicated by the large number of commentaries on it, must be explained as due not to any remarkable novelty of treatment, but to the clear and lucid (albeit the obscurities due to its brevity of exposition, necessitating commentaries) working out of the already accumulated stock of ideas in the light of the new scheme put forward in the Dhvanydloka.

But from the theoretical point of view, Mammata's definition of poetry has been subjected to much vigorous criticism. Visvanaths, for instance, undoubtedly takes Mammata's work as the basis (upajivya) of his own, but begins his Sahitya darpana with a trenchant attack on his definition. He points out, in the first place, that the gunas being merely properties of the rasa, should not have been logically included in the definition of essentials. He shows next that if only faultless compositions be called poetry, some of the best poems will have to be given up, inasmuch as it is almost impossible to keep clear of all blemishes. Nor could it be said that faults mar only those particular words or their meanings in which they occur; for if they are faults at all, bearing relation to the underlying sentiment in the composition, they must mar the whole poem. Lastly, he maintains that no reference to poetic figures ought to have been made in the definition, as they are admittedly non-essential. Jagannatha's criticism is more fundamental, although

he agrees with Visvanatha as to the impropriety of including a reference to guna, dosa, and alamkara in the definition. He objects that a word and its sense are not what is denoted by the term 'poetry'; for the universal use of such expressions as 'a poem is read but its meaning is not understood' shows clearly that a particular kind of words only is what is meant. If it is said that the essence of poetry lies in its capability of producing a mood (rasa), and that inasmuch as a word and its sense have this capability, both constitute poetry, then it may be replied that, according to this too wide view, musical tones and theatrical gestures will have to be called poetry.

Some of these and other arguments appear, no doubt, fastidious and pedantic, and have been met with equal ingenuity by the commentators and followers of Mammata; but the whole controversy indicates the futility of arriving at a precise logical definition of poetry and the difficulty of combining all the conventional elements in such a definition. The earlier theorists probably realised this and carefully avoided the task, for even the Dhvanikāra contents himself with describing its general nature and its divisions, an omission on which Mahimabhatta ridicules him by saying: kim ca kāvyasya svarūpam vyutpādayitukāmena matimatā tallakṣaṇam eva sāmānyenākhyātavyam.

From the historical point of view, however, the definition is interesting, its apparent inconsistency and obscurity being a curious fact which can reasonably be explained by a reference to the views of

the older schools and systems. The term rasa does not occur in the definition, and the fact that Mammata accepts the citra-kāvya, which is grudgingly admitted by Anandavardhana as a division of poetry, would indicate, as Visvanatha points out, that Mammata does not consider rasa to be essential. Yet he defines the gungs and dosus in terms of their relation to rasa, a procedure which is not justifiable if the essentiality of rasa is not admitted. On the other hand, if it is maintained that all reference to rasa is omitted in the definition because it is such a well known and established fact in the poetical and critical world, then the prominence of threefold suggestion and the division of poetry on its basis are hardly explicable. The gusas and dosas should in that case be omitted, as done by Jagannatha, from the definition, which corresponds more to the definition of Vamana (1. 1. 1-3); and these two elements must be understood in the sense in which Vamana takes them, viz., as properties of sabda and arthas. This and other discrepancies make it probable that Mammata, belonging as he does to the new school, is influenced to a great extent by the views of the older schools. He accepts, no doubt, the general scheme and theory of the Dhvani school, but in trying to reconcile them with those of earlier theorists, he lands himself in hopeless inconsistencies.

³ This is the modified view of Jagannatha who realises the difficulty and does not agree with Mammata (see Rasa-gangādhara pp. 55). Similarly Vidyānātha, though belonging to the new school, would accept (p. 334) Udbhata's dictum sanghatana-dharmā gapāḥ.

(8)

Even the definition of Visvanatha, who took upon himself the task of criticising Mammata is open to similar objections, and has been criticised in its turn by Govinda and Jagannatha. declaring that poetry consists of a sentence of which the 'soul' is rasa (väkyam rasatmakam känyam), he is indeed betraying the unmistakable influence, of the Rasa school; but he is also putting into a shape, in a way clearer than Abhinavagupta does, the essentiality of rasa-dhvani, wisely left unstated but practically meant by the authors of the Dhvanyáloka . In taking up this extreme position, Visvanatha involves himself, however, in the somewhat clumsy subterfuge of admitting a distant touch of rasa in all poetry, even in what is professedly descriptive or ornamental. Even if it is ideally correct to say that a poem ought always to manifest the rasa alone, it does not, as a matter of fact, always do so. Jagannatha rightly objects 5 that Visvanatha's definition would exclude poems in which the centre of gravity lies only in the matter (vastu-dhoani) or in the imaginative mood (alamkara-dhvani). The opponent cannot reply that this is exactly his own opinion, for thereby he goes against the view of ancient authorities, as well as against the established practice of great poets, who have admitted the scope of

⁴ See above ch. v, p. 210 ch VI, p. 225f.

⁵ p. 7-8. Cf. Prabhā p. 11, ed. N. S. P. 1912.

fact and imagination, and described subjects like a flood or parrated a travel, in which there is is hardly any touch of rasa. It would not do, therefore, to accept the rasa-dhvani alone, for a complete definition must also take into account vastu-dhvani and alamkara-dhvani. Visvanatha anticipates this objection by saying that in cases other than those admitted expressly by himself there is always a semblance of rasa (rasabhāsa); and the verse given in the Dheanyaloka as an instance of vastu-dhvani is, in his opinion, admissible only because there is such a touch of the rasa in it, and not because mere vyangya vastu can constitute the essence of poetry. Jagannatha replies that nothing is gained by such a supposition of an indirect reference to rasa, because such a reference may also be construed in phrases like 'the cow moves' or 'the deer leaps'. This cannot be taken as the sole criterion, because thereby any and every content of poetry would be reduced to the position of an excitant, an ensuant or an accessory of the rasa.

Apart from this technicality and the emphasis put on the essentiality of rasa, which however is not reconciled to other elements of poetry, Visvanatha's scheme does not substantially differ from that of Mammata, on whose work he also appears to have written a commentary. In one passage, indeed, he pays an elegant tribute to his predecessor's work by admitting his own indebtedness to it. After defining poetry as a sentence the 'soul' of which is rasa, he proceeds in the usual way to analy 2

the 'sentence' (vakya) and the different functions of its constituent word and sense, establishing suggestion or vycajana as the function necessary and important for the purpose of conveying the suggested rasa (bodhe rasadinām). He accepts only two divisions of poetry, viz., dhvani and quatbhuta-vyangya kāvya, and rejects the third, the citra-kāvya (which is suffered by Anandavardhana and accepted by Mammata) on the ground that it is entirely devoid of rase and therefore inconsistent with his own definition of poetry. It is curious, however, that Visyanatha, following Anandavardhana, partially admits the suggestion of vastu and alamkaru under suggestion of perceptible process (kramóddyotavyangya), based on the power of word or sense or both. The case of poetry of subordinate suggestion (qualibilita-vyangya), where the rasa involved is secondary, is justified by holding that the mere circumstance of the rasa being collaterally suggested does not destroy the claim of such poetry; for the relish of rasa alone, whether circumstantial or essential, is the true criterion. It is this partiality to rasa which makes him include a treatment, omitted by most writers on Poetics, of the varieties of dramatic composition, in which the delineation of the rasas, the moods and sentiments, is already established as fundamental by both poets and theorists. Consistently with the same idea, a dosa or blemish is defined as the detractor of the rasa (rasapakarsaka), while a guna is explained as a particular mode or quality of the rasa depending on sabda and artha and enhancing the beauty of

the rasa when the rasa is principal. The gunas are really attributes of the rasa, but they are figuratively spoken of as belonging to a word and sense: which figurative use also explains the old distinction between sabda-guna and artha-guna. The gunus are accepted as three in number, viz. mādhurya, ojas and prasāda, depending upon a combination of particular letters and justified by the attributes of expanding, pervading and melting the mind in its enjoyment of rasa; and the ten gunas of older writers are mentioned and criticised after the manner of Mammata. It is corious, however, that Visvanatha admits the ritis separately, instead of comprehending them, as Mammata does, under the ortis or considering them redundant after the enumeration of the three gasas. He defines the riti as pada-samphatana or particular arrangement of words (and letters) which helps the rasas (upakartri rasadinām). The riti, however, relates entirely to the external frame-work of poetry, and is likened to the conformation of the body in relation to the souls.

^{6.} Visivanatha speaks of four ritis as follow: (i) vaidharbla or sweet style (marked by letters indicative of madhurya, and by short compounds or absence of compounds). (ii) gamili or bombastic style (marked by letters indicative of ojas and possessing a large number of compounds). (iii) pancali (marked by letters other than those mentioned above and containing five or six compound words). (iv) lati or the style intermediate between vaidarbla and pancali. This is only a variation on the conventional enumeration; but strictly speaking, Mammata is right in not considering the ritis separately, as they are comprehended by the three writis or even by the three gunas accepted by the

Finally, the poetic figures (alamkāras), which are treated substantially after the manner of Mammata and Ruyyaka, are defined as those non-permanent attributes of a word and its sense which add to their beauty and thus embellish the rasa indirectly. The term 'non-permanent' (asthira) is explained, after Mammata, by the statement that the presence of the alamkāras is not necessary but accidental, as compared to the gamas which are necessary attributes.

The above sketch of Visvanatha's general position will sufficiently indicate that he is more or less a compiler and not an original writer, although he shows some constructive genius in elaborating a full and compact system of his own on the basis of rasa-dhvani. His borrowings from Anandavardhana, Mammata and Ruyyaka are very extensive, and sometimes his judgment forsakes him, making him copy his originals rather slavishly. He is not always happy in his innovation, and sometimes (though rarely) he is positively wrong in his interpretation. In spite of these and other defects his work is interesting in the history of Sanskrit Poetics as an attempt at a further development of the dhouni-theory out of itself, an attempt to which recognition was not universally accorded by other strict followers of the theory. The Sahitya-darpana, written like the Kanya-prakasa in the form of karika

new school. Višvanātha alludes to vēttis under vēttyanuprāta and simply says (after Ruyyaka): rasa-viņaya vyāpāravati varņa-racanā vēttih, tadanugatatvena prakarsena nyasanād vēttyanuprāsah.

⁷ See above pp. 214f, 276.

with vetti, has also the great merit of being written in a more simple and less controversial style than the treatises of Mammata and Jagannatha respectively; and as a suitable and complete manual of Poetics, including a treatment of the dramatic art, it has always held its popularity as one of the most convenient text-books on the subject as a whole,

(4)

One of the most important writers of this group is Ruyyaka, who comes immediately after Mammata and who also appears to have written a commentary on Mammata's work. In his treatment of the poetic figures, with which his work (as its name implies) is directly concerned, he shows, however, a remarkable degree of insight and independence of judgment which distinguishes him from his predecessor. The value of his contribution in this respect may be judged from the fact that his Alamkara-sareasea not only helped to define and fix the conception of an alamkara, of which the first indication was given by Kuntala but which was left untouched by the authors of the Dhvanydloka, but it had also a great influence in establishing by its careful analysis the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, so that his views on this matter have been accepted as authoritative by such important later writers as Visvanātha, Vidyādhara, Vidyānātha and Appayya Diksita.

The plan of Ruyyaka's work, written in the form satra with vetti, is stated by himself in the

introductory portion of his vetti. He starts, in common with other followers of the Dhvani school. with the suggested sense (pratiyamana artha) and demonstrates by a rapid survey of the views of older writers that it was directly or indirectly recognised by all. But he thinks that, in the opinion of the authorities who came before the Dhyani school, the chief function of the suggested sense consisted in embellishing the expressed meaning (vācyópaskāra), and therefore it was naturally comprehended in the sphere of poetic figures in which the expressed sense prevailed. This is generally the view of Bhamsha, Dandin, Udbhata, Vamana and Rudrata. The Vakroktijivita-kāra, who came after Anandavardhana, includes all ideas of dhvani in a variety of vakrekti based on upacara or metaphorical expression. Bhatta Nayaka maintains that the suggested sonse, established chiefly through the forcible utterance of the poet (kavi-praudh6kti) is only a secondary element in poetry, the essential thing being the relish of rasa realised through a function called bhoga or enjoyment, which is distinct from and which transcends the denotative or generalising function of words. The Vyakti-vivekakara takes the relation of the expressed and the suggested in terms of the logical linga and lingin, and regards the process of suggestion as a process of inference. None of these views comes up to that of the Dhvanikara, which is, therefore, accepted indisputably by Ruyyaka, who lays down sententious-

väeyöpaskärakatvanp hyalamkäränäm ätma-bhūtatvam,
 Jayaratha p. 3-

ly at the end: asti tāvad vyangya-niṣtho vyanjanāvyāpārah. The three divisions of poetry into dhvani,
gunībhūtā-vyangya and citra are also recognised;
but as the first two are already discussed in the
Alamkāra-manjarī, and the Dhvanyāloka respectively, Ruyyaka proposes in this treatise to take up
the remaining citra-kāvya, which, including in its
scope all poetic figures devoid of suggestion 10,
naturally covers an extensive field. As all detailed
consideration of this part is omitted in the Dhvanyāloka (as coming not properly within the limits of
of its theory), here was an opportunity of supplementing the work of his predecessors.

But the point had already been taken up and discussed in his own way by Kuntala who recognised that the poet's intention need not always be to awaken the rasa or unything else unexpressed but may be directed simply to producing a certain strikingness of expression in the form of an expressed poetic figure. He analysed poetic expression and found that the elements which went to make up the being of such a figure consisted of a peculiar turn of expression, which produced a certain charm, called caicitrya or vicchitti-visesa, and which ultimately depends on the

⁹ Presumably this work was composed by himself. But in the Trivandrum edition, the reading is different. It reads kālidāsidi-prabandhesu instead of alamkāramani-aryām daršītah. The Alamkāra-manjarī appears to have dealt particularly with rasa-dhvani, apparently laying stress on sringāra-rasa.

to See above ch. v p. 217.

conception of the poet (kavi-pratibhā-nirvartitatva)11. Both these terms are not new, the kavi-pratibhā having been acknowledged as essential in a poetic composition by older theorists, and the saundarya of Vāmana reappearing under the name of vaicitrya or viochitti. The ukti-vaicitrya is discussed in another connexion by Ānandavardhana (p. 243); and Mammata (probably under the influence of Kuntala) lays down that the alamkāra is nothing but vaicitrya itself. Abhinavagupta speaks of endless varieties of upamā-vicchitti (p. 5), and in another passage (p. 8) uses the term as almost synonymous with kāmanīyaka or cārutva-hetu.

Ruyyaka does not elaborate a doctrine on this point but he accepts Kuntala's analysis implicitly and applies it to the detailed examination of individual poetic figures, a procedure which is followed by Visvanatha, Appayya Diksita and Jagannatha. That he derived this idea from Kuntala is indicated by Jayaratha in a passage in which the commentator, while rejecting on this ground the claim of the yathasamkhya to be counted as a poetic figure, says : etac ca vakroktijivita-krtā saprapañcam uktam ityasmābhir nāyastam (p. 149). In the Alankara-sarvasva Ruyyaka does not define the term vicchitti, but in the commentary on the Vyakti-piveka attributed to him, he says (p. 44): tathā ca sabdarthayor vicchittir alamkārah, vicchittiš ca kavi-pratibhóllasa-rapatvat kavi-pratibhóllasasya anantyad anantatvam bhajamano na paricehettum sakyate ('Then again, an alamkara consists

¹¹ See above Ch. VI, p. 240.

of the charm or vicchitti of sound and sense; and it is not possible to define vicchitti exactly, inasmuch as it is of infinite variety, being identical with the play of the poetic imagination, which itself is infinite in its scope'), the boundlessness or infinite scope of poetic conception having been already admitted by Anandavardhana himself (ch. iv), as well as by Kuntala.

Ruyyaka, however, takes this vicchitti, brought out by the productive imagination of the poet, to be the test of a poetic figure; or, in other words, a form of expression or a mere speech-figure (if the phrase is allowable), becomes a poetic figure when a certain charm is lent to it by the peculiar conception of the poet. Thus, a form of expression involving the logical assemena would not prima facie constitute the figure anumana, unless it involved this special charm; or, the doubt involved in the figure samdeka must be brought into being by the imagination of the poet, for it should not be an ordinary doubt but a 'poetic' doubt. Jayaratha makes this doctrine more explicit than his author in many places in his commentary. He lays down repeatedly that a special charm (vicchitti-višesa) depending on the conception of the poet (kavikarma or 'pratibha) is to be taken without question as the essential factor of an alamkara (pp. 144, 149-50, 183), and all so-called figures are to be accepted or rejected accordingly 12.

¹² The question has been dealt with in some detail by Jacobi in his article Ueber Begriff und Wesen der poetischen, Figuren in der indischen Poetik in Nachrichten

In later writings this doctrine is admitted as settled beyond question. Appayya Dīkṣita explains it at the beginning of his Citra-mīmāṇṣā (p. 6), and Jagannātha repeatedly states: alaṃkārāṇāṇ bhaṇiti-viāeṣa-rūpatvam. In addition to the terms bhaṇiti-viāeṣa, vaicitrya and vicchitti, Viāvanātha and Jagannātha use the terms cārutva, brdyatva, camatkāritva and saundarya almost synonymously, while the latter attempts to define it (p. 466, 470) more precisely as the poetic imagination with reference to the power of poetic production; or rather, as the charm which is thereby brought into being, upon which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities.

Ruyyaka's work is also important for its acute analysis of the scope and nature of individual poetic figures, of which nearly eighty independent varieties are dealt with. At first sight one would be inclined to classify him as belonging to the Alamkara school. There is no doubt that Ruyyaka was a great admirer of Udbhata, on whose work his father Tilaka (as Jayaratha informs us) wrote a viceka or vicara. Ruyyaka himself tells us (and he is borne out by Jayaratha and Samudrabandha) 13 that he is

der Goettingischen Gesellschaft 1903, and also in my introduction to the Vakrokti-fivita, pp. xxxi-xl.

¹³ Jayaratha refers to Ruyyaka's following of cirantana mata at pp. 72, 83, 103, 172 etc., and of Udbhata at pp. 10, 20, 34, 87, 93, 97, 98, 125, 126, 150 etc. Samudrabandha's references are at pp. 4, 7, 10, 11, 14, 21, 74, 82, 103 etc. Ruyyaka's own references to Udbhata's views will be found in numerous places, at pp. 3, 7, 23, 59, 82, 86, 92, 123, 126, 148, 174, 191 etc.

a follower of the views of the "ancients" (e. g. cirantana-matanus prtih, p. 205), by which he means apparently the older Alamkara school of Bhamaha and Udbhata; but, of course, he corrects, modifies or expands older authoritative opinions in the light of the progressive study of the subject. Ruyyaka's development of Udbhata's idea of slesa may be taken as a typical instance. The controversy regarding the divisions of slesa and its relation to other figures in cases of combination, started, as Ruyyaka himself as well as his commentators point out, from Udbhata's time. Ruyyaka accepts the division of this figure into sabda-slesa and artha-sless (adding ubhaya-sless), and holds that the principle of this distinction consists in the dictum yo'lamkaro yadasritah sa tadalamkarah. He rejects Mammata's view that the distinction is based on the ground that the sabda-sless is incapable of enduring a change of synonym (pariertti-saha), while the artha-slesa is capable of doing so; for Mammata holds that it is not airaydirayi-bhava (mutual dependence or inherence) but aneaya (connexion) and vyatireka (contrast) which must be taken as the test for determining whether a figure is of sabda or of artha. According to Ruyyaka, however, a sabdaslesa occurs when the expression, being differently split up, yields two different meanings. Here the words are really different, as is indicated by a difference of accent as well as by the effort required in pronouncing them. They present the appearance of sameness or coalescence (slesa), just in the same way as the lacqured wood appears to be one single

object, though really lac is put on the wood. The artha-slesa occurs where the expression is the same and has the same accent and effort, but possesses two meanings, just as two fruits hang down from a single stem. The ubhaya-âleşa is the case where both these circumstances exist 14. Regarding the implication of slesa in other poetic figures, the question has been raised whether it should be regarded (i) as stronger than and thus dispelling the notion of the accompanying figure, (ii) as being equally powerful and therefore entering into combination with them, or (ii) as being weaker and therefore not prominent where other figures occur15. Udbhata takes the first position, and thinks that where the alesa is present (e. g. along with apamā) there is only the appearance (pratibhā) of the other figure, the real figure being in such a case the slesa (and not upama). Ruyyaka demurs to this view, and agrees with Mammata in pointing out that in such cases of conflict the possession of common attributes (sādharmya) inherent in upamā is alone sufficient to constitute the latter figure; for the unqualified definition of sadharmya as community of attributes or circumstances is not exclusive of the verbal sameness conveyed by the accompanying sless. The upama, therefore, is predominant and

¹⁴ Visvanatha follows Mammata, but Vidyadhara agrees with Ruyyaka's interpretation in this matter.

¹⁵ Jagannātha, p. 393, sums up the views thus: ayan vilamkārah prāyenidankārintarasya visayam abhinivišate, tatra kim asya bhādhakatvam syād āhosvit sankārnatvam utāho bādhyatvam iti.

the subordinate *ileşa* only helps it; for in such cases, the common property is not arrived at without the *ileşa*, and without the common property there can be no *upamā*. If the two figures are thus found together, one helping the other, we have saṃkirnatva of ileşa and upamā.

From these and other instances which we need not multiply here, the influence of the Alamkara school on Ruyyaka will be obvious; but it will be also obvious that the views of the older school never receive unqualified acceptance from him. His following of ancient opinions, a trait which he shares with Mammata and Visvanatha in their following of Vamana and the vasa-writers respectively, should be explained as an earnest attempt on his part to reconcile the views of later theorists with those of the earlier, of which he was a professed admirer. It is this impulse probably which made him take up the Vakroktijīvita-kāra's conception of a poetic figure, and apply it to his own detailed analysis of individual figures, as this part of Poetics was not sufficiently dealt with in the Dhranydloka. It can not be said16, however, that Ruyyaka was a follower of the Vakroktijīvita-kāra, for Ruyyaka himself declares his own adherence to the dhvanitheory : and, in spite of his borrowing from Udbhata and Kuntala, he cannot by any means be directly affiliated with the Alamkara school.

¹⁶ as suggested by Haricand Sastrt p. 108.

(5)

To most of the writers who followed in the footsteps of Mammata and Ruyyaka, there was hardly any original work that seemed left or unaccomplished. The details of the new system having already been established, there was apparently no occasion for any creative work, and even the task of critical elaboration had well-nigh run its course. Nor did any of the writers possess the genius of making an entirely new departure. This was also the period of the early Muhammadan incursions, and was marked, as was to be expected, by a general decadence of all investigations, reflecting a corresponding ebb in the tide of intellectual, as well as social and political, activity. In the centuries that follow there arose a host of commentators, Mammata alone claiming more than fifty, who busied themselves in interpreting the already established rules and in adding here and there minor points of detail, not clearly made out by their predecessors. The task of remodelling and presenting the new theory in an easier style was also undertaken, giving birth to works like the Ekavali of Vidyādhara and the Pratāpa-rudra-yašo-bhūşana of Vidyanatha, the chief merit of which consisted in systematic compilation and arrangement. On the main problems, these treatises and even the later works of Jayadeva and Appayya Diksita, which carry in particular the process of analysing the poetic figures to its utmost limits, throw little valuable light.

Vidyadhara, for instance, models his text (consisting of kārikā and vrtti) on the Kāvya-prakāsa of Mammata, and in the treatment of poetic figures follows Ruyyaka in the main 17. After characterising the kānya as dhoani-pradhāna18, and setting forth its purpose as well as the qualifications necessary for the poet, he devotes the first chapter to the establishment of the dhound or suggested sense in poetry. In this connexion, he refutes at some length the views of those schools which maintain the non-existence of dhrani or its inclusion in other processes, drawing mostly on the Dheanyaloka and the Kavya-prakasa. The second chapter deals with the three functions of word and sense, viz. abhidha, lakeaya and vyanjana, while the third chapter classifies the dhvani-kacya, in which the suggested sense excels the expressed, explaining incidentally the different theories of rasa, which constitutes the province of one of the eight varieties of the imperceptible process of suggestion (asamlaksya-krama vyangya). The second class of poetry. the gunibhūta-vyangya kārya, is taken up in the next chapter. The fifth chapter defines the gunas, distinguishing them from the alamkaras, and concluding with the treatment of the riti, with au incidental attack of older views and general support

¹⁷ In this he agrees with Viśvanātha, Vidyānātha and others. See his definition of figures like vicitra, vikalpa or ullekha which are passed over by Mammata.

¹⁸ In the first chapter of his work he follows the Dhvanyúloka very closely, and some of his kārikās, e. g. i 6, 15, are mere paraphrases of the kārikās of the older work

of Mammata's position. The next chapter is concerned with the dosas, while the last two chapters deal with the poetic figures, the sabdalamkāras and arthālamkāras respectively, adhering in general to the treatment of Ruyyaka. This brief enumeration of the contents of Vidyādhara's work will sufficiently indicate the scope and nature of these subsequent treatises, as well as the fact that they embrace the same topics as are dealt with in the Kāvya-prakāša, even the different chapters sometimes corresponding, in regard to their subject-matter, to the different ullāsas of the latter.

The scope of Vidyanatha's work, written also in the form of karika with ortti, is much wider, and its plan somewhat different, but from the theoretical point of view it is perhaps less interesting. Its nine prakarasus cover almost the same ground as the ten paricchedas of Visvanatha's Sahityadarpana. Like Vidyadhara, Vidyanatha followa Mammata in general, but prefers Bhoja in the matter of gunas, and Ruyyaka in the matter of poetic figures. The author justifies the production of his work by stating that although the older writers have already dealt with the different branches of the subject, none of them has described a nayaka or hero in it; but as the greatness of a composition depends on the representation of the merits of the hero described in it, the first prakaraga, entitled nayaka-prakarana, deals with the attributes of a hero, as well as of the heroine, and their necessary adjuncts. Then follows the kāvya-prakarana, which describes in the usual way the nature of a kāvya

and its constituents, the erttis and vitis suitable to the development of different sentiments, the sayyā or repose of words in their mutual favourableness, the pāka or maturity of sense 18, and the

19 The theory of paka and kayya follows from the stress laid on felicity of expression, which depends on poetic genius and which lies at the root of all discussions on style, poetic figure and kindred topics. The word sayyo is old, having been used, apparently in this sense, by Banabhatta in one of the introductory verses of his Kadambari; while the Agni-purana uses the word mudra with a similar connotation. Vidyadhara and Vidyanatha develop it further as a special excellence of expression. The sayya is defined as the repose of words in their mutual favourableness like the repose of the body in a bed, the similitude explaining the etymology of the term. This mutual friendship (maitri) of words is so close that they cannot, as Mallinatha explains, be replaced even by synonyms: a theory of the immutability of words which mutatis mutandis would remind one of Flaubert's halfplatonic view, developed by Walter Pater, that each idea has its fixed word-counterpart. The theory of paka is very closely allied with this. The word paka, meaning literally 'ripeness', 'maturity' or 'fruition', is as old as Vamana. He speaks of paka (I. 2. 21 vrtti), resulting from the vaidarbli riti in a delightful effect on the connoisseur, as "that attaining which the excellence of a word quickens and in which the unreal appears as real". Elsewhere he says that kabda-paka occurs when the words are so carefully chosen that they cannot bear an exchange of synonym. Later theorists elaborate the doctrine as consisting of (1) sabda-paka, which may be explained, after Vamana, as maturity of expression due to the perfect fitness of a word and its sense, and (2) artha-paka or depth of sense which is of various kinds brought about

divisions of kāvya. It is curious that Vidyānātha's definition of poetry (guṇālaṇkāra-sahitau šahdārthau doṣa-varjitau | gadya-padyōbhayamayaṃ kāvyaṃ kāvya-vido viduķ) follows closely Mammata's famous definition which is quoted in a slightly modified form immediately afterwards. He speaks of šabda and artha as the 'body' of poetry, vyaṅgya as the 'soul', the guṇas and alaṇkāras in the usual manner

by the different tastes of different poetic rasas. Mangala, according to Rajasekhara, regards paka only as sausabdya (excellence of words) or triain supam on vyutpattih (proficiency in the use of nouns and verbs, of Bhamaha i 14-15). Vidyadhara admits only what is called artha-paka above; but he alludes to the other theories which say that paka consists of pada-vyutpatti (Mangala) or of pada-parivrttivaimukhya (Vāmana). Vidyanātha calls this last kayvā. and accepts and defines pata as depth of sense. Bhoja would call it praudit and enumerate it as a habita-guna. Rajasekhara's discussion of earlier views on this point (p. 20) is interesting and deserves quotation. "The acarras ask what is paka?" Mangala says 'it is maturity (parinama)'. 'What, again, is maturity?' ask the gairyas, Mangala replies 'it is the skill in the use of nouns and verbs'. Hence it is saulabdya or excellence of language. 'The pāka is the fixedness in the application of words' say the Ecdryar. It is said [by Vamana 1, 3, 15]: 'The insertion and deletion of words occur so long as there is uncertainty in the mind; when the fixity of words is established, the composition is successful'. So the followers of Vamana say 'the paka is the aversion of words to alteration by means of synonyms'. Therefore it is said [Vamana, loc, cit.]: 'The specialists in the propriety of words have called that \$abda-paka in which the words abandon the capability of being exchanged (by synonyms)'.

being likened to natural qualities like heroism and to outward ornaments like bracelets respectively. The ritis are described as natural dispositions which lead to the excellence of the soul (ātmōtkarṣdvahāḥ svabhāvāḥ). After dealing with the three functions of word and sense, he goes on to the consideration of the vyañjanā-vṛtti (pp. 52 f) and mentions (pp. 77 f) in passing 5304 varieties of dhvani. And yet he defines the excellence, called gāṃbhīrya, as 'dhvani-mattā', after Bhoja! He lays down racanāyā api rasa-vyañjakatvaṃ prasiddham, which leads him

But Avantisundari thinks that this want of capability is not paka. Since the varied expressions of great poets, with regard to one and the same object, all attain maturity, the paka consists in the composition of word and sense proper to the development of rasa. So it is said: 'That is vakya-paka to me by which the mode of stringing together word and sense, according to guna, alaquiara, riti and whit, is relished'. And again: 'There being the speaker, there being the word, there being the rata, there is still not that by which the nectar of words flows'. Hence the yayavariyas say: 'Since the paka, which is capable of being communicated by habda (word) through its inferribility from its effect, is in a high degree the province of Denotation (abhidha), still it is subject to usage of what is established by the sanction of the sahrdaya'." From this passage it would seem that Rajasekhara admits that the paka is conveyed chiefly through words; and taken as naukabdya or kabda-oyutpatti, it comes primarily under the province of abhidha; but it finds its scope only in the artha which is established by the taste of the sahrdaya. In this connexion it is proper to note that the term paka, like the word rasa, has a reference to its etymological meaning of physical taste, taste which has

The third chapter, styled the nataka-prakarana, deals with the subject of rapaka or dramatic composition, a theme generally omitted by most writers, taking up the nataka as the most important variety and analysing its plot into five sandhis. Although based avowedly on Dhananjaya's Daśa-rapaka, this chapter is one of the important later contributions to the subject of Dramaturgy, and a great interest attaches to its inclusion of a model drama illustrative of all its characteristics and culogistic of the author's patron Prataparudra. Next comes the rasa-prakarana dealing with the nature and theories of rasa. The next two chapters are

been fancifully likened to that resulting from the ripeness of fruits. As such ripeness of fruits bears different tastes, some theorists carry the analogy into distinguishing and naming pakas after various kinds of fruits. Thus Vamana quotes two old verses (under III, 2, 14) which speak of wintāka-pāka; while Vidyānātha speaks of two kinds of pākas (1) drākṣā-pāka, or the maturity of grapes in which the taste flows both in and out, and (2) närikelapaka, the ripeness of cocoanut which is rough outside but tasty inside. Bhoja similarly distinguishes between mydvikapāka and nārikela-pāka; but Ratnesvara in his commentary alludes to various kinds of paka, named after salarkāra (mango), vārttāka (egg-plant) and nilakapittha (feronia elephantum). Rajašekhara goes to the length of mentioning nine such cases of pake named after the following nine fruits (pp. 20-21): picumanda (nimba, azadirachta indica), badara (jujube), perdviki (grages) vārttāka (eggplant fruit), tintirli (tamarind), sahakāra (mango), kramuka (betel-mit), trapusa (cucumber) and narihera (cocoanut).

the doşa-prakaraya and the guna-prakaraya²⁰, while the last two chapters are devoted to the topic of sabdálankāra, arthálankāra and misrálankāra.

20 It is curious that Vidyadhara follows Bhoja in mentioning as many as twenty-four gunar. The definitions are almost identical in the two authors. The gunas are: (1) klesa, coalescence of words (owing to the imperceptibility of samdhi, when it is not harsh to the ear and when the letters belong to the same sthang or organ of pronunciation). (ii) prasada, lucidity arising from carefully selected words which lead to the intended sense at once-(iii) samati, uniformity of diction (rejected by Mammata as being often a defect). (iv) widhurya, distinctoess of words (prthak-padatus) on account of the absence of sandhi. (v) saukumarya, softness of expression due to the use of soft-sounding letters (vi) arthavyakti, clearness of sense due to the completion of a sentence in all its parts, (vii) kānti, gracefulness of diction, explained as follows by Ratnesvara : apratihata-padair arambhah samdarbhasyarva kantih 'kusumasya dhanur' iti prakatam, 'kausumam' ityaprahatam ; 'jalanidhau' iti prahatam, 'adhijalam' ityaprahatam ; 'gurutvam' it prahatam, 'gauravam' ityaprahatam ityadi asti tu tulye pi vacakatve padanam kancid abbyantara vinego yam adhiketya kimcid coa prayunjate mahakavayah, lu sarvam. (viii) au (arya, where the is so arranged with formidable letters (vikabiknara) or hard vocables (vikata, explained as kathina-varnasamghalana-rilea by Jagannatha) that the words proceed as if they were dancing (nrtyadbhir iva padair yad vākyaracana). (ix) udatta, the use of praiseworthy epithets (cf Agni-purana 345, 9, and see above p. 18, fn 38); Kumārasvāmin notes that it is the absence of the defect known as anucibirtha, (x) ojas, strength due to the presence of compounds. (xi) sausabdya, elegance in the use of nominal and verbal forms (cf Bhamaha i 14-15, Rajasekhara p. 20). (xii) preyas, statement of agreeable or flattering things

(6)

The group of three Jaina writers, Hemacandra and the older and the younger Vagbhatas may be conveniently mentioned here, but they do not call for any special remark. Hemacandra's Kāvyánusāsana, written in the form of sūtra with ortti.

(Bhāmaha, Dandin and some other writers regard this as an alamkara and not a guna); the commentator notes that this is the absence of the defect parasa (see above p. 18, In 36). (xiii) auriitya, compactness of structure. (This is said to be the absence of the defect called visamdhi. This defect, mentioned also by Bharata and Bhamaha, is dealt with at p. 305. It is explained as visaquhita virupe va yasya sandhih, Kumāra-svāmin explaining visanhitah as vigatā samhita varnanam paraspara-sannikaree vatra, and virubah as simply karna-kathorah. The samhiti, therefore, means close proximity of letters which leads to euphonic combinations sanctioned by grammar. The fault occurs (a) when there is no samdhi (villeya) and (b) when the samdhi is harsh to the ear (kapta). Mammuta (pp. 331f) adds a third case of its occurrence when the samulki gives rise to the implication of an indecent (astila) idea. See Trivedi's note to Prataparudra pp. 73-75. (xiv) samādhi, attribution of the properties of one object to another (an echo of Dandin's samadhi), e.g., attribution of the properties of an inanimate object to an animate object (what Kuntala would comprehend under upacara-vakrata and other writers under the figure rupaka). (xv) vistara, detailed corroboration of what is said. (xvi) sammitatua, use of the absolutely necessary words, neither more nor less, to convey the intended sense, i.e., balance of sound and sense (arthasya padanam ca tula-vidhetatvat tulyatoena sammitatvam). (xvii) gambhirya, presence of the suggested sense or dhvani (dhvani-matta).

and its commentary, called Viceka²¹, composed by himself, indicate extensive learning and constitute a compact manual of Poetics in eight chapters; but there is hardly anywhere any striking trait of originality²² or 'even independent thinking out

(xviii) samksepa, brevity of statement. (xix) saukemya, minuteness or subtlety of sense. (xx) praudhi, maturity of sense (this comes under pāka detailed above). (xxi) uhti, eleverness of speech. (xxii) rīti, homogeneity of manner (corresponding to Vāmana's samatā), consisting of the completion of a sentence or theme in the manner in which it was begun, (xiii) bhāviha, conduct of a sentence according to its underlying emotion or sentiment (bhāvatah). (xxiv) gati, a pleasing effect produced by long and short vowels (suramyatvans svardrohdvarohayah, in which svardroha is explained as alrghūksara-prāyatva, and svaravaroha as its reverse). The Agni-purāna, while admitting most of these excellences, classifies and defines them somewhat differently. See ch. 345, and above p. 259.

21 The siltra-portion is called Körrünnissana, the vetti is styled the Alamkära-siidä-mani, while the brief commentary which explains the vetti may be called Viveka from its mangala-verse.

22 Hemacandra's treatment of poetic figures, however, is somewhat peculiar. He speaks of six subditambaras, viz., anuprasa, yamaka, citra, ślesa, vakrokti and punaruktavadābāsa. The arthidamkāras are limited to twenty-nine (viz., upamā, utprekṣā, rūpaka, niduriana, dipaka, anyokti, paryā-yokta, atisayokti, ūkṣṣpa, virodhā, sahokti, samāsokti, jāti, nyājastuti, ideņa, vyatireka, arthintaranyūsa, sasaydeha, apahnuti, parāvṛtti, anumāna, tmṛti, bhrānti, viṣama, sama, samuccaya, parisaṃkhyā kāraṇamātā and saṃkara.) He includes saṇṣṣṣṭi under saṃkara, and treates ananvaya and upameyōpamā as varieties of npamā. The abrastuta-

of the main problems. This work is chiefly a compilation 33, and Hemacandra not only paraphrases
literally most of the standardised definitions, and
reproduces almost unhesitatingly the illustrative
quotations of Mammata, but his acknowledged and
unacknowledged borrowings from the Dhvanyáloka
and the Locana, from the Abhinavabharati, from
the Pakrokti-jivita, from Rājašekhara's Kāvyamīmāmsā, as well as from other well known works are

pratagusă similarly goes under anyakti. All figures like rasavat, preyas, îirjasvin and samăkila that have a touch of rasa and bhāva are omitted as being comprehended (so also Mammața thinks) in the class of poetry called gunībhūta vyaigya. Hemacandra does not deal with parikara, yathāsamkhya, bhāvika, udātta, āith and pratyanīka for reasons explained by himself at pp. 292-4. Hemacandra, however, defines some figures somewhat broadly so as to include other recognised figures in them, e.g., his dipaka would include talyayagitā, his parāvrīti would contain the paryāya and parivrīti of Mammața, his nidraiana would comprehend prativastispanā, drejānta and nidarianā of other writers.

The eight chapters of Hemacandra's Kāvyanuiāsana comprehends the following topies: 1. The purpose (proyojana) of poetry, its causes (hetu), viz pratibhā to which are added vyutpatti and abhyāsa; the definition of poetry; the nature of habda artha; the denoted, indicated and suggested meanings. II. The rasa and it factors. III. The dosas of pada, vākya, artha and rasa. IV. The gunas, accepted as three after Mammata, and the letters which produce them. V. Six figures of sound. Vi. Twentynine figures of sense. VII. The nāyaka and nāyikā. VIII. Division of poetry into preksya and āraupa, and their characteristics and subdivisions. indeed numerous. No doubt, Hemacandra adds a chapter on Dramaturgy, chiefly compiled from Bharata and others, but the doctrines of dheani, rasa, guna, dosa, and alamkāra are closely and somewhat uncritically copied from Mammata, supplemented, however, by excerpts, in the commentary, of other views on the subject. In trying to improve upon Mammata's imperfect definition of poetry by substituting salamkārau ca in the place of analamkrtī punah kvāpi, he lays himself open to greater technical objection, although he adds the gloss: ca-kāra airalamkārayar api šabdārthayah kvacit kāvyatsa-sthāpanārthah.

The older and the younger Vagbhatas, on the other hand, though making considerable use of Mammata's text (the latter especially borrowing from Hemacandra's version, too), do not admit dhvani, and are allied in their sympathies with the Pre-dhvani schools. The authority of Dandin, for instance, carries great weight with them; and the younger Vagbhata admits some of Rudrata's peculiar poetic figures. At the same time, the unmistakeable influence of the new school on them precludes us from affiliating them directly with the older Alamkara and Riti schools. The older Vagbhata defines poetry as

sādhu-šabdārtha-saṃdarbhaṃ guṇālaṃkāra-bhūṣitam / sphuṭa-rīti-rasopētaṇ kāvyaṃ kurvīta kirttaye // while the younger Vāgbhaṭa, whose work is written in the sātra-and-vṛṭṭi form like Hemacandra's, adopts literally the latter's modification of Mammaṭa's definition. The criterion of poetry, according to them,

is that it must contain, through its word and sense. the guna, alamkāra, riti and rasa, but these elements are mentioned rather in an eclectic than critical spirit. The older Vagbhata accepts without question the ten gunas of older writers, but the younger Vagbhata follows Mammata in limiting them to three. with the pointed remark ; iti dandi-vāmana-vāgbhatddi-pranita dasa kavya-qunah, vayam tu madhuryaujah-prasada-lakşanan trin cea yayan manyāmahe. The younger Vāgbhata speaks of rasa as as the 'soul' of poetry "4 ; but beyond a description, after Hemacandra and others, of the different rasas, he does not touch upon the theoretical aspect of the question, nor does he indicate the mutual relation of the different elements of poetry with reference to the rasa, Indeed, both of them do not appear to accept the reconciliation proposed by the dheani-theorists, and the younger Vagbhata specifically includes dheani, after Bhamaha and Udbhata, in the figure paryayokta with the significant remark : ecamddi-bhedair dhvanitoktir bhavati. param grantha-gaurava-bhayad asmābkir nodāhriyate, sa prapañcas tvánandavardhanâd avagantavyah (p. 37). The object of these Jains manuals (though there is nothing Jaina in them) appears to have been the presentation of a popular and easy epitome of the subject 95, allying themselves to no particular school

²⁴ doşa-muktanı guna-yuktam alanıkara-bhüşitam sabdürtha-rüpam uktanı kövya-sariram, paranı tattvapranisariram iva nirütmakanı na pratibliäsate, atalı kävyasya bröna-bhütanı rasam äha (ch. v, p. 53.)

²⁵ The topics dealt with in the five paricchedas of

or system, but following the traditional notions in a spirit of eclecticism, without critically systematising them in the light of a central theory. In this respect, they bear a close resemblance to the alankara section

the Varbhatalamkara are as follow: 1. The definition of kāvya; pratibhā as the source of the kāvya, aided by vyutpatti and abhyūsa; the circumstances favourable to poetry and the conventions observed by poets (ii) The language of poetry (Sanskrit, Prakrit, Apabhramsa and Bhūta-bhūgā); forms of poetry (metrical chandonibaddha and non-metrical); its divisions into padya (verse), gadya (prose) and misra (mixed verse and prose); eight doess of pada and of vakya respectively, and the dosas of artha. (iii) The ten gwnas. (iv) Four poetic figures of sound, viz., citra, vakrokti, anuprasa and yamaka, and thirty-five figures of sense; the two ritis (vaidarbhi and gamliya). (v) Nine rasas; kinds of nayaka and nayika and kindred topics. The Kavydnusisana of the younger Vagbhata is, unlike the Vagbhatalanskara (which is written in the metrical form, generally in the anuslubh with only one prosepassage at iii 14), composed in the satra-and-vetti style of Hemacandra's Kapydnukasana. It is also divided into five chapters with topics as follow: (i) The prayejana, and the hetu (pratibha sided by vyutpatti and abhyāsa) of kāvya; its division into padya, gadya and miira; the clasification of poetical composition into mahākāvya, ākhyāyikā, kathā, camptī and rāpaka. (ii) Sixteen doşas of pada, fourteen of vakya, and fourteen of artha; the ten gunas of Vamana and Dandin reduced to three, viz., madhurya, ojas and prasada; three ritis, viz., vaidarbhi, gaudiya and pancati. (ii) Sixty-three figures of sense, in which some of Rudrata's old figures reappear. (iv) Six figures of sound, viz., citra, slega, anuprasa, vakrokti, yamaka and punaruktavadūbhāsa. (v) Nine rasas; the topic of nāyakanāyikā; and the dosas of rasa.

in the Agni-purana and the Sarasvati-kanthábharana of Bhoja, whose definition of poetry is forcibly recalled by that of the older Vägbhata quoted above.

(7)

We have now practically closed our survey of the principal Post-dhyani writers who deserve mention. The school of knoi-tiked and the erotic rasawriters stand apart in many respects, and we propose to deal with them separately in the following chapters. But the above account of the Post-dhyani writers must not be supposed to exhaust the extraordinary wealth of scholastic activity of this period. The commentators and textbook-writers continued to multiply, and a glance at their names given in our preceding volume 16 will show the extent to which their activity was carried; but hardly any of these later works, except perhaps Jagannatha's Rasagangadhara, with an account of which we shall close our survey, deserves separate or detailed mention. Even Keśava Miśra's Alamkara-śekhara ? , or

²⁶ See Vol. 1, ch. xix, pp. 282-327, Minor Writers. For commentators, see Bibliography given under each writer.

²⁷ This work, drawing largely upon Mammata and the younger Vägbhata (besides older writers) is declared to have been based upon the kārikās of one alamkāra-vidyā-sūtra-kāra bhagavān Sauddhodani (see Vol. 1, pp. 260f); but it does not present any theory nor set up any new system. There are, however, certain opinions which are peculiar to the work, the chief of which is that it sets up rasa as the essence of poetry. The work is divided

Acyuta Rāya's more modern Sāhitya-sāra, convenient and well-written compendiums as they are, and standing as they do much above the average, add hardly

into eight rainas, consisting of twenty-two maricis. first raina defines kāuya as rasūdimai pūkya, and discusses pratibha etc. as its sources. After an enunciation of three ritis (vaidarbhi, gameli and magadhi, (which are defined with reference to the employment of compounds), along with ukti (4 kinds) and madra (4 kinds), it goes on to discuss the three usual functions, viz., *akti (=abhidhā), laksanā and vyahjanā. Then comes the desa-ratua, in which are detailed two series of eight faults each of word and sense, and twelve defects of sentences. The next section, called gapa-ratua, deals with five excellences of sabda (viz., samkniptatva, udattetva, prasada, ukti and samādhi), and four excellences of sense (viz., bhāvikatva, subabdatoa, paryiyakto and sudharmita). This is followed by a discussion of the cases where some of the above dosas may sometimes become ganas. The influence of Bhoja's opinions on this part of the work is obvious, Then comes the alamkara-rates, where mention is made of eight figures of sound (citra, vakrokti, anuprasa, giulka, ilera, prahelikă, prainottara and pamaka) and only fourteen figures of sense (upamā, rūpaka, utpreksā, samātokti, apahnuti, samihita, svabhava, virodha, sara, dipaka, sahokti, anyadeyatva = asamgati of Mammaja, viscookti and vibhavana). This is followed by a curious chapter, entitled varnaka-ratna, in which are detailed the upamanas of a damsel, of her complexion, hair, forehead, eyebrows etc. It goes on to give practical hints as to how poets should describe the physical characteristics of the hero, mentions words which convey the idea of similarity, details the conventional usages of poets (kavi-samaya), as well as the topics for description (such as the king, the queen, a town, a city, a river etc.) and the way of describing them, the colours of various

anything fresh to our knowledge²⁸. Jayadeva's Candráloka²⁹, has been a deservedly popular manual, but in spite of its clearness and brevity of

objects in nature, words that convey numerals from one to one thousand, certain tricks of words such as bhāṣā-sama (where a verse reads the same in Sanskrit as in Prakrit), samasyā-pūraṇa, the nine rasas, the kinds of hero and heroine, the different bhāvas, the deṣas of rasa, and lastly, the arrangement of letters favourable to each rasa.

28 For a summary of the contents of this work, see Vol.1, p.283.

29 See Vol. I, pp. 210f for a resume of its contents. It deals with ten gunas and one hundred alamkaras. The third chapter, curiously enough, is devoted to labornas, which are not mentioned by later writers except in connexion with Dramaturgy (as in Visvanatha). Instead of Bharata's 46 laksanas (ch. xvi 6-30; see above pp. 4-5), Javadeva defines and illustrates only 10, viz. the economical combination of letters to convey a striking meaning (aksara-samhati), the prohibition of a fault by the indication of an excellence (hobbs), the deliberation resulting in a negation of what is said (abbimana), the determination of a proposition by a rejection of other possible alternatives (hetu), the disregard of well established causes (pratisedha), the interpretation of a name both as true and false (nirukta), false attribution where both the major and middle terms of a proposition are absent (mithyddhyavasawa), substantiation of the excellence of an object or by emphasising its well-matched resemblance to a well known object (siddhi), establishment of a particular attribute through the drift of two different meanings (yukti), and the accomplishment of a purpose through some action or occurrence (phala). Visvanatha, however, adds 33 dramatic embellishments (natyalamkaras) to his laksanas which are enumerated after Bharata, as 36 in number, but which do not correspond exactly to Bharata's

exposition and aptness of its illustrations, it is nothing more than a convenient epitome, its most remarkable feature being its detailed treatment of poetic figure,

laksanas, as some of the latter fall also under Visvanatha's nit yulamkuras. The two classes cannot indeed be distinguished on any conceivable theory; and though Viśvanātha adopts the conventional enumeration, he remarks in the end : esam ca laksaminim (for laksamam in the printed text) nätydlankäränäm ekarlipatue pi bhedena vyapadebah gadlalikā-pravāhena. Thus, we find included under laksanas the combination of gunas with alankaras; the economical grouping of letters to produce a charming import; the use of double entendre for the purpose of conveying a less known import along with one more well known; the use of analogy and example; the brief citation of a reason for the intended meaning; the expression of doubt in the case of an object whose nature is not known; the surmise from a matter coincident with the course of nature; the fitting of expression to the sense; the citation of admitted facts to refute inadmissible views; the supposition of a nonexistent object or fact from resemblance; the inference of an object from some of its peculiarities; the deduction by reasoning of a fact which is not capable of senseperception; the description of an object under the similitude of time and place; the statement of agreeable views in accordance with the sastras; the indication of acts contrary to one's qualities; the attribution to an object of qualities in excess of its ordinary qualities; the discrimination of a particular meaning out of other well known meanings by an allusion to the literal sense; the repetition of a proposition already established; the mention of various objects in eulogy of the intended object; the unconscious expression, under the influence of passion, of the contrary of what one means; the alteration of a conclusion through doubt; the compliance with other people's views by words or acts:

which occupy nearly half its bulk. These remarks apply also to Appayya Diksita's three well known

the persuasion by means of affectionate words; the statement in succession of several means to attain a desired object; the suggestion and strengthening of one view by a different view; the reproach; the respectful enquiry; the employment of names of well known persons or things in eulogy of the person or thing under description; the mistaken resemblance of apparently similar things causing resentment; the offer of oneself in the service of another; the flattering statement; the employment of a comparison to convey a sense which is not directly desired; the indirect expression of desire; the veiled compliment; and the expression of gratitude in pleasing terms. The nülyülmiküras are the benediction, the lamentation, the deception, the unforgiving attitude, the arrogant expression, the expression of a resolution or of an excellent purpose, the raillery, the desire for a charming object, the agitation due to reproach, the repentance for missing an object through folly, the use of an argument, the longing for an object, the request, the commencement of an undesirable act, the mentioning of a purpose, the provocation, the reproach, the observance of the bastras, the covert rebuke administered by citing a common opinion, the narration, the prayer, the apology, the reminding of a duty neglected, the recounting of previous history, the determination of an act by reasoning, the ecstacy and the instruction. It will be seen that the division is not only overlapping, but both the laksanas and the natyalankaras refer largely to modes of exposition, to the use of what other writers would regard as specific figures or excellences of diction, or they may sometimes appertain to the feelings and emotions which come within the sphere of ness and bhive. This fact is recognised very early by Dandin who includes laksanas under alamkaras

manuals30 one of which is directly based on Jayadeva's work, and to Viśveśvara's Alamkara-kaustubha31, both of which are indeed remarkable for their elaborate treatment of poetic figures and have merits of their own, but which are in reality nothing more than elementary textbooks, excellent résumés which methodically register previous speculations on the subject. There is such a general sameness of characteristics, such a monotony of treatment, as well as repetition of conventional topics in conventional phraseology, that it is not worth while to linger over the activity of these lesser writers, The work of the great Kashmirian writers was over, and although Bengal and the Deccan had come into prominence as fields of later activity, the age of really original or thoughtful writers was long gone by. It was succeeded by an age of commentators, interpreters and critics (some of them were very able and painstaking) as long as there was the need of critical elaboration, of understanding and explaining a great author. But in course of time, even this became superfluous, and there was nothing

in the wider sense. Dhanañjaya does the same, but he recognises also that some them come under rasa and bhāva. Viāvanātha, therefore, includes them under the guna, alanthāra, bhāva, and samdhi, but deals with them only in connexion with the drama. There is practically no need for them in later Poetics from which they ultimately disappear, their function having been assigned to other recognised elements of poetry.

³⁰ See Vol. I, pp. 267-68.

³¹ See Vol. I, pp. 312-13. The work, as its name implies, deals entirely with poetic figures in an elaborate way. The number of independent figures dealt with is about 76,

to be done but the writing of smaller and simpler manuals adapted to general comprehension. The declining age of most of the schools witnessed a host of such manuals and manuals of manuals, but this was the period when the declining age of the Post-dhyani school, as represented by Mammata, went through the same process. Even this was not enough. Out of the debris of these schools there grew up a spirit of eclecticism, of which we have already an early indication in the works of Bhoja and the Vagbhatas after the decline of the older Rasa, Alamkara and Riti schools; and we meet with hand-books which depend upon no system but which are apparently written for the enlightenment of the lay understanding. The different systems of Sanskrit Poetics may now be supposed to have well-nigh run their course and attained their natural termination.

(8)

Jagannātha's Rasa-gangādhara is the last remarkable work on Poetics. We do not, however, find in it a complete presentation of the subject, as the available text forms about two-fifths of what the work was originally designed by its author and is thus extant only in an unfortunately incomplete shape. Nearly three-fourths of this, again, and the whole of his Citra-mimānsā-khandana are taken up with the discussion and illustration of poetic figures, a topic which, as here set forth,

forms indeed one of the most exhaustive and noteworthy presentation of later times, but is of little theoretical interest from the standpoint of general poetics. Jaganuatha's style is erudite and frightens the student by its involved language, its subtle reasoning and its unsparing criticism of earlier writers. The most criticised authors in this respect are Ruyyaka, his commentator Jayaratha and his follower Appayya Diksita. But in spite of this tendency towards controversy, which is combined with an aptitude for hair-aplitting refinements, Jagannatha's work displays an acute and independent treatment, or at least an attempt at a rethinking of the old problems. He shows himself conversant with the poetic theories of the older writers, which he does not ignore but which he endeavours to harmonise with the new currents of thought. Along with some other important writers of the new school, Jagannatha marks a reaction in this respect; and the school of Mammata and Ruyyaka does not receive from him unqualified homage.

Jagannātha defines poetry as a word or linguistic composition which brings a charming idea into expression (ramantyártha-pratipādakaḥ śabdaḥ): a definition which reminds us of Dandin's well known description of kāvya-śarīra as istártha-vyavacchinnā padāvalī, but which is further explained in this way. The charmingness belongs to an idea which causes unworldly or disinterested pleasure. This quality of disinterestedness is an essential characteristic, which is a fact of internal experience and

which is an attribute of pleasure, being synonymous with comatkara or strikingness. The cause of this pleasure is a conception or a species of representation, consisting of continued contemplation of something characterised by the pleasure itself. Thus, there is no disinterestedness in the pleasure conveyed by the apprehension of the sense of a sentence like 'a son is born to you' or 'I shall give you money'; in such a sentence, therefore, there is no poetry. Hence poetry consists of words which express an idea that becomes the object of contemplation causing pleasure **

The beautiful (ramanyata) in poetry, therefore, is that which gives us disinterested or impersonal pleasure. This pleasure is specifically different from that which one finds in the actually pleasing, and depends upon taste formed by continued contemplation of beautiful objects. It will be noticed that this definition not only gives us a remarkable analysis of the beautiful but includes in its generality and comprehensiveness all the elements of poetry recognised by previous theorists, without specifically naming them. We have already noted that the poetic sentiment or rasa, excited in the reader's

³² ramaniyatü ca lokittarühlüda-janaka-jüäna-gocaratü; lokittaranı cühlüda-gatas camatküratvüpara-paryüyo'nubhava-sükniko jüti-visenah; kürananı ca tad-avacchinne bhüvanü-visenah punah punar-anusanıdhünütmü; putras te jütah, dhananı te düsyümiti väkyürtha-dhi-janyasyühlüdasya na lokittaratvam, ato na tasminvükye küvyatva-prasaktili. Itham ca camatküra-janaka-bhüvanü-vinayürtha-pratipüdaka-sabda-tvam. Cl Jacobi in Internat. Wochensehrift, 1910, iv 821.

mind is peculiar in its nature; it is, no doubt, a fact of one's own consciousness but it is essentially universal and impersonal in character, being common all trained readers and possessing no significance to their personal relations or interests. A distinction is made between a natural emotion and a poetic sentiment; the former is individual and immediately personal and therefore may be pleasurable or painful, but the latter is generic and disinterested and marked by an impersonal joy. The poetic sentiment in this sense is supernormal(alaukika) and those things which cause disgust, fear or sorrow in ordinary life and those normal emotions which are far from pleasant in actual experience, being conveyed in poetry, become ideal and universal, and bring about this supernormal pleasure which is not to be compared to the very mixed pleasure experienced in ordinary life. This pleasure, dissociated from all personal interests, is the essence of the mental condition involved in the enjoyment of rasa; it is also the essence of all poetry, as conceived by Jagannatha.

In the same way, the definition includes the concept of the suggested sense (dheam), and Jagannätha proceeds to divide poetry on this basis into four (viz., uttamottama, uttama, madhyama and adhama) classes, corresponding to the three classes recognised by his predecessors since the Dhyanikāra's time. The first occurs where the sound and sense, subordinating themselves, suggest another charming sense, corresponding to the principal dheam-kāvya of the Dhyanikāra. The second and third classes, the

gunibhuta-vyangya and citra, mentioned by the Dhvanikāra, are split up 33 into three classes, viz., (i) where the suggested sense, though not principal. is yet the cause of special charm, (ii) where the charm of the expressed sense is predicated equally with the charm of the suggested, (iii) where the charm of sound, being embellished by the charm of sense, is principal. This lowest class of poetry, corresponding to the sabda-citra and artha-citra of Mammata (a distinction which is rejected by Jagannatha), apparently comprehends those cases where the artha-camatkyti is swallowed up or strengthened by sabda-camatkrti. Jaganustha adds that although it is possible to count a still lower fifth class of poetry, in which the charm of sound is altogether devoid of all charm of sense (e. g., cases of conundrums like the padmabandha) and which is allowed by the practice of some poets, yet in view of the definition of poetry already given, as consisting of words expressing a charming sense, these instances have to be excluded or ignored.

After this classification, Jagannatha follows the conventional way of dividing dheani, infinite aspects as it may present (asamkhya-bheda), into two broad groups, based on the Denotation (abhidhā-mūla) and the Indication (lakṣaṇā-mūla) respectively. The former has a threefold aspect, according as it is

³³ The object of this splitting up is to dispense with the necessity of minutely subdividing the various cases of the gunibhūta-vyangya kāvya and also to include generally all poetry which is alanukāra-pradhāna.

a suggestion of rasa, alamkara or vastu, while recognition is given to the two cases of the latter, viz., (i) where the expressed meaning passes over to snother sense (arthantara-samkramita-väcya) and (ii) where the expressed sense is made to disappear entirely (atyanta-tiraskṛta-vācya). This brings our author topically to a detailed consideration of rasadhvani which is characterised as parama-ramaniya, and an elaborate discussion of the nature and theory of rasa and bhana and its constituent elements. He speaks in this connexion of bhava-dhvani (pp. 74-98) and takes into consideration different phases of rasa and bhava, such as rasabhasa (p. 99), bhavasanti (p. 102), bhavotputti, bhava-samelhi and bhavasabalata (p. 100f)34. The discussion of the gunas come in this context, inasmuch as they are related to the rasa. Jagannatha enumerates and discusses the ten sabda- and artha-guyas of Vamana and other older writers; but he appears to accept only three quasa after Mammata, viz., madhurya, ojas and prasada, classifying them on the basis of their respective effects on the reader's mind, viz., druti (melting), dipti (brilliance, i.e. expansion) and vikāsa (pervasion)35. Jagannatha remarks in this connexion: gunānām caisām druti-dipti-vikāsākhyas tisraš citta-vrttayah kramena prayojyah, tat-tad-gunavišista-rasa-carvanā-janyā iti yūcat, making clear that the justification of this classification consists in the divergent nature of the mental activity

³⁴ These topics are also dealt with by Mammata Visyanatha and others.

³⁵ See above p. 176, fn 3.

involved in the relish of rasa. He does not agree however, with Mammata in the latter's statement that when we speak of a composition as madhura we use the word in a secondary sense (as when we say "the appearance of this man is brave"), inasmuch as, the gunas being the properties of the rasa, we apply to the body' what appertains to the 'soul' of poetry by an extended use of the term. Jagannatha maintains that when we say the sentiment of love (\$\tilde{\text{phyara}}\) is madhura in a particular case, we mean to imply its influence, such as draft etc., on the mind, and this must be taken to refer not only to rasa but also to tabda and artha and the composition in general (tabdartha-rasa-racana-gatam eva grahyam).

The next chapter proceeds to discuss other varioties of suggestion, including suggestion based on the laksana, which is treated of in detail, and then takes up the poetic figures (to the number of about 70) to which the rest of the work, breaking off in the middle of the figure uttara, is devoted. The poetic figure or alamkara comes in as the source of the charm or ramaniyata essential in the principal suggested element of poetry already defined (prāg-abhihita-laksanasya kācyatmano vyangyasya ramaniyatä-prayojakā alankārāh, p. 156). The aesthetic pleasure (camatkara or lokôttaratva) into which this ramaniyata resolves itself is an essential element in the poetic figure, and Jagannatha harmonises his own conception of poetry with Ruyyaka's theory of the alamkara (which he accepts and elaborates) as involving this camatkara (also called

hrdyatva, carutva, saundarya, or denoted by the technical terms vaicitrya, vicehitti-visesa or bhanitiprakāra) imparted by the conception of the poet (kavipratibha). Kuntala, from whom Ruyyaka appears to have derived his analysis, laid down that in every poetical production the activity of the poet, which consists in an act of the productive imagination (pratibha), is the principal point, and it should result in poetic expression. Jagannatha asserts that the pratibha alone is the source of poetry and therefore of poetic expression, and as such it fixes the nature of the alamkara. The special charm (vicchitti-visesa), which is thus imparted to poetic figure by the imagination of the poet, is taken (pp. 466, 470) as the basis upon which the poetic figures distinguish themselves in their special peculiarities, and is explained as an act of imaginative production on the part of the poet in so far as it is produced in the poem, or as that sesthetic pleasure 36 which is thereby brought into being. As to how this vicehitti is determined, Jagannatha settles the question by resting it not only upon established usage (sampradāya) but also upon one's own imagination and intuition (anubhava). On this fundamental principle, the various figures are minutely defined, differentiated, illustrated and classified; and this portion of Jagan natha's work, in spite of its subtlety and polemic attitude, is one of the soundest, though unfortunately uncompleted, treatment of the subject.

³⁶ This translation of the term camatkara is justified by Jagannatha's own definition of poetry.

VIII. LATER WRITERS ON RASA

(1)

The dectrine of rasa, which is advocated, if not first enunciated, by Abhinavagupta, is finally adopted by almost all writers on general Poetics who accept rasa-dheani as an important element of poetry. With the exception of Visvanatha and Kesava Misra, they do not indeed go so far as to declare expressly with Abhinavagupta that rasa is the essence of poetry, but they accept in reality the suggested sense in the form of rasa as essentially the main element. The rasa is viewed as a pleasant sentiment belonging to the reader whose dormant emotions, derived from experience or inherited instincts, are evoked by the reading of poems into an ideal and impersonalised form of joy; an appreciation or enjoyment, consisting of a pleasant mental condition in which the reader identifies himself with the feelings of the hero and experiences them in a generic form, the fulness of the enjoyment depending upon the nature and experience of the particular reader. The sentiment thus evoked is essentially universal in character, and the aesthetic pleasure resulting from it is not individual (even though enjoyed as an intimately personal feeling), but generic and disinterested, being such as would be common to all trained readers (samasta-bhāvaka-

svasamvedya); it is therefore described as something supernormal (alaukika) and invariably pleasant, not to be compared to the normal pleasures of life which have always a reference to one's personal relations or interests, and which may be pleasant or painful. Things, which would be called causes of an emotion in the normal sense and which may produce disgust, horror or pity in real life, awaken these feelings indeed in poetry and drama, but convey them in such an ideal and generic form that these emotions, which are far from pleasant in ordinary life, are converted into an impersonal joy, which is ineffable and indivisible. One may be moved by disgust, horror or pity and shed real tears; but the underlying sentiment is always one of exquisite joy, which must be distinguished from an ordinary feeling.

This is the general position of all later theorists with regard to the nature and function of rasa in poetry. Dhanañjaya, for instance, gives us the same process of transformation of an ordinary emotion, which is dominant in a composition, into a poetic sentiment, as formally laid down by Bharata and interpreted by Abhinavagupta; and in this he is practically in agreement with Mammata, Vidyādhara Visvanātha and others. The dominant emotion (sthāyi-bhāva), he says, becomes a sentiment (rasa) when it is brought into a relishable condition through the co-operation of the excitants, the ensuants and the accessories (including the sāttvika bhāvas). This statement is further amplified by the assertion that the enjoyer of rasa (rasika) is the audience (sāmājika)

on whose capacity of enjoyment it depends, and that the dominant feeling becomes a sentiment when it is so enjoyed. The rasa, being a mental state, a subjective experience of the reader, in which enjoyment(āsvāda, careaņā, rasanā or bhoga) is essential and in which the enjoyer and the object of enjoyment become identical, the reader receives the represented feeling into his own soul and thereby enjoys it1. The locus of the rasa is not in the represented hero who belongs to the past; nor is it in the poem itself, the task of which is merely to exhibit the excitants etc., by which the dominant emotion is brought into expression, and the rasa, on its part, become revealed to the reader. Nor does the rasa consist of the reader's mere apprehension (pratiti) of the emotions exhibited in the poem or enseted by the setor; for the reader would then apprehend not the rasa but a feeling varying in different individuals, just as in real life the spectacle of a pair of lovers in union gives different spectators who witness it the varying emotions. according to their individual nature, of shame, envy, desire or aversion3. The wibhavas etc., therefore, bring the sthayi-bhava to the enjoyment of the rasika, the aesthetically receptive reader or spectator, and thereby convert it to rusa; but they

t Cf Jacobi in GgA, 1913, pp. 308f.

² These circumstances, Dhanika thinks, disprove the vyangvatva of rasa. It seems that Dhanika does not accept the vyangva-vyanjaka relation of rasa to poetry, but holds some views similar to the bhāvva-bhāvaka theory of Bhatta Nāyaka (see ed. Parab, 1917, p. 96).

must be generalised and have no specific relation to a particular individual (parityakta-visesa). Thus the vibhava Sita, Dhaniks explains, must refer to woman in general, and not to the particular individual who was the daughter of Janaka, Hence things, which are the exciting, ensuing or accessory circumstances in ordinary life, act as vibhavas etc., in poetry, and generalise the dominant feeling into rasa. The spectator, say, of the deeds of Arjuna on the stage may be compared, therefore, to the child who, in playing with clay elephants, experiences the sensation of its own energy as pleasant. The enjoyment in the spectator's mind is a manifestation of that joy which is innate as the blissful nature of self, a circumstance which gives us the frequent comparison of rasdsvada with brahmásväda.

The mental activity involved in this enjoyment has got four aspects taken in connexion with the four primary sentiments of the erotic (\$r\$\tilde{v}\$\tilde{q}\$\tilde{q}\$ra), the heroic (\$v\$\tilde{v}\$\tilde{q}\$a), the horrible (\$b\$\tilde{b}\$\tilde{b}\$\tilde{d}\$tsa) and the furious (raudra) admitted by Bharata 3, and consists respectively of the conditions of unfolding (vik\tilde{a}\$sa) expansion (vist\tilde{a}\$ra), agitation (\$k\$\tilde{s}\$\tilde{b}\$\tilde{b}\$a) and distraction (vik\tilde{s}\$epa). We have seen that Bhatta N\tilde{a}\$yaka (along with Abhinavagupta) speaks of the \$b\$\tilde{b}\$\tilde{b}\$\tilde{g}\$a (or \$\tilde{a}\$sv\tilde{a}\$da) of rasa as involving only three mental conditions, named vik\tilde{a}\$sa (pervasion), vist\tilde{a}\$ra (ex-

³ See above p. 29. The fourfold division is probably adopted as an ostensible rationale for the doctrine of four primary and four secondary rasa recognised by Bharata.

⁴ See above p. 278 in 3.

pansion) and druti (melting), which later theorists have taken5 as the basis and justification of the three gunas of prasada, ojas and madhurya respectively. With regard to the ninth rasa, the quietistic, which is not mentioned by Bharata but which is acknowledged by some theorists, Dhananjaya forbids its delineation in the drama (iv 35); for the sentiment of absolute peace is in its own nature undefinable, and consists of four states mentioned by philosopherse, viz., maitrī, karuņā, muditā and upekṣā, which are not realisable by the sahrdaya. If it exists at all as rasa, it must comprehend the fourfold mental activity enunciated above, as corresponding to the fourfold states recognised by philosophers in sama?.

It is not necessary in this connexion to take up in detail the views of Mammata, Vidyadhara and other writers, for it would be repeating substantially what has already been said regarding the final doctrine of rasa. Visyanatha is the only important writer, among later theorists, who boldly accepts Abhinayagupta's extreme view that the rasa-dhvani alone is the essence of poetry and builds up a system of Poetics on its basis*.

⁵ See above pp. 218f, 276 fn 3.

⁶ e.g. Voga-stitra i 33.

⁷ na ca tathābhūtasya iānta-rasasya sahrdayāh svādavitarah santi, atha tad-upāyahhīito muditā-maitri-karunopeksiidi-laksanas tasya ca vikasa-vistara-ksobha-viksepa-rupataivéti.

⁸ See above pp. 283f. Bhānudatta, who substantially follows the doctrine of rasa detailed here, is however singular in his classification of some aspects of rasa. He speaks of rasa as laukika and alaukika, subdividing the latter

Following up his own definition of poetry as "a sentence of which the soul is the rasa". Visvanātha gives us an elaborate analysis of rasa in almost all its aspects. He sums up at the outset the characteristics of rasa in two verses thus : "The rasa, arising from an exaltation of the quality of sattea or goodness, indivisible, self-manifested, made up of joy and thought in their identity, free from the contact of aught else perceived, akin to the realisation of Brahma, and having for its essence supernormal wonder (camatkara), is enjoyed by those competent in its inseparableness (as an object of knowledge) from the knowledge of itself". He explains camatkara as consisting of an expansion of the mind and as synonymous with vismaya. In this connexion. Visyanatha quotes with approval an opinion of his ancestor Narayana who put a premium on the sentiment of the marvellous (adbhuta rasa) and maintained that it was essential in all rasas.

into svāpnika (enjoyed in a dream), mānorathika (fanciful like a castle in the air) and aupanāyika (as depicted in poetry). He again gives us (ch. viii, p. 65, ed. Regnaud) a three-fold arrangement of rans with reference to its manner of manifestation: (i) abhimuka, when it is manifested by means of the bhīva, vibhāva and anubhāva (ii) vimukha, when these elements are not directly expressed; and so called because it is comprehensible with difficulty, (iii) paramukha, which has again two aspects according as it is (a) alanhāra-mukha, i. e. where the alanhāra is principal and the rasa is secondary. This includes probably the cases of figures like rasavat, which are included in gunībhūta-vyangya kāvya by the dhomi-theorists, (b) bhāva-mukha where the bhāva is in the same way principal.

It is also explained clearly that the rasa is identical with the enjoyment of itself, or, in other words, there is no distinction between the object and the operation in the apprehension of rasa; so that when we say the rasa is enjoyed, we only use a figurative expression. It follows from this that the enjoyment of rasa is different in its nature from the ordinary processes of knowledge.

Visvanātha insists very strongly on the necessity of vāsanā in the spectator, which consists of experience (idānīntanī) or instincts acquired from previous births (prāktanī). If one is not endowed with these germs of the capacity of appreciation, one may develop them by study of poetry and experience of life. In the case of the grammarian, the philosopher or one well-versed in the sacred lore, these susceptibilities are deadoned. If it is sometimes found that an eager student of poetry is still deficient in the capacity of relishing rasa, we must assume that it is the result of his accumulated demerit of a previous birth. Thus Visvanātha is anxious to show that experience and cultivation of the power of imagination are essential in one who seeks to enjoy rasa.

Visvanatha also insists that the vibhavas etc., as well as the dominant feeling (shhayi-bhava) must be felt as generic or impersonalised. The reader must not take the feeling as his own individual emotion; for it would then remain as his feeling (and never become rasa) and would sometimes (e.g., in the case of the pathetic sentiment) cause pain, and not joy. Nor should the feeling be taken as pertaining solely to the hero; for then it can

not, as the feeling of another person, affect the reader and become rasa. It is necessary, therefore, that the excitants etc., as well as the dominant feeling, should be generalised by a generic action (sādhāranī kṛti) inherent in themselves, which corresponds to the generic power (bhārakatva) postulated for poetry by Bhatta Nāyaka. This universalisation of the factors and the feelings enables the reader to identify himself with the personages depicted, and this conceit of community removes all difficulty about accepting extraordinary episodes of exalted personages who may be superior in virtue or prowess to the average reader. The excitants etc. are indeed normally called causes, but in reality the rasa is not an effect in the ordinary sense; for in the case of rasa there is the simultaneous presence of itself and its excitants, which is not true of an ordinary cause and offect. It is also pointed out that all the factors (vibhavas etc.,) need not be present at once, for the presence of one would revive the others by the law of association of ideas. In other words, what might seem wanting in the utterance of poetry is supplied, from the suggestive character of poetry itself, by force of association of ideas. It also follows from the character of rasa described above that it is not necessarily found in the actor, who in assuming the rôle of the hero performs his part only mechanically by rule and rote9; he ranks as a spectator (and

⁹ This follows Dhanañjaya's dictum that the enjoyment of rara is not precluded in the actor, if he realises in himself the feelings depicted.

therefore as a recipient of rasa) in so far as he is himself a man of taste and actually experiences the feelings he enacts.

(2)

In spite of the unquestioned dominance of the Dhyani School, which no doubt recognised the importance of rasa but regarded it as one of the phases of the unexpressed only, one class of writers, who still adhered to rasa as the only element worth considering in poetry, continued to devote exclusive attention to it and build up a system. so to say, on the basis of the rasa alone. all the rasas, however, as sympara (or love) forms the absorbing theme of Sanskrit poetry and drama in general, and as this particular poetic sentiment has an almost universal appeal, these writers naturally work out this important rasa in all its phases; and we have in consequence a series of eroticorhetorical treatises, of which the earliest known and the most remarkable is Rudrabhatta's Spagaratilaka 10. Rudra states distinctly at the beginning of his work that although Bharata and others

¹⁰ The topics dealt with in its three chapters are:

1. The rasas, the sthäyi-bhävas, the bhävas, the dramatic vettis, hengura and its division, the Näyaka his classification with illustrations, the assistants, the classification of the Näyikä, II. Characteristics of love-in-separation, of purvariga, the ten stages of love, the upāyas, etc. III. The other rasas, viz., hāsya, karuņa, randra, vira, bhayānaka, bībhatsa, adbhuta, and šūnta: the four vettis, appropriate to the rasas,

have spoken of rasa in the drama, his object is to apply it to the case of poetry, and that a kāvya, in his opinion, must possess rasa as its constant theme. Following upon this we have Bhoja's Srugara-prakāša 11, which (following the tradition of the Agni-purana) deals with the subject in the usual elaborate cyclopaedic manner of its author, with profuse illustrations of every phase of the erotic sentiment in no less than twenty chapters. After this come innumerable works of a similar nature 12, which take rasa, especially spagara, as their principal theme and which were composed apparently with the object of guiding the poet in the composition of crotic pieces so popular and profuse in Sanskrit poetry. Of these, the Bhacaprakiisa 15 of Saradatanaya, which reproduces the substance of most of the chapters of Bhoja's work, and the exhaustive Rasdrugue of Singa Bhupala, 14 a Tanjore prince of the 17th century, as well as the two well-known works of Bhanudatta15, deserve

¹¹ See Vol I, pp. 147-8.

¹² See Vol. I, pp. 241f, and chapter on Minor Writers.

¹³ See Vol. I, p. 242.

¹⁴ See Vol. I. p. 243f. The three vilasas of this extensive work deals with the following topics: I. The hero, his qualities, his classification, his adjuncts; the heroine, her classification and qualities, her sittvika excellences; the uddipana-vibhāvas; the riti and the gwpas; the dramatic vittis; the sattvika bhāvas. II. The vyabhicāri-bhāvas, the anubhāvas, the eight sthāvi-bhāvas, the eight rasas. III. The drama and its varieties, characteristics etc.

¹⁵ The eight tarangus of Rasa-tarangini are: I. Definition of bhava and subdivisions thereof; the sthavi-bhavas.

mention. But none of these later treatises adds anything new or original to a subject already thrashed out to its utmost.

A new turn was given to the theory by Rupa Gosvāmin's Ujjvala-nīla-maņi, which attempted to deal with rose in terms of the Vaisnava idea of ujjeala or madhura rasa, by which was meant the bragara rasa, the term sjirala having been apparently suggested by Bharata's description of that rasa 16. The madhur rasa, however, is represented not in its secular aspect but primarily as a phase of bhakti-rasa (madhurákhyo bhakti-rasah, i 3); for according to Vaisnava theology, there are five rasas forming roughly the five degrees of the realisation of lihakti or faith, viz., santa (tranquility), dasya (servitude or humility, also called priti), sakhya (friendship or equality, also called preyas), vātsalya (parental affection) and mādhurya (sweetness). The last, also called the ujjvala rasa, being the principal, is termed bhakti-rasa-rat17 and constitutes the subject-matter of the present treatise.

^{11.} The vibhāvas. III. The anubhīvas, IV. The eight sāttvika bhāvas. V. The vyabhicāri-bhāvas VI. The rasas and detailed treatment of srūgāra. VII. The other rasas. VIII. The sthāvi-bhāvajā and rasajā dreti. The Rasamahjari, a much smaller work, devotes more than half of itself to the nāyikā and her companions, and applies the rest to the nīgāra-nāyaka, his assistants, the eight sūttvika guņas, the two aspects of srūgāra and the ten stages of vipralanabha-srūgāra.

¹⁶ yat kiñeil loke buci medhyam ujjvalam daršanīyam vā tac chringāremipamīyate, ed. Grosset, pp. 89-90.

¹⁷ i 2, explained by Visvanatha Cakravartin as santa-

The kṛṣṇa-rati or the love of Kṛṣṇa forms the dominant feeling or sthayi-bhaca of this sentiment, and the recipient here is not the literary sahrdaya but the bhakta, or the faithful 18. This sthayi-bhava, known as madhurā rati, which is the source of the particular rasa, is defined in terms of the love of Krsna19; and the nature of nayaka and the nāyikā is defined in the same manner and their feelings and emotions illustrated by adducing examples from poems dealing with the love-stories of Krana and Radha. The work is, therefore, essentially a Vaisnava religious treatise presented in a literary garb, taking Krsna as the ideal hero, with the caution, however, that what is true of Kṛṣṇa as the hero does not apply to the ordinary secular hero (i 18-21)10

With the exception of the Ujjvala-nila-man, which attempts to bring crotico-religious ideas to bear upon the general theme of rasa, these special-

priti-preyo-vätsalyöjjvala-nämasu mukhyene.....sa evõjjvaläpara-paryäyo bhakti-rasänäm röjä madkurakhyo rasah.

¹⁸ svädyatvan hrdi bhaktänäm änttö kravanddibhih / eşä kṛṇṇa-ratth sthäyl bhāvo bhakti-raso bhavet, cited by Visva-nātha Cakravartin, p. 4.

¹⁹ maihurūkhyāyā rater lakṣaṇaṇ ūktam—mitho harer mṛgākṣyāi ca saṃbhogasyādi-kāraṇam | madhurāparaparyāyā priyatākhyāditā ratih, ibid, loc. cit.

²⁰ The orthodox theorists (cf Jagannātha pp. 45 f) would regard blinkti (which being based on anurāga or attachment cannot be comprehended by iānta rasa) as included in bhāva, being devādi-viṣayā rati, and as inadmissible as fully developed rasa. Cf Bhānudatta, Rasa-taranginī ch. vi.

ised treatises have, however, very little importance from the speculative point of view; and as they belong properly to the province of Erotics rather than Poetics, a treatment of them should be sought elsewhere. The simple idea, elaborated more or less in all these works, is that the awakening of rasa is all-important in poetry, and that the fundamental rasa is srugara or the erotic, which is consequently treated in its various phases with copious illustrations. This is clearly expressed in the attitude of the author of Agni-purage and of Bhoja, who accept only one poetic rasa, the erotic 11. In the same way, Rudrabhatta declares spagaro nayako rasah, (i 20), and Bhanudatta appears to take it for granted that aragara occupies an honoured place among all the rasas (tatra rasesu srugarasydbhyarhitatvena etc, ed. Benares, p. 21).

(3)

It is unnecessary, as it is unprofitable, in the discussion of general principles, to enter here into the elaborate definitions, distinctions and classifications of the amorous sentiment with all its varying emotional moods and situations, which these treatises industriously discuss and which have always possessed such attraction to mediaeval scholastic minds. The theorists delight in arranging into divisions and subdivisions, according to rank, chara-

²¹ See Vol. I, p. 148. Cf also Mandara-maranda-campii ix p. 107 (ed. Kāvyamālā).

cter, circumstances and the like, all conceivable types of the hero, the heroine and their adjuncts, together with the different shades of their gestures and feelings, in conformity with the tradition which already obtained in the cognate sphere of dramaturgy 22. Thus Rudrabhatta, after a preliminary enumeration and definition of the rasas and the bhavas, proceeds to speak of two aspects of spingara viz., sambhoga (love in union) and vipralambha (love in separation) "5, and classify the hero (nayaka) into the faithful (anukūla), the gallant whose attention is equally divided among many (daksina), the sly (satha) and the saucy (dhrsta), according to his character as a lover. Later writers, however, subdivide each of these, again, into the best (uttama), the middling (madhyama) and the lowest (adhama), and arrange the whole classification under the fourfold division of the genus hero into four useful

²² See Bharata chs. xxil-xxiv : Daiar lpaka iv 50f and iii.

This statement follows Bharata and is accepted by most theorists: but Dhanañjaya distinguishes three cases, privation (ayega), sundering (viprayega) and union (samblega): the first denoting the inability of lovers, through obstacles, to secure union, and the second arising from absence or resentment. The first case of love may pass through the well-known ten stages (longing, anxiety, recollection, praise of the beloved, distress, raving, insanity, fever, stupor and death; Cf Śińgabhūpāla ii 178-201); while the second condition may be caused by a quarrel, due to discovery or inference of unfaithfulness (which may be counteracted by six upūyas, viz., conciliation, winning over her friends, gifts, humility, indifference or distracting her attention) or by absence arising from business, accident or a curse.

types (i) the brave and the high-spirited (dhird-data) (ii) the brave and haughty (dhirdddhata) (iii) the brave and sportive (dhira-lalita) and (iv) the brave and serene (dhira-prasanta), thus giving us altogether forty-eight subdivisions of the hero^{4,2}. Then follows a brief description of the assistants of the hero^{3,5} in matters of love (narma-saciva), viz., the Comrade (pitha-marda), the Companion (vita) and the Buffoon (vidayaka), some adding ceta (or the servant) in the enumeration.

In the same way, the heroine is taken broadly in threefold aspects in her relation to the hero as his wife (sviyā), or belonging to another, (parakīyā) and as common to all (sāmānyā). The sviyā is subdivided again into the adolescent and artless (mugdhā), the youthful (madhyā), and the mature and audacious (pragalbhā), i.e., the inexperienced, the partly experienced and the fully experienced. The later

²⁴ The good qualities of the hero are innumerable. For his characteristics, see Dhananjaya ii 11; Visvanatha iii 301; Šingabhūpāla 1 611; also see Keith, Sanskrit Drama, pp. 3051.

The Pratinayaka or the enemy of the hero is dhirdidhata, haughtiness being his essential characteristic; but
he is described also as stubborn and vicious (Daka' ii 9;
Sāhityadarpaṇa iii 130, p. 136), The pithamarda of the
hero possesses, in a lesser degree, the qualities of the
hero (e.g. Makaranda in the Mālati-mādhava). The term
pithamardikā in the feminine occurs in the Mālavikāgnimitra
in the sense of a trusty go-between, applied to the nun Kaušiki,
The vila, usually neglected in the serious drama, except in
Cārudatta and Mrcchakalika, appears in all his glory in the
Bhāna, for which he is prescribed as the hero.

authors introduce greater fineness by subdividing each of these according to her temper, into the self-possessed (dhira), the not-selfpossessed (adhira). and the partially self-possessed (dhiradhira), or according to the rank, higher (jyestha) or lower (kanistha), each holds in the affection of the hero. The parakiya or anyadiya, which, according to Vaisnava ideas, is the highest type of the heroine 26, is twofold, according as she is maiden (kanyā) or married (udhā); while the sāmānyā heroine, who is sometimes extolled (Rudrabhatta) and sometimes deprecated (Rudrata), is only of one kind, the vesys or courtesan27. The sixteen types of heroine thus obtained are further arranged according to an eightfold diversity in their condition or situation in relation to her lover, viz., the heroine who has the lover under absolute control (swidhingpatika), the heroine disappointed in her assignation through misadventure or involuntary absence (utka), the heroine in full dress expectant of her lover (vāsaka-sajjikā), the heroine deceived (vipra-

²⁶ An amour with a married woman cannot, according to Rudraţa and Rudrabhaţţa form the subject of dominant nata in a play or poem: but this is the central theme of Vaiṣṇava lyrics.

²⁷ Bharata xxii 197-206: Dhanañjaya ii 21f: Viávanātha iii 67-70: Singabhūpāla i 121-51. Rarely a heroine, she must be represented as in love when she is a heroine: but she cannot be so when the hero is divine or royal. The exception occurs in a prakasana or farce (and incidentally in a bhāṇa or the erotic monologue) where she can be represented in her low and avaricious character for comic effect.

labdhā), the heroine separated by a quarrel (kala-hānataritā, also called abhisandhitā), the heroine outraged by the discovery of marks of unfaithfulness in the lover (khanditā), the heroine who meets her lover in assignation 24 (abhisārikā) and the heroine pining for the absence of her lover gone abroad (prosita-patikā). We arrive in this way at an elaborate classification of the heroine into three hundred and eighty-four types; and one of the later writers states characteristically that there are other types also, but they cannot be specified for fear of prolixity (Visvanātha, iii 88, p. 120).

But here the theorists do not stop. The hero is endowed further by a set of eight special excellences, as springing from his character (sattvika) : e.g. brilliance (#obhā) including heroism; cleverness, truthfulness, emulation with superiors and compassion to inferiors; vivacity (vilāsa) indicated by his glance, step and laughing voice; grace (madhurya) displayed in placid demeanour even in trying circumstances; equanimity (gambhirya) consisting in superiority to emotions; steadfastness (sthairya) in obtaining one's object; sense of honour (tejas) manifested in his impatience of insult; gallantry (lalita) in his word, dress or deportment; magnanimity (audārya) exhibited in generosity, agreeable words and equal treatment to friend or foe. The heroine is allowed a more generous set of qualities. First

²⁸ The usual meeting places are given as a ruined temple, a garden, the house of a go-between, a cemetery, the bank of a stream, or any dark place generally.

we have the three physical characteristics : bhave or first indication of emotion in a nature previously exempt, have or movement of eyes and brows indicating the awakening of emotion, held or the decided manifestation of feeling. Then we have seven inherent qualities : e. g. brilliance of youth, beauty and passion, the touch of loveliness given by love, sweetness, courage, meckness, radiance and selfcontrol. Then are enumerated her ten graces, to which Visvanatha adds eight more. All her gestures, moods or different shades of emotion, e g. giggling, trepidation, hysterical fluster of delight, involuntary expression of affection, self-suppression through bashfulness, affected repulse of endearments, as well as the deepest and tenderest display of sentiments, are minutely analysed and classified. To this is added a detailed description of the modes in which the different types of heroines display their affection, the maidenly modest demeanour of the mugdha or the shameless boldness of the more experienced heroine. We cannot refuse to recognise the subtle power of analysis and insight which these attempts indicate; but speaking generally, the analysis is more of the form than of the spirit, based on what we should consider accidents rather than essentials. At the same time, marked as it is by much of scholastic formalism, there is an unmistakable attempt to do justice to facts, not only as they appeared to the experience of these theorists but to the observation of general poetic usage; and in the elaborate working out of the general thesis that the rasa is evolved on the

basis of one or other of what they call the permanent mental moods, with the help of the various emotional adjuncts, the writers on Poetics have proceeded a long way in the careful analysis of poetic emotions, the psychology of which bears an intimate relation to their theory and in itself deserves a separate study.

(4)

The discussion of this extensive topic of the nāyaka and nāyikā comes in topically under the theory of vibhava and anubhava, which act as factors of rasa. The mood, which is at the root of sentiment, is held to be the athayi-bhava, the dominant feeling, the main theme of the composition in question. These feelings, according to Bharata, who is accepted on this point by all writers, can be classified into eight categories, viz., Love (rati), Mirth (hasa), Sorrow (soka), Anger (krodha), Energy (utsāha). Fear (bhaya), Disgust (jugapsa) and Astonishment (vismaya), though some later writers add, as we shall see, Tranquillity (same or nirveda) to the number. These dominant feelings are worked up into a corresponding number of sentiments or rasas through the means of the vibhāvas etc29. The vibhāvas or Excitants are said

²⁹ Theoretically the rasa is one, a single ineffable and impersonal joy, but it can be subdivided, not according to its own nature, but according to the emotions which form its basis. Bharata (ch. vi) and other theorists give a full description of the sthāyi-bhāvas, vibhāvas etc. in the

to be of two kinds³⁰, viz., (1) the Substantial or Essential (alambana), which consists of such material

case of each rasa, into which space forbids us to enter. A summary of it will be found in Lindenau, Rasalehre Leipzig 1913, pp. 18f. Thus, in the case of the heroic sentiment (vira), the dominant feeling is energy (utsaha): the excitants (vibàāvas) are coolness (asammoka), resolve (adhyavasāya), circumspection (aaya), strength (bala) etc.; the ensuants (anubhavas) are firmness (sthairya), heroism (kaurya), sacrifice (tyaga) etc ; the vyabhicarius or accessory feelings are those of assurance, arrogance etc. Visvanātlia gives them somewhat differently. The essential excitant (alambanavibhava) of the heroic sentiment, according to him, consists of those to be vanquished, and their acts and gestures form the enhancing excitants (addipana-vibhāvas); the ensuants comprehend the desire or seeking for assistants and adherents; while the accessory feelings are patience, intelligence, remembrance, cogitation etc. The sentiment may take three forms of courage (Bharata vi 79 = ed. Regnaud vi 80), viz., in battle (yuddha-vira), in virtuous deeds (dharma-vira) and in liberality (dina-vira), to which later writers (e.g. Viśvanātha) add dayā-viru. It should also be noted that a special colour and a presiding deity is attributed to each rusa, Thus, red, black, white, dark, (syama) and grey are associated, not unreasonably, with the furious, terrible, comic, erotic and pathetic sentiments, although it is difficult to explain why horror is dark blue (nila), wonder is orange, and heroism is yellow. The respective deities are Vispu (erotic), Yama (pathetic), Pramatha (comic), Rudra (furious), Indra (heroic), Kala (terrible), Mahakala (disgustful), Brahma (the marvellous), Visvanatha adds that Narayana is the presiding deity of of santa rasa and the colour associated is that of jasmin (kunda).

30 These two divisions of vibhava are not maintained by

and indispensable ingredients as the hero, the heroine, the rival here and their adjuncts, and (2) the Enhancing (uddipana), viz., such conditions of time, place and circumstance as serve to foster the rasa, e.g. the rising of the moon, the cry of the cuckoo etc. in the case of the erotic sentiment. The anubhavas or the Ensuants, which follow and strength en a mood, comprise such outward manifestations of feeling as side-long glances, a smile, a movement of the body, or such involuntary action of sympathetic realisation of the persons depicted (sattvika)81 as fainting (pralaya), change of colour (vaivarnya), trembling (vepathu) etc., which are, again dogmatically classified into eight varieties. There are other feelings of a more or less transitory nature, which accompany or interrupt the permanent mood without, however, supplanting it; and these are known, as we have noted, by the name of Accessories or vyabhicari-bhāvas. These are likened to the servants following a king or to the waves of the sea, whereby the dominant mood is understood as the king and the sea respectively, and classified elaboratetly into thirty-three categories, first mentioned by Bharata39 and implicitly accepted by his followers.

All these elements contribute towards developing the eight or nine sthāyi-bhāvas into eight or nine different types of rasa. We have the earliest and

Bharata but distinguished by Dhananjaya (iv 2) and traditionally handed down by Visyanatha.

³¹ See above p. 31, fn 53. The sattvika bhavas in later works form a special class of anubhavas.

³² See above p. 30.

the most orthodox mention in Bharata of eight sthayi-bhavas and the resulting eight rasas corresponding to them, of which the Erotic (\$rngara), the Heroic (vira), the Furious (raudra) and the Disgustful (bibhatsa) are the main, leading to four others, the Comic (hāsya), the Marvellous (adbhuta) the Pathetic (karusa) and the Terrible (bhayanaka). Dandin accepts this classification (ii 280-87), but Udbhata (iv 49) adds ** the Quietistic (santa) as the ninth rasa, although Bharata neither defines it nor mentions its corresponding vibhāvas. Rudrata is singular in postulating a tenth rasa, called the Agreeable (preyas), which is accepted by Bhoja and others. Rudrabhatta admits nine rasas in poetry ; so do Hemacandra and the two Vagbhatas. The Agni-purana in the same way mentions nine rasas, (and eight sthawi-bhavas), but follows Bharata in regarding four as principal and lava special stress on the Aragara. Those later authors who accept the ninth rasa, the Quietistic, necessarily postulate wireeda or self-disparagement, arising out of the knowledge of reality (tattva-jääna), as its ethäyibhava, which is called by some authorities sama, or repose resulting from freedom from mental excitement34.

The author of the Dasarapaka, however, contends that there can be no such sthāyi-bhāva as nirveda or sama, for the development of that state (if it

³³ if the verse is genuinely Udbhaţa's. See above p. 143, în 13.

³⁴ This sentiment is also closely related to the sentiment of disgust; for it arises from an aversion to worldly things.

is at all possible to destroy utterly love, hatred and other human feelings) would tend to the absence of all moods; and in the drama, the object of which is to delineate and inspire passion, it is inadmissible. Others, again, hold that the Quietistic rasa does exist, as it is experienced by those who have attained that blissful state, but it has no sthāyi-bhāva in dramatic composition; for nirveda, being the cessation of all worldly activity, or sama being freedom from all mental excitement, it is not fit to be represented. Hence Mammata takes eight rasas in the drama (p. 98) and nine in poetry (p. 117). Bhoja, in accordance with the views of the school which lays special emphasis on the syngara, accepts only one rasa, the Erotic, in his Syngara-prakasa; and although he mentions as many as ten rasas in his evelopsedic Sarasvatikanthabharana, including the santa and the preyes, he appears to devote almost exclusive attention to the srngara in his treatment of the rasas in this work. The views about the admissibility of the santa are discussed by the author of the Ekavali (pp. 96-7) who maintains that Bharata has mentioned nirveda as a vyabhicāri-bhāva immediately in context after the enumeration of the sthayi-bhavas and at the beginning of the list of the vyabhicaribhavas; and this fact is interpreted as indicating that the sage meant it both as a sthayi-bhava and as a vyabhicāri-bhāva; but Hemacandra (p. 81) anticipates and rejects this quibble of verbal interpretation, though agreeing with him in the general proposition as to the admissibility of santa as the ninth rasa,

Viśvanātha primarily admits eight orthodox rasas (iii. p. 160) but adds the ninth santa in deference to the views of these anthorities, and a tenth rasa, called vatsala or parental affection, subscribing apparently to Vaisnava ideas (pp. 185-6)35. He quotes a verse to explain that the mood, called by the great sages the Quietistic, which has, among all sentiments, tranquillity (sama) as its basis, is that state in which there is neither pain nor pleasure, nor hatred, nor affection, nor any desire 26, But the question arises how can the Quietistic, being of the nature described, arising only in a state of emancipation wherein there is an absence of all feelings like the Accessories etc., be rasa, which implies a state of relishable enjoyment 37. To this objection he replies that the Quietistic is a rasa because in that state the soul is only about to be emancipated (yukta-viyukta-dasa) and is not completely absorbed in the Divine, so that the presence of feelings, like the Accessories etc. in it, is

³⁵ Bhānudatta counts (Rasa-tarangipā) māyā under the rasas. Rudraţa mentioned prepas (friendship), which rasa is accepted by Bhoja. Some writers add braddhā, along with bhabti. See Bhānudatta, op. cit. p. 56, ll. 25f (ed. Regnaud). Singabhūpāla admits only eight rasas, but his treatment is from the standpoint of dramaturgy.

³⁶ na yatra duhkham na sukham na cintă, na dveņarăgau na ca kācid icchă / rasah sa săntah kathito munindraih, sarven bhāven sama-pradhānah //, cited also in Dasa' iv 49 (comm).

³⁷ ityévam-rűpasya köntasya mokmivastháyám evátmasvarűpápatti-laksanáyám prádurbhűtatvát tatra sahcáryúdinám abhávát katham rasatvam.

not incompatible. As for the statement that there is an absence of even pleasure in it, it is not contradictory, for it refers only to worldly pleasure38. Jagannatha, the latest authority on the subject, advocates nine rasas and maintains (pp. 29-30) that like all other rasas, the santa is capable of being represented and appreciated by the audience. Since the clever performance of the actor, representing such a state of mind, free from disturbance and not affected by passions or desire, is found in actual experience to produce an impression on the mind of the audience, it is their state of mind, exhibited by their silent and rapt attention, which ought to settle the question, The representation of absolute indifference or the actor's power of representing it is not the point in issue ; it is the capacity of the spectator who actually feels the sentiment. Jagannatha also adds that even those, who do not admit this rusa in the drama, should accept it in poetry from the fact that poems like the Mahābhārata have for principal theme the delineation of santa rasa, which is thus established by universal experience (akhila-lokdnubhava-siddhatvāt). Nagesa remarks on this that the santa rasa should also be admitted in the drams on this ground, inasmuch as the Prabodha-candrodaya is universally acknowledged as a drama (p. 30).

Coming to the essential basis of rasa, viz. the bhāva, we have seen that Bharata defines it in general terms as that which manifests the sense of poetry through the three kinds of re-

³⁸ yas cüsmin sukhübhävo pyuktas tasya vaişayikasukha-paratvān na virodhah.

presentation, vācika, āngika and sāttvika39; it is the emotion which ultimately becomes a sentiment, if it is dominant, and therefore, serves as the basis of rasa. But later authorities arrive at a greater precision and apply the term technically to those cases where there is no proper or complete development of rasa. Both Dhananjaya and Bhanudatta expand the definition of Bharata, the latter defining it as a deviation from the natural mental state (vikara) which is favourable to the development of rasa (rasanukula) and which may be either physieal (sarīra) or mental (antara); but Mammata fixes the conception as ratir devadi-visaya vyabhicari tathdifitah ('love having for its object a deity or the like, and also the suggested Accessory'), on which he adds the gloss adi-sabdan muni-guru-nrpa-putradivişayah, kanta-vişaya tu vyakta srngarah ('by the term the like are meant sages, preceptor, the king, son etc., the one having a beloved woman for its object becomes the crotic'). Govinda explains that the word rati here implies the sthayi-bhaca which has not attained to the state of rasa 40. What is meant is that when the sthayi-bhacas, like rati, have for their objects God, king, son and the like, or when the vyabhicari-bhavas are manifested as the principal sentiment in a composition, there is no rasa but bhava; and this definition is accepted by all writers after him.

³⁹ A fourth kind of abhinaya is sometimes added, viz., āhārya (extraneous) i.e. derived from dress, decoration etc.

⁴⁰ ratir iti sthäyi-bhavopalakyanam, devadi-vinayétyapy-aprapta-rasavasthopalaksanam, p. 206.

Thus Visvanatha explains the bhava as follows: sancārinah pradhānāni, devādi-visayā ratih / udbuddha-mātrah sthāyī ca, bhāva ity-abhidhīyate ! In other words, when the Accessories are principal, or when love etc., has a deity or the like for its object, or when a dominant feeling (sthāyi-bhāva) is merely awakened, we have baava. His own gloss upon the above verse explains it in this way. Although they are always concomitants of rasa in which they finally rest, such Accessories as are for the time being principally developed, like a servant for the time being followed by his king in his marriage procession; or love etc. having a deity, a sage, a spiritual guide, a king and the like for its object; or such sthayi-bhacas as are merely awakened or have not attained the state of a rasa from their not being fully developed, are denoted by the term bhava. In all these cases apparently there is no complete or proper development of rasa; and a bhava, there-

fore, in later terminology, may be generally described as an incomplete rasa. But this must be distinguished from the rasabhāsa or semblance of rasa and the analogous bhāvābhāsa, which occur when the poetic sentiments and emotions are falsely attributed (e.g. sentiment in animals such as described in Kumāra-sambhava, III. 36-7), or when they are brought out improperly, i.e. when there is a lack of entireness in them as regards their ingredients ⁴¹. The cases occur, according to Bhoja (v 20), when

⁴¹ anaucitya-pravrttatve übhüsa rasa-bhüvayoh, explained as anaucityam chtra rasünüm bharatüdi-pranita-laksanünüm sümagri-rahitatve tveka-desa-yogitvopalaksana-param bodhyam,

the mood or emotion is developed in an inferior character (hīna-pātra), in animals (tiryak), in the rival hero (nāyaka-pratiyogia) or in any other subordinate object (gausa padārtha) *2, but Višvanātha elaborately summarises various other cases (iii 263-66), especially noting improprieties in connexion with particular rasas. Thus there is an impropriety if the Terrible (bhayānaka) is made to reside in a noble personage, or the Comic (hāsya) in a spiritual guide. It must be noted, as Jagannātha explains, that if a mood or feeling is developed by impropriety, the impropriety, unless it acts as a bar, does not constitute a fault *3.

In the same way, (1) when there is an excitement only of sentiments, (2) when two opposing sentiments, striving for mastery, are represented as being relished in one and the same place and at the same time, or (3) when a number of sentiments, of which each succeeding one puts down the preceding, they constitute respectively bhāvādaya, bhāva-saṃdhi and bhāva-sabalatā. Now, all these phases of the sentiments are taken as rasa topically, inasmuch as they are capable of being tasted (sarve'pi rasanād rasāh). These cases do not seem to have been formally recognised by Bharata, though hinted at by him in vi 40, as we learn from Abhinava's commentary on ch. vi, which is partially

⁴² Šingabhūpāla (pp. 141-2) distinguishes two cases (i) where rasa is ascribed to an inanimate object and (ii) where it is developed in an inferior character or in animals.

⁴³ yavata tvanaucityena rasasya puelis tavat tu na varyate, rasa-pratikulaspaiva tasya nizedhatvat.

reproduced also in his "Locana, p. 66. They are first met with in Udbhata, who includes them under urjasoin (iv 6); but in Rudrata (xii 4) and the Dhvanikāra (ii 3) we find them definitely established.

This incomplete development of rasa and its subordination must be distinguished from the cases of the opposition (virodha) of simultaneously existing sentiments in the same theme. It is laid down formally that some rasas are intrinsically inconsistent with one another, e.g., the Erotic is opposed to the Disgustful, the Heroic to the Quietistic, and so forth44. The incongruity or opposition results in three ways, viz., (1) from identity of the exciting cause (alambana-vibhara) (2) from the identity of the subject of emotion and (3) from immediacy of succession. The incongruity in the first two cases may be removed by representing the sentiments as having different exciting causes respectively, or as existing in different subjects (e.g. in the hero and the rival hero). The last case of conflict may be removed by placing, between the two immediately

⁴⁴ Some rasas again are mutually consistent, e.g. karuna and bibhatsa go with vira; śrigūra goes with hūsya (cf Bharata vi 40) etc. On this question see Lindenau, Rasalchre (pp. 71f.) According to Viśvanātha, the rasas hostile (i) to śrigūra are karuna, bibhatsa, rasadra, vira and bhayānaka (ii) to hūsya—bhayūnaka and karuna (iii) to karuna—hūsya, and śrigūra (iv) to raudra—hūsya, srigūra and bhayūnaka (v) to vira—bhayūnaka and šūnta (vi) to bhayūnaka—śrigūra, vira, raudra, hūsya and šūntā (vii) to šūnta—vira, śrigūra, raudra, hūsya, and bhayūnaka (viii) to bibhatsa—śrigūra, Bhānudatta gives the antagonistic rasas as follow: śrigūra—bibhatsa; vīra—bhayūnaka; raudra—adbhuta; hūsya—karuna.

succeeding sentiments, a sentiment which is not opposed to them. These are cases where two or more rasas stand in the relation of principal and subordinate: the term 'subordinate' being misleading, it is sometimes called a concomitant rasa (sañcāria), which implies that it cannot terminate absolutely in itself and at the same time is distinct from a fully developed rasa, as well as from a mere undeveloped bhava45. There is also no incongruity where a conflicting rasa is recalled or described under a comparison. All these questions properly come under the theory of propriety or aucitya in relation to rasa, elaborated by Anandavardhana and his followers, and is ultimately based on the dictum attributed to the Dhyanikara (p. 145, of Locana p. 138), which lays down in general terms that the secret of rasa lies in conforming to the established rules of propriety.

The doctrine of the Dhranydloka that in a composition in which the sentiment is awakened, proprieties of various kinds (e.g. with reference to the speaker, the theme, the employment of the vibhāvas etc., the use of the alankāras and other elements, pp. 134f, 144f) should be observed, and that certain items of conflict (virodha) with the dominant sentiment should be avoided, gave rise to a theory of propriety, which is generally comprehended by later writers under the discussion of the dosas of rasa. Thus, in later treatises, the rasa-dosas occupy

⁴⁵ ata evitra pradhānētareņu raseņu svātantrya-višrāmarāhityāt, pūrņarasa-bhāva-mātrāc ca vilakņaņatayā, sahcārirasa-nāmnā vyapadešuh prācyānām, Višvanātha. p. 420.

a separate and important place, in addition to the conventional dosas of pada-, padartha-, vākya-, väkyártha-dosas recognised since Vamana's time. It is Ksemendra alone who emphasises the importance of the subject by making it the theme of his well known Aucitya-vicara-carca which will be noticed in its proper place. Mahimabhatta, in the second chapter of his work, considers the question of anaucitya in some detail. According to him, impropriety or incongruity has two aspects, according as it refers to sabda or to artha respectively. Then he speaks of propriety as external (bahiranga) or internal (antaranga), apparently as it is sabda-visaya or artha-visaya. The cases of internal propriety, which consists in the proper employment of the vibhavas etc., have already been explained by previous writers (e.g. the Dhvanyáloka pp. 144f); Mahimabhatta, therefore, takes up the question of external propriety, which he thinks falls under five faults of composition, viz., vidheydvimaréa (non-discrimination of the predicate), prakrama-bheda (violation of uniformity in the expression), krama-bheda (syntactical irregularity), paunaruktya (tautology) and vacydvacana (omission of what must be expressed), to the explanation and exemplification of which he devotes, amidst several digressions, the rest of the chapter. It is difficult to say why these faults of expression alone are singled out as defects resulting in a violation of rasa (rasa-bhanga). Later writers would include them under general defects, reserving the cases of virodha or opposition of rasas as specific instances of rasa-dosas.

IX. WRITERS ON KAVI-SIKSA

(1)

The small group of writers who deal with the theme of kavi-siksa ("education" of the poet) does not, strictly speaking, come directly under general Poetics, but deserves notice, partly from the reputation and authority enjoyed by some of these authors but chiefly because it displays a peculiar tendency which emphasises one aspect of Poetics as a discipline, namely, its practical object which developed side by side with the theoretical consideration of general principles. These treatises do not deal with the conventional topics of Poetics, with its theories, dogmas and definitions, but they are meant chiefly as manuals to guide the post in his profession, their primary object being kavi-sikea or instruction of the aspiring poet in the devices of the craft, It is difficult, in the absence of data, to determine the origin of this school, but the attitude adopted is significant, being almost co-extensive with what may be supposed to have been the original standpoint of Poetics itself as a more or less mechanical 'Ars Poetica' 1. The socient as well as the modern writers on general Poetics, no doubt, touch occasionally upon the question of the practical training of the poet2; and it is not improbable that this,

t See above pp. 42-43 and footnote.

² See above pp. 52f.

in course of time, formed the object of a separate study and multiplied these convenient hand-books, of which necessarily we possess comparatively late specimens.

Ksemendra's two works, Aucitya-picara and Kavi-kanthahharana, which may be conveniently grouped here, are curious and valuable in many respects. In his theory of queitya or propriety, he takes as his thesis, mainly, Anandavardhana's treatment of the same question with reference to rasa which is crystallised in the oft-quoted verse from the Dhuanydloka: "There is no other circumstance which leads to the violation of rasa than impropriety : the supreme secret of rasa consists in observing the established rules of propriety"s. To depict rasa, it is necessary to observe the rules of propriety ; and the subject, which is anticipated by Bharata (who, for instance, speaks of the proper employment of anubhāvas), may take various forms according as it relates to the subject-matter, the speaker, the nature of the sentiment evoked or the means employed in evoking it. We have already noted that this theme has been discussed topically at some length by the formulators of the dhvani-theory, by Mahimabhatta, as well as by most post-dhvani writers who consider it generally in connexion with rasadoşas. Kşemendra develops and pushes the idea to its extreme, and speaks of aucitya as the essence of rasa (rasa-jīvitabhūta), and as having its foundation in the charm or aesthetic pleasure (camatkāra)

³ anaucityād rte nānyad rasa-bhangasya kāraņam | prasiddaucitya-bandhas tu rasayopanisat parā ||

underlying the relish of rasa. The alamkaras and gunas in poetry are justified by and receive their respective significance from this element, which may, therefore, be fittingly regarded as the 'soul' of poetry*. That which is suitable or conformable to another is called ucita in its relation to that object5. This aucitya may have application with reference to various points in a poem, such as a word (pada), a sentence (vakya), the sense of the composition as a whole (prabandhartha), its literary excellences (quas) its poetic figures (alamkaras), the rasa or the sentiment in a poem, the employment of the verb (kriyā), the use of the case (kāraka), of the gender (linga), of the number (racana), of preposition, adjective, particles (upasarga), or considerations of time and place (desa and kala) etc.; and the cases of application are dogmatically summarised as twenty-seven in number (#. 8-10). The treatment of each of these cases is accompanied by profuse illustrations of every point from the works of various poets, the favourite method being first to cite examples of verses which comply with a rule and then adduce one or two examples of verses which do not do so. There is hardly anything original in the theory itself; for though it rightly insists upon a standard of propriety in poetic expression, it ultimately resolves itself into assuming a more or less variable criterion of taste or personal appreciation, which Anandavardhana

⁴ ed. Kavyamālā, pt. i, pp. 115-16.

⁵ ucitam prāhur ācāryāh sadršam kila yasya yat, explained by the gloss as yat kila yasyānurūpam tad ucitam ucyate.

and others admit as sahrdayatva, but which is bound to be, as it is, rather vaguely defined and therefore incapable of exhaustive formal treatment. It is really the province of taste or criticism, rather than of Poetics proper.

At the same time, the fact must not be overlooked that works of this nature in Sanskrit, ostensibly meant as they are for the guidance of the aspiring poet, display, in their discussion of what is right and proper in poetry, a tendency towards genuine criticism, taken spart from the beaten paths of orthodox Poetics; and they set up in their naive way a standard, whatever it may be, of taste and critical judgment. No doubt, most writers on general Poetics, betray some critical acumen and give us a great deal of critical or semi-critical matter while considering the application of a rule or principle, especially in the chapters on dosa and guna; but their outlook is often and necessarily limited by their confining themselves to rigid rules and specific definitions. Ksemendra's work, in this

⁶ The growth of artificial poetry, we have seen, made the technical analysis of rhetoric, and instruction of it, a necessity: but rhetoric involves (and sometimes becomes identical with) criticism; and it is almost impossible for Alamkārikas, who also theorised on principles, not to busy themselves with the forms and general phenomena of literature. Thus most works, whether on general poetics or on rhetoric, did involve some amount of criticism which could not be avoided. It must also be borne in mind that our modern ideas of Aesthetics, Poetics or Rhetoric are not sharply distinguished in these old authors, nor was there any well-defined notion of the respective spheres of these

respect, possesses a unique value, and the part of his treatment which discusses the illustrative verses is extremely interesting as an evidence of "appreciation" which is comparatively rare in Sanskrit. Ksemendra deals out praise and censure, within his limits, as a true critic who is no respector of persons; even the honoured names of Amaru, Kalidāsa or Bhavabhūti make no difference. In more than one instance, he illustrates two sides of a question, regarding both merit or defect laid down by a rule, by different verses from his own work; and in some cases he does not hesitate to go against orthodox opinion?. Whatever may be the intrinsic value of his critical dicta, some of which may appear too trivial or crude to us, he shows a wide acquaintance with the whole range of classical Sanskrit Poetry and an undoubtedly cultured taste.

from existing classical Sanskrit literature which, though magnificent in partial accomplishment, was not fully equipped for purposes of general criticism. The absence of any other literature for comparison—for later Prakrit and allied specimens are mainly derivative—was a serious drawback. This will explain partially why their outlook is so limited, and their principles and definitions so stereotyped.

7 e. g. while discussing the question of propriety of the contents of a composition, he cites (p. 120) from Kumāra-sambhava viii—which canto he accepts as Kālidāsa's—and severely censures the poet's manner of describing the amours of Hara and Pārvatī in terms of ordinary dalliance, against the authority of Anandavardhana who defends (p. 137) it against the imputation of vulgarity.

If the common saying that a bad poet often turns out to be a good critic carries any wisdom in it, it is very apt in the case of Ksemendra whose critical powers cannot indeed be ignored.

Ksemendra's other work, Kavi-kanthabharanas, though less interesting, is equally remarkable for its refreshingly novel treatment. Ksemendra postulates two impulses for the attainment of poetic capacity, viz., divine help (divya-prayatna) and individual effort (paurusa). The first includes prayer, incantation and other heavenly aids; but from the latter standpoint, he classifies three groups of persons with whom instruction in the art of poetry is concerned, viz., those who require little effort (alpa-prayatna-sādhya), those who require great effort (krechra-sādhya), and those in whom all effort is fruitless (asadhya), and sums up by saying that the capacity for poetry is vouchsafed only to the fit and few. The next chapter discusses with illustrations the question of borrowing or plagiarism, a theme which is just touched upon in the third chapter of the Dhoanydloka, but which is dealt with

⁸ A sketch of this work will be found in Ksemendra's Kavikanthalbharana by J. Schönberg (Wien, 1884), pp. 9f. The five samdhis or sections of this work deal respectively with the following themes: (i) attainment of poetry by an unpoetical person (ahaveh kavitodptih), (ii) instruction of the poet already gifted (šiksā prāpta-girah kaveh), (iii) the faults and excellences of poetry, (iv) familiarity which a poet should possess with other arts and sciences as a source of charm to his poetry (paricaya-cărutva).

⁹ Cf Vámana 1. 2. 1-5; Rájašekhara IV.

extensively by Rajasekhara 10. Ksemendra divides poets from this point of view into those who imitate the general colour of a poet's idea (chayopajivin), those who borrow a word or a verse-line (padakaand pada-upajivin), or an entire poem (sakalópajivin) and lastly, those who are taken by the whole world as legitimate sources (bhuvanopajivya, e.g., Vyasa). Then he lays down elaborate rules for regulating the life, character and education of the poet. This is followed by a discussion of camatkara or poetic charm, without which, we are told, no poetry is possible, and the illustration (by means of examples draw from the works of various poets) of its tenfold aspect, according as it appeals with or without much thought (avicarita-ramaniya or vicaryamana-ramantya 11), resides in a part or in the whole composition, appertains to the sound, the sense or both, or relates to the poetic figure, to the sentiment, or to the well known nature of the theme. Then we come to the treatment of the excellences and defects with reference to the sense (artha), the verbal

is unlimited, in spite of the fact that hundreds of poets have composed works for centuries; but the thoughts of two inspired poets may bear certain resemblance, which may be like that between an object and its reflection, between a thing and its picture, or between two human beings. The first two kinds of resemblance should be avoided, but the third is charming (iii 12-13).

¹¹ Rājašekhara attributes a dictum to Udbhaţa which says that the sense may be vicārita-sustha or avicārita-ramaṇāya, according as it is found in the sūstra or the kāvya respectively. See above p. 75, fn 29.

expression (sabda), or the poetic sentiment (rasa) involved; and the work is rounded off by fixing the extent of knowledge which a poet must possess and giving a long list of the arts and sciences in which he must be proficient, which is thus set forth : tatra tarka-vyākarana-bharata-cānakyavālsyāyana-bhārata-rāmāyana-moksopāyātmajāānadhātuvāda-ratnapariksā-vaidyaka-jyantisa-dhanurveda-gaja-turaga-purusa-laksaya-dyūtė įdrajāla-prakirnesu paricayah kavi-sāmrājya-vyanjanah. rapid summary of the contents of this work will show that it hardly puts forward any special claim as a work of great theoretic importance, but that its value consists not in its substance but in its treatment of practical issues, in its careful and minute illustration of every point by examples taken from previous poets, with not a little amount of knowledge and critical discornment.

(2)

The Kāvya-kalpalatā-vṛtti of Arisimha and Amaracandra and the Kavi-kalpalatā of Devesvara, written in imitation of that work, need not detain us long. They are essentially treatises on the composition of verses, including a practical treatment of prosody and rhetoric. They furnish elaborate hints on the construction of different metres, on the display of word-skill of various kinds, on jeux de mots and tricks of producing double meaning, conundrums, riddles, alliterative and rhyming verses, and various other devices of verbal ingenuity, concluding with a chapter on the construction of similes and enumeration of parallelisms for the purpose of ordinary
comparisons. It gives also a list of kavi-samayas
or conventions observed by the poets, and states
in detail what to describe and how to describe
it. These decadent treatises, therefore, offer such
adventitious aids for ready-made poetry, as may—
to take a particular point—be afforded, for instance,
by a modern rhyming dictionary or works of similar
nature.

A summary of the main topics dealt with in the Kavya-kalpalata and its vrtti will make the standpoint clear and give an idea of the general scope and nature of such works. The first pratana of this work is called chandah-siddhi (prosody) and consists of five sections on (i) the construction of the anustup metre (anustup-sasana). (ii) enumeration of the principal metres, shifts in grammatical forms of the verb, Prakrit loan-words (where Hemacandra seems to be superficially quoted), transmutation of one's own or another poet's ideas into the same or different metres, conversion of one metre into another, caesura (yati), the whole section being generally entitled chandobhyasa. (iii) use of expletive particles and words for filling up the verse (chandah-purana), such as sri, sam, sat, drak, vi, pra etc. (sāmānya-sabdaka). (iv) argumentation, pointed sayings, subjects of laudation or vituperation, interrogations e.g. in kula-šāstrādi, spa-šāstrādhyayana-prathā etc. (vāda). (v) subjects for descriptive poetry, and how to describe the king. ministers, the prince, the army, battle and hunting,

as well as a city, a village, a garden, a lake and so forth; enumeration of the kavi-samayas (varnya-sthiti). The second chapter, called sabdasiddhi treats of etymology, derived meanings of compounds, alliteration and rhyme in the middle of a verse, with a list of words suitable for this purpose, enumeration of sambandhin expressions; denoted, indicated and suggested meanings, showing the influence of the Dhyani school. The chapter, entitled slesa-siddhi, upon play on words of various kinds, consists of the following sections : (i) composing of words in such a way that they can be read differently according as they are divided, with a list of tlesopayogi words, (ii) a kind of sless occuring in the description of an object by analogies, in each of which the same quality or condition has to be traced in the same words or in synonyms, (iii) cases of double meaning, produced by homonyms capable of widely different interpretations, (iv) ambiguity produced by similarity of inflections of different origins, (v) surprises of different kinds, such as verses in which the same consonant or vowel is repeated in each syllable, verses spread out in disgrams to be read in different ways, e.g. according to the move of the knight in chess etc :- a subject which is treated in some detail, for instance, in the Vidagdha-mukhamandana of Dharmadasa Sūri13. The last chapter called artha-siddhi, is devoted to the construction of similes, ellipsis and similar figures, and gives long

¹² The subject is dealt with as early as Dandin, Rudraţa, and the Agni-purana.

lists of parallelisms arising from like conditions or attributes of the objects compared, e.g. the lips may be compared to the coral, to the bimba fruit or fresh-blown twigs and so forth.

A large part of this treatment is reproduced in Kesava's Alamkara-sekhara, as well as in Devesvara's Kavi-kalpalata, the latter work being directly modelled on the Kavya-kalpalata with considerable plagiarism of passages in extenso. These works, therefore, do not require any separate notice : and although Kesava's text deals, besides this, with the ordinary topics of Poetics, set forth as the views of his master Sauddhodani, but in substance and form following the views of Mammata, Hemacandra and the Vagbhatas, it thus possesses hardly any claim to originality either in theory or in treatment. Most of the works of Jaina authors, even including those of Hemacandra and the Vagbhatas, are written apparently from the practical standpoint of composing a suitable text-book, and they always, in their discussion of general principles, incorporate hints on matters helpful for the practical working out of poetry 13.

(3)

Although written in a fanciful style and hardly presenting one systematic theory, Rajasekhara's Kāvya-mīmāṃsā may be noticed here, inasmuch

¹³ e.g. Hemacandra, pp. 5-15, 126-135; the younger Vagbhaţa pp. 38-68. Both borrow largely from Kşemendra and Rājašekara.

as it mixes up the topics of kaci-siksā with those of Poetics proper, at the same time giving us a somewhat rambling treatment of various extraneous matters. The work is also remarkable for its varied collection of different opinions, as well as for the light it throws on the literary practices of a certain period. Its views cannot be directly connected with any particular school, but it is quite possible that its author follows in the main a tradition of opinion inherited from his literary ancestors, whom he frequently quotes as the yāyāvarīyas.

The origin of Poetics is attributed by Rajasekhara to the Supreme Being and the celestials, and he claims a very high position for the discipline, which is regarded as the seventh anga without which the significance of Vedic texts cannot be grasped. The self-born Srikantha taught this science to his sixty-four will-born disciples, among whom the most venerable was the Kavya-purusa, born of Sarasvati, and he figures as the nominal hero of this half-allegorical work. As Prajapati set him to promulgate the science to the world, he imparted it to his seventeen divine pupils, Sahasrāksa and others, who embodied it in eighteen separate adhikaranas on the portions learnt by each 14. Our author seeks to set forth in one book, consisting of eighteen adhikarayas, the substance of these teachings, which were in his time, to some extent, lost. If we are to accept this plan of the author, only the first adhikarana on kavi-rahasya exists

¹⁴ See Vol. 1, pp. 1-2.

of this ambitious work. The Kāvya-puruṣa, from whom metrical speech first began and who stands symbolically for the spirit of poetry, is the son born to the goddess of learning, Sarasvatī, as the result of her long penance on the Himālayas. In order to keep the boy company, Sarasvatī creates Sāhityavidyā as his bride who follows him and wins him over. On this slight conceit the book proceeds to set forth its peculiar doctrines, including in its desultory scope various literary remarks and dogmas, as well as topics like general geography, conventions observed by poets, a disquisition on the seasons, an account of kavi-gosthi and other relevant and irrelevant subjects.

The work begins (ch. ii) by dividing literature (vānmaya) into sāstra (both human and revealed) on the one hand, and karya, on the other. It enumerates the different sastras and defines their nature and form, including under the revealed sastras the Vedas, the Upanisads, and the six angas (the Yāyāvarīyas taking Alamkāra-sāstra as the seventh). and comprehending the Puranas, Itihasa, Anviksiki, the two Mimamsas and the Smrtis under human sastras. It then mentions fourteen (or eighteen) vidyā-sthānas, bringing under it several technical and philosophical disciplines. The meanings of the terms sūtra, vṛtti, bhāṣya, samīkṣā, tikā, panjikā, kārikā and vārttika, which are the different forms or styles of the sastras, are then explained, incidentally giving an etymological definition of sahitya-vidya15. Then, after a digression on the fable of the Kāvya-

¹⁵ See above p. 47, in 4

purusa, the author goes on to deal with the different kinds of pupils to whom a knowledge of the science can be imparted, viz., buddhiman and aharya-buddhi, the latter of who may be again anyatha-buddhi and durbuddhi, and discusses in this connexion the force of šakti (genius), pratibhā (poetic imagination), vyutpatti, (culture) and abhyasa (practice). The Yayavarīyas think that sakti is the only source of poetry and gives rise to pratibhā and vyutpatti; but others hold that the aid of concentration (samadhi) and practice (abhyāsa) is also required. The pratibhā16 may have a twofold aspect, according as it is creative (kāravitrī) or discriminative (bhāvayitrī). The creative faculty may be natural (sahoja), adventitious (aharya) or acquired by instruction (aupadesika), and poets are accordingly classified as sarasvata, abhayasika and aupadesika. The discriminative faculty (bhavakatva) is distinguished from the poetic (kavitva). The bhavaka may be either 'the discontended (arocakinab, i.e., who possesses the faculty but requires to be guided), 'those feeding on grass' (satradbhyacahārisab, i.e., the vulgar person absolutely devoid of the faculty17), 'the envious' (matsarinah), and lastly, 'the really discerning' (tattedbhinivetinah) who is rare.

In the next chapter we have elaborate classifications of the poet from different points of view. Poets may be grouped generally into three classes,

¹⁶ defined as yā habda-grāmam artha-sārtham alamkāratantram mukti-mārgam anyad api tathā-vidham adhihrdayam pratibhāsayati sā pratibhā.

¹⁷ Cí Vámana I. 2. 1-3.

the sastra-kavi, the kavya-kavi and the ubhayakavi. The sāstra; kavi may either compose the sāstra, or produce kāvya-effect in the sāstra or sāstraeffect in the kāvya. The kāvya-kavi is classified elaborately, if not very logically, into eight groups, viz., racanā-kavi, sabda-kavi, artha-kavi, alamkārakavi, ukti-kavi, rasa-kavi, marga-kavi and šāstrārthakavi. Then we have an enumeration of ten grades of apprenticeship through which a poet has to pass until he becomes a kapi-rāja, which is indeed not the highest distinction but which, according to Rajasekhara, who was himself so designated, indicates a status even higher than that of a mahakavi. Elsewhere in ch. x, he gives an account of the test or literary examination of poets for such honour and recognition, in which the successful poet is conveyed in a special chariot and crowned with a fillet (patta-bandha). He speaks also of purity of body, speech and thought necessary for a poet, and describes the house of the poet, his attendants, his writing materials, the division of his whole day into eight parts and duties appropriate thereto, chapter under discussion concludes with a reference to the theory of pake 15, of which as many as nine varieties, named after the taste of different fruits. are mentioned.

The next chapter deals with the word and the sentence, and their functions, grammatical, logical or otherwise. In this connexion Rājašekhara states that a sentence possessing the literary excellences (guņas) and embellished by poetic figures (alaṃkāras)

¹⁸ See above pp. 301 fn

constitutes poetry (quaavad alamkrtam ca vākvam eva kāvyam,p. 24). If any definite conclusion can be drawn from this statement, Rajasekhara, in general theory, appears to recognise tacitly the position of the Riti school; for in this sentence he reproduces Vāmana's well-known dictum (kāvuašabdo'yam gunalamkara-samsketayoh šabdarthayor vartate, on L L 1). This is supported also by the apparent disfavour he shows towards the view of Udbhata and Rudrata, as well as by the marked partiality attached to the opinions of Mangala and Vamana, whose classification of riti is accepted on p. 31. It is true that his school lays special stress also on rasata, and, like most writers coming after Anandavardhana, Rajasekhara does not fail to bring rasa into prominence. This makes it difficult to take his work as framed definitely for any particular system. But it is clear that his sympathies ally him with the older Riti and Rasa schools, rather than with the new school of Anandavardhana, who, though cited at p. 16, does not appear to have influenced his views greatly. It is probable that he is following some old tradition, which stands apart from orthodox schools, but which has many things in common with the older currents of thought and opinion.

The rest of the work, devoted to topics of a similar character, does not throw any further light on his general view of Poetics. The seventh chapter, which comes next, analyses the modes of speech on a novel basis, referring to the promul-

e.g., kin tu rasavata eva nibandho yuktah, na nirasasya
 45.

gators of different religious doctrines, into brahma, saiva and vaisnava, with their sectarian subdivisions; and after a brief mention of the three ritis of Vamanaso, we have some remarks on the methods of reading or pronunciation of different peoples, incidentally discussing the question of appropriate language and style of gods, apsarasas, pisācas The eighth chapter enumerates the sources or auxiliaries of poetry (kārya-yonayah), already referred to by Bhāmaha (i 9) and Vāmana (t. 3), such as the scriptures, the law-books, the epics, the Puranas etc., and gives a long list of arts and sciences, as well as philosophical systems, which contribute to the content of poetry 21. The next chapter is concerned with the possible themes of poetry, topically referred to by Anandavardhana (p. 146), according as it deals with incidents and personages, human, divine, or pertaining to the

²⁰ Rājašekhara's account of the origin of ritis is curious. He says that on account of the Sāhityavidyā's wanderings through various countries, different poetic forms evolved themselves, the important among them being the three ritis mentioned by Vāmana.

²¹ These are: bruti, smṛti, itihāsa, purāṇa, pramāṇavidyā, samaya-vidyā, rāja-siddhānta-trayī (artha-bāstra, nāṭyabāstra und kāma-šāstra), loka, viracanā (= kavi-manīṣā-nirmitaṃ kathā-tantram artha-mātraṃ vā), and prakīṇaka (miscellaneous, like hasti-sikṣā, ratna-parīkṣā, dhanur-veda etc.).
In ch. x. he speaks of (i) kāvya-vidyās, viz., nāma-dhātupārāyaṇa (= grammar) abhidhāna-keia (lexicon), chando-viciti
(prosody) and alaṃkūra (poetics), (ii) 64 kalās, called upavidyās (accessory studies) and (iii) kāvya-mātarah, viz., kavisannidhi, deba-vārttā, vidagāha-vāda loka-yātrā, vidvad-goṣlhī,
and purātana-kavi-nibandha.

lower world (pātāla), by themselves or in different combinations. Two very interesting chapters follow on the elaborate 42 classification of the different shades of borrowing or plagiarism (harana), with reference respectively to borrowing of words and borrowing of ideas. A verse is cited towards the end which says that there is hardly any poet who does not 'steal' from others, but the best of stealing is cleverly concealing the fact 45. But mere reflection or copying of ideas is condemned as unpoetical (so'yam kaver akacitvadöyi sarvathā pratibimba-kalpah pariharaniyah, p. 68). The true poet is said to be one who discovers something novel in the expression of words and ideas, as well as restates what is old a. The next chapter, therefore, details thirty-two different modes by which plagiarism or literary borrowing may be skilfully turned to advantage (a question which must have assumed some importance in in Rajasekhara's time), all the points in these interest-

plagiarise and reproduce this portion of Rajašekhara's treatment and draw also partly from Kaemendra (see above p. 361f). On these passages, see F. W. Thomas in Bhandarkar Commemoration Volume, pp. 379-383). To Anandavardhana's classification of three kinds of resemblance which may be found in two poets (see above p. 362 in 10) these writers add a fourth kind, viz., "foreign-city-entrance" likeness (parapura-praveia-pratimatā), i.e., where there is substantial identity, but the garnishing is widely different. And of these four kinds, the superiority is in the ascending order.

²³ nästyacaurah kavi-jano nästyacauro vanig-janah ; sa nandati vinä väcyam yo jänäti nigühitum //

²⁴ kabdarthöktişu yah paiyed iha kihcana nütanam ! ullikhet kihcana prücyam manyatam sa mahakavih ||

ing chapters being profusely illustrated by examples drawn from the works of various poets. This discussion is followed by three chapters on the established poetic conventions (kavi-samaya), with reference to countries, trees, plants, flowers etc., as well as about intangible things (e. g., a smile should always be described as white). There are two more chapters on geography (desa-vibhāga) and the seasons (kāla-vibhāga) respectively, the former mentioning the countries, rivers, mountains etc. of India, the products peculiar to each, the colour and complexion of various peoples, and the latter describing the winds, flowers and birds, and actions appropriate to various seasons.

This bare outline of the Kavya-mimamsa, so far as it is available and actually published, will make it clear that nearly the whole of its content falls, strictly speaking, outside the province of general Poetics, whose conventional topics have thus far been hardly touched upon. At the same time, some of the subjects dealt with by Rajasekhars have been referred to, if not elaborately treated of, by even orthodox writers like Vamana; and the unique evidence of the comparatively early work of Rajasekhara on this topic, written ostensibly in conformity with some old tradition, will go to support the hypothesis that sahitya or the art of poetry originally included in its comprehensive scope all such varied literary topics, until there was a gradual branching off of kavi-šiksā as an allied but separate discipline, and a limiting of the sastra itself to the discussion of more or less general principles. In themselves, however, these topics are extremely interesting and throw a great deal of light

on some of the literary aspects of classical Sanskrit poetry and its practice. They are made all the more delightful reading by Rājašekhara's concise but easy and picturesque style, especially as it is enriched by judiciously selected and varied illustrations, very unlike the conventional illustrations one meets with in an ordinary text-book on Poetics.



ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLUME I

- P. 17, fn 3. The inscription itself is written in prose having long compounds, and contains alliteration, repetition of sounds and other tricks in the approved style. The sphula, madhura, kānta and citra qualities may correspond to pratāda, mādhurya, kānti and other excellences discussed, e.g., by Dandin.
- P. 20, L 5. Subandhu refers (p. 146) also to irikhalabandha.
- P. 25. fn 2. Kohala is cited also by Manikyacandra (p. 65). A work, entitled Kohala-rahasya in 13 chapters, dealing with musical modes, is ascribed to the sage Kohala (described as the son of Bharata) who reveals the subject on being requested by Mataoga (Madras Trm 1, C, 787).
- P. 36, fn 23 and above p. 143, fn 13. An examination of some chapters of Abbinava's commentary on Bharata makes it clear that Abbinava discusses some readings and interpretation of some passages of Bharata's text, given by Lollata, Śańkuka and Udbhata; a fact which would make it most probable that they did in fact comment upon the text. Regarding Bhatta Nayaka the passages are not conclusive; but he might have been, for aught we know, also a commentator on Bharata.
- P. 30, L. 8. It is difficult to say what the terms sutrânubaddha and anuvanisya idokas mean. The first term may signify (i) verses connected with or following upon the sutras, or (ii) generally speaking, verses composed in the condensed form of a sutra. It is not clear whether these verses are Bharata's own or quoted by him from some unknown source. The term anavanisya ilokas may mean

literally 'verses handed down traditionally in the family' (i. e., from teacher to pupil in spiritual succession); but it may also be interpreted as 'verses connected with the same class of topics',

- P. 35, k 9. Vikramo Act iii; Mālavikā Act i. Kālidāsa refers to the eight dramatic rasas acknowledged by Bharata. Kane notes that in Harsa-carita iii, para 5, Bāņa refers to bharata-mārga-bhajana-gītam, and in ii 4 speaks of actors acting in the ārabhajī vrtti (discussed in Bharata xx 54f). Asvaghosa uses the terms hāva and bhāva (iv 12) in the sense they have in dramaturgic rasa-systems.
- P. 39. Māṇikyacandra says (p. 8) that the Hṛdaya-darpaṇa-kāra spoke of vyañṇanā-vyāṇāra as being essentially a case of subordination of sound and sense (nyagbhāvita-babdārtha-svarāṇatā); a statement which agrees literally with what Ruyyaka says (p. 9) regarding the view of Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka. The verse habda-prādhānyam is ascribed to Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka also by Māṇikyacandra (p. 4).
- P. 39, fn 2. Read this footnote along with the correction made in this volume, p. 192, fn 16. Abbinavagupta, in his "Locana p. 188, attributes a similar view to the Bhatta or Prabhakara school, which may have been the source of Govinda's mistaken statement that the Dirghavyapara-vadins are bhattamathpar vinal.
- P. 42, L. 3. Read "in a metrical form with a running prose-vrtta". This question has been discussed again in this volume on pp. 230f.
- P. 45, L 3. Anandavardhana quotes at p. 236 from Bhāmaha iii 27 (anonymously).
- P. 54, fn 1. Kane (HAL p. xx) notes that Nārāyaṇa in his commentary on Vṛṭṭṭa-raṭnūkara quotes (pp. 5-6) long passages from Bhāmaha which, if authentic, indicate that Bhāmaha wrote also on Metrics.
 - P. 68, U. 2 and II. Read 'dosas' for 'gunas'.
- P. 70, l. 22. Kane notes that in the commentary of Vadighanghala, entitled Srutinupilini, Kasyapa, Brahma-

datta and Nandisvāmin are spoken of as Dandin's predecessors.

P. 71, L 15. Add a further reference: Kautilya, Arthaśāstra I, 3, 1.

P. 79, I. 13. Bhattendurāja, on the other hand, apparently approved of the new doctrine of dhvani; for Abhinava ("Locana p. 2) tells us that this teacher of his explained to him the manigala-verse of Ananda's vetti in the light of the dhvani-theory. The only instance where the two Indurājas are confused or identified occurs in Samudrabandha p. 132; but this is no strong evidence.

P. St., fn r. One must also note that Vāmana v. 2. 9= Māgha i 25. The words yo bhartrpindatya cited as ungrammatical in v. 2. 28 occur in Pratijāā-yaugandharāyana iv 3; and the verse saracchoiānka-gaurena (cited in iv. 3 25) occurs in Svapnavāsava iv 7.

P. 84. Add in Bibliography of editions: "Text and translation of the last section of Vamana's work, by Cappeller, entitled Vamana's Stillegeln, Strassburg, 1880". Add also on p. 85: "A commentary by Sahadeva, quoted in the notes to the Gackwad ed. of the Kavra-mimanusi, p. 5".

P. 87, fn 2. Also Pratihārendurāja p. 11=Rudraţa viii 40; P p. 31=R viii 89; P p. 34=R viii 95; also Dhanika on iv 35=R xii 4.

P. 97, L. ro. Pathak (introd. to Meghadīta p. xiví) distinguishes our Vallabhadeva from Vallabhadeva, the grandfather of Kayyaṭa; for our Vallabha, who also commented on the four standard kāvyaṣ, quotes, according to Pathak, from Halāyudha and Kṣtrasvāmin, and therefore must be much later than what his identification with Kayyaṭa's grandfather would warrant. But the evidence does not seem to be conclusive, as there is nothing to show that these are cases of real borrowings, or that these late writers did not themselves borrow the passages in question from our Vallabha himself.

P. 99, l. 2. It is interesting that Nami quotes on ii 19 a Prakrit verse from one Harl, presumably a writer on Poetics, which mentions eight vettix (and not five of Rudrata).

P. 107, fn 2. One of these passages from *Locana on p. 123 would imply that the earlier commentator, the Candrikā-kāra, probably made a similar distinction between the Kārikākāra and the Vṛttikāra.

P. 110, l. 15. Rājašekhara, p. 15, in his only quotation from Ānanda, really cites a parikara-āloka of the vetti at p. 137. Kuntala, on the other hand, quoting the Prakrit verse tālā jāanati (Dhva" p. 62), which is Ānanda's own (from his lost Viņamabāṇa-tīlā), appears to designate Ānanda-vardhana as the Dhvanikāra (see my introd. to Vakrokti-fivita p. vii).

P. III. Sovani's hypothesis is further supported in a modified form by Kane (HAL pp. lx-lxi, lxiii-lxiv) but his arguments are hardly convincing. See the question discussed again in this volume above p. 175 fn 1, p. 178 fn 5.

P. 117, l. 16-18. See Pischel in ZDMG xxxix (1885) p. 315. Is it a commentary, entitled Dharmottama, on the (Pramana-) viniscaya (of Dharmakirti)?

P. 118. The Kāsya-kautuka is quoted by Māņikyacandra at p. 5.

P. 135. The Dašarūpaka-paddhati by Kuravirāma is not a commentary on Dhanaūjaya's Dašarūpaka, as Hultzsch's entry would imply. It is an independent work on dramaturgy consisting of 110 verses. See Madras Trm II, A, 820 (c),

P. 146, An inscription of Bhoja of Dhara is noticed in the Proceedings and Transactions of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, p. 319 (Tilakwada Copperplate of Bhoja dated in vikrama-samvat 1103).

P. 149. Ratnesvara appears to have flourished in the 14th century A. D.

P. 150. Jagaddhara's "likā is noticed also in Stein, Jammu Cat. p. 275.

P. 155, ll. 15-16. Mahimabhatta himself gives antaraslokas or antarūryā (besides saṃgraha-slokas which summarise a discussion and which may be his own) which add to the discussion and are probably adduced from external sources, indicating previous exposition of similar topics by other writers.

P. 156, IL 18-19. The commentary is published incomplete, breaking off in the midst of the second vimarka.

P. 160, IL 3-4. Māṇikyacandra (p. 304) states that the six pramāṇas and saṃbhava of Jaimini have been accepted by Bhoja as poetic figures but Mammaţa has not taken them as such, implying distinctly that Mammaţa came chronologically after Bhoja.

P. 162, I. 1. Read: "Peterson is incorrect in stating that Manikyacandra Suri" etc.; for Manikyacandra remarks on this verse: atha clyan grantho'nyenarabdho'parena samāpita iti dvi-khawlo'pi sangholanā-vaiād akhandāyate, sughalam hyalaksya-samdhi syād ityarthah (p. 304).

P. 167. Add in Bibliography: "(k) with Māṇikyacandra Sūri's "samheta, in Ānandāērama Series no. 89, Poona, 1921: also ed. Mysore Govt. Orient. Library, Mysore, nos. 58-60"; and make necessary additions on p. 170 under Māṇikyacandra.

P. 177, fn 1. A work, called Siddhanta-ratna-mala (a refutation of the donita view of Vedanta) is noticed in Madras Trm I, B, 362, and is said to have been composed by Srtvatsalanchana Sarman, son of Visaudhvajacarya.

P. 178, L.7. The Kānya-parikeā consists of five chapters which correspond in the following way to Mammata's work: (1) sabdartha-nirnaya = M 1-3, (ii) kānya-bheda = M 4-5, (iii) dosa-nirnaya = M 7, (iv) guna-nirūpana = M 8-9, (v) alankāra = M 10, With a few exceptions, it gives the kūrikās as well as the illustrations of Mammata with appropriate observations on them. See Aufrecht in ZDMG xlv (1891), p. 307.

Pp. 176-77. The date of Jayarama's Nyaya-siddhanta-

mālā is given as sampat 1750 = 1693 A. D. He is said to have been patronised by Rājā Rāmakṛṣṇa of Krishnagar (Bengal). See S. C. Vidyabhusan, Indian Logic, Calcutta, 1921, pp. 4771.

P. 187, L. 1. On Jagadiša Tarkālamkāra, see S. C. Vidyabhusan, op. cit. p. 469f.

P. 187, l. 13. Devanātha is described as the son of Govinda. One Devanātha appears to have been a logician of Bengal who upheld the views of Mammata against the adverse criticism of Visvanātha. See Madras Trm II, C, 1570 (extract): II, A, 819.

P. 194, I. 18. Māṇikyacandra's "saṃketa which was composed in 1160 A.D., quotes the Alaṃkāra-sarvasva of Ruyyaka, which should therefore have been written somewhat earlier than this date.

P. 196. The Sahrdaya-lila consists of four ullekhas:

(i) guna, describing the ten excellences (c. g. riipa, varya, prabhā etc.) of a woman, (ii) alamkāra, speaking of the ornaments of gold, pearls etc., unquents, flowers worn by a woman, (iii) jivita, dealing with youth which is the essence of womanly charm, and (iv) parihara, treating of the parapharnelia of beauty.

P. 227, fn. 3. Šingabhūpāla, however, unmistakably refers to our Vidyādhara when he says (p. 206): uthalādhipateḥ hṛṇgāra-rasdhimānine narasiṃhadevasya cittam anuvarta-mānena vidyādharepa kavinā etc. Trivedī (introd. p. xxiii) comes to the conclusion that Vidyādhara was patronised by Kesarī Narasiṃha 1282-1307, or by Pratāpa Narasiṃha 1307-1327 A. D.

P. 230. It is curious that Nārāyaņa, who describes himself as a descendant of our Kumārasvāmin, gives the genealogy of his ancestor thus in his commentary on Campūrāmāyaņa (Madras Catalogue, xxi, Kāvya, p. 8212):

Mallinātha→Kapardin→ {Mallinātha→Kumārasvāmin, He speaks of Peddubhaṭṭa→Kumārasvāmin, He

commentator on the Naisadha and as having been bathed in gold by Sarvajña (Śińgabhūpála?).

P. 230 Ratna-Fina. This commentary, as it appears from the colophon of a Ms of this work, noticed in Madras. Trm II, C, 1923, was composed by Tirumaläcärya, son of Rāmānujācārya of Sukavaṭa family and disciple of Vātsya Rāmānujācārya. He is said to have lived in Rāmatīrtha (near Koṭipallī in the Godávarī district).

P. 244. Šingabhūpāla. M. T. Narasimhiengar in his ed. of Subhūṣita-nīvī states that Šingama Nāyadu, our author was a contemporary of Praudha Devarāja of Vijayanagara (1422-1447); but P. R. Bhandarkar in his Note on Singa-bhūpūla (Proc. of the First Oriental Conference, Poona, vol. ii, 1916, p. 425) doubts the correctness of this date.

P. 244. Śińgabhūpāla also wrote a work, entitled Sangitasudhikara, which appears to have been a commentary on the Sangita-ratnikara of Śārugadeva.

P. 250. Kane (HAL p. cxviii) points out that as Bhānu's father Gaņešvara was a Maithila, he was very likely the Gaņešvara Mantrin, brother of Virešvara, whose son Caṇdešvara composed the Vivāda-ratuākara and weighed himself in gold in 1315 A.D. If this indentification is correct, it would support our approximation of Bhānu's date. The terms Gaṇanātha, Gaṇapāti and Gaṇešvara having been interchangeably employed, need not present any difficulty. A MS of Rata-tarangruš noticed in Madras Trm 11, A, 823 (b) calls Bhānudatta gaṇanātha-tanaya-maithila-bhānudatta.

P. 252. Rasika-ranjana comm. of Vrajarāja. It appears from Madras Cat. xx. Kāvya, p. 8008, that Vrajarāja wrote an independent poem, entitled Rasika-ranjana, in three stavakas, describing feminine attractions and charms.

P. 255. A tradition in Bengal gives tanwat 1550 = 1493
A. D. and tanwat 1625 = 1568 A. D. as the dates respectively of Rūpa Gosvāmin's birth and death. His Dāna-keli-kaumudī is dated in 1549 A. D. (Madras Catalogue, xxi, Kāvya, no. 12521, p. 8407).

P. 257. One of Kavicandra's known dates is 1661 A. D., because the Cikitsā-ratminal! is so dated, and it describes itself expressly as the work of Kavicandra of Datta-kula, Dtrghānka-nagara, son of Kavikarņapūra and grandson of Vidyāvišārada, and a vaidya of Sudhtra on the banks of the Ganges (the Hoogly?). It also mentions the names of his two sons as given here.

P. 260. Add Bibliography under Alambara-kaustubha; "Ed. with an anonymous commentary, and a gloss by Sivaprasada Bhattacarya Sahitya-sastri, Rajsahi (Varendra Research Society), Vol. I, 1923 (ch. i-v), in progress".

P. 273. Dharananda, author of Sudhā commentary, also wrote commentaries on the Anargha-rāghava (Madras Cat. xxi, Kāvya, no. 12444, p. 8355) and Mrchakatika (composed in 1814 A. D., ibid, no. 12625, p. 8475). In the last-named commentary, he gives his genealogy and an account of himself, from which we learn that he was the son of Rāmabala of Bharatapura and grandson of Thākura of Vasistha-gotra, and a worshipper of Hanumat and disciple of Paramānanda.

P. 278, In 1. There is a reference in Citramiquiquiakhaqqana to a matter to be dealt with in the midarianidan käraprakarapa (p. 101), which Jagannatha obviously contemplated writing. It is curious that in the same work (p. 12) Jagannatha says: vinesas tu udiharanidan kära-prakarane rasagangādharād avanyah, although the treatment of udāharana is wanting in the existing text of Rasagangādhara.

P. 284. Ratnašekhara Sūri composed his Kriyā-ratnasamucaya (ed. Jaina Yosovijaya Granthamālā Series) in samuat 1466=1410 A. D.

P. 286. Indrajit. Bühler mentions (ZDMG xlii p. 543) a work on Alamkara, called Rämeandra-candrikā by Indrajila (is it Indrajit?), the date of which is given as 1712 A. D.

P. 286. Kandalayārya. The author tells us that he lived in the court Veńkaţa-bhūpati, son of Soma-bhūpati (and Giryamāmbā), who was the son of Nallareddi of

Muşţipalli (also called Pākanāḍu) family and of Miţimillagotra. He resided in Boruvalli in Nadigadda country which lies between the Tungabhadrā and Kṛṣṇā. The work is in ten wllāsas, as follow: (i) upodghāta (ii) kāvyalakṣaṇa (iii) dhvani-prakaraṇa (iv) rasa-prakaraṇa (v) doṣaprakaraṇa (vi) guṇa-prakaraṇa (vii-ix) kāvya-viseṣa-prakaraṇa (x) nāyaka-prakaraṇa.

P. 289. Ragunātha-bhūpāliya. It was written in honour of the author's patron, whose name it bears in its title, after the manner of Vidyānātha, who is referred to as Vidyāpati in the introductory part. It consists of eight vilāsas, dealing with (1) nāyaka-guņa (ii) kāvya-svarūpa (iii) saņdakṣyakrama-vyaūgya (iv) asaņdakṣyakrama-vyaūgya (v) guņībhūta-vyaūgya (vi) šabdālaņkāra (vii) arthālaņkāra (viii) guņa.

P. 294. Ciranjtva's Kāvya-vilāta was composed in 1703

A. D. The author's genealogy, as above, is given by himself in his Vidvanmeda-tarangini. His grandfather Kāštnātha is said to have lived in Rādhāpura in Gauda country.

P. 298-99. Sāhitya-ratnikara, The ten tarangas of this work deal with (i) granthārambha (ii) vācaka-šabdārtha-vṛtti (iii) lakṣaṇā-sabdārtha-vṛtti (iv) vyañjaka-sabdārtha-vṛtti (v) guṇa (vi) šabdālamkāra (vii) arthālamkāra (viii) doṣa (ix) dhvani-bheda (x) rasa.

P. 299. Nanjarūja-yaiv-bhūņaņa. The alias of the author was Abhinava-Kālidāsa, and he describes himself as the friend of Abhinava-Bhavabhūti (alias Alūra Tirumala Kavi). The work is in seven ullāsas, dealing with (1) nāyaka (ii) kāvya-svarūpa (iii) dhvani (v) dosa-guņa (vi) candrakalā-kalyāņa (a short typical drama) (vii) alaukāra.

Pp. 307-8. Rajacūdāmaņi Dīkṣita. In his poem Rukmiņī-kalpāṇa (in 10 sargas) he states that he composed it when king Raghunātha (son of Acyutendra and grandson of Cinnadeva or Cinnacevva) was ruling at Tanjore; and his two dramas, Ānandarāghava and Kamalinī-kalahaṃsa were staged in the court of the same prince. The ten

ullāsas of his Kāvya-darpaņa deal with (r) kāvya-svarūpa (ii) šabdārtha (iii) vyangyārtha-svarūpa (iv-vi) kāvya-bheda (vii) doşa (viii) guņa (ix) šabdālaņkāra (x) arthālaņkāra.

P. 308. Ramacandra's Natya-darpana. For an account of this work, see Levi in JA, cciii, 1923 (Octobre-Décembre).

P. 309. Rāma Subrahmanya. A work, called Alamkārakāstra-vilāsa, is ascribed to him in Madras Trm II, C, 1802, 1805 (extracts). This work refers to the Sāhitya-darpana, and quotes (not correctly) Vidyānātha's Pratāparudriya. It must be a very late work. The author appears to have written also some philosophical works noticed in the Catalogue cited above.

P. 311. The Srigara-rasa-mandana of Vitthalesvara is not a work on Alamkara as mistakenly entered here, but really a lyric poem (mostly in imitation of Jayadeva), erotico-religious in character, dealing with the amours of of Krana. Ed. Bombay, samual 1975 (=1919 A. D).

P. 310-11. Vasanta-rūjīya Nātya-šāstra. See notice of a MS of this work in Madras Trm I, A, 295 (b), where the stanzas (missing in Burnell and IOC), giving the author's genealogy, state that Vasantarāja, who ruled over Kumāra-giri, was the son of Annapota and grandson of Vemabhūpati. Kāṭayāvema was the son of Kāṭayabhūpati by his wife Doddāmbā, who was the daughter of Vemabhūpati. For a discussion of his genealogy and time, see introd. to Pārvatī-parinaya in ed. Šrī Vāṇt Vilāsa Press, 1906.

P. 327, L. 17. Vāmana Bhaṭṭa Bāṇa is the real author of the work which bears the name of his patron. He also wrote the Pārvati-pariṇaya (usually ascribed to Bāṇa), the bhāṇa Śṛṅgūra-bhīṭṣṇa (ed. N. S. P.), and a Śabdaratna-nighaṇṭu, besides the prose Vemabhūṭāla-carita. For an account of the author and his time, see introd. to his two plays, ed. Śṛṭ Vāṇṭ Vilāsa Press.

P. 316. Venkaţācārya. The author describes himself as the disciple of his uncle Śrtnivāsācārya, and says that he flourished in the court of Venkaţe-nāyaka, son of Bahirt

Pāmi. Our Venkata may be the same as Bucci Venkațăcărya, author of Vedănta-kārikāvalt, and his uncle and preceptor Śrinivāsa was probably the author of /ijñāsā-darpaṇa.

P. 317. Alamkāra-cintāmani. This work is in five paricchedas, and was composed, as two verses added at the end indicate, on Sunday, the 7th day of the bright fortnight of Māgha in the year vibhava (7) kaka 1730.

P. 327, l. 17. The Alambara-mani-hara is published in the Mysore Govt. Oriental Series, nos. 56-58.

P. 342, I. 5. Read "successors" for "predecessors", and add the names of Vatsa and Kohala. See Nāṭya-šāstra xxxvii 24. Bharata himself refers to the opinions of "others" (e. g. pp. 48, 109).

P. 342, 1. 25. On the other hand, erotic theories were perhaps not unknown to Bharata; and where the themes are common to the two writers, there is considerable similarity of treatment, c. g., Bharata axiii 15f and Vätsyäyana vi. 5. 29f.

ADDITIONS AND CORRECTIONS TO VOLUME II

- P. 18, fn 36. Abhinava reads sukha-prayojyais chandobhih in the text, which is paraphrased by Hemacandra and Manikyacandra simply as sukha-habdurtham saukumäryam iti bharatah.
- P. 89, fn. Add in the last line: "also ZDMG, 1919, pp. 189f, where he deals with prativastispamā and dretānta".
- P. 233. L. z. Read 1. 2 as follows: "as he accepts the suggestion of rasa as the essence of poetry."

INDEX

Entries are confined to those passages which contain a substantive reference to, and not mere citation of, the persons, works or subjects indicated. The figures denote pages, and references to footnotes are marked with an asterisk. The following abbreviations are used : fig = poetic figure ; Agp = Agnipurāna; Anv = Anandavardhana; Abh = Abhinavagupta; Bh = Bharata; Bha = Bhamaha; Bh N = Bhatta Nāyaka ; Bhānu = Bhānudatta ; D = Dandin ; Dh = Dhanafijaya; Dhk = Dhvanikāra; Hc = Hemacandra; Ig = Jagannatha; Knt = Kuntala; Kt = Ksemendra; L=Lollata : Mmt = Mammata; Mkc = Manikyacandra; Mbb = Mahimabhatta; Rdt = Rudrata; Rk = Ruyyaka; Ud = Udbhata; Vg I = the older Vagbhata ; Vg II = the younger Vagbhata ; Vm = Vāmana ; Vis = Viśvanātha ; Vid = Vidyādhara ; Vin = Vidyanatha : Sobh = Singabhupala.

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ERRATA

To avoid the inconvenience of a needlessly lengthy errata, a limited number of obvious but unwelcome misprints is not marked here, as they can be corrected without much difficulty. They occur chiefly in connection with diacritical marks (some of which have been misplaced or have broken down entirely in printing), unfortunate transposition of letters or the heedless dropping or redundancy of a letter.

P. 18, L. 9 from bottom, Read 'Cf' for 'Of'

P. 21, fn, l. 3. Read 'Commemoration'

P. 48, I. 7. Delete the quotation-mark.

P. 61, L 21. Read 'Strikingness'; in the footnote (last but one line), read 'figures'.

P. 64, L. II. Supply 's' after 'atisaya'.

P. 79. L. 21. Read 'adhika' and 'virodha' for 'adhia' and 'vikrodha'

P. St. I. S. Delete 'of' before 'general principles'

P. 116. 4.29. Read 'guna'; in the footnote read 'Walter' for 'water'.

P. 141, 1, 22. Delete 'the'.

P. 154, fn, l, 2 from bottom. Read 'prekyasu.'

P. 175, fn, L. 2. Read 'convincingly'

P. 208, l. r. Read 'figures'

P. 233, 4, 12. Add 'that' after 'fact'

P. 234. 1, 4 Read 'on' for 'no'.

P. 294, I, 2. Read mathnus; tils for mathnusm; ti

P. 304, fn, I, I. Read 'Vidyanatha' for 'Vidyadhara'.

The folio-heading of ch. iii has been inadvertantly printed throughout as 'VAMANA AND DANDIN' for 'DANDIN' AND VAMANA'.



